PKIX Working Group S. Santesson (Accurata) INTERNET-DRAFT W. Polk (NIST) Expires April, 2000 P. Barzin (SECUDE) M. Nystrom (RSA Laboratories) October, 1999 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document forms a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates, based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet. The term Qualified Certificate is used to describe a certificate with a certain qualified status within applicable governing law. Further, Qualified Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons represented by a registered unmistakable identity. The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent of local legal requirements. The profile is however designed to allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs. It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 1] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 requirements for Qualified Certificates. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mailing list. Table of Contents 1 Introduction ................................................ 3 2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 3 2.1 Properties ................................................ 4 2.2 Statement of Purpose ...................................... 5 2.3 Policy Issues ............................................. 5 2.4 Uniqueness of names ....................................... 5 3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .............. 6 3.1 Basic Certificate Fields .................................. 6 3.1.1 Issuer .................................................. 6 3.1.2 Subject ................................................. 7 3.2 Certificate Extensions .................................... 9 3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name ................................ 9 3.2.2 Certificate Policies .................................... 13 3.2.3 Key Usage ............................................... 13 3.2.4 Biometric Information ................................... 13 3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements ........................ 14 4 Security Considerations ..................................... 15 5 References .................................................. 16 6 Intellectual Property Right ................................. 17 Appendices A ASN.1 definitions ........................................... 18 A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 18 A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 21 B A Note on Attributes ........................................ 26 C. Example Certificate ........................................ 26 C.1 ASN.1 Structure ........................................... 27 C.2 Structured Hex Dump ....................................... 29 C.3 Unstructured Hex Dump ..................................... 33 D. Author Addresses ........................................... 34 E. Full Copyright Statement ................................... 35 Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 2] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 1 Introduction This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. The standard is based on RFC 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and semantics needed for full implementation of this standard. The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates named Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates and the assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic certificate as well as five certificate extensions. The certificate fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions are subject alternative name, certificate policies, key usage, a private extension for storage of biometric data and a private extension for storage of statements related to Qualified Certificates. In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are assumed to be utilized. Section 5 contains the references. Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are not already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B contains an example certificate. Appendix C contains Authors Addresses and Appendix D contains the IETF Copyright Statement. It should be noted that this specification does not define the specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the policies that should be used with them. That is, this document defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in Qualified Certificates. It is expected that laws and corporate policies will make these definitions. 2 Requirements and Assumptions The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European Commission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific relevance for European legislation. This specification is intended to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited to this application. Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used more Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 3] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary purpose is identifying a person with high level of assurance in public non-repudiation services. The actual mechanisms that will decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered to be a "Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside the scope of this standard. Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential within several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459. The most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are: - Definition of names and identity information in order to identify the associated subject in a uniform way. - Definition of information which identifies the CA and the jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular certificate. - Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified Certificates. - Definition of information structure for storage of biometric information. - Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements with relevance for Qualified Certificates. - Requirements for critical extensions. 2.1 Properties A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to have the following properties: - The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2 - The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as discussed in 2.3 - The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human being). - The certificate contains an unmistakable identity based on a pseudonym or a real name of the subject. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 4] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 2.2 Statement of Purpose For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate, it is assumed that the CA will have to include in the certificate a public statement that explicitly defines this intent. The function of this statement is thus to assist any concerned entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate. 2.3 Policy Issues Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern services that issue or utilize certificates according to this profile. It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its liabilities, practices and procedures. 2.4 Uniqueness of names In this draft requirements on name uniqueness are specified by the terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the following meaning: Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory. In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501]. In the case of subject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain of the CA. An unmistakable identity denotes a set of attributes and/or data elements, which forms an identity that by unmistakable means relates to a specific entity. The unmistakable connection between the identity and the entity may be dependent on the context within which the name is formed. This context should however be evident for any relying party given the information in the certificate. Some contexts, such as when identities are based on pseudonyms, may Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 5] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 require assistance from the CA or a registration authority, to obtain a corresponding officially registered identity under some predefined circumstances, such as investigation of criminal offence. 3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full implementation of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459. ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A. 3.1 Basic Certificate Fields This specification provides additional details regarding the contents of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer and subject fields. 3.1.1 Issuer The issuer field SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the organization responsible for the certificate, and SHALL include a registered name of the organization. The unmistakable identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate subset of the following attributes: domainComponent; countryName; stateOrProvinceName; organizationName; localityName; commonName and dnQualifier. Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary to identify the issuing organization. Many client implementations presuppose presence of a commonName attribute value in the issuer field, containing relevant information about the Issuer and the scope of the certificate. Certificates aimed for public use SHOULD therefore always use the commonName attribute to store information, which gives users reasonable guidance on the nature of the certificate. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 6] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 The legal jurisdiction for the issuing CA SHOULD be consistent with the issuer name. It should be noted, however, that a relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name fields and legal jurisdiction. 3.1.2 Subject The subject field SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name). An unmistakable identity (see 2.4) of the subject (based on a registered name or a pseudonym) SHALL be present in the certificate in the subject field and/or the personalData object in the subjectAltName extension (see 3.2.1.). If a personalData object is not present in the subjectAltName extension, the unmistakable identity of the subject is determined solely by the subject field. If a personalData object is present in the subjectAltName extension, it SHALL contain a complete unmistakable identity of the subject. In this case the subject field SHALL still contain a complete distinguished name. The distinguished name of the subject MAY contain the following attributes: countryName; commonName; surname; givenName; pseudonym; dnQualifier; organizationName; organizationalUnitName; title; localityName and postalAddress. Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of the following: Choice I: commonName Choice II: givenName Choice III: pseudonym Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish the subject name from other subject names within the issuer domain. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 7] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of issuance. Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName in the DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the countryName attribute SHOULD always be present. The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format. Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by the registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to examine present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute, and if necessary, the personalData object in the subjectAltName extension. Note: Many client implementations presuppose presence of the commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname or pseudonym attribute values. Certificates aimed for public use SHOULD therefore always include the commonName attribute even if givenName, surname or pseudonym attributes are present. The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain the registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which the CA prepares the certificate. These attributes SHALL be used in the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present. In cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be omitted. The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym of the subject, which SHALL be part of the subject's unmistakable identity (as defined in Section 2.4). Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName. The dnQualifier attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise be identical. This qualifier has no defined semantics beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or civil authority. It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the dnQualifier is sufficient to resolve any subject name collisions. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 8] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant information of an organization with which the subject is associated. The type of association between the organization and the subject is beyond the scope of this document. The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a designated position or function of the subject within the organization specified by present organizational attributes. The association between the title, the subject and the organization is beyond the scope of this document. The postalAddress and the localityName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store address and geographical information with which the subject is associated. If an organizationName value also is present then the postalAddress and localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the specified organization. The type of association between the postalAddress and the localityName and either the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document. Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes named in this section. 3.2 Certificate Extensions This specification provides additional details regarding the contents of five certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject alternative name, certificate policies, key usage extension, private extension for biometric information and private extension for Quali- fied Certificate statements. 3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name This section defines a new OTHER-NAME object, personalData, to be contained in the OtherName choice of the subjectAltName extension. Instances of this object may be used to construct unique names from personal attributes of the subject. This data may be useful to a relying party in identifying the person that is the subject of the certificate. If the subjectAltName extension contains an instance of a personalData object, it SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the subject of the certificate (see 2.4). The subject field is still required to contain a distinguished name (within issuer domain) as defined in Section 3.1.2. -- OtherName is reproduced here (from RFC 2459) for clarity Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 9] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 -- only. It does not appear in the ASN.1 modules at the end -- of this specification. -- 1988 ASN.1 Syntax: -- OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { -- type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } -- 1993 ASN.1 Syntax: -- OtherName ::= INSTANCE OF TYPE-IDENTIFIER personalData OTHER-NAME ::= { PersonalDataSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-on-personalData } id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-on 1} PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord } PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute {{PersonalDataAttributeSet}} } PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { countryName | givenName | surname | pseudonym | dnQualifier | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | postalAddress | countryOfCitizenship | countryOfResidence,... } The optional nameRegistrationAuthority component SHALL, when present, contain a name of an authority within which associated attribute values are registered. The registrationAuthority component in the PersonalDataSyntax and the PersonalDataRecord type allow specifying multiple name registration authorities, responsible for different attributes. If the registrationAuthority field of the PersonalDataSyntax type is present, it serves as the default value for subordinate PersonalDataRecord structures with an absent registrationAuthority value. The optional attributeSemantics component SHALL, when present, contain an object identifier that defines semantics for associated attributes. The object identifier MAY define any set of rules and semantics for any set of attributes. The attributeSemantics value MAY Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 10] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 guide applications how to understand and display different attribute values. This value MAY also define the context within which certain attribute values are unique and thereby provide means to achieve guaranteed uniqueness for the present set of attribute values The optional attributeSemantics component in the PersonalDataSyntax and the PersonalDataRecord type allows specifying multiple object identifiers, describing the semantics for different attribute values. If the attributeSemantics field of the PersonalDataSyntax type is set, it serves as the default value for subordinate PersonalDataRecord types with an absent attributeSemantics value. Complying applications SHALL expect any subset of the following defined attribute types within a PersonalDataRecord: countryName; givenName; surname; pseudonym; dnQualifier; dateOfBirth; placeOfBirth; gender; postalAddress; countryOfCitizenship; and countryOfResidence. An instance of a personalData object may also contain any additional attributes, subject to local definitions, but they SHALL not be necessary to specify the unmistakable identity of the subject. Attribute values SHALL be consistent with attribute values stored in the subject field. (I.e., the subject field and the personalData object may contain different values as long as these values are not in conflict.) The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of issuance. The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain a registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which the CA prepares the certificate. The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym of the subject. The pseudonym SHALL be registered by a registration authority, responsible for holding the identity of the real physical Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 11] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 person related to the pseudonym. When this attribute is used the CA is the default registration authority if no other registrationAuthority value, related to the pseudonym attribute, is present in the personalData object. The dnQualifier attribute SHALL, when present, contain a local registration identifier of the subject, such as an identifier assigned by the CA, a drivers license number or any type of government aid registration or civic registration code. Note that the value of this field may contain digits, alphabetic characters, and punctuation. The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document. The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the place of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document. The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the gender of the subject. For females the value "F" and for males the value "M" have to be used. The manner in which the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document. The postalAddress attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of an address with which the subject is associated. This value SHALL be associated with the subject as a private address even if the postalAddress attribute value in the subject field is associated with an organization. The manner in which the postalAddress is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document. The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed country of citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued. If the subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document. The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determination of residence is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 12] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 3.2.2 Certificate Policies The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and procedures undertaken by the CA. The certificate policy extension MAY be marked critical. A statement by the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate as discussed in Section 2.2 SHOULD be evident through indicated policies. In order to enhance path validation based on policy object identifiers any statement related to Qualified Certificates, as defined in 3.2.5, SHOULD also be defined by included certificate policies. Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in RFC 2459. 3.2.3 Key Usage The key usage extension SHALL be present. If the key usage nonRepudiation bit is asserted then it SHALL NOT be combined with any other key usage , i.e. if set, the key usage non-repudiation SHALL be set exclusively. The key usage extension MAY be marked critical. 3.2.4 Biometric Information This section defines an extension for storage of biometric information. Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash of a biometric template. The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication of biometric information. The biometric information that corresponds to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can be obtained. If included, this URI does not imply that this is the only way to access this information. This extension SHALL only be used to store a hash of biometric information suitable for human verification, i.e. where decision whether this information is an accurate representation of the subject is performed by a physical person. This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented by for example a graphical image, displayed to the relying party, which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of the subject. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 13] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BiometricSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo } id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2} BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE { typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData, hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, biometricDataHash OCTET STRING, sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL } TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE { predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType, biometricDataID OBJECT IDENTIFIER } PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...) The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the image type. The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present, SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the image type. 3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements This section defines an extension for inclusion of defined statements related to Qualified Certificates. A typical statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as discussed in Section 2.2). Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which the certificate is issued. As an example this MAY include a maximum reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's liability. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 14] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the statementInfo parameter. If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the semantics of this parameter. If the object identifier does not define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics. This profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs- pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifying conformance with syntax and semantics defined in this profile. This qualified certificate profile is referred to as version 1. qcStatements EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements } id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 } QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF QcStatement QcStatement ::= SEQUENCE { statementId QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}), statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL } SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...} qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 } -- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1) 4 Security Considerations The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy governing the use of the associated private key. Both the private key holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder. Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issues certificates as Qualified Certificates. The associated private keys must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the subject's sole control. That is, a CA should not issue a qualified Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 15] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 certificate if the private key is shared among entities, or the means to use the private key is not protected against unintended usage. This implies that the CA must perform proof-of-possession of the private key. In addition, it implies that the CA have some knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions are met. Comparing two qualified certificates to determine if they represent the same physical entity may provide misleading results and should not be performed. This specification is a profile of RFC 2459. The security considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well. 5 References [RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. [RFC 2247] S. Kille, M. Wahl, A. Grimstad, R. Huber, S. Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", January 1998. [RFC 2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D.Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", January 1999. [X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June 1997. [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997. [X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, June 1997. [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997. [ISO 3166] ISO Standard 3166: Codes for the representation of names of countries, 1993. [PKCS 9] RSA Laboratories: PKCS #9 v2.0: Selected Object Classes and Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 16] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 Attributes, 1999 (draft). 6 Intellectual Property Rights The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain ageneral license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 17] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 APPENDICES A. ASN.1 definitions As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants of the ASN.1 syntax. Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros. However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e. Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 2459's 1988 modules. Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax. However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e. Appendix A.2 may be parsed by an 1993 ASN.1-parser by removing the UTF8String choice from the definition of DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in RFC 2459. Appendix A.2 may be parsed "as is" by an 1997 ASN.1 parser, however. A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS GeneralName FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)} AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, Attribute, AttributeType, id-pkix, id-pe, id-at FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}; Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 18] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 -- Locally defined OIDs -- Arc for QC 'OtherName' types id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } -- Arc for QC personal data attributes id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 } -- Arc for QC statements id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 } -- Attributes id-at-postalAddress AttributeType ::= { id-at 16 } PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString domainComponent AttributeType ::= { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 } DomainComponent ::= IA5String id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 } DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 } PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString id-pda-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 } Pseudonym ::= DirectoryString id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 } Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1)) -- "M", "F", "m" or "f" id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 } CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2)) -- ISO 3166 Country Code id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 6 } CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2)) -- ISO 3166 Country Code -- Other name types -- PersonalData according to this standard -- OtherName types ("AnotherName" in RFC 2459) id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 1 } PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 19] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord } PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute } -- Private extensions -- Biometric info extension id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2} BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE { typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData, hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, biometricDataHash OCTET STRING, sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL } TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE { predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType, biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER } PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature) -- QC Statements Extension id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3} QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF Statement Statement ::= SEQUENCE { statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL} -- QC statements id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 } -- This object identifier identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1) END Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 20] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage, privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies, policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints, subjectDirectoryAttributes, authorityInfoAccess, GeneralName, OTHER-NAME FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)} id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, ATTRIBUTE, SupportedAttributes, Extension, EXTENSION, DirectoryString{}, ub-name, id-pe, id-at, id-at-commonName, id-at-surname, id-at-countryName, id-at-localityName, id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-organizationName, id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-givenName, id-at-dnQualifier, pkcs9email, title, organizationName, organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName, localityName, countryName, dnQualifier, generationQualifier, initials, givenName, surname, commonName, name FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)}; -- Object Identifiers -- Externally defined OIDs id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 16 } id-domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 } -- Locally defined OIDs -- Arc for QC 'OtherName' types id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 21] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 -- Arc for QC personal data attributes id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 } -- Arc for QC statements id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 } -- Private extensions id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 } id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 } -- OtherName types id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 1 } -- Personal data attributes id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 } id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 } id-pda-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 } id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 } id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 } id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 6 } -- QC statements id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 } -- Useful types -- This definition of the Attribute type is compatible with the one -- in RFC 2459 but allows (due to the parameterization) different -- attribute sets to be used in different contexts Attribute {ATTRIBUTE:AttributeSet} ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id ({AttributeSet}), values SET OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({AttributeSet}{@type}) } -- Object Sets -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an -- extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459. ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= { authorityKeyIdentifier | subjectKeyIdentifier | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | privateKeyUsagePeriod | certificatePolicies | policyMappings | subjectAltName | issuerAltName | basicConstraints | Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 22] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 nameConstraints | policyConstraints | cRLDistributionPoints | subjectDirectoryAttributes | authorityInfoAccess | biometricInfo | qcStatements, ... } -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in -- distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet -- local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may -- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that -- this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributeSet in RFC 2459. SupportedAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { name | commonName | surname | givenName | initials | generationQualifier | dnQualifier | countryName | localityName | stateOrProvinceName | organizationName | organizationalUnitName | title | pkcs9email | domainComponent | postalAddress | pseudonym, ... -- For future extensions -- } -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in -- personalData objects. The set may be augmented to meet local -- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may prevent -- interoperability with conforming implementations. PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { countryName | givenName | surname | pseudonym | dnQualifier | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | postalAddress | countryOfCitizenship | countryOfResidence, ... } -- Attributes -- postalAddress from X.520 postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 } ID id-at-postalAddress } -- domainComponent from RFC 2247 domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX IA5String ID id-domainComponent } dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime ID id-pda-dateOfBirth } placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= { Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 23] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name } ID id-pda-placeOfBirth } pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name } ID id-pda-pseudonym } gender ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f")) ID id-pda-gender } countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2)) (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- }) ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship } countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2)) (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- }) ID id-pda-countryOfResidence } -- OtherName types personalData OTHER-NAME ::= { PersonalDataSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-on-personalData } PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord } PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE { registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL, attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute {{PersonalDataAttributeSet}} } -- Private extensions -- Biometric info extension biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BiometricSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo } BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE { Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 24] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData, hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, biometricDataHash OCTET STRING, sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL, ... -- For future extensions -- } TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE { predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType, biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER } PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...) -- QC Statements Extension qcStatements EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements } QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF QcStatement QcStatement ::= SEQUENCE { statementId QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}), statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL } QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &Type OPTIONAL } WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] } qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 } -- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and -- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile -- (Version 1) -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs. SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- } END Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 25] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 B. A Note on Attributes This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the subject field of issued certificates and in the personalData alternative name. In the interest of conformity, they have been defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from RFC 2459, which is sufficient for the purposes of this document, but greatly simplified in comparison with ISO/ITU's definition. A complete definition of these new attributes (including mathing rules), along with object classes to support them in LDAP-accessible directories, can be found in [PKCS 9]. C. Example Certificate This section contains the ASN.1 structure and a hex dump of a 817 byte version 3 qualified certificate. The certificate contains the following information: 1. The serial number is 1 2. The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algo- rithm 3. The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE 4. The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M. Gloeckner, O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE 5. The certificate was issued on July 6, 1999 and will expire on July 6, 2000 6. The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key 7. The certificate includes a critical key usage extension exclusively indicating non-repudiation 8. The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust, Germany. It is required to be set in a certificate conformant to the german digital signature law. 9. The certificate includes one subject alternative name - a PersonalData structure (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.1) in the OtherName sub-field containing the following attributes: Registered by: municpality@seeheim.de surname: Gloeckner given name: Petra date of birth: October, 14th 1971 (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.1) place of birth: Darmstadt (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.2) Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 26] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 country of citizenship:DE (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.5) gender: female (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.4) 10. The certificate includes a qualified statement (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3) indicating a maximum reliance limit of DM 5000,-. Therefore the monetary value has been used which has been defined by ISO (object identifier 1.2.840.10052.1.1): currency: 280 (=DEM) amount: 5 exponent: 3 C.1 ASN.1 Structure SEQUENCE length = 813 { SEQUENCE length = 666 { [0] (constructed) length = 3 { INTEGER 2 } INTEGER 1 SEQUENCE length = 9 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29) NULL } SEQUENCE length = 72 { SET length = 11 { SEQUENCE length = 9 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.countryName(6) PrintableString "DE" } } SET length = 57 { SEQUENCE length = 55 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.organizationName(10) PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH" } } } SEQUENCE length = 30 { UTCTime "990706153122Z" UTCTime "000706153122Z" } SEQUENCE length = 101 { SET length = 11 { SEQUENCE length = 9 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.countryName(6) Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 27] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 PrintableString "DE" } } SET length = 57 { SEQUENCE length = 55 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.organizationName(10) PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH" } } SET length = 27 { SEQUENCE length = 25 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.commonName(3) PrintableString "Petra M. Gloeckner" } } } SEQUENCE length = 159 { SEQUENCE length = 13 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.rsaEncryption(1) NULL } BIT STRING number of bits = 1120 content: 30818902818100ff 0524ce2d11337f8c ccfb8211faa33088 f53c244ca3155ba5 6ad181f54ab6b1f8 4d1d7298623907f6 3956b392d700bf09 9c6ffeca8ac96622 dcbe2d7ff88f40d8 4f561b34c70e3e6e 32f2aa68e7ed2a21 202ff858fc5f42bf b25864b2c0e9e8c3 21f66adcbad87a8c a754fce448e1e507 8906fb8a81b7fe27 9ec35794ca20e502 03010001 } [3] (constructed) length = 272 { SEQUENCE length = 268 { SEQUENCE length = 14 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.keyUsage(15) BOOLEAN TRUE OCTET STRING length = 4 content: 03020640 } SEQUENCE length = 18 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.certificatePolicies(32) OCTET STRING length = 11 content: 3009300706052b24 080101 } SEQUENCE length = 190 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.subjectAltName(17) OCTET STRING length = 182 Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 28] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 content: 3081b3a081b00608 2b06010505070801 a081a33081a03081 9d30819a16176d75 6e69636970616c69 7479407365656865 696d2e6465307f30 120603550404310b 1309676c6f65636b 6e6572300e060355 042a310713055065 747261301d06082b 0601050507090131 11180f3139373131 3031343030303030 305a301706082b06 010505070905310b 13094461726d7374 616474301006082b 0601050507090331 0413024445300f06 082b060105050709 043103130146 } SEQUENCE length = 37 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3 OCTET STRING length = 25 content: 3017301506072a86 48ce440101300a02 0201180201050201 03 } } } } SEQUENCE length = 9 { OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29) NULL } BIT STRING number of bits = 1024 content: 3858d00a57281748 98923f8968cd8c7f 561a531472a34d1a 189d836d66e42104 ac126ffe52d1f1bc f15c17076df75860 c4ad6fa850d2a6c7 0bfbf6f7816f5a8b 1e74a08ce6db0d81 2e5fdda0a0ece8b1 6ad5e6c2acc225a5 4cfe1965f44706c8 0dd854d82ff80de5 4c03ab63eeb2664c 8326f3d54bf15027 c7bc22c79ebf46c8 } C.2 Structured hexdump: 0x00000000 T: 30 L: 82 03 2d{ 0x00000004 T: 30 L: 82 02 9a{ 0x00000008 T: a0 L: 03{ 0x0000000a T: 02 L: 01 C: 02 } 0x0000000d T: 02 L: 01 C: 01 0x00000010 T: 30 L: 09{ 0x00000012 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d 0x00000019 T: 05 L: 00 C: } Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 29] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 0x0000001b T: 30 L: 48{ 0x0000001d T: 31 L: 0b{ 0x0000001f T: 30 L: 09{ 0x00000021 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06 0x00000026 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45 } } 0x0000002a T: 31 L: 39{ 0x0000002c T: 30 L: 37{ 0x0000002e T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a 0x00000033 T: 13 L: 30 C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f 72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73 7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20 49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68 6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48 } } } 0x00000065 T: 30 L: 1e{ 0x00000067 T: 17 L: 0d C: 39 39 30 37 30 36 31 35 33 31 32 32 5a 0x00000076 T: 17 L: 0d C: 30 30 30 37 30 36 31 35 33 31 32 32 5a } 0x00000085 T: 30 L: 65{ 0x00000087 T: 31 L: 0b{ 0x00000089 T: 30 L: 09{ 0x0000008b T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06 0x00000090 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45 } } 0x00000094 T: 31 L: 39{ 0x00000096 T: 30 L: 37{ 0x00000098 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a 0x0000009d T: 13 L: 30 C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f 72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73 7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20 49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68 6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48 } } 0x000000cf T: 31 L: 1b{ 0x000000d1 T: 30 L: 19{ 0x000000d3 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 03 Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 30] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 0x000000d8 T: 13 L: 12 C: 50 65 74 72 61 20 4d 2e 20 47 6c 6f 65 63 6b 6e 65 72 } } } 0x000000ec T: 30 L: 81 9f{ 0x000000ef T: 30 L: 0d{ 0x000000f1 T: 06 L: 09 C: 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 0x000000fc T: 05 L: 00 C: } 0x000000fe T: 03 L: 81 8d C: 00 30 81 89 02 81 81 00 ff 05 24 ce 2d 11 33 7f 8c cc fb 82 11 fa a3 30 88 f5 3c 24 4c a3 15 5b a5 6a d1 81 f5 4a b6 b1 f8 4d 1d 72 98 62 39 07 f6 39 56 b3 92 d7 00 bf 09 9c 6f fe ca 8a c9 66 22 dc be 2d 7f f8 8f 40 d8 4f 56 1b 34 c7 0e 3e 6e 32 f2 aa 68 e7 ed 2a 21 20 2f f8 58 fc 5f 42 bf b2 58 64 b2 c0 e9 e8 c3 21 f6 6a dc ba d8 7a 8c a7 54 fc e4 48 e1 e5 07 89 06 fb 8a 81 b7 fe 27 9e c3 57 94 ca 20 e5 02 03 01 00 01 } 0x0000018e T: a3 L: 82 01 10{ 0x00000192 T: 30 L: 82 01 0c{ 0x00000196 T: 30 L: 0e{ 0x00000198 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 0f 0x0000019d T: 01 L: 01 C: ff 0x000001a0 T: 04 L: 04 C: 03 02 06 40 } 0x000001a6 T: 30 L: 12{ 0x000001a8 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 20 0x000001ad T: 04 L: 0b C: 30 09 30 07 06 05 2b 24 08 01 01 } 0x000001ba T: 30 L: 81 be{ 0x000001bd T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 11 Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 31] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 0x000001c2 T: 04 L: 81 b6 C: 30 81 b3 a0 81 b0 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 08 01 a0 81 a3 30 81 a0 30 81 9d 30 81 9a 16 17 6d 75 6e 69 63 69 70 61 6c 69 74 79 40 73 65 65 68 65 69 6d 2e 64 65 30 7f 30 12 06 03 55 04 04 31 0b 13 09 67 6c 6f 65 63 6b 6e 65 72 30 0e 06 03 55 04 2a 31 07 13 05 50 65 74 72 61 30 1d 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09 01 31 11 18 0f 31 39 37 31 31 30 31 34 30 30 30 30 30 30 5a 30 17 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09 05 31 0b 13 09 44 61 72 6d 73 74 61 64 74 30 10 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09 03 31 04 13 02 44 45 30 0f 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09 04 31 03 13 01 46 } 0x0000027b T: 30 L: 25{ 0x0000027d T: 06 L: 08 C: 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 03 0x00000287 T: 04 L: 19 C: 30 17 30 15 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 44 01 01 30 0a 02 02 01 18 02 01 05 02 01 03 } } } } 0x000002a2 T: 30 L: 09{ 0x000002a4 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d 0x000002ab T: 05 L: 00 C: } 0x000002ad T: 03 L: 81 81 C: 00 38 58 d0 0a 57 28 17 48 98 92 3f 89 68 cd 8c 7f 56 1a 53 14 72 a3 4d 1a 18 9d 83 6d 66 e4 21 04 ac 12 6f fe 52 d1 f1 bc f1 5c 17 07 6d f7 58 60 c4 ad 6f a8 50 d2 a6 Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 32] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 c7 0b fb f6 f7 81 6f 5a 8b 1e 74 a0 8c e6 db 0d 81 2e 5f dd a0 a0 ec e8 b1 6a d5 e6 c2 ac c2 25 a5 4c fe 19 65 f4 47 06 c8 0d d8 54 d8 2f f8 0d e5 4c 03 ab 63 ee b2 66 4c 83 26 f3 d5 4b f1 50 27 c7 bc 22 c7 9e bf 46 c8 0x00000331 } C.3 Hex Dump 0 3082032D 3082029A A0030201 02020101 |0..-0...........| 10 30090605 2B0E0302 1D050030 48310B30 |0...+......0H1.0| 20 09060355 04061302 44453139 30370603 |...U....DE1907..| 30 55040A13 30474D44 202D2046 6F727363 |U...0GMD - Forsc| 40 68756E67 737A656E 7472756D 20496E66 |hungszentrum Inf| 50 6F726D61 74696F6E 73746563 686E696B |ormationstechnik| 60 20476D62 48301E17 0D393930 37303631 | GmbH0...9907061| 70 35333132 325A170D 30303037 30363135 |53122Z..00070615| 80 33313232 5A306531 0B300906 03550406 |3122Z0e1.0...U..| 90 13024445 31393037 06035504 0A133047 |..DE1907..U...0G| A0 4D44202D 20466F72 73636875 6E67737A |MD - Forschungsz| B0 656E7472 756D2049 6E666F72 6D617469 |entrum Informati| C0 6F6E7374 6563686E 696B2047 6D624831 |onstechnik GmbH1| D0 1B301906 03550403 13125065 74726120 |.0...U....Petra | E0 4D2E2047 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 30819F30 |M. Gloeckner0..0| F0 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010101 05000381 |...*.H..........| 100 8D003081 89028181 00FF0524 CE2D1133 |..0........$.-.3| 110 7F8CCCFB 8211FAA3 3088F53C 244CA315 |........0..<$L..| 120 5BA56AD1 81F54AB6 B1F84D1D 72986239 |[.j...J...M.r.b9| 130 07F63956 B392D700 BF099C6F FECA8AC9 |..9V.......o....| 140 6622DCBE 2D7FF88F 40D84F56 1B34C70E |f"..-...@.OV.4..| 150 3E6E32F2 AA68E7ED 2A21202F F858FC5F |>n2..h..*! /.X._| 160 42BFB258 64B2C0E9 E8C321F6 6ADCBAD8 |B..Xd.....!.j...| 170 7A8CA754 FCE448E1 E5078906 FB8A81B7 |z..T..H.........| 180 FE279EC3 5794CA20 E5020301 0001A382 |.'..W.. ........| 190 01103082 010C300E 0603551D 0F0101FF |..0...0...U.....| 1A0 04040302 06403012 0603551D 20040B30 |.....@0...U. ..0| 1B0 09300706 052B2408 01013081 BE060355 |.0...+$...0....U| 1C0 1D110481 B63081B3 A081B006 082B0601 |.....0.......+..| 1D0 05050708 01A081A3 3081A030 819D3081 |........0..0..0.| 1E0 9A16176D 756E6963 6970616C 69747940 |...municipality@| 1F0 73656568 65696D2E 6465307F 30120603 |seeheim.de0.0...| 200 55040431 0B130967 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 |U..1...gloeckner| 210 300E0603 55042A31 07130550 65747261 |0...U.*1...Petra| Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 33] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 220 301D0608 2B060105 05070901 3111180F |0...+.......1...| 230 31393731 31303134 30303030 30305A30 |19711014000000Z0| 240 1706082B 06010505 07090531 0B130944 |...+.......1...D| 250 61726D73 74616474 30100608 2B060105 |armstadt0...+...| 260 05070903 31041302 4445300F 06082B06 |....1...DE0...+.| 270 01050507 09043103 13014630 2506082B |......1...F0%..+| 280 06010505 07010304 19301730 1506072A |.........0.0...*| 290 8648CE44 0101300A 02020118 02010502 |.H.D..0.........| 2A0 01033009 06052B0E 03021D05 00038181 |..0...+.........| 2B0 003858D0 0A572817 4898923F 8968CD8C |.8X..W(.H..?.h..| 2C0 7F561A53 1472A34D 1A189D83 6D66E421 |.V.S.r.M....mf.!| 2D0 04AC126F FE52D1F1 BCF15C17 076DF758 |...o.R......m.X| 2E0 60C4AD6F A850D2A6 C70BFBF6 F7816F5A |`..o.P........oZ| 2F0 8B1E74A0 8CE6DB0D 812E5FDD A0A0ECE8 |..t......._.....| 300 B16AD5E6 C2ACC225 A54CFE19 65F44706 |.j.....%.L..e.G.| 310 C80DD854 D82FF80D E54C03AB 63EEB266 |...T./...L..c..f| 320 4C8326F3 D54BF150 27C7BC22 C79EBF46 |L.&..K.P'.."...F| 330 C8 |. | D. Author's Address Stefan Santesson Accurata Systemsaekerhet AB Slagthuset S-211 20 Malmoe Sweden stefan@accurata.se Tim Polk NIST Building 820, Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 USA wpolk@nist.gov Petra Barzin SECUDE - Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH Landwehrstrasse 50a D-64293 Darmstadt Germany barzin@secude.com Magnus Nystrom RSA Laboratories Box 10704 S-121 29 Stockholm Sweden magnus@rsasecurity.com Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 34] INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999 E. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 35]