SIP WG C. Jennings Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Expires: November 25, 2002 J. Peterson NeuStar, Inc. M. Watson Nortel Networks May 27, 2002 Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks draft-ietf-sip-asserted-identity-00 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2002. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document describes private extensions to SIP that enable a network of trusted SIP servers to assert the identity of end users or end systems, and the application of existing privacy mechanisms to the identity problem. The use of these extensions is only applicable inside an administrative domain with previously agreed-upon policies for generation, transport and usage of such information. This document does NOT offer a general privacy or identity model suitable Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 for inter-domain use, or use in the Internet at large. Table of Contents 1. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Proxy Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Hints for Multiple Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Requesting Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. User Agent Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1 The P-Asserted-Identity Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2 The "id" Privacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1 Network Asserted Identity passed to trusted gateway . . . . 9 10.2 Network Asserted Identity Withheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11. Example of Spec(T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11.1 Protocol requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11.2 Authentication requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.3 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.4 Scope of Trust Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.5 Implicit handling when no Privacy header is present . . . . 13 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.1 Registration of "P-Asserted-Identity" SIP header field . . . 14 13.2 Registration of "id" privacy type for SIP Privacy header . . 14 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 1. Applicability Statement This document describes private extensions to SIP [1] that enable a network of trusted SIP servers to assert the identity of end users or end systems, and to convey indications of end-user requested privacy. The use of these extensions is only applicable inside a 'Trust Domain' as defined in Short term requirements for Network Asserted Identity [5]. Nodes in such a Trust Domain are explicitly trusted by its users and end-systems to publicly assert the identity of each party, and to be responsible for withholding that identity outside of the Trust Domain when privacy is requested. The means by which the network determines the identity to assert is outside the scope of this document (though it commonly entails some form of authentication). A key requirement of [5] is that the behavior of all nodes within a given Trust Domain 'T' is known to comply to a certain set of specifications known as 'Spec(T)'. Spec(T) MUST specify behavior for the following: 1. The manner in which users are authenticated 2. The mechanisms used to secure the communication among nodes within the Trust Domain 3. The mechanisms used to secure the communication between UAs and nodes within the Trust Domain 4. The manner used to determine which hosts are part of the Trust Domain 5. The default privacy handling when no Privacy header field is present 6. That nodes in the Trust Domain are compliant to SIP [1] 7. That nodes in the Trust Domain are compliant to this document 8. Privacy handling for identity as described in Section 7. An example of a suitable Spec(T) is shown in Section 11. This document does NOT offer a general privacy or identity model suitable for inter-domain use or use in the Internet at large. Its assumptions about the trust relationship between the user and the network may not apply in many applications. For example, these extensions do not accommodate a model whereby end users can independently assert their identity by use of the extensions defined Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 here. Furthermore, since the asserted identities are not cryptographically certified, they are subject to forgery, replay, and falsification in any architecture that does not meet the requirements of [5]. The asserted identities also lack an indication of who specifically is asserting the identity, and so it must be assumed that the Trust Domain is asserting the identity. Therefore, the information is only meaningful when securely received from a node known to be a member of the Trust Domain. Despite these limitations, there are sufficiently useful specialized deployments that meet the assumptions described above, and can accept the limitations that result, to warrant informational publication of this mechanism. An example deployment would be a closed network which emulates a traditional circuit switched telephone network. 2. Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [3]. Throughout this document requirements for or references to proxy servers or proxy behavior apply similarly to other intermediaries within a Trust Domain (ex: B2BUAs). The terms Identity, Network Asserted Identity and Trust Domain in this document have meanings as defined in [5]. 3. Introduction Various providers offering a telephony service over IP networks have selected SIP as a call establishment protocol. Their environments require a way for trusted network elements operated by the service providers (for example SIP proxy servers) to communicate the identity of the subscribers to such a service, yet also need to withhold this information from entities that are not trusted when necessary. Such networks typically assume some level of transitive trust amongst providers and the devices they operate. These networks need to support certain traditional telephony services and meet basic regulatory and public safety requirements. These include Calling Identity Delivery services, Calling Identity Delivery Blocking, and the ability to trace the originator of a call. While baseline SIP can support each of these services independently, certain combinations cannot be supported without the extensions described in this document. For example, a caller that wants to Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 maintain privacy and consequently provides limited information in the SIP From header field will not be identifiable by recipients of the call unless they rely on some other means to discovery the identity of the caller. Masking identity information at the originating user agent will prevent certain services, e.g., call trace, from working in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) or being performed at intermediaries not privy to the authenticated identity of the user. This document attempts to address this requirement using a very limited, simple mechanism, based on requirements in [5]. This work is derived from a previous attempt, [6], to solve several problems related to privacy and identity in Trust Domains . A more comprehensive mechanism, [7] which uses cryptography to address this problem is the subject of current study by the SIP working group. Providing privacy in a SIP network is more complicated than in the PSTN. In SIP networks, the participants in a session typically are normally able to exchange IP traffic directly without involving any SIP service provider. The IP addresses used for these sessions may themselves reveal private information. A general purpose mechanism for providing privacy in a SIP environment is discussed in [2]. This document applies that privacy mechanism to the problem of network asserted identity. 4. Overview The mechanism proposed in this document relies on a new header field called 'P-Asserted-Identity' that contains a URI (commonly a SIP URI) and an optional display-name, for example: P-Asserted-Identity: "Cullen Jennings" A proxy server which handles a message can, after authenticating the originating user in some way (for example: Digest authentication), insert such a P-Asserted-Identity header field into the message and forward it to other trusted proxies. A proxy that is about to forward a message to a proxy server or UA that it does not trust MUST remove all the P-Asserted-Identity header field values if the user requested that this information be kept private. Users can request this type of privacy as described in Section 7. The formal syntax for the P-Asserted-Identity header is presented in Section 9. Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 5. Proxy Behavior A proxy in a Trust Domain can receive a message from a node that it trusts, or a node that it does not trust. When a proxy receives a message from a node it does not trust, the proxy MUST authenticate the originator of the message, and use the identity which results from this authentication to insert an appropriate P-Asserted-Identity header field into the message. If the proxy receives a message (request or response) from a node that it trusts, it can use the information in the P-Asserted-Identity header field, if any, as if it had authenticated the user itself. The proxy MAY add a P-Asserted-Identity header field with either a single SIP URI or a single SIPS URI. Likewise, the proxy MAY add a P-Asserted-Identity header field with a single tel URL. When a proxy forwards a message to another node, it must first determine if it trusts that node or not. If it trusts the node, the proxy does not remove any P-Asserted-Identity header fields that it generated itself, or that it received from a trusted source. If it does not trust the element, then the proxy MUST examine the Privacy header field (if present) to determine if the user requested that asserted identity information be kept private. 6. Hints for Multiple Identities If an P-Asserted-Identity header is already present in the message that a proxy receives from an entity that it does not trust, the proxy MAY use this information as a hint suggesting which of multiple valid identities for the authenticated user should be asserted. If such a hint does not correspond to any valid identity known to the proxy for that user, the proxy MUST not forward the user-provided P- Asserted-Identity header. In this case, the proxy can add an P- Asserted-Identity header of its own construction, or it can reject the request (for example, with a 403 Forbidden). A user agent only sends a hint to proxy server in a Trust Domain; user agents MUST NOT populate the P-Asserted-Identity header in a message that is not sent directly to a proxy that is trusted by the user agent. Were a user agent to send a message containing a P- Asserted-Identity header to a node outside a Trust Domain, then the hinted identity might not be managed appropriately by the network, which could have negative ramifications for privacy. 7. Requesting Privacy Parties who wish to request the removal of P-Asserted-Identity header Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 fields before they are transmitted to an element that is not trusted may add the "id" privacy token to the Privacy header field. If this token is present, proxies MUST remove all the P-Asserted-Identity header fields before forwarding messages to elements that are not trusted. If the Privacy header field value is set to "none" then the proxy MUST NOT remove the P-Asserted-Identity header fields. If there is no Privacy header field, the proxy MAY include the P- Asserted-Identity header field or it MAY remove it. This decision is a policy matter of the Trust Domain and MUST be specified in Spec(T). It is RECOMMENDED that unless local privacy policies prevent it, the P-Asserted-Identity header fields SHOULD NOT be removed, since removal may cause services based on Asserted Identity to fail. However, it should be noted that unless all users of the Trust Domain have access to appropriate privacy services, forwarding of the P- Asserted-Identity may result in disclosure of information which was not requested by and could not be prevented by the user. It is therefore STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that all users have access to privacy services as described in this document. Formal specification of the "id" Privacy header priv-value is described in Section 9.2. Some general guidelines for when users require privacy are given in [2]. Users will typically want to request "id" privacy when they are challenged for authentication. If multiple P-Asserted-Identity headers field values are present in a message, and privacy of the P-Asserted-Identity header field is requested, then all instances of the header field values MUST be removed. 8. User Agent Server Behavior Typically, a user agent renders the value of a P-Asserted-Identity header field that it receives to its user. It may consider the identity provided by a Trust Domain to be privileged, or intrinsically more trustworthy than the From header field of a request. However, any specific behavior is specific to implementations or services. This document also does not mandate any user agent handling for multiple P-Asserted-Identity header field values that happen to appear in a message (such as a SIP URI alongside a tel URL). However, if a User Agent Server receives a message from a previous element that it does not trust, it MUST NOT use the P-Asserted- Identity header field in any way. If a UA is part of the Trust Domain from which it received a message Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 containing a P-Asserted-Identity header field, then it can use the value freely but it MUST ensure that it does not forward the information to any element that is not part of the Trust Domain. If a UA is not part of the Trust Domain from which it received a message containing a P-Asserted-Identity header field, then it can assume this information does not need to be kept private. 9. Formal Syntax The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as described in RFC-2234 [4]. 9.1 The P-Asserted-Identity Header The P-Asserted-Identity header field is used among trusted SIP entities (typically intermediaries) to carry the identity of the user sending a SIP message as it was verified by authentication. PAssertedID = "P-Asserted-Identity" HCOLON ( name-addr / addr-spec ) A P-Asserted-Identity header field value MUST consist of exactly one name-addr or addr-spec. There may be zero or one P-Asserted-Identity headers with either a SIP or SIPS URI and in addition there may be zero or one P-Asserted-Identity headers with a tel URL. It is worth noting that proxies can (and will) add and remove this header field. This document adds the following entry to Table 2 of [1]: Header field where proxy ACK BYE CAN INV OPT REG ------------ ----- ----- --- --- --- --- --- --- P-Asserted-Identity adr - o - o o - SUB NOT REF INF UPD PRA --- --- --- --- --- --- o o o - - - 9.2 The "id" Privacy Type This specification adds a new privacy type ("priv-value") to the Privacy header, defined in [2]. The presence of this privacy type in a Privacy header field indicates that the user would like the Network Asserted Identity to be kept private with respect to SIP entities outside the Trust Domain or trust federation with which the user authenticated. Note that a user requesting multiple types of privacy MUST include all of the requested privacy types in its Privacy header Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 field value. priv-value = "id" Example: Privacy: id 10. Examples 10.1 Network Asserted Identity passed to trusted gateway In this example, proxy.cisco.com creates a P-Asserted-Identity header field from an identity it discovered from SIP Digest authentication. It forwards this information to a trusted proxy which forwards it to a trusted gateway. Note that these examples consist of partial SIP messages that illustrate only those headers relevant to the authenticated identity problem. Via header branch parameters are omitted for clarity. * F1 useragent.cisco.com -> proxy.cisco.com INVITE sip:+14085551212@cisco.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 1 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Privacy: id * F2 proxy.cisco.com -> useragent.cisco.com SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authorization Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 1 INVITE Proxy-Authenticate: .... realm="sip.cisco.com" * F3 useragent.cisco.com -> proxy.cisco.com INVITE sip:+14085551212@cisco.com SIP/2.0 Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Privacy: id Proxy-Authorization: .... realm="sip.cisco.com" user="fluffy" * F4 proxy.cisco.com -> proxy.pstn.net (trusted) INVITE sip:+14085551212@proxy.pstn.net SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 69 P-Asserted-Identity: "Cullen Jennings" P-Asserted-Identity: tel:+14085264000 Privacy: id * F5 proxy.pstn.net -> gw.pstn.net (trusted) INVITE sip:+14085551212@gw.pstn.net SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.pstn.net To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 68 P-Asserted-Identity: "Cullen Jennings" P-Asserted-Identity: tel:+14085264000 Privacy: id 10.2 Network Asserted Identity Withheld In this example, the User Agent sends an INVITE to the first proxy, which authenticates this with SIP Digest. The first proxy creates a P-Asserted-Identity header field and forwards it to a trusted proxy (outbound.cisco.com). The next proxy removes the P-Asserted-Identity header field, and the request for Privacy before forwarding this Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 10] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 request onward to the biloxi.com proxy server which it does not trust. * F1 useragent.cisco.com -> proxy.cisco.com INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 1 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Privacy: id * F2 proxy.cisco.com -> useragent.cisco.com SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authorization Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 1 INVITE Proxy-Authenticate: .... realm="cisco.com" * F3 useragent.cisco.com -> proxy.cisco.com INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Privacy: id Proxy-Authorization: .... realm="cisco.com" user="fluffy" * F4 proxy.cisco.com -> outbound.cisco.com (trusted) INVITE sip:bob@biloxi SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 69 Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 11] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 P-Asserted-Identity: "Cullen Jennings" Privacy: id * F5 outbound.cisco.com -> proxy.biloxi.com (not trusted) INVITE sip:bob@biloxi SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP outbound.cisco.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 68 Privacy: id * F6 proxy.biloxi.com -> bobster.biloxi.com INVITE sip:bob@bobster.biloxi.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP useragent.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP outbound.cisco.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP proxy.biloxi.com To: From: "Anonymous" ;tag=9802748 Call-ID: 245780247857024504 CSeq: 2 INVITE Max-Forwards: 67 Privacy: id 11. Example of Spec(T) The integrity of the mechanism described in this document relies on one node knowing (through configuration) that all of the nodes in a Trust Domain will behave in a predetermined way. This requires the predetermined behavior to be clearly defined and for all nodes in the Trust Domain to be compliant. The specification set that all nodes in a Trust Domain T must comply with is termed 'Spec(T)'. The remainder of this section presents an example Spec(T), which is not normative in any way. 11.1 Protocol requirements The following specifications MUST be supported: Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 12] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 1. SIP [1] 2. This document. 11.2 Authentication requirements Users MUST be authenticated using SIP Digest Authentication. 11.3 Security requirements Connections between nodes within the Trust Domain and between UAs and nodes in the Trust Domain MUST use TLS using a cipher suite of RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA1. Mutual authentication between nodes in the trust domain MUST be performed and confidentiality MUST be negotiated. 11.4 Scope of Trust Domain The Trust Domain specified in this agreement consists of hosts which posses a valid certificate which is a) signed by examplerootca.org; b) whose subjectAltName ends with one of the following domain names: trusted.div1.carrier-a.net, trusted.div2.carrier-a.net, sip.carrier- b.com; and c) whose domain name corresponds to the hostname in the subjectAltName in the certificate. 11.5 Implicit handling when no Privacy header is present The elements in the trust domain must support the 'id' privacy service therefore absence of a Privacy header can be assumed to indicate that the user is not requesting any privacy. If no Privacy header field is present in a request, elements in this Trust Domain MUST act as if no privacy is requested. 12. Security Considerations The mechanism provided in this document is a partial consideration of the problem of identity and privacy in SIP. For example, these mechanisms provide no means by which end users can securely share identity information end-to-end without a trusted service provider. Identity information which the user designates as 'private' can be inspected by any intermediaries participating in the Trust Domain. This information is secured by transitive trust, which is only as reliable as the weakest link in the chain of trust. When a trusted entity sends a message to any destination with that party's identity in a P-Asserted-Identity header field, the entity MUST take precautions to protect the identity information from Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 13] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 eavesdropping and interception to protect the confidentiality and integrity of that identity information. The use of transport or network layer hop-by-hop security mechanisms, such as TLS or IPSec with appropriate cipher suites, can satisfy this requirement. 13. IANA Considerations 13.1 Registration of "P-Asserted-Identity" SIP header field This document defines a new private SIP header field, "P-Asserted- Identity". As recommended by the policy of the Transport Area, this header should be registered by the IANA in the SIP header registry, using the RFC number of this document as its reference. Name of Header: P-Asserted-Identity Short form: none Registrant: Cullen Jennings fluffy@cisco.com Normative description: Section 9.1 of this document 13.2 Registration of "id" privacy type for SIP Privacy header Name of privacy type: id Short Description: Privacy requested for Third-Party Asserted Identity Registrant: Cullen Jennings fluffy@cisco.com Normative description: Section 9.2 of this document 14. Acknowledgements Thanks to Bill Marshall and Flemming Andreason[6], Mark Watson[5], and Jon Peterson[7] for authoring drafts which represent the bulk of the text making up this document. Thanks to many people for useful comments including Rohan Mahy and Paul Kyzivat. Normative References [1] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "SIP: Session Initiation Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 14] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 Protocol", draft-ietf-sip-rfc2543bis-09 (work in progress), February 2002. [2] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-sip-privacy-general-00 (work in progress), May 2002. [3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [4] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. [5] Watson, M., "Short term requirements for Network Asserted Identity", draft-ietf-sipping-nai-reqs-01 (work in progress), May 2002. Informational References [6] Andreasen, F., "SIP Extensions for Network-Asserted Caller Identity and Privacy within Trusted Networks", draft-ietf-sip- privacy-04 (work in progress), March 2002. [7] Peterson, J., "Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft- peterson-sip-identity-00 (work in progress), April 2002. Authors' Addresses Cullen Jennings Cisco Systems 170 West Tasman Drive MS: SJC-21/3 San Jose, CA 95134 USA Phone: +1 408 527-9132 EMail: fluffy@cisco.com Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 15] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 Jon Peterson NeuStar, Inc. 1800 Sutter Street, Suite 570 Concord, CA 94520 USA Phone: +1 925/363-8720 EMail: Jon.Peterson@NeuStar.biz Mark Watson Nortel Networks Maidenhead Office Park (Bray House) Westacott Way Maidenhead, Berkshire England Phone: +44 (0)1628-434456 EMail: mwatson@nortelnetworks.com Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 16] Internet-Draft SIP Asserted Identity May 2002 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Jennings, et al. Expires November 25, 2002 [Page 17]