Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Internet Draft Seo, K. Expires: May 2009 Kent, S. Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies November 2008 Template for an Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2009. Abstract This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 9 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. Table of Contents Preface...........................................................8 1. Introduction...................................................9 1.1. Overview.................................................10 1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 1.3.5. Other participants..................................12 1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 1.5. Policy administration....................................13 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 2.1. Repositories.............................................15 2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 3. Identification And Authentication.............................16 3.1. Naming...................................................16 3.1.1. Types of names......................................16 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation.................................................18 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19 4.1. Certificate Application..................................19 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions ...........................................................19 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................20 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................22 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate................................................22 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................22 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................23 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate................................................23 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................24 4.8. Certificate modification.................................24 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber.................................................25 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate ...........................................................25 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................25 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request....................................................26 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]..................................................27 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]..................................................27 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27 4.10. Certificate status services.............................27 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] ...........................................................27 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]........................................27 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28 5.1. Physical controls........................................28 5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28 5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28 5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28 5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28 5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28 5.2. Procedural controls......................................28 5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements ...........................................................29 5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29 5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]..................................................30 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]..................................................30 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]..................................................30 5.6. Key changeover...........................................30 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]..................................................31 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31 6. Technical Security Controls...................................32 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls......................................................33 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34 6.2.5. Private key archival................................34 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module.....................................................34 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34 6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods....................................................35 6.4. Activation data..........................................35 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35 6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35 6.5. Computer security controls...............................35 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36 6.6.1. System development controls.........................36 6.6.2. Security management controls........................36 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36 6.7. Network security controls................................36 6.8. Time-stamping............................................36 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37 Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr- res-certs-01].................................................37 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38 8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38 8.6. Communication of results.................................38 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39 9.1. Fees.....................................................39 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39 9.2.2. Other assets........................................39 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information................................................39 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process....................................................40 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]..................................................40 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 9.9. Indemnities..............................................40 9.10. Term and termination....................................40 9.10.1. Term...............................................40 9.10.2. Termination........................................40 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40 9.12. Amendments..............................................40 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]..................................................40 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40 9.14. Governing law...........................................40 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41 9.16.3. Severability.......................................41 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41 10. Security Considerations......................................42 11. IANA Considerations..........................................42 12. Acknowledgments..............................................42 13. References...................................................42 13.1. Normative References....................................42 13.2. Informative References..................................43 Author's Addresses...............................................43 Intellectual Property Statement..................................44 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45 Copyright Statement..............................................45 Preface This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., " Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc. 2. delete this Preface Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 3. fill in the information indicated below by 4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a reference section with just the references in 13.2 5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and additions above. Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an explanation to the user. 1. Introduction This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of . It describes the practices employed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses. Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. 1.1. Overview This CPS describes: . Participants . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) . Key management . Audit procedures . Business and legal issues The PKI encompasses several types of certificates: . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.2. Document name and identification The name of this document is "'s Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)". 1.3. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an LIR/ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP. 1.3.1. Certification authorities will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The offline CA is the top level CA for the portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to members, to which address space or AS numbers have been allocated. 1.3.2. Registration authorities There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA. The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI. already establishes a business relationship with Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 each subscriber ( member) and assumes responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS numbers. Since operates the BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI. 1.3.3. Subscribers Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies) who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or LIRs/ISPs.> 1.3.4. Relying parties Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make use of address and AS number allocation certificates in support of improved routing security are relying parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross) certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to this space. To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties. 1.3.5. Other participants will operate a repository that holds certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs. 1.4. Certificate usage 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system. Such uses also are permitted under this policy. 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. 1.5. Policy administration 1.5.1. Organization administering the document This CPS is administered by 1.5.2. Contact person 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.6. Definitions and acronyms BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations. LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or National) Registry. NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia - Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC (Africa). ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of address blocks. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2.1. Repositories As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for use in support of routing security. The RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki..net. 2.2. Publication of certification information will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories. 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times and frequency: A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance. The RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate. 2.4. Access controls on repositories Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 3. Identification And Authentication 3.1. Naming 3.1.1. Types of names The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the NIR. 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique relative to all certificates issued by RPKI CA. However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this PKI. Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense, since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced through technical means. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key accepts certificate requests via the protocol described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester. 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented in records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the member database that maintains the resource allocation records. The certificate request is matched against the database record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the member. 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a resource holder. However, maintains contact information for each resource holder in support of certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI. The BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that are used to identify individuals who represent members that are address space (or AS number) holders. 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 3.2.5. Validation of authority Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI. 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. However, operates a BPKI [cps- business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate requests, revocation requests, etc. 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the requester. 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the requester. 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public key bound to an authorized representative via the BPKI. When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not "shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated with that Subscriber. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application The following entities may submit a certificate application to this CA: o o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by this registry 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities members who are resource holders are enrolled in the BPKI via the process described in [operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate request. 4.2. Certificate application processing resource holder requests a certificate via a Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the BPKI. processes the resource request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled. 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions The BPKI is used to identify member representative applying for a certificate via a certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki]. 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled. 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in [up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in [up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message. That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled. 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the Certificate Issuance Response message. 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the RPKI repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this CA. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below. 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of repository access control. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g., in support of generating route filters. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then will notify the resource holder The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous certificate by , to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The certificate holder or may initiate the renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down]. 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber initiated the renewal. If initiated the renewal process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed certificate in the repository. A Subscriber can discover a certificate renewed by through use of the List message [up/down]. 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the RPKI repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA will publish a renewal certificate in the RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of the renewed certificate. 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when requested, based on: Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked. Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey, authentication is effected using the BPKI. 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided in the PKCS #10 portion of the request. 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate via the Certificate Issuance Response message. 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the RPKI repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this CA. 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of additional resources, or may be explicit. A subscriber also may request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the previous certificates. If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not request that a new certificate be issued containing only these resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation) issued. 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification The certificate holder or may initiate the certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests the modification, the request is authenticated using the BPKI, as described in [up/down]. will modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are different from those in the currently issued certificates, the request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification. 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate by the publication of the certificate in the RPKI repository system. 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the RPKI repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA A modified certificate will be published in the RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this CA. 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by that certificate. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation The certificate holder or may request a revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation request by , and indicates that will include the revoked certificate in a CRL. 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency The RPKI production CA will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours. The RPKI offline CA will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. will set the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay after generation. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] 4.10. Certificate status services does not support OCSP. issues CRLs. 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED] 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED] 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED] 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED] 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED] 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls 5.1.1. Site location and construction 5.1.2. Physical access 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 5.1.4. Water exposures 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 5.1.6. Media storage 5.1.7. Waste disposal 5.1.8. Off-site backup 5.2. Procedural controls 5.2.1. Trusted roles 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties 5.3. Personnel controls Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 5.3.2. Background check procedures 5.3.3. Training requirements 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4.1. Types of events recorded Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include: Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions Posting of any material to a repository Any attempts to change or delete audit data 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 5.4.4. Protection of audit log 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED] 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED] 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED] 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED] 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED] 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED] 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED] 5.6. Key changeover The CA certificate will contain a validity period that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA certificate. To support this, will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED] 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED] 5.8. CA or RA termination Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6. Technical Security Controls This section describes the security controls used by . 6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1.1. Key pair generation 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer Subscribers deliver public keys to the RPKI CA by use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down]. 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6.1.5. Key sizes For the offline CA'sand production CA's certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent (e) F4 (65,537). is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. For 's CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control There will be private key out of multi-person control. 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6.2.4. Private key backup 6.2.5. Private key archival See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module The private keys for 's offline CA and production CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module. 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module The private keys for 's CA will be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS]) 6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by The module will be stored securely when not in use. 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating The cryptographic module used by the production CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3.1. Public key archival Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The CA's key pair will have a validity interval of 6.4. Activation data 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.2. Activation data protection Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by . 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 6.5. Computer security controls 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] 6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6.1. System development controls 6.6.2. Security management controls 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 6.7. Network security controls 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED] 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED] 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED] 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED] 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED] 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED] 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED] 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED] 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED] 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.4. Topics covered by assessment 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.6. Communication of results Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 9. Other Business And Legal Matters 9.1. Fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.3. Refund policy 9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.2. Other assets 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.8. Limitations of liability 9.9. Indemnities 9.10. Term and termination 9.10.1. Term 9.10.2. Termination 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.12. Amendments 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 9.14. Governing law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.3. Severability 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.5. Force Majeure 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 10. Security Considerations The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7 Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems. 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress. [up/down] Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", work in progress. 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. [cps-business-pki] [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. [operations-business-pki] [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. Author's Addresses Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 Email: skent@bbn.com Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 Email: dkong@bbn.com Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Email: kseo@bbn.com Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- ipr@ietf.org. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008 Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 45]