Network Working Group S. Weiler Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track A. Sonalker Expires: August 29, 2015 Battelle Memorial Institute R. Austein Dragon Research Labs February 25, 2015 A Publication Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) draft-ietf-sidr-publication-06 Abstract This document defines a protocol for publishing Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) objects. Even though the RPKI will have many participants issuing certificates and creating other objects, it is operationally useful to consolidate the publication of those objects. This document provides the protocol for doing so. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2015. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Common XML Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Publication and Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Listing the repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Error handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.5. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Query, No Existing Object . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Query, Overwriting Existing Object . . . . . . 9 3.3. Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.6. With Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.7. Without Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Introduction This document assumes a working knowledge of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), which is intended to support improved routing security on the Internet. [RFC6480] In order to make participation in the RPKI easier, it is helpful to have a few consolidated repositories for RPKI objects, thus saving every participant from the cost of maintaining a new service. Similarly, relying parties using the RPKI objects will find it faster and more reliable to retrieve the necessary set from a smaller number of repositories. These consolidated RPKI object repositories will in many cases be outside the administrative scope of the organization issuing a given RPKI object. In some cases, outsourcing operation of the repository will be an explicit goal: some resource holders who strongly wish to Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 2] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 control their own RPKI private keys may lack the resources to operate a 24x7 repository, or may simply not wish to do so. The operator of an RPKI publication repository may well be an Internet registry which issues certificates to its customers, but it need not be; conceptually, operation of a an RPKI publication repository is separate from operation of RPKI CA. This document defines an RPKI publication protocol which allows publication either within or across organizational boundaries, and which makes fairly minimal demands on either the CA engine or the publication service. 1.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. "Publication engine" and "publication server" are used interchangeably to refer to the server providing the service described in this document. "Business Public Key Infrastructure" ("Business PKI" or "BPKI") refers to a PKI, separate from the RPKI, used to authenticate clients to the publication engine. We use the term "Business PKI" here because an internet registry might already have a PKI for authenticating its clients and might wish to reuse that PKI for this protocol. There is, however, no requirement to reuse such a PKI. 2. Protocol Specification The publication protocol uses XML messages wrapped in signed CMS messages, carried over HTTP transport. The publication protocol uses a simple request/response interaction. The client passes a request to the server, and the server generates a corresponding response. A message exchange commences with the client initiating an HTTP POST with content type of "application/rpki-publication", with the message object as the body. The server's response will similarly be the body of the response with a content type of "application/rpki- publication". The content of the POST and the server's response will be a well- formed Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] object with OID = 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC6492]. Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 3] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 2.1. Common XML Message Format The XML schema for this protocol is below in Section 2.5. The basic XML message format looks like this: Common attributes: version: The value of this attribute is the version of this protocol. This document describes version 3. type: The possible values of this attribute are "reply" and "query". A query PDU may be one of three types: , , or . A reply PDU may be one of four types: , , , or . Each of these PDUs may include an optional tag to facilitate bulk operation. If a tag is set in a query PDU, the corresponding reply(s) MUST have the tag attribute set to the same value. 2.2. Publication and Withdrawal The publication protocol uses a common message format to request publication of any RPKI object. This format was chosen specifically to allow this protocol to accommodate new types of RPKI objects without needing changes to this protocol. Both the and PDUs have a payload of an optional tag and a URI. The query also contains the DER object to be published, encoded in Base64. Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 4] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 Both the and PDUs also have a "hash" attribute, which carries a hash of an existing object at the specified repository URI. For PDUs, the hash is mandatory, as this operation makes no sense if there is no existing object to withdraw. For PDUs, the hash MUST be present if the publication operation is overwriting an existing object, and MUST be omitted if this publication operation is writing to a new URI where no prior object exists. Presence of an object when no hash attribute is specified is an error, as is absence of the hash attribute or an incorrect hash value when an object is present. Any such errors MUST be reported using the PDU. The current hash algorithm is SHA-256 [SHS], to simplify comparison of publication protocol hashes with RPKI manifest hashes. The intent behind the hash attribute is to allow the client and server to detect any disagreements about the effect that a or PDU will have on the repository. Note that every publish and withdraw action requires a new manifest, thus every publish or withdraw action will involve at least two objects. 2.3. Listing the repository The operation allows the client to ask the server for a complete listing of objects which the server believes the client has published. This is intended primarily to allow the client to recover upon detecting (probably via use of the "hash" attribute, see Section 2.2) that they have somehow lost synchronization. The query consists of a single PDU. The reply consists of zero or more PDUs, one per object published in this repository by this client, each PDU conveying the URI and hash of one published object. 2.4. Error handling Errors are handled at two levels. Since all messages in this protocol are conveyed over HTTP connections, basic errors are indicated via the HTTP response code. 4xx and 5xx responses indicate that something bad happened. Errors that make it impossible to decode a query or encode a response are handled in this way. Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 5] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 Where possible, errors result in an XML PDU which takes the place of the expected protocol response PDU. Like the rest of this protocol, PDUs are CMS-signed XML messages and thus can be archived to provide an audit trail. PDUs only appear in replies, never in queries. Like all other PDUs in this protocol, the PDU includes a "tag" attribute to assist in matching the error with a particular query when using batching. It is optional to set the tag on queries but, if set on the query, it MUST be set on the reply or error. The error itself is conveyed in the error_code attribute. The value of this attribute is a token indicating the specific error that occurred. The body of the element itself is an optional text string; if present, this is debugging information. 2.5. XML Schema The following is a RelaxNG compact form schema describing the Publication Protocol. # $Id: rpki-publication.rnc 3171 2015-02-26 00:09:05Z sra $ # RelaxNG schema for RPKI publication protocol. default namespace = "http://www.hactrn.net/uris/rpki/publication-spec/" # This is version 3 of the protocol. version = "3" # Top level PDU is either a query or a reply. start |= element msg { attribute version { version }, attribute type { "query" }, query_elt* } start |= element msg { attribute version { version }, attribute type { "reply" }, reply_elt* } Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 6] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 # PDUs allowed in queries and replies. query_elt = publish_query | withdraw_query | list_query reply_elt = publish_reply | withdraw_reply | list_reply | error_reply # Tag attributes for bulk operations. tag = attribute tag { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } } # Base64 encoded DER stuff. base64 = xsd:base64Binary # Publication URIs. uri = attribute uri { xsd:anyURI { maxLength="4096" } } # Digest of an existing object (hexadecimal). hash = attribute hash { xsd:string { pattern = "[0-9a-fA-F]+" } } # Error codes. error = xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } # element publish_query = element publish { tag?, uri, hash?, base64 } publish_reply = element publish { tag?, uri } # element withdraw_query = element withdraw { tag?, uri, hash } withdraw_reply = element withdraw { tag?, uri } # element list_query = element list { tag? } list_reply = element list { tag?, uri, hash } # element error_reply = element report_error { tag?, attribute error_code { error }, xsd:string { maxLength="512000" }? } Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 7] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 3. Examples Following are examples of various queries and the corresponding replies for the RPKI publication protocol 3.1. Query, No Existing Object MIIE+jCCA+KgAwIBAgIBDTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhE RjRBODAxN0U2NkE5RTkxNzJFNDYxMkQ4Q0Y0QzgzRjIzOERFMkEzMB4XDTA4 MDUyMjE4MDUxMloXDTA4MDUyNDE3NTQ1M1owMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoOEZCODIx OEYwNkU1MEFCNzAyQTdEOTZEQzhGMENEQ0Q4MjhGN0YxNzCCASIwDQYJKoZI hvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMeziKp0k5nP7v6SZoNsXIMQYRgNtC6F r/9Xm/1yQHomiPqHUk47rHhGojYiK5AhkrwoYhkH4UjJl2iwklDYczXuaBU3 F5qrKlZ4aZnjIxdlP7+hktVpeApL6yuJTUAYeC3UIxnLDVdD6phydZ/FOQlu ffiNDjzteCCvoyOUatqt8WB+oND6LToHp028g1YUYLHG6mur0dPdcHOVXLSm UDuZ1HDz1nDuYvIVKjB/MpH9aW9XeaQ6ZFIlZVPwuuvI2brR+ThH7Gv27GL/ o8qFdC300VQfoTZ+rKPGDE8K1cI906BL4kiwx9z0oiDcE96QCz+B0vsjc9mG aA1jgAxlXWsCAwEAAaOCAhcwggITMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSPuCGPBuUKtwKn2W3I 8M3Ngo9/FzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTfSoAX5mqekXLkYS2M9Mg/I43iozBVBgNV HR8ETjBMMEqgSKBGhkRyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9zdDo0NDAwL3Rlc3RiZWQv UklSLzEvMzBxQUYtWnFucEZ5NUdFdGpQVElQeU9ONHFNLmNybDBFBggrBgEF BQcBAQQ5MDcwNQYIKwYBBQUHMAKGKXJzeW5jOi8vbG9jYWxob3N0OjQ0MDAv dGVzdGJlZC9XT01CQVQuY2VyMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIw DwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwgZsGCCsGAQUFBwEL BIGOMIGLMDQGCCsGAQUFBzAFhihyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9zdDo0NDAwL3Rl c3RiZWQvUklSL1IwLzEvMFMGCCsGAQUFBzAKhkdyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9z dDo0NDAwL3Rlc3RiZWQvUklSL1IwLzEvajdnaGp3YmxDcmNDcDlsdHlQRE56 WUtQZnhjLm1uZjAaBggrBgEFBQcBCAEB/wQLMAmgBzAFAgMA/BUwPgYIKwYB BQUHAQcBAf8ELzAtMCsEAgABMCUDAwAKAzAOAwUAwAACAQMFAcAAAiAwDgMF AsAAAiwDBQDAAAJkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCEhuH7jtI2PJY6+zwv 306vmCuXhtu9Lr2mmRw2ZErB8EMcb5xypMrNqMoKeu14K2x4a4RPJkK4yATh M81FPNRsU5mM0acIRnAPtxjHvPME7PHN2w2nGLASRsZmaa+b8A7SSOxVcFUR azENztppsolHeTpm0cpLItK7mNpudUg1JGuFo94VLf1MnE2EqARG1vTsNhel /SM/UvOArCCOBvf0Gz7kSuupDSZ7qx+LiDmtEsLdbGNQBiYPbLrDk41PHrxd x28qIj7ejZkRzNFw/3pi8/XK281h8zeHoFVu6ghRPy5dbOA4akX/KG6b8XIx 0iwPYdLiDbdWFbtTdPcXBauY Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 8] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 3.2. Query, Overwriting Existing Object MIIE+jCCA+KgAwIBAgIBDTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhE RjRBODAxN0U2NkE5RTkxNzJFNDYxMkQ4Q0Y0QzgzRjIzOERFMkEzMB4XDTA4 MDUyMjE4MDUxMloXDTA4MDUyNDE3NTQ1M1owMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoOEZCODIx OEYwNkU1MEFCNzAyQTdEOTZEQzhGMENEQ0Q4MjhGN0YxNzCCASIwDQYJKoZI hvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMeziKp0k5nP7v6SZoNsXIMQYRgNtC6F r/9Xm/1yQHomiPqHUk47rHhGojYiK5AhkrwoYhkH4UjJl2iwklDYczXuaBU3 F5qrKlZ4aZnjIxdlP7+hktVpeApL6yuJTUAYeC3UIxnLDVdD6phydZ/FOQlu ffiNDjzteCCvoyOUatqt8WB+oND6LToHp028g1YUYLHG6mur0dPdcHOVXLSm UDuZ1HDz1nDuYvIVKjB/MpH9aW9XeaQ6ZFIlZVPwuuvI2brR+ThH7Gv27GL/ o8qFdC300VQfoTZ+rKPGDE8K1cI906BL4kiwx9z0oiDcE96QCz+B0vsjc9mG aA1jgAxlXWsCAwEAAaOCAhcwggITMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSPuCGPBuUKtwKn2W3I 8M3Ngo9/FzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTfSoAX5mqekXLkYS2M9Mg/I43iozBVBgNV HR8ETjBMMEqgSKBGhkRyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9zdDo0NDAwL3Rlc3RiZWQv UklSLzEvMzBxQUYtWnFucEZ5NUdFdGpQVElQeU9ONHFNLmNybDBFBggrBgEF BQcBAQQ5MDcwNQYIKwYBBQUHMAKGKXJzeW5jOi8vbG9jYWxob3N0OjQ0MDAv dGVzdGJlZC9XT01CQVQuY2VyMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIw DwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwgZsGCCsGAQUFBwEL BIGOMIGLMDQGCCsGAQUFBzAFhihyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9zdDo0NDAwL3Rl c3RiZWQvUklSL1IwLzEvMFMGCCsGAQUFBzAKhkdyc3luYzovL2xvY2FsaG9z dDo0NDAwL3Rlc3RiZWQvUklSL1IwLzEvajdnaGp3YmxDcmNDcDlsdHlQRE56 WUtQZnhjLm1uZjAaBggrBgEFBQcBCAEB/wQLMAmgBzAFAgMA/BUwPgYIKwYB BQUHAQcBAf8ELzAtMCsEAgABMCUDAwAKAzAOAwUAwAACAQMFAcAAAiAwDgMF AsAAAiwDBQDAAAJkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCEhuH7jtI2PJY6+zwv 306vmCuXhtu9Lr2mmRw2ZErB8EMcb5xypMrNqMoKeu14K2x4a4RPJkK4yATh M81FPNRsU5mM0acIRnAPtxjHvPME7PHN2w2nGLASRsZmaa+b8A7SSOxVcFUR azENztppsolHeTpm0cpLItK7mNpudUg1JGuFo94VLf1MnE2EqARG1vTsNhel /SM/UvOArCCOBvf0Gz7kSuupDSZ7qx+LiDmtEsLdbGNQBiYPbLrDk41PHrxd x28qIj7ejZkRzNFw/3pi8/XK281h8zeHoFVu6ghRPy5dbOA4akX/KG6b8XIx 0iwPYdLiDbdWFbtTdPcXBauY 3.3. Reply Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 9] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 3.4. Query 3.5. Reply 3.6. With Text Shampooing with sterno again, are we? 3.7. Without Text Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 10] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 4. Operational Considerations There are two basic options open to the repository operator as to how the publication tree is laid out. The first option is simple: each publication client is given its own directory one level below the top of the rsync module, and there is no overlap between the publication spaces used by different clients. For example: rsync://example.org/rpki/Alice/ rsync://example.org/rpki/Bob/ rsync://example.org/rpki/Carol/ This has the advantage of being very easy for the publication operator to manage, but has the drawback of making it difficult for relying parties to fetch published objects both safely and as efficiently as possible. Given that the mandatory-to-implement retrieval protocol for relying parties is rsync, a more efficient repository structure would be one which minimized the number of rsync fetches required. One such structure would be one in which the publication directories for subjects were placed underneath the publication directories of their issuers: since the normal synchronization tree walk is top-down, this can significantly reduce the total number of rsync connections required to synchronize. For example: rsync://example.org/rpki/Alice/ rsync://example.org/rpki/Alice/Bob/ rsync://example.org/rpki/Alice/Bob/Carol/ Preliminary measurement suggests that, in the case of large numbers of small publication directories, the time needed to set up and tear down individual rsync connections becomes significant, and that a properly optimized tree structure can reduce synchronization time by an order of magnitude. The more complex tree structure does require careful attention to the base_uri attribute values when setting up clients. In the example above, assuming that Alice issues to Bob who in turn issues to Carol, Alice has ceded control of a portion of her publication space to Bob, Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 11] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 who has in turn ceded a portion of that to Carol, and the base_uri attributes in the setup messages should reflect this. The details of how the repository operator determines that Alice has given Bob permission to nest Bob's publication directory under Alice's is outside the scope of this protocol. 5. IANA Considerations IANA is asked to register the application/rpki-publication MIME media type as follows: MIME media type name: application MIME subtype name: rpki-publication Required parameters: None Optional parameters: None Encoding considerations: binary Security considerations: Carries an RPKI Publication Protocol Message, as defined in this document. Interoperability considerations: None Published specification: This document Applications which use this media type: HTTP Additional information: Magic number(s): None File extension(s): Macintosh File Type Code(s): Person & email address to contact for further information: Rob Austein Intended usage: COMMON Author/Change controller: Rob Austein 6. Security Considerations The RPKI publication protocol and the data it publishes use entirely separate PKIs for authentication. The published data is authenticated within the RPKI, and this protocol has nothing to do with that authentication, nor does it require that the published objects be valid in the RPKI. The publication protocol uses a separate Business PKI (BPKI) to authenticate its messages. Each RPKI publication protocol message is CMS-signed. Because of that protection at the application layer, this protocol does not require the use of HTTPS or other transport security mechanisms. Although the hashes used in the and PDUs are cryptographic strength, the digest algorithm was selected for convenience in comparing these hashes with the hashes that appear in RPKI manifests. The hashes used in the and Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 12] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 PDUs are not particularly security-sensitive, because these PDUs are protected by the CMS signatures. Compromise of a publication server, perhaps through mismanagement of BPKI keys, could lead to a denial-of-service attack on the RPKI. An attacker gaining access to BPKI keys could use this protocol delete (withdraw) RPKI objects, leading to routing changes or failures. Accordingly, as in most PKIs, good key management practices are important. 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5652, STD 70, September 2009. [RFC6492] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", RFC 6492, February 2012. [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012, . 7.2. Informative References [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Authors' Addresses Samuel Weiler SPARTA, Inc. 7110 Samuel Morse Drive Columbia, Maryland 21046 US Email: weiler@tislabs.com Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 13] Internet-Draft RPKI Publication Protocol February 2015 Anuja Sonalker Battelle Memorial Institute Email: sonalkera@battelle.org Rob Austein Dragon Research Labs Email: sra@hactrn.net Weiler, et al. Expires August 29, 2015 [Page 14]