Network Working Group D. Harrington Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies (USA) Intended status: Standards Track J. Salowey Expires: January 12, 2009 Cisco Systems July 11, 2008 Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP draft-ietf-isms-secshell-11 Status of This Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 12, 2009. Abstract This memo describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol, using the Secure Shell protocol (SSH). This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP based internets. In particular it defines objects for monitoring and managing the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 1.1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3. Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.5. Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. The Secure Shell Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. How SSHTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Security Capabilities of this Model . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1.3. Authentication Protocol Support . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.4. Privacy Protocol Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.5. Protection against Message Replay, Delay and Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.6. SSH Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Security Parameter Passing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.3. Notifications and Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Passing Security Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. tmStateReference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. tmSameSecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Elements of Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Procedures for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2. Procedures for an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.3. Establishing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.4. Closing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. MIB Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2. Textual Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.3. Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.3.1. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9.1. noAuthPriv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9.2. Use with SNMPv1/v2c Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.3. Skipping Public Key Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.4. The 'none' MAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.5. MIB Module Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix A. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 1. Introduction This memo describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol, using the Secure Shell protocol (SSH) [RFC4251] within a transport subsystem [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]. The transport model specified in this memo is referred to as the Secure Shell Transport Model (SSHTM). This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP based internets. In particular it defines objects for monitoring and managing the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP. It is important to understand the SNMP architecture [RFC3411] and the terminology of the architecture to understand where the Transport Model described in this memo fits into the architecture and interacts with other subsystems within the architecture. 1.1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of RFC 3410 [RFC3410]. Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58, RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580 [RFC2580]. 1.2. Conventions For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document favors terminology as defined in STD62 rather than favoring terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3 terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP specifications when SNMPv3 was advanced to Full Standard. Authentication in this document typically refers to the English meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not data source authentication or peer identity authentication. The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document, because in the RFC 3411 architecture [RFC3411], all SNMP entities Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 have the capability of acting in either manager or agent or in both roles depending on the SNMP application types supported in the implementation. Where distinction is required, the application names of Command Generator, Command Responder, Notification Originator, Notification Receiver, and Proxy Forwarder are used. See "SNMP Applications" [RFC3413] for further information. Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to refer to the two ends of the SSH transport connection. The client actively opens the SSH connection, and the server passively listens for the incoming SSH connection. Either SNMP entity may act as client or as server, as discussed further below. The User-Based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] is a mandatory-to- implement Security Model in STD 62. While SSH and USM frequently refer to a user, the terminology preferred in RFC3411 [RFC3411] and in this memo is "principal". A principal is the "who" on whose behalf services are provided or processing takes place. A principal can be, among other things, an individual acting in a particular role; a set of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an application or a set of applications, or a combination of these within an administrative domain. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Sections requiring further editing are identified by [todo] markers in the text. Points requiring further WG research and discussion are identified by [discuss] markers in the text. Note to RFC Editor - if the previous paragraph and this note have not been removed, please send the document back to the editor to remove this. 1.3. Modularity The reader is expected to have read and understood the description of the SNMP architecture, as defined in [RFC3411], and the Transport Subsystem architecture extension specified in "Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol" [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]. This memo describes the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP, a specific SNMP transport model to be used within the SNMP transport subsystem to provide authentication, encryption, and integrity checking of SNMP messages. In keeping with the RFC 3411 design decision to use self-contained Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 documents, this document defines the elements of procedure and associated MIB module objects which are needed for processing the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP. This modularity of specification is not meant to be interpreted as imposing any specific requirements on implementation. 1.4. Motivation Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3) added security to the protocol. The User-based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] was designed to be independent of other existing security infrastructures, to ensure it could function when third party authentication services were not available, such as in a broken network. As a result, USM utilizes a separate user and key management infrastructure. Operators have reported that deploying another user and key management infrastructure in order to use SNMPv3 is a reason for not deploying SNMPv3. This memo describes a transport model that will make use of the existing and commonly deployed Secure Shell security infrastructure. This transport model is designed to meet the security and operational needs of network administrators, maximize usability in operational environments to achieve high deployment success and at the same time minimize implementation and deployment costs to minimize deployment time. This document addresses the requirement for the SSH client to authenticate the SSH server, for the SSH server to authenticate the SSH client, and describes how SNMP can make use of the authenticated identities in authorization policies for data access, in a manner that is independent of any specific access control model. This document addresses the requirement to utilize client authentication and key exchange methods which support different security infrastructures and provide different security properties. This document describes how to use client authentication as described in "SSH Authentication Protocol" [RFC4252]. The SSH Transport Model should work with any of the ssh-userauth methods including the "publickey", "password", "hostbased", "none", "keyboard-interactive", "gssapi-with-mic", ."gssapi-keyex", "gssapi", and "external-keyx" (see http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters). The use of the "none" authentication method is NOT RECOMMENDED, as described in Security Considerations. Local accounts may be supported through the use of the publickey, hostbased or password methods. The password method allows for integration with deployed password infrastructure such as AAA servers using the RADIUS protocol [RFC2865]. The SSH Transport Model SHOULD be able to take advantage of future defined Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 ssh-userauth methods, such as those that might make use of X.509 certificate credentials. It is desirable to use mechanisms that could unify the approach for administrative security for SNMPv3 and Command Line interfaces (CLI) and other management interfaces. The use of security services provided by Secure Shell is the approach commonly used for the CLI, and is the approach being adopted for use with NETCONF [RFC4742]. This memo describes a method for invoking and running the SNMP protocol within a Secure Shell (SSH) session as an SSH subsystem. This memo describes how SNMP can be used within a Secure Shell (SSH) session, using the SSH connection protocol [RFC4254] over the SSH transport protocol, using SSH user-auth [RFC4252] for authentication. There are a number of challenges to be addressed to map Secure Shell authentication method parameters into the SNMP architecture so that SNMP continues to work without any surprises. These are discussed in detail below. 1.5. Constraints The design of this SNMP Transport Model is influenced by the following constraints: 1. In times of network stress, the transport protocol and its underlying security mechanisms SHOULD NOT depend upon the ready availability of other network services (e.g., Network Time Protocol (NTP) or AAA protocols). 2. When the network is not under stress, the transport model and its underlying security mechanisms MAY depend upon the ready availability of other network services. 3. It may not be possible for the transport model to determine when the network is under stress. 4. A transport model should require no changes to the SNMP architecture. 5. A transport model should require no changes to the underlying protocol. 2. The Secure Shell Protocol SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network. It consists of three major protocol components, and add-on methods for user authentication: Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 o The Transport Layer Protocol [RFC4253] provides server authentication, and message confidentiality and integrity. It may optionally also provide compression. The transport layer will typically be run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any other reliable data stream. o The User Authentication Protocol [RFC4252] authenticates the client-side principal to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol. o The Connection Protocol [RFC4254] multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the transport after successfully authenticating the principal. o Generic Message Exchange Authentication [RFC4256] is a general purpose authentication method for the SSH protocol, suitable for interactive authentications where the authentication data should be entered via a keyboard o Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Authentication and Key Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol [RFC4462] describes methods for using the GSS-API for authentication and key exchange in SSH. It defines an SSH user authentication method that uses a specified GSS-API mechanism to authenticate a user, and a family of SSH key exchange methods that use GSS-API to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer connection has been established. A second service request is sent after client authentication is complete. This allows new protocols to be defined and coexist with the protocols listed above. The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide range of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up secure interactive shell sessions and for forwarding ("tunneling") arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11 connections. 3. How SSHTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem A transport model plugs into the Transport Subsystem [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]. The SSH Transport Model thus fits between the underlying SSH transport layer and the message dispatcher [RFC3411]. The SSH Transport Model will establish a channel between itself and the SSH Transport Model of another SNMP engine. The sending transport model passes unencrypted messages from the dispatcher to SSH to be encrypted, and the receiving transport model accepts decrypted incoming messages from SSH and passes them to the Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 dispatcher. After an SSH Transport model channel is established, then SNMP messages can conceptually be sent through the channel from one SNMP message dispatcher to another SNMP message dispatcher. Multiple SNMP messages MAY be passed through the same channel. The SSH Transport Model of an SNMP engine will perform the translation between SSH-specific security parameters and SNMP- specific, model-independent parameters. 3.1. Security Capabilities of this Model 3.1.1. Threats The Secure Shell Transport Model provides protection against the threats identified by the RFC 3411 architecture [RFC3411]: 1. Message stream modification - SSH provides for verification that each received message has not been modified during its transmission through the network. 2. Information modification - SSH provides for verification that the contents of each received message has not been modified during its transmission through the network, data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data sequences been altered to an extent greater than can occur non-maliciously. 3. Masquerade - SSH provides for both verification of the identity of the SSH server and verification of the identity of the SSH client. SSH provides verification of the identity of the SSH server through the SSH Transport Protocol server authentication [RFC4253]. 4. Verification of principal identity is important for use with the SNMP access control subsystem, to ensure that only authorized principals have access to potentially sensitive data. The SSH user identity is provided to the transport model, so it can be used to map to an SNMP model-independent securityName for use with SNMP access control and notification configuration. (The identity may undergo various transforms before it maps to the securityName.) 5. Authenticating both the SSH server and the SSH client ensures the authenticity of the SNMP engine that provides MIB data. Operators or management applications might act upon the data they receive (e.g., raise an alarm for an operator, modify the configuration of the device that sent the notification, modify Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 the configuration of other devices in the network as the result of the notification, and so on), so it is important to know that the provider of MIB data is authentic. 6. Disclosure - the SSH Transport Model provides that the contents of each received SNMP message are protected from disclosure to unauthorized persons. 7. Replay - SSH ensures that cryptographic keys established at the beginning of the SSH session and stored in the SSH session state are fresh new session keys generated for each session. These are used to authenticate and encrypt data, and to prevent replay across sessions. SSH uses sequence information to prevent the replay and reordering of messages within a session. 3.1.2. Message Authentication The RFC 3411 architecture recognizes three levels of security: - without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv) - with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv) - with authentication and with privacy (authPriv) The Secure Shell protocol provides support for encryption and data integrity. While it is technically possible to support no authentication and no encryption in SSH it is NOT RECOMMENDED by [RFC4253]. The SSH Transport Model determines from SSH the identity of the authenticated principal, and the type and address associated with an incoming message, and the SSH Transport Model provides this information to SSH for an outgoing message. The transport layer algorithms used to provide authentication, data integrity and encryption SHOULD NOT be exposed to the SSH Transport Model layer. The SNMPv3 WG deliberately avoided this and settled for an assertion by the security model that the requirements of securityLevel were met The SSH Transport Model has no mechanisms by which it can test whether an underlying SSH connection provides auth or priv, so the SSH Transport Model trusts that the underlying SSH connection has been properly configured to support authPriv security characteristics. The SSH Transport Model does not know about the algorithms or options to open SSH sessions that match different securityLevels. For interoperability of the trust assumptions between SNMP engines, an SSH Transport Model-compliant implementation MUST use an SSH Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 connection that provides authentication, data integrity and encryption that meets the highest level of SNMP security (authPriv). Outgoing messages requested by SNMP applications and specified with a lesser securityLevel (noAuthNoPriv or authNoPriv) are sent by the SSH Transport Model as authPriv securityLevel. The security protocols used in the Secure Shell Authentication Protocol [RFC4252] and the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol [RFC4253] are considered acceptably secure at the time of writing. However, the procedures allow for new authentication and privacy methods to be specified at a future time if the need arises. 3.1.3. Authentication Protocol Support The SSH Transport Model should support any server or client authentication mechanism supported by SSH. This includes the three authentication methods described in the SSH Authentication Protocol document [RFC4252] - publickey, password, and host-based - and keyboard interactive and others. The password authentication mechanism allows for integration with deployed password based infrastructure. It is possible to hand a password to a service such as RADIUS [RFC2865] or Diameter [RFC3588] for validation. The validation could be done using the user-name and user-password attributes. It is also possible to use a different password validation protocol such as CHAP [RFC1994] or digest authentication [RFC5090] to integrate with RADIUS or Diameter. At some point in the processing, these mechanisms require the password be made available as clear text on the device that is authenticating the password which might introduce threats to the authentication infrastructure. [DISCUSS: do we really need this paragraph? GSSKeyex [RFC4462] provides a framework for the addition of client authentication mechanisms which support different security infrastructures and provide different security properties. Additional authentication mechanisms, such as one that supports X.509 certificates, may be added to SSH in the future. 3.1.4. Privacy Protocol Support The SSH transport model supports any privacy protocol used with SSH. [DISCUSS: The authentication support section goes into significant detail; should the same be done here?] 3.1.5. Protection against Message Replay, Delay and Redirection SSH uses sequence numbers and integrity checks to protect against replay and reordering of messages within a connection. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 SSH also provides protection against replay of entire sessions. In a properly-implemented Diffie-Helman exchange, both sides will generate new random numbers for each exchange, which means the encryption and integrity keys will be distinct for every session. 3.1.6. SSH Subsystem This document describes the use of an SSH subsystem for SNMP to make SNMP usage distinct from other usages. SSH subsystems of type "snmp" are opened by the SSH Transport Model during the elements of procedure for an outgoing SNMP message. Since the sender of a message initiates the creation of an SSH session if needed, the SSH session will already exist for an incoming message or the incoming message would never reach the SSH Transport Model. [DISCUSS: If a notification originator opens a subsystem called "snmp" and a command generator opens a subsystem called "snmp", will that be confusing to SSH? ] Implementations MAY choose to instantiate SSH sessions in anticipation of outgoing messages. This approach might be useful to ensure that an SSH session to a given target can be established before it becomes important to send a message over the SSH session. Of course, there is no guarantee that a pre-established session will still be valid when needed. SSH sessions are uniquely identified within the SSH Transport Model by the combination of transportAddressType, transportAddress, securityName, and securityLevel associated with each session. 3.2. Security Parameter Passing For incoming messages, SSH-specific security parameters are translated by the transport model into security parameters independent of the transport and security models. The transport model accepts messages from the SSH subsystem, and records the transport-related and SSH-security-related information, including the authenticated identity, in a cache referenced by tmStateReference, and passes the WholeMsg and the tmStateReference to the dispatcher using the receiveMessage() ASI (Application Service Interface). For outgoing messages, the transport model takes input provided by the dispatcher in the sendMessage() ASI. The SSH Transport Model converts that information into suitable security parameters for SSH, establishes sessions as needed, and passes messages to the SSH subsystem for sending. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 3.3. Notifications and Proxy SSH connections may be initiated by command generators or by notification originators. Command generators are frequently operated by a human, but notification originators are usually unmanned automated processes. As a result, it may be necessary to provision authentication credentials on the SNMP engine containing the notification originator, or use a third party key provider such as Kerberos, so the engine can successfully authenticate to an engine containing a notification receiver. The targets to whom notifications should be sent is typically determined and configured by a network administrator. The SNMP- TARGET-MIB module [RFC3413] contains objects for defining management targets, including transport domains and addresses and security parameters, for applications such as notifications and proxy. For the SSH Transport Model, transport type and address are configured in the snmpTargetAddrTable, and the securityName, and securityLevel parameters are configured in the snmpTargetParamsTable. The default approach is for an administrator to statically preconfigure this information to identify the targets authorized to receive notifications or perform proxy. These MIB modules may be configured using SNMP or other implementation-dependent mechanisms, such as CLI scripting or loading a configuration file. It may be necessary to provide additional implementation-specific configuration of SSH parameters. 4. Passing Security Parameters For the SSH Transport Model, some state needs to be maintained using tmStateReference. RFC3411 discusses a securityStateReference, which is not accessible to the Transport Subsystem. 4.1. tmStateReference Upon opening each SSH connection, the SSH Transport Model stores model- and mechanism-specific information about the connection in a cache, referenced by tmStateReference. This connection information might be consistent across multiple messages, and might also be stored in the sshtmLCDTable. For interoperability with Security Model designs, the state referenced by tmStateReference MUST include the following fields (with sample values). See the Elements of Procedure for detailed processing instructions on the use of these fields by the SSH Transport Model. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 tmTransport = snmpSSHDomain tmAddress = an snmpSSHAddress tmRequestedSecurityLevel = ["noAuthNoPriv" | "authNoPriv" | "authPriv" ] tmTransportSecurityLevel = "authPriv" tmSecurityName = the principal name [to be] authenticated by SSH. See the section on tmSecurityName below. tmSameSecurity = true or false, depending on whether the Security Model requires that an outgoing response be sent using the same security parameters as were used for the incoming request or for any other security-model-dependent reason. See the section on tmSameSecurity below. The state referenced by tmStateReference for an SSH Transport Model should also contain an implementation-dependent identifier (e.g., tmSessionID). The per-session state that is referenced by tmStateReference may be saved across multiple messages in a Local Configuration Datastore (sshtmLCDTable). The tmStateReference cache should be generated anew for each message, so that it can be used to determine whether the SSH session available for sending an outgoing message is the same SSH session as was used when receiving the corresponding incoming message (e.g., a response to a request), when tmSameSecurity is set. A Transport Model will maintain any mapping between transport- specific security parameters and tmTransportSecurityLevel and tmSecurityName, and will verify for outgoing messages that the transport-provided security is at least as strong as tmRequestedSecurityLevel.. The SSH Transport Model implementation has the responsibility for "garbage collection" - releasing any associated tmStateReference when a session is closed. 4.2. tmSecurityName How the SSH identity is extracted from the SSH layer is implementation-dependent. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 tmSecurityName is a human-readable name in SnmpAdminString format that is mapped from the identity that has been successfully authenticated by SSH. By default, tmSecurityName is determined from the value of the user name field of the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message for which a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS has been received. As described in RFC4252 section 5, all authentication requests, regardless of authentication mechanism, MUST use the same message format, which includes a byte to indicate SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, and a user name field. How the authenticated user name is made available to the SNMP implementation is SSH-implementation dependent. The SSH protocol is not always clear on whether the user name field must be filled in, so for some implementations, it may be necessary to use a non-default mapping algorithm. How the SSH identity is mapped to a tmSecurityName should be administratively configurable. The sshtmLCDTransformPolicy object is used during the elements of procedure to determine whether the default transform or an alternative tranbsform is used. The tmSecurityName may ultimately be used to identify the layer 8 principal for use in such things as logging and for access control policy assignment. For example, USM provides this by pre- configuration of the mapping of the auth protocol and auth-specific credentials to a securityName, in the usmUserTable. Transport model transforms SHOULD generate a predictable tmSecurityName representing the principal. 4.3. tmSameSecurity If a Secure Shell transport session is closed between the time a request message is received and the corresponding response message is sent, then the response message MUST be discarded, even if a new SSH session has been established. The SSH Transport Model does not know whether a message contains a request or response (at least architecturally, this is not available to the transport model; implementations may choose to make this available for simplicity.) Each Security Model that supports the tmStateReference cache will pass a tmSameSecurity parameter in the tmStateReference cache for outgoing messages to indicate whether the same security MUST be used for the outgoing message as was used for the corresponding incoming message (e.g., a request-response pair). The tmStateReference for the Secure Shell Transport Model SHOULD also include a tmSessionID to indicate which SSH session should be used for the corresponding response. If the tmSameSecurity is indicated, but the session identified in the Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 tmStateReference does not match the current established SSH session for the tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName, and tmSecurityLevel, then the message MUST be discarded, and the dispatcher should be notified that the sending of the message failed. 5. Elements of Procedure Abstract service interfaces have been defined by RFC 3411 to describe the conceptual data flows between the various subsystems within an SNMP entity. The Secure Shell Transport Model uses some of these conceptual data flows when communicating between subsystems. These RFC 3411-defined data flows are referred to here as public interfaces. To simplify the elements of procedure, the release of state information is not always explicitly specified. As a general rule, if state information is available when a message gets discarded, the message-state information should also be released, and if state information is available when a session is closed, the session state information should also be released. An error indication may return an OID and value for an incremented counter and a value for securityLevel, and values for contextEngineID and contextName for the counter, and the securityStateReference if the information is available at the point where the error is detected. ContextEngineID and contextName are not accessible to Transport Models, so contextEngineID is set to the local value of snmpEngineID, and contextName is set to the default context for error counters. 5.1. Procedures for an Incoming Message 1) The SSH Transport Model queries the SSH engine, in an implementation-dependent manner, to determine the transportAddress, the principal name authenticated by SSH, and a session identifier. By default, the principal name is the value of the user name field of the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message for which a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS has been received. How this name is extracted from the SSH environment is implementation-dependent. 2) Using the sshtmLCDTransformPolicy, calculate a corresponding tmSecurityName value. Determine if there is a row in the sshtmLCDTable with the transport address and an sshtmLCDTmSecurityName that matches the calculated tmSecurityName value. 3) If one does not exist, create an entry in the sshtmLCDTable: Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 sshtmTransportAddress = transport address sshtmLCDTmSecurityName = calculated tmSecurityName sshtmLCDPrincipal=the SSH principal sshtmLCDSessionID=the SSH session identifier sshtmStorageType=volatile sshtmRowStatus=createAndGo 4) Create a tmStateReference cache for subsequent reference to the information. tmTransportDomain = snmpSSHDomain tmTransportAddress = sshtmLCDTransportAddress tmSecurityLevel = "authPriv" tmSecurityName = sshtmLCDTmSecurityName tmSessionID = an implementation-dependent value that can be used to detect when a session has closed and been replaced by another session. The value in tmStateReference should identify the session over which the message was received. Then the Transport model passes the message to the Dispatcher using the following ASI: statusInformation = receiveMessage( IN transportDomain -- snmpSSHDomain IN transportAddress -- address for the received message IN wholeMessage -- the whole SNMP message from SSH IN wholeMessageLength -- the length of the SNMP message IN tmStateReference -- (NEW) transport info ) 5.2. Procedures for an Outgoing Message The Dispatcher passes the information to the Transport Model using the ASI defined in the transport subsystem: Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 statusInformation = sendMessage( IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length IN tmStateReference -- (NEW) transport info ) The SSH Transport Model performs the following tasks: 1) Extract the tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName, tmSameSecurity, and tmSessionID from the tmStateReference. (SSHTM ignores the provided tmTransportDomain and tmRequestedSecurityLevel.) 2) Using tmTransportAddress and tmSecurityName, determine if a corresponding row exists in the sshtmLCDTable. 3) If there is a corresponding row, and tmSameSecurity is true, and tmSessionID does not match sshtmLCDSessionID, then increment the sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions counter, discard the message and return the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing of this message stops. 4) If there is no corresponding row, then call openSession() with the tmTransportAddress and tmSecurityName as parameters. 4b) If an error is returned from OpenSession(), then discard the message, and return the error indication returned by OpenSession() in the statusInformation. 5) Determine any SSH-implementation-specific parameters from the sshtmLCDTable 6) Pass the wholeMessage to SSH for encapsulation as data in an SSH message. 5.3. Establishing a Session The Secure Shell Transport Model provides the following application service interface (ASI) to describe the data passed between the SSH Transport Model and the SSH service. It is an implementation decision how such data is passed. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 statusInformation = openSession( IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used IN tmSecurityName -- on behalf of this principal IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity ) The following describes the procedure to follow to establish a session between a client and server to run SNMP over SSH. This process is used by any SNMP engine establishing a session for subsequent use. This will be done automatically for an SNMP application that initiates a transaction, such as a Command Generator or a Notification Originator or a Proxy Forwarder. 1) Using destTransportAddress, the client will establish an SSH transport connection using the SSH transport protocol, authenticate the server, and exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The parameters of the transport connection and the credentials used to authenticate are provided in an implementation-dependent manner. If the attempt to establish a connection is unsuccessful, or server authentication fails, then sshtmSessionOpenErrors is incremented, and an openSession error indication is returned, and openSession processing stops. 2) Create an entry in the sshtmLCDTable: sshtmLCDTransportAddress = tmTransportAddress sshtmLCDTmSecurityName = tmSecurityName Using the sshtmLCDTransformPolicy, calculate the corresponding sshtmLCDPrincipal value. 3)In an implementation-specific manner, pass the sshtmLCDPrincipal to the SSH layer. The client will then invoke an SSH authentications service to authenticate the principal, such as that described in the SSH authentication protocol [RFC4252]. The credentials used to authenticate sshtmLCDPrincipal are determined in an implementation- dependent manner. If the authentication is unsuccessful, then the transport connection is closed, tmStateReference is released, the message is discarded, the sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures counter is incremented, an error indication is returned to the calling module, and processing stops Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 for this message. 4) Once the principal has been successfully authenticated, the client will invoke the "ssh- connection" service, also known as the SSH connection protocol [RFC4254]. 5) After the ssh-connection service is established, the client will request a channel of type "session" in an implementation-dependent manner. If unsuccessful, the transport connection is closed, tmStateReference is released, the message is discarded, the sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures counter is incremented, an error indication is returned to the calling module, and processing stops for this message. 6) If successful, this will result in an SSH session. Set the sshtmLCDSessionID in the corresponding entry. Increment the sshtmSessionOpens counter. 7) Once the SSH session has been established, the client will invoke SNMP as an SSH subsystem, as indicated in the "subsystem" parameter. In order to allow SNMP traffic to be easily identified and filtered by firewalls and other network devices, servers associated with SNMP entities using the Secure Shell Transport Model MUST default to providing access to the "SNMP" SSH subsystem if the SSH session is established using the IANA-assigned TCP port. Servers SHOULD be configurable to allow access to the SNMP SSH subsystem over other ports. 5.4. Closing a Session The Secure Shell Transport Model provides the following ASI to close a session: statusInformation = closeSession( IN tmTransportAddress -- transport address to be used IN tmSecurityName -- on behalf of this principal ) The following describes the procedure to follow to close a session between a client and sever . This process is followed by any SNMP engine to close an SSH session. It is implementation-dependent when a session should be closed. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 1) Lookup the session in the sshtmLCDTable using the tmTransportAddress and tmSecurityName. 3) If there is no entry, then closeSession processing is completed. 4) Extract sshtmLCDPrincipal and sshtmLCDSessionID. Have SSH close the session. Increment the sshtmSessionCloses counter. 6. MIB Module Overview This MIB module provides management of the Secure Shell Transport Model. It defines some needed textual conventions, and some statistics. 6.1. Structure of the MIB Module Objects in this MIB module are arranged into subtrees. Each subtree is organized as a set of related objects. The overall structure and assignment of objects to their subtrees, and the intended purpose of each subtree, is shown below. 6.2. Textual Conventions Generic and Common Textual Conventions used in this document can be found summarized at http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html 6.3. Relationship to Other MIB Modules Some management objects defined in other MIB modules are applicable to an entity implementing the SSH Transport Model. In particular, it is assumed that an entity implementing the SSHTM-MIB will implement the SNMPv2-MIB [RFC3418], the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411] and the SNMP-TRANSPORT-MIB [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]. This MIB module is for managing SSH Transport Model information. This MIB module models a sample Local Configuration Datastore for the Transport Model (not for SSH or an associated security model). 6.3.1. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS The following MIB module imports items from [RFC2578], [RFC2579], [RFC2580]. This MIB module also references [RFC3490] and [RFC3986] Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 7. MIB Module Definition SSHTM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains, Counter32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI TEXTUAL-CONVENTION FROM SNMPv2-TC MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF ; sshtmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "200710140000Z" ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group" CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: isms@lists.ietf.org Subscribe: isms-request@lists.ietf.org Chairs: Juergen Quittek NEC Europe Ltd. Network Laboratories Kurfuersten-Anlage 36 69115 Heidelberg Germany +49 6221 90511-15 quittek@netlab.nec.de Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen Campus Ring 1 28725 Bremen Germany +49 421 200-3587 j.schoenwaelder@iu-bremen.de Co-editors: David Harrington Huawei Technologies USA 1700 Alma Drive Plano Texas 75075 USA +1 603-436-8634 ietfdbh@comcast.net Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Joseph Salowey Cisco Systems 2901 3rd Ave Seattle, WA 98121 USA jsalowey@cisco.com " DESCRIPTION "The Secure Shell Transport Model MIB Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This version of this MIB module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices. -- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number -- for this document and remove this note " REVISION "200710140000Z" DESCRIPTION "The initial version, published in RFC XXXX. -- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number -- for this document and remove this note " ::= { mib-2 xxxx } -- RFC Ed.: replace xxxx with IANA-assigned number and -- remove this note -- ---------------------------------------------------------- -- -- subtrees in the SNMP-SSH-TM-MIB -- ---------------------------------------------------------- -- sshtmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 0 } sshtmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 1 } sshtmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 2 } -- ------------------------------------------------------------- -- Objects -- ------------------------------------------------------------- snmpSSHDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The SNMP over SSH transport domain. The corresponding transport address is of type SnmpSSHAddress. When an SNMP entity uses the snmpSSHDomain transport model, it must be capable of accepting messages up to Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 and including 8192 octets in size. Implementation of larger values is encouraged whenever possible." ::= { snmpDomains yy } -- RFC Ed.: replace yy with IANA-assigned number and -- remove this note SnmpSSHAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "1a" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Represents either a hostname with a port number or an IP address with a port number. The hostname must be encoded in ASCII, as specified in RFC3490 (Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications) followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number in ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified whenever possible. An IPv4 address must be a dotted decimal format followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number in ASCII. An IPv6 address must be a colon separated format, surrounded by brackets, followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number in ASCII. Values of this textual convention may not be directly useable as transport-layer addressing information, and may require runtime resolution. As such, applications that write them must be prepared for handling errors if such values are not supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs at the time of the management operation). The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may have snmpSSHAddress values must fully describe how (and when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice versa. This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in object definitions since it restricts addresses to a specific format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used either on its own or in conjunction with TransportAddressType or TransportDomain as a pair. When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 index object, there may be issues with the limit of 128 sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2, STD 58. It is RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual convention make explicit any limitations on index component lengths that management software must observe. This may be done either by including SIZE constraints on the index components or by specifying applicable constraints in the conceptual row DESCRIPTION clause or in the surrounding documentation. " REFERENCE "RFC3896, Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255)) -- The sshtmSession Group sshtmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmObjects 1 } sshtmLCD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmObjects 2 } sshtmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request has been executed, whether it succeeded or failed. " ::= { sshtmSession 1 } sshtmSessionCloses OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times a closeSession() request has been executed, whether it succeeded or failed. " ::= { sshtmSession 2 } sshtmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request failed to open a Session, for any reason. " ::= { sshtmSession 3 } sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures OBJECT-TYPE Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request failed due to user authentication failures. " ::= { sshtmSession 4 } sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request failed due to channel open failures. " ::= { sshtmSession 5 } sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of times an outgoing message was dropped because the same session was no longer available. " ::= { sshtmSession 6 } -- The table of users for the Transport Security Model -- This table can support users of multiple transport models sshtmLCDSpinLock OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TestAndIncr MAX-ACCESS read-write STATUS current DESCRIPTION "An advisory lock used to allow several cooperating Command Generator Applications to coordinate their use of facilities to alter the sshtmLCDTable. " ::= { sshtmLCD 1 } -- The transform policy for the SSH Transport Model sshtmLCDTransformPolicy OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX INTEGER { default(1), private(2) } MAX-ACCESS read-write Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The policy that should be used to perform transforms between the SSH identity and tmSecurityName, and vice-versa. default (1) - for incoming messages, the value passed in the user name field of SSH user_auth is assigned to both sshtmLCDTmSecurityName and sshtmLCDPrincipal. For outgoing messages, the value passed in tmSecurityName is assigned to both sshtmLCDTmSecurityName and sshtmLCDPrincipal. private (2) - use an implementation-specific mapping algorithm for the transform. If the algorithm does not yield a mapping, no entry should be created for the identity in the sshtmLCDTable. It is implementation-dependent whether a private algorithm is supported. " DEFVAL { default } ::= { sshtmLCD 2 } sshtmLCDTable OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF sshtmLCDEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The table of users configured in the SSH Transport Model Local Configuration Datastore (LCD). Rows in this table can be instantiated when an authenticated identity is passed to the transport model from SSH, and they can be instantiated by a command generator. To instantiate a new row in this table, the sshtmLCDSpinLock should be used to prevent conflicts. 1) GET(sshtmLCDSpinLock.0) and save in sValue. 2) SET(sshtmLCDSpinLock.0=sValue, sshtmLCDTransportAddress=(desired value), sshtmLCDTmSecurityName=(desired value), sshtmLCDPrincipal=(desired value), sshtmLCDSessionID=sValue, sshtmLCDStorageType=(desired value), sshtmLCDStatus=createAndGo) " ::= { sshtmLCD 3 } Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 sshtmLCDEntry OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX sshtmLCDEntry MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A user configured in the Local Configuration Datastore (LCD) for the SSH Transport Model. To maintain modularity of design, and to avoid side-effects, only the SSH Transport Model (or a SET operation) should modify this table. For all entries in this table, the transportDomain is snmpSSHTransportDomain, and the security level is authpriv. " INDEX { sshtmLCDTransportAddress, sshtmLCDTmSecurityName } ::= { sshtmLCDTable 1 } sshtmLCDEntry ::= SEQUENCE { sshtmLCDTransportAddress TransportAddress, sshtmLCDTmSecurityName SnmpAdminString, sshtmLCDPrincipal SnmpAdminString, sshtmLCDSessionID Integer32 sshtmLCDStorageType StorageType, sshtmLCDRowStatus RowStatus } sshtmLCDTransportAddress OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX TransportAddress MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "This object contains a transport address. " ::= { sshtmLCDEntry 2 } sshtmLCDTmSecurityName OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32)) MAX-ACCESS not-accessible STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A human readable string representing the user. This value is passed in tmSecurityName. The default transformation of the SSH user name to Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 tmSecurityName and vice versa is the identity function so the sshtmLCDTmSecurityName is usually the same as the sshtmLCDPrincipal. " ::= { sshtmLCDEntry 3 } sshtmLCDPrincipal OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32)) MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A human readable string used to determine, in an implementation-dependent manner, which SSH credentials are used during authentication of the prinicipal. By default, this is the SSH user name. " ::= { sshtmLCDEntry 5 } sshtmLCDStorageType OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX StorageType MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows having the value readOnly, permanent, or nonVolatile must persist across reinitializations of the management subsystem. Conceptual rows having the value 'volatile' must not persist across reinitializations of the management subsystem. It is an implementation issue to decide if a SET for a readOnly or permanent row is accepted at all. In some contexts this may make sense, in others it may not. If a SET for a readOnly or permanent row is not accepted at all, then a 'wrongValue' error must be returned. " DEFVAL { volatile } ::= { sshtmLCDEntry 6 } sshtmLCDRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX RowStatus MAX-ACCESS read-create STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The status of this conceptual row. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding instance of sshtmLCDStatus is 'notReady'. The sshtmLCDPrincipal value should only be changed when the value of this object is 'active'. " ::= { sshtmLCDEntry 7 } -- ************************************************ -- sshtmMIB - Conformance Information -- ************************************************ sshtmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmConformance 1 } sshtmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmConformance 2 } -- ************************************************ -- Compliance statements -- ************************************************ sshtmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the SNMP-SSH-TM-MIB" MODULE MANDATORY-GROUPS { sshtmGroup } ::= { sshtmCompliances 1 } -- ************************************************ -- Units of conformance -- ************************************************ sshtmGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS { sshtmSessionOpens, sshtmSessionCloses, sshtmSessionOpenErrors, sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures, sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures, sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions, sshtmLCDSpinLock, sshtmLCDTransportAddress, sshtmLCDTmSecurityName, sshtmLCDPrincipal, sshtmLCDStorageType, Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 sshtmLCDRowStatus } STATUS current DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects for maintaining information of an SNMP engine which implements the SNMP Secure Shell Transport Model. " ::= { sshtmGroups 2 } END 8. Operational Considerations The SSH Transport Model will likely not work in conditions where access to the CLI has stopped working. In situations where SNMP access has to work when the CLI has stopped working, a UDP transport model should be considered instead of the SSH Transport Model. The SSH Transport Model defines two well-known default ports, one for request/response traffic, and one port that listens for notifications. If the SSH Transport Model is configured to utilize AAA services, operators should consider configuring support for a local authentication mechanisms, such as local passwords, so SNMP can continue operating during times of network stress. The SSH protocol has its own windowing mechanism. RFC 4254 says: The window size specifies how many bytes the other party can send before it must wait for the window to be adjusted. Both parties use the following message to adjust the window. The SSH specifications leave it open when such window adjustment messages are created. Some implementations have been found to send window adjustment messages whenever received data has been passed to the application. Since window adjustment messages are padded, encrypted, hmac'ed, and wrapped, this results in noticeable bandwidth and processing overhead, which can be avoided by sending window adjustment messages less frequently. The SSH protocol requires the execution of CPU intensive calculations to establish a session key during session establishment. This means that short lived sessions become computationally expensive compared to USM, which does not have a notion of a session key. Other transport security protocols such as TLS support a session resumption Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 feature that allows reusing a cached session key. Such a mechanism does not exist for SSH and thus SNMP applications should keep SSH sessions for longer time periods. To initiate SSH connections, an entity must be configured with SSH client credentials and information to authenticate the server. While hosts are often configured to be SSH clients, most internetworking devices are not. To send notifications over SSHTM, the internetworking device will need to be configured to be SSH clients. How this credential configuration is done is implementation and deployment specific. A scalable IETF standard protocol for configuration or key management is RECOMMENDED. 9. Security Considerations This document describes a transport model that permits SNMP to utilize SSH security services. The security threats and how the SSH Transport Model mitigates those threats is covered in detail throughout this memo. The SSH Transport Model relies on SSH mutual authentication, binding of keys, confidentiality and integrity. Any authentication method that meets the requirements of the SSH architecture will provide the properties of mutual authentication and binding of keys. While SSH does support turning off confidentiality and integrity, they SHOULD NOT be turned off when used with the SSH Transport Model. SSHv2 provides Perfect Forward Security (PFS) for encryption keys. PFS is a major design goal of SSH, and any well-designed keyex algorithm will provide it. The security implications of using SSH are covered in [RFC4251]. The SSH Transport Model has no way to verify that server authentication was performed, to learn the host's public key in advance, or verify that the correct key is being used. The SSH Transport Model simply trusts that these are properly configured by the implementer and deployer. 9.1. noAuthPriv SSH provides the "none" userauth method, which is normally rejected by servers and used only to find out what userauth methods are supported. However, it is legal for a server to accept this method, which has the effect of not authenticating the SSH client to the SSH server. Doing this does not compromise authentication of the SSH server to the SSH client, nor does it compromise data confidentiality or data integrity. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 SSH supports anonymous access. If the SSH Transport Model can extract from SSH an authenticated principal to map to securityName, then anonymous access SHOULD be supported. It is possible for SSH to skip entity authentication of the client through the "none" authentication method to support anonymous clients, however in this case an implementation MUST still support data integrity within the SSH transport protocol and provide an authenticated principal for mapping to securityName for access control purposes. The RFC 3411 architecture does not permit noAuthPriv. The SSH Transport Model SHOULD NOT be used with an SSH connection with the "none" userauth method. 9.2. Use with SNMPv1/v2c Messages The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c message processing described in RFC3584 (BCP 74) [RFC3584] always selects the SNMPv1(1) Security Model for an SNMPv1 message, or the SNMPv2c(2) Security Model for an SNMPv2c message. When running SNMPv1/SNMPv2c over a secure transport like the SSH Transport Model, the securityName and securityLevel used for access control decisions are then derived from the community string, not the authenticated identity and securityLevel provided by the SSH Transport Model. 9.3. Skipping Public Key Verification Most key exchange algorithms are able to authenticate the SSH server's identity to the client. However, for the common case of DH signed by public keys, this requires the client to know the host's public key a priori and to verify that the correct key is being used. If this step is skipped, then authentication of the SSH server to the SSH client is not done. Data confidentiality and data integrity protection to the server still exist, but these are of dubious value when an attacker can insert himself between the client and the real SSH server. Note that some userauth methods may defend against this situation, but many of the common ones (including password and keyboard-interactive) do not, and in fact depend on the fact that the server's identity has been verified (so passwords are not disclosed to an attacker). SSH MUST NOT be configured to skip public key verification for use with the SSH Transport Model. 9.4. The 'none' MAC Algorithm SSH provides the "none" MAC algorithm, which would allow you to turn off data integrity while maintaining confidentiality. However, if you do this, then an attacker may be able to modify the data in Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 flight, which means you effectively have no authentication. SSH MUST NOT be configured using the "none" MAC algorithm for use with the SSH Transport Model. 9.5. MIB Module Security There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB module via direct SNMP SET operations. Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their sensitivity/vulnerability: o The readable objects in this MIB module are not sensitive. SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec or SSH), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB module. It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410] section 8), including full support for the USM and the SSH Transport Model cryptographic mechanisms (for authentication and privacy). Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. 10. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to assign: 1. a TCP port number in the range 1..1023 in the http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers registry which will Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 be the default port for SNMP over an SSH Transport Model as defined in this document, 2. an SMI number under mib-2, for the MIB module in this document, 3. an SMI number under snmpDomains, for the snmpSSHDomain, 4. "snmp" as an SSH Service Name in the http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters registry. 11. Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank Jeffrey Hutzelman for sharing his SSH insights. 12. References 12.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J. Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999. [RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J. Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999. [RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999. [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000. [RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411, December 2002. [RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62, RFC 3413, December 2002. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 [RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002. [RFC3418] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3418, December 2002. [RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003. [RFC3584] Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S., and B. Wijnen, "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework", BCP 74, RFC 3584, August 2003. [RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006. [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. [RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006. [RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, January 2006. [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", draft-ietf-isms-tmsm-12 (work in progress), February 2008. 12.2. Informative References [RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. [RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart, "Introduction and Applicability Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Statements for Internet-Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002. [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005. [RFC4256] Cusack, F. and M. Forssen, "Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)", RFC 4256, January 2006. [RFC4462] Hutzelman, J., Salowey, J., Galbraith, J., and V. Welch, "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Authentication and Key Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 4462, May 2006. [RFC5090] Sterman, B., Sadolevsky, D., Schwartz, D., Williams, D., and W. Beck, "RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication", RFC 5090, February 2008. [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, December 2006. Appendix A. Open Issues We need to reach consensus on some issues. Here is the current list of issues from the SSH Transport Model document where we need to reach consensus. o Issue #2: In USM, there is a mapping table that permits one user to have multiple methods for authentication, that map to a common securityName. Since SSH supports multiple authentication mechanisms, do we need to specify how these mechanism-specific identities map to a common securityName? This is important to permit admins to configure the TARGET-MIB, for example, with one common identity rather than mechanism-specific identities. o Issue #3: Mapping from the sshtmLCDTable identity to an SSH mechanisms-specific identity. This may just be the opposite transform of Issue #2. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 o Issue #5: what are the elements of procedure if you run for example SNMPv3/USM over SSHTM? The ASIs do not have parameters to identify two methods of authentication, and it is unclear how an outgoing message request would specify both SNMPv3/USM and SSHTM should be used, and which securityName/Level should be used for each. o Issue #6: We have not resolved whether the principal associated with a notification receiver must be a principal (aka user) or whether a hostname is adequate. In SNMPv3, the access controls are symmetrical - it is a user-level principal that access controls apply to, whether for R/R or notify applications. Is it acceptable to have user-level for R/R and host-level for notify functionality? A user that is not allowed to GET an object might be able to have the value of the object reported in a notification, or vice-versa. This is not much different that a principal having two different identities, one for R/R and another for notifications, or an admin configuring systems to send notifications to a different principal than those who do R/R processing. The WG needs to discuss this and reach some consensus on whether this is an issue or not, and how we want to proceed. TODO: finalize error processing in EOP Appendix B. Change Log From -10- to -11 Changed LCD to sshtmLCDTable so it would not be confused with the snmpTsmLCD. Removed the text that said the format and content of the LCD is implementation-specific, since we now have a MIB module to standardize the format and content. Designed sshtmLCDTable to reflect there is only one transportDomain and one securityLevel supported by this transport model. Used sshtmLCDTmSecurityName to reflect that the values in this table and the values in the tmStateReference are usually the same for some fields. Added operational considerations about SSH client credential distribution. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Modified EOP to use sshtmLCDTable Resolved Issue #8: Should we allow transport models to select the corresponding security model by providing an additional parameter - the securityModel parameter - to tmStateReference, which would override the securityModel parameter extracted from a message header? Doing this would resolve Issue #5, and would allow the transport security model to be used with all SNMP message versions. - The consensus is that we will not allow the transport model to specify the security model. From -09- to -10 Issue #1: Made release of cached session info an implementation requirement on session close. Issue #4: UTF-8 syntax of userauth user name matches syntax of SnmpAdminString. Issue #7: Resolved to not describe how an SSH session is closed. From -08- to -09 Updated MIB assignment to by rfc4181 compatible update MIB security considerations with coexistence issues update sameSession and tmSessionID support Fixed note about terminology, for consistency with SNMPv3. From -07- to -08 Updated MIB update MIB security considerations develop sameSession and tmSessionID support Added a note about terminology, for consistency with SNMPv3 rather than with RFC2828. Removed reference to mappings other than the identity function. From -06- to -07 Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 removed section on SSH to EngineID mappings, since engineIDs are not exposed to the transport model removed references to engineIDs and discovery removed references to securityModel. added security considerations warning about using with SNMPv1/v2c messages. added keyboard interactive discussion noted some implementation-dependent points removed references to transportModel; we use the transport domain as a model identifier. cleaned up ASIs modified MIB to be under snmpModules changed transportAddressSSH to snmpSSHDomain style addressing From -05- to -06 replaced transportDomainSSH with RFC3417-style snmpSSHDomain replaced transportAddressSSH with RFC3417-style snmpSSHAddress Changed recvMessage to receiveMessage, and modified OUT to IN to match TMSM. From -04- to -05 added sshtmUserTable moved session tabel into the transport model MIB from the transport subsystem MIB added and then removed Appendix A - Notification Tables Configuration (see Transport Security Model) made this document a specification of a transport model, rather than a security model in two parts. Eliminated TMSP and MPSP and replaced them with "transport model" and "security model". Removed security-model-specific processing from this document. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Removed discussion of snmpv3/v1/v2c message format co-existence changed tmSessionReference back to tmStateReference "From -03- to -04-" changed tmStateReference to tmSessionReference "From -02- to -03-" rewrote almost all sections merged ASI section and Elements of Procedure sections removed references to the SSH user, in preference to SSH client updated references creayted a conventions section to identify common terminology. rewrote sections on how SSH addresses threats rewrote mapping SSH to engineID eliminated discovery section detailed the Elements of Procedure eliminated secrtions on msgFlags, transport parameters resolved issues of opening notifications eliminated sessionID (TMSM needs to be updated to match) eliminated use of tmsSessiontable except as an example updated Security Considerations "From -01- to -02-" Added TransportDomainSSH and Address Removed implementation considerations Changed all "user auth" to "client auth" Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Removed unnecessary MIB module objects updated references improved consistency of references to TMSM as architectural extension updated conventions updated threats to be more consistent with RFC3552 discussion of specific SSH mechanism configurations moved to security considerations modified session discussions to reference TMSM sessions expanded discussion of engineIDs wrote text to clarify the roles of MPSP and TMSP clarified how snmpv3 message parts are ised by SSHSM modified nesting of subsections as needed securityLevel used by the SSH Transport Model always equals authpriv removed discussion of using SSHSM with SNMPv1/v2c started updating Elements of Procedure, but realized missing info needs discussion. updated MIB module relationship to other MIB modules "From -00- to -01-" -00- initial draft as ISMS work product: updated references to SecSH RFCs Modified text related to issues# 1, 2, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30, and 32. updated security considerations removed Juergen Schoenwaelder from authors, at his request Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 ran the mib module through smilint Authors' Addresses David Harrington Huawei Technologies (USA) 1700 Alma Dr. Suite 100 Plano, TX 75075 USA Phone: +1 603 436 8634 EMail: dharrington@huawei.com Joseph Salowey Cisco Systems 2901 3rd Ave Seattle, WA 98121 USA EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP July 2008 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Harrington & Salowey Expires January 12, 2009 [Page 43]