SPFBIS Working Group M. Kucherawy Internet-Draft Cloudmark Intended status: Informational April 18, 2012 Expires: October 20, 2012 Resolution of The SPF/Sender-ID Experiment draft-ietf-spfbis-experiment-04 Abstract In 2006 the IETF published a suite of protocol documents comprising SPF and Sender-ID, two proposed email authentication protocols. Because of interoperability concerns created by simultaneous use of the two protocols by a receiver, and some concerns with Sender-ID and compatibility with existing standards, the IESG required them to have Experimental status and invited the community to observe their deployments for a period of time, hoping convergence would be possible later. After six years, sufficient experience and evidence have been collected that the experiment thus created can be considered concluded, and a single protocol can be advanced. This memo presents those findings. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Evidence of Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. DNS Resource Record Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. The SUBMITTER SMTP Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Evidence of Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Experiences Developing SPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 1. Introduction In April 2006, the IETF published the [SPF] and Sender-ID email authentication protocols, the latter consisting of three documents ([SUBMITTER], [SENDER-ID], and [PRA]). Both of these enable one to publish via the Domain Name System a policy declaring which mail servers were authorized to send email on behalf of a specific domain name. The two protocols made use of this policy statement and some specific (but different) logic to evaluate whether or not the email client sending or relaying a message was authorized to do so. Due to the absence of consensus behind one or the other, and because Sender-ID supported use of the same policy statement defined by SPF, the IESG at the time was concerned that an implementation of Sender-ID might erroneously apply that statement to a message and, depending on selected recipient actions, could improperly interfere with message delivery. As a result, the IESG required the publication of all of these documents as Experimental, and requested that the community observe deployment and operation of the protocols over a period of two years from publication in order to determine a reasonable path forward. (For further details about the IESG's concern, see the IESG Note prepended to all of those documents.) Accordingly, this memo resolves the experiment by presenting evidence regarding both deployment and comparative effect of the two protocols. At the end it presents conclusions based on the data collected. It is important to note that this memo makes no direct technical comparison of the two protocols in terms of correctness, weaknesses, or use case coverage. The email community at large has already done that. Rather, the analysis presented here merely observes what has been deployed and supported in the time since the protocols were published, and draws conclusions based on those observations. 2. Evidence of Deployment This section presents the collected research done to determine what parts of the two protocol suites are in general use, as well as related issues like DNS support. 2.1. DNS Resource Record Types Two large-scale DNS surveys were run that looked for the two supported kinds of resource records (RR) that can contain SPF policy statements. Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 DNS Survey #1 +------------------+-----------+-------+ | Domains queried | 1,000,000 | - | | TXT replies | 397,511 | 39.8% | | SPF replies | 6,627 | <0.1% | | SPF+TXT replies | 6,603 | <0.1% | | spf2.0/* replies | 5,291 | <0.1% | +------------------+-----------+-------+ TXT replies are DNS RRtype 16; SPF replies are DNS RRtype 99. The "spf2.0/*" replies are those replies whose payload started with the string "spf2.0/", which are express requests for Sender-ID processing. DNS Survey #2 +------------------+-----------+-------+ | Domains queried | 259,918 | - | | TXT replies | 142,640 | 54.9% | | SPF replies | 2,727 | 1.0% | | SPF+TXT replies | 2,554 | <0.1% | | spf2.0/* replies | 6,972 | 2.7% | +------------------+-----------+-------+ During this second survey, some domains were observed to provide immediate answers for type 16 queries, but would time out waiting for replies to type 99 queries. For example, it was observed that 4,179 (over 1.6%) distinct domains in the survey returned a result of some kind (a record or an error) for the TXT query in time N, while the SPF query ultimately failed after at least time 4N. DNS Survey #3 +------------------+-----------+-------+ | Domains queried | 100,000 | - | | TXT replies | 46,221 | 46.2% | | SPF replies | 954 | <0.1% | | SPF+TXT replies | 1,383 | 1.4% | +------------------+-----------+-------+ A survey was done of queries for type 16 and type 99 records by observing nameserver logs. Only a few queries were ever received for type 99 records, and those almost exclusively came from one large email service provider that queried for both types. The vast majority of other querying agents only ever requested type 16. Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 2.2. Implementations It is likely impossible to determine from a survey which MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents) have SPF and/or Sender-ID checking enabled at message ingress since it does not appear, for example, in the reply to the EHLO command from extended [SMTP]. We therefore rely on evidence found via web searches, and observed the following: o A web site [SID-IMPL] dedicated to highlighting Sender-ID implementations last updated in late 2007 listed 13 commercial implementations, which we assume means they implement the PRA checks. At least one of them is known no longer to be supported by its vendor. There were no free open source implementations listed. o The [OPENSPF] web site maintains a list of known implementations of SPF. At the time of this memo's writing it listed six libraries, 22 MTAs with built-in SPF implementations, and numerous patches for MTAs and mail clients. The set included a mix of commercial and free open source implementations. 2.3. The SUBMITTER SMTP Extension In a review of numerous MTAs in current or recent use, two (Santronics WinServer and McAfee MxLogic) were found to contain implementations of the SMTP SUBMITTER extension as part of the MTA service, which could act as an enabler to Sender-ID. An unknown number of clients implement SUBMITTER. Although there is substantial activity showing its use in MTA logs, it is not possible to determine whether they are multiple instances of the same client, or separate client implementations. An active survey was done of a large number of running and publicly reachable MTAs. Fewer than 4.5% of these advertised the SUBMITTER extension. Based on the SMTP banner presented upon connection, the entire set of SUBMITTER-enabled MTAs consisted of the two found during the review (above) and a third whose identity could not be positively determined. The vast majority of the MTAs advertising SUBMITTER were different instances of one MTA. That MTA was a mail filtering service, which reports that about 11% of all observed SMTP sessions involve clients that make use of SUBMITTER. Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 3. Evidence of Differences Separate surveys compared the cases where the PRA (used by Sender-ID) and the RFC5321.MailFrom address (used by SPF) differed. The results of these tests showed that at least 50% of the time the two addresses were the same, but beyond that the percentage varied substantially from one sampling location to the next due to the nature of the mail streams they each receive. Despite this, one set of specific data collected by a working group contributor shows that in more than 95% of cases, Sender-ID and SPF reach the same conclusion about a message, meaning either both protocols return a "pass" result or both return a "fail" result. The data set yielding this response could not further characterize the cases in which the answers differed. 4. Analysis Given the six years that have passed since the publication of the experimental RFCs, and the evidence reported in the earlier sections of this document, the following analysis appears to be supported: 1. There has not been substantial adoption of the type 99 (SPF) DNS resource record. In all large-scale surveys performed for this work, less than 2% of responding domains published type 99 records, and almost no clients requested them. 2. Of the records retrieved, fewer than 3% requested processing of messages using the PRA algorithm, which was an essential part of Sender-ID. 3. Although the two mechanisms often used different email addresses as the subject being evaluated, no data collected showed any substantial operational benefit (e.g., cheaper processing, improved accuracy) to using Sender-ID over SPF. 4. A review of known implementations shows significant support for both protocols, though there were more implementations in support of SPF than of Sender-ID. Further, the SPF implementations showed better upkeep and current interest than the Sender-ID implemenations. 5. A survey of running MTAs shows fewer than 5% of them advertised the SUBMITTER extension, which is a Sender-ID enabler. Only three implementations of it were found. Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 6. Although they may be marginal, there remain obstacles to deployment of protocols that use DNS RRtypes other than the most common ones, including firewalls and DNS servers that block or discard requests for unknown types. Further, few if any web- based DNS configuration tools offer support for type 99 records. 5. Conclusions It is standard procedure within the IETF to document as standard those protocols and practices that have come into sufficient common use as to become part of the basic infrastructure. In light of the this and the analysis in the previous section, the working group recommends to the IESG the following: 1. The experiment comprising the series of RFCs defining the SUBMITTER SMTP extension, the Sender-ID mechanism, the Purported Responsible address algorithm, and SPF, should be considered concluded. 2. The absence of significant adoption of the type 99 DNS resource record, the [SUBMITTER] extension, [SENDER-ID], and [PRA], indicates that they are de facto obsolete. 3. Continued widespread use of [SPF] indicates it is worthy of consideration for the Standards Track. Appendix A is offered as a cautionary review of problems that affected the process of developing SPF and Sender-ID in terms of their use of the DNS. 6. IANA Considerations This memo presents no actions for IANA. [RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication.] 7. Security Considerations This memo contains information for the community, akin to an implementation report, and does not introduce any new security concerns. Its implications could, in fact, resolve some. Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 8. Informative References [OPENSPF] "Sender Policy Framework: Project Overview", . [PRA] Lyon, J., "Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail Messages", RFC 4407, April 2006. [SENDER-ID] Lyon, J. and M. Wong, "Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail", RFC 4406, April 2006. [SID-IMPL] "Sender ID Framework Industry Support and Solutions", October 2007, . [SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, October 2008. [SPF] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1", RFC 4408, April 2006. [SUBMITTER] Allman, E. and H. Katz, "SMTP Service Extension for Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail Message", RFC 4405, April 2006. Appendix A. Experiences Developing SPF SPF was originally developed by a community of interested developers outside the IETF, with the intent of bringing it to the IETF for standardization after it had become relatively mature and ready for the rigors of the RFC publication process. At the time of SPF's initial development, the prospect of getting a DNS resource record (RR) type allocated for SPF was not seriously considered, partly because doing so had high barriers to entry. As a result, at the time it was brought to the IETF for development and publication, there was already a substantial and growing installed base that had SPF running using TXT RRs. Eventually the application was made for the new RR type as a result of pressure from the DNS experts in the community, who insisted upon doing so as the preferred path toward using the DNS for storing such things as policy data. Later, after type 99 was assigned (long after IESG approval of the Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 document, in fact), a plan was put into place to effect a gradual transition to using type 99 instead of using type 16. This plan failed to take effect for four primary reasons: 1. there was hesitation to make the transition because existing nameservers (and, in fact, DNS-aware firewalls) would drop or reject requests for unknown RR types (see Section 2 for evidence of this), which means successful rollout of a new RR type is contingent upon widespread adoption of updated nameservers and resolver functions; 2. many DNS provisioning tools (e.g., web interfaces to controlling DNS zone data) were, and still are, typically lethargic about adding support for new RR types; 3. the substantial deployed base was already using type 16, and it was working just fine, leading to inertia; 4. [SPF] itself included a faulty transition plan, likely because of the late addition of a requirement to develop one: It said a server SHOULD publish both types and MUST publish at least one, while a client can query either or both, which means both can claim to be fully compliant while failing utterly to interoperate. It is likely that this will happen again if the bar to creating new RR types even for experimental development purposes is not lowered, and handling of unknown RR types in software becomes generally more graceful. Also important in this regard is encouragement of support for new RR types in DNS record provisioning tools. There are DNS experts within the community that will undoubtedly point to DNS servers and firewalls that mistreat queries for unknown RR types, and claim they are broken, as a way of answering this concern. This is undoubtedly correct, but the reality is that they are among us and likely will be for some time, and this needs to be considered as new protocols and IETF procedures are developed. Appendix B. Acknowledgments The following provided operational data that contributed to the evidence presented above: Cisco: contributed data about observed Sender-ID and SPF records in the DNS for a large number of domains Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SPF/Sender-ID Experiment April 2012 Hotmail: contributed data about the difference between RFC5321.MailFrom and RFC5322.From domains across large mail volumes, and a survey of DNS queries observed in response to outgoing mail traffic John Levine: conducted a survey of DNS server logs to evaluate SPF- related query traffic McAfee: provided details about their SUBMITTER implementation and usage statistics Santronics: contributed data about the use of the SUBMITTER extension in aggregate SMTP client traffic The Trusted Domain Project: contributed data about the difference between Sender-ID and SPF results, conducted one of the two detailed TXT/SPF record surveys including collecting timing data, and conducted the MTA SUBMITTER survey The author would also like to thank the following for their contributions to the development of the text in this memo: Dave Crocker, Scott Kitterman, Barry Leiba, John Leslie, John Levine, Hector Santos, and Alessandro Vesely. Author's Address Murray S. Kucherawy Cloudmark 128 King St., 2nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94107 USA Phone: +1 415 946 3800 Email: msk@cloudmark.com Kucherawy Expires October 20, 2012 [Page 10]