Audio/Video Transport Working Group G. Hunt Internet-Draft Unaffiliated Intended status: Standards Track A. Clark Expires: December 14, 2012 Telchemy G. Zorn Network Zen C. Bi STTRI Q. Wu Huawei June 12, 2012 RTCP XR Report Block for Concealed Seconds metric Reporting draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-concsec-00.txt Abstract This document defines an RTCP XR Report Block that allows the reporting of Concealed Seconds metrics primarily for audio applications of RTP. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on December 14, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Concealed Seconds Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. RTCP and RTCP XR Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3. Performance Metrics Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.4. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Loss Concealment Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Report Block Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Definition of Fields in Concealed Seconds Metrics Block . 5 3. SDP Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. New RTCP XR Block Type value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. New RTCP XR SDP Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. Contact information for registrations . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1. draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-concsec-00 . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 2] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 1. Introduction 1.1. Concealed Seconds Block This draft defines a new block type to augment those defined in [RFC3611], for use primarily in audio applications of RTP. At any instant, the audio output at a receiver may be classified as either 'normal' or 'concealed'. 'Normal' refers to playout of audio payload received from the remote end, and also includes locally generated signals such as announcements, tones and comfort noise. Concealment refers to playout of locally-generated signals used to mask the impact of network impairments such as lost packets or to reduce the audibility of jitter buffer adaptations. The new block type provides metrics for concealment. Specifically, the first metric (Unimpaired Seconds) reports the number of whole seconds occupied only with normal playout of data which the receiver obtained from the sender's stream. The second metric (Concealed Seconds) reports the number of whole seconds during which the receiver played out any locally-generated media data. A third metric (Severely Concealed Seconds) reports the number of whole seconds during which the receiver played out locally-generated data for more than SCS Threshold (ms). The metric belongs to the class of transport-related terminal metrics defined in [MONARCH]. 1.2. RTCP and RTCP XR Reports The use of RTCP for reporting is defined in [RFC3550]. [RFC3611] defined an extensible structure for reporting using an RTCP Extended Report (XR). This draft defines a new Extended Report block that MUST be used as defined in [RFC3550] and [RFC3611]. 1.3. Performance Metrics Framework The Performance Metrics Framework [RFC6390] provides guidance on the definition and specification of performance metrics. The RTP Monitoring Architectures [MONARCH] provides guideline for reporting block format using RTCP XR. The Metrics Block described in this document are in accordance with the guidelines in [RFC6390] and [MONARCH]. 1.4. Applicability This metric is primarily applicable to audio applications of RTP. EDITOR'S NOTE: are there metrics for concealment of transport errors Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 3] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 for video? Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 4] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 2. Loss Concealment Block This sub-block provides a description of potentially audible impairments due to lost and discarded packets at the endpoint, expressed on a time basis analogous to a traditional PSTN T1/E1 errored seconds metric. The following metrics are based on successive one second intervals as declared by a local clock. This local clock does NOT need to be synchronized to any external time reference. The starting time of this clock is unspecified. Note that this implies that the same loss pattern could result in slightly different count values, depending on where the losses occur relative to the particular one-second demarcation points. For example, two loss events occurring 50ms apart could result in either one concealed second or two, depending on the particular 1000 ms boundaries used. The seconds in this sub-block are not necessarily calendar seconds. At the tail end of a call, periods of time of less than 1000ms shall be incorporated into these counts if they exceed 500ms and shall be disregarded if they are less than 500ms. 2.1. Report Block Structure Loss Concealment metrics block 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | BT=NLC | I |plc| rsv. | block length=4 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | SSRC of Source | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Unimpaired Seconds | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Concealed Seconds | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Severely Concealed Seconds | RESERVED | SCS Threshold | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 1: Report Block Structure 2.2. Definition of Fields in Concealed Seconds Metrics Block Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 5] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 Block type (BT): 8 bits A Concealed Seconds Metrics Report Block is identified by the constant NCS. [Note to RFC Editor: please replace NCS with the IANA provided RTCP XR block type for this block.] Interval Metric flag (I): 2 bit This field is used to indicate whether the Delay metrics are Sampled, Interval or Cumulative metrics, that is, whether the reported values applies to the most recent measurement interval duration between successive metrics reports (I=10) (the Interval Duration) or to the accumulation period characteristic of cumulative measurements (I=11) (the Cumulative Duration) or is a sampled instantaneous value (I=01) (Sampled Value). Packet Loss Concealment Method (plc): 2 bits This field is used to identify the packet loss concealment method in use at the receiver, according to the following code: bits 014-015 0 = silence insertion 1 = simple replay, no attenuation 2 = simple replay, with attenuation 3 = enhanced Other values reserved Reserved (resv): 4 bits These bits are reserved. They SHOULD be set to zero by senders and MUST be ignored by receivers. block length: 16 bits The length of this report block in 32-bit words, minus one. For the Delay block, the block length is equal to 4. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 6] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 SSRC of source: 32 bits As defined in Section 4.1 of [RFC3611]. Unimpaired Seconds: 32 bits A count of the number of unimpaired Seconds that have occurred. An unimpaired Second is defined as a continuous period of 1000ms during which no frame loss or discard due to late arrival has occurred. Every second in a call must be classified as either OK or Concealed. Normal playout of comfort noise or other silence concealment signal during periods of talker silence, if VAD is used, shall be counted as unimpaired seconds. If the measured value exceeds 0xFFFFFFFD, the value 0xFFFFFFFE SHOULD be reported to indicate an over-range measurement. If the measurement is unavailable, the value 0xFFFFFFFF SHOULD be reported. Concealed Seconds: 32 bits A count of the number of Concealed Seconds that have occurred. A Concealed Second is defined as a continuous period of 1000ms during which any frame loss or discard due to late arrival has occurred. Equivalently, a concealed second is one in which some Loss-type concealment has occurred. Buffer adjustment-type concealment SHALL not cause Concealed Seconds to be incremented, with the following exception. An implementation MAY cause Concealed Seconds to be incremented for 'emergency' buffer adjustments made during talkspurts. Loss-type concealment is reactive insertion or deletion of samples in the audio playout stream due to effective frame loss at the audio decoder. "Effective frame loss" is the event in which a frame of coded audio is simply not present at the audio decoder when required. In this case, substitute audio samples are generally formed, at the decoder or elsewhere, to reduce audible impairment. Buffer Adjustment-type concealment is proactive or controlled Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 7] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 insertion or deletion of samples in the audio playout stream due to jitter buffer adaptation, re-sizing or re-centering decisions within the endpoint. Because this insertion is controlled, rather than occurring randomly in response to losses, it is typically less audible than loss-type concealment. For example, jitter buffer adaptation events may be constrained to occur during periods of talker silence, in which case only silence duration is affected, or sophisticated time-stretching methods for insertion/deletion during favorable periods in active speech may be employed. For these reasons, buffer adjustment-type concealment MAY be exempted from inclusion in calculations of Concealed Seconds and Severely Concealed Seconds. . However, an implementation SHOULD include buffer-type concealment in counts of Concealed Seconds and Severely Concealed Seconds if the event occurs at an 'inopportune' moment, with an emergency or large, immediate adaptation during active speech, or for unsophisticated adaptation during speech without regard for the underlying signal, in which cases the assumption of low-audibility cannot hold. In other words, jitter buffer adaptation events which may be presumed to be audible SHOULD be included in Concealed Seconds and Severely Concealed Seconds counts. Concealment events which cannot be classified as Buffer Adjustment- type MUST be classified as Loss-type. For clarification, the count of Concealed Seconds MUST include the count of Severely Concealed Seconds. If the measured value exceeds 0xFFFFFFFD, the value 0xFFFFFFFE SHOULD be reported to indicate an over-range measurement. If the measurement is unavailable, the value 0xFFFFFFFF SHOULD be reported. Severely Concealed Seconds: 16 bits A count of the number of Severely Concealed Seconds. A Severely Concealed Second is defined as a non-overlapping period of 1000 ms during which the cumulative amount of time that has been subject to frame loss or discard due to late arrival, exceeds the SCS Threshold. If the measured value exceeds 0xFFFD, the value 0xFFFE SHOULD be reported to indicate an over-range measurement. If the measurement is unavailable, the value 0xFFFF SHOULD be reported. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 8] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 RESERVED: 8 bits These bits are reserved. They SHOULD be set to zero by senders and MUST be ignored by receivers. SCS Threshold: 8 bits The SCS Threshold defines the amount of time corresponding to lost or discarded frames that must occur within a one second period in order for the second to be classified as a Severely Concealed Second. This is expressed in milliseconds and hence can represent a range of 0.1 to 25.5 percent loss or discard. A default threshold of 50ms (5% effective frame loss per second) is suggested. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 9] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 3. SDP Signaling [RFC3611] defines the use of SDP (Session Description Protocol) [RFC4566] for signaling the use of XR blocks. XR blocks MAY be used without prior signaling. This section augments the SDP [RFC4566] attribute "rtcp-xr" defined in [RFC3611] by providing an additional value of "xr-format" to signal the use of the report block defined in this document. The SDP attribute for the block has an additional optional paremeter, "thresh", used to supply a value for the SCS Threshold parameter. If this parameter is present, the RTP system receiving the SDP SHOULD use this value for the current session. If the parameter is not present, the RTP system SHOULD use a locally configured value. rtcp-xr-attrib = "a=" "rtcp-xr" ":" [xr-format *(SP xr-format)] CRLF (defined in [RFC3611]) xr-format =/ xr-conc-sec-block xr-conc-sec-block = "conc-sec" ["=" thresh] thresh = 1*DIGIT ; threshold for SCS (ms) DIGIT = %x30-39 Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 10] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 4. IANA Considerations New block types for RTCP XR are subject to IANA registration. For general guidelines on IANA considerations for RTCP XR, refer to [RFC3611]. 4.1. New RTCP XR Block Type value This document assigns the block type value NJB in the IANA "RTCP XR Block Type Registry" to the "Concealed Seconds Metrics Block". [Note to RFC Editor: please replace NCS with the IANA provided RTCP XR block type for this block.] 4.2. New RTCP XR SDP Parameter This document also registers a new parameter "conc-sec" in the "RTCP XR SDP Parameters Registry". 4.3. Contact information for registrations The contact information for the registrations is: Alan Clark (alan.d.clark@telchemy.com) 2905 Premiere Parkway, Suite 280 Duluth, GA 30097 USA Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 11] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 5. Security Considerations It is believed that this proposed RTCP XR report block introduces no new security considerations beyond those described in [RFC3611]. This block does not provide per-packet statistics so the risk to confidentiality documented in Section 7, paragraph 3 of [RFC3611] does not apply. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 12] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 6. Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and contributions made by Bruce Adams, Philip Arden, Amit Arora, Bob Biskner, Kevin Connor, Claus Dahm, Randy Ethier, Roni Even, Jim Frauenthal, Albert Higashi, Tom Hock, Shane Holthaus, Paul Jones, Rajesh Kumar, Keith Lantz, Mohamed Mostafa, Amy Pendleton, Colin Perkins, Mike Ramalho, Ravi Raviraj, Albrecht Schwarz, Tom Taylor, and Hideaki Yamada. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 13] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", RFC 3550, July 2003. [RFC3611] Friedman, T., Caceres, R., and A. Clark, "RTP Control Protocol Extended Reports (RTCP XR)", November 2003. [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session Description Protocol", July 2006. 7.2. Informative References [MONARCH] Hunt, G., "Monitoring Architectures for RTP", ID draft-ietf-avtcore-monarch-04, August 2011. [RFC6390] Clark, A. and B. Claise, "Framework for Performance Metric Development", RFC 6390, October 2011. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 14] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 Appendix A. Change Log Note to the RFC-Editor: please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC. A.1. draft-ietf-xrblock-rtcp-xr-concsec-00 The following are the major changes to previous version : o Updated references. o Allocate two bits for interval metric flag and 32 bit for SSRC o Other editorial changes to get in line with MONARCH and MeasID draft. Hunt, et al. Expires December 14, 2012 [Page 15] Internet-Draft RTCP XR Concealed Seconds June 2012 Authors' Addresses Geoff Hunt Unaffiliated Email: r.geoff.hunt@gmail.com Alan Clark Telchemy Incorporated 2905 Premiere Parkway, Suite 280 Duluth, GA 30097 USA Email: alan.d.clark@telchemy.com Glen Zorn Network Zen 77/440 Soi Phoomjit, Rama IV Road Phra Khanong, Khlong Toie Bangkok 10110 Thailand Phone: +66 (0) 87 502 4274 Email: gwz@net-zen.net Claire Bi Shanghai Research Institure of China Telecom Corporation Limited No.1835,South Pudong Road Shanghai 200122 China Email: bijy@sttri.com.cn Qin Wu Huawei 101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 China Email: sunseawq@huawei.com Hunt, et al. 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