DNS Extensions R. Arends Internet-Draft Telematica Instituut Expires: August 15, 2003 R. Austein ISC M. Larson VeriSign D. Massey USC/ISI S. Rose NIST February 14, 2003 DNS Security Introduction and Requirements draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-05 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2003. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Abstract The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions, and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 1] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the group of documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Definitions of Important DNSSEC Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Services Provided by DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity . . . . . . . . 6 3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-Existence . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Services Not Provided by DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Resolver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Stub Resolver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Zone Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1 TTL values vs. SIG validity period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.2 New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Name Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. DNS Security Document Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1 DNS Security Document Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2 Categories of DNS Security Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 2] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 1. Introduction This document introduces the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This document and its two companion documents ([13] and [14]) update, clarify, and refine the security extensions originally defined in RFC 2535 [3]. These security extensions consist of a set of new resource record types and modifications to the existing DNS protocol [2]. The new records and protocol modifications are not fully described in this document, but are described in a family of documents outlined in Section 9. Section 3 and Section 4 describe the capabilities and limitations of the security extensions in greater detail. Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 discuss the effect that these security extensions will have on resolvers, stub resolvers, zones and name servers. This document and its two companions update and obsolete RFCs 2535, 3008, 3090, 3225, 3226, and 3445, as well as several works in progress: "Redefinition of the AD bit", "Delegation Signer Resource Record", and "DNSSEC Opt-In". See [18] for more details on these documents. The DNS security extensions provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data, as well as a means of public key distribution. These extensions do not provide protection against other types of attack, nor do they provide confidentiality. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 3] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 2. Definitions of Important DNSSEC Terms authentication chain: In the DNSSEC model, a KEY RR signs a DS RR, which hashes one RR in another KEY RRset, which in turn signs another DS RR, which hashes one RR in yet another KEY RRset, and so forth, finally ending, if all goes well, with a KEY RR which signs whatever DNS data the end user was looking for in the first place. This alternating succession of KEY RRsets and DS RRs forms a chain of signed data, with each link in the chain vouching for the next. If a signature somewhere in this chain has been generated by an authentication key known to a security-aware resolver, then the resolver can attempt to verify and authenticate the signed chain of KEY and DS RRs from that point down to the target data. authentication key: A public key which a security-aware resolver trusts and can therefore use to verify data. A security-aware resolver can discover trusted authentication keys in three ways. First, the resolver is generally preconfigured to know about at least one key which it should trust. Second, the resolver may be able to discover both a new key and an associated DS RR which contains a valid hash of the new key and which has been signed by a key which the resolver trusts. Third, the resolver may be able to determine that a new key has been signed by another key which the resolver trusts. Note that the resolver must always be guided by local policy when deciding whether to trust a new key, even if the local policy is simply to trust any new key for which the resolver is able verify the signature. key signing key: An authentication key which is used to sign one or more other authentication keys. Typically, a key signing key will sign a zone signing key, which in turn will sign other zone data. Local policy may require the zone signing key to be changed frequently, while the key signing key may have a longer validity period in order to provide a more stable secure entry point into the zone. Designating an authentication key as a key signing key is purely an operational issue: DNSSEC itself does not distinguish between key signing keys and other DNSSEC authentication keys. Key signing keys are discussed in more detail in [12]. security-aware name server: An entity acting in the role of a name server (defined in section 2.4 of [1]) which understands the DNS security extensions defined in this document set. In particular, a security-aware name server is an entity which receives DNS queries, sends DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 [4] message size extension and the DO bit [8], and supports the RR types and message header bits defined in this document set. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 4] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 security-aware recursive name server: An entity which acts in both the security-aware name server and security-aware resolver roles. A more cumbersome equivalent phrase would be "a security-aware name server which offers recursive service". security-aware resolver: An entity acting in the role of a resolver (defined in section 2.4 of [1]) which understands the DNS security extensions defined in this document set. In particular, a security-aware resolver is an entity which sends DNS queries, receives DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 [4] message size extension and the DO bit [8], and is capable of using the RR types and message header bits defined in this document set to provide DNSSEC services. security-aware stub resolver: An entity acting in the role of a resolver (defined in section 2.4 of [1]) which has at least a minimal understanding the DNS security extensions defined in this document set, but which trusts one or more security-aware recursive name servers to perform most of the tasks discussed in this document set on its behalf. In particular, a security-aware stub resolver is an entity which sends DNS queries, receives DNS responses, and is capable of establishing an appropriately secured channel to a security-aware recursive name server which will provide these services on behalf of the security-aware stub resolver. Note that the distinction between security-aware resolvers and security-aware stub resolvers is different from the distinction between iterative-mode and recursive-mode resolvers in the base DNS specification: a particular security-aware resolver may operate exclusively in recursive mode, but still performs its own DNSSEC signature validity checks, while a security-aware stub resolver does not, by definition. security-oblivious: The opposite of "security-aware". signed zone: A zone whose RRsets are signed and which contains properly constructed KEY, SIG, NXT and (optionally) DS records. unsigned zone: The opposite of a "signed zone". zone signing key: An authentication key which is used to sign a zone. See key signing key, above. Typically a zone signing key will be part of the same KEY RRset as the key signing key which signs it, but is used for a slightly different purpose and may differ from the key signing key in other ways, such as validity lifetime. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 5] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 3. Services Provided by DNS Security The Domain Name System (DNS) security extensions provide origin authentication and integrity assurance services for DNS data, including mechanisms for authenticated denial of existence of DNS data. These mechanisms are described below. These mechanisms require minor changes to the DNS protocol. DNSSEC adds four new resource record types (SIG, KEY, DS and NXT) and two new message header bits (CD and AD). In order to support the larger DNS message sizes that result from adding the DNSSEC RRs, DNSSEC also requires EDNS0 support [4]. Finally, DNSSEC requires support for the DO bit [8], so that a security-aware resolver can indicate in its queries that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in response messages. These services protect against most of the threats to the Domain Name System described in [11]. 3.1 Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity DNSSEC provides authentication by associating cryptographically generated digital signatures with DNS RRsets. These digital signatures are stored in a new resource record, the SIG record. Typically, there will be a single private key that signs a zone's data, but multiple keys are possible: for example, there may be keys for each of several different digital signature algorithms. If a security-aware resolver reliably learns a zone's public key, it can authenticate that zone's signed data. An important DNSSEC concept is that the key that signs a zone's data is associated with the zone itself and not with the zone's authoritative name servers (public keys for DNS transaction authentication mechanisms may also appear in zones, as described in [7], but DNSSEC itself is concerned with object security of DNS data, not channel security of DNS transactions). A security-aware resolver can learn a zone's public key either by having the key preconfigured into the resolver or by normal DNS resolution. To allow the latter, public keys are stored in a new type of resource record, the KEY RR. Note that the private keys used to sign zone data must be kept secure, and should be stored offline when practical to do so. To discover a public key reliably via DNS resolution, the target key itself needs to be signed by either a preconfigured authentication key or another key that has been authenticated previously. Security-aware resolvers authenticate zone information by forming an authentication chain from a newly learned public key back to a previously known authentication public key, which in turn either must have been preconfigured into the resolver or must have been learned and verified previously. Therefore, the Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 6] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 resolver must be configured with at least one public key: if the preconfigured key is a zone signing key, then it will authenticate the associated zone; if the preconfigured key is a key signing key, it will authenticate a zone signing key. To help security-aware resolvers establish this authentication chain, security-aware name servers attempt to send the signature(s) needed to authenticate a zone's public key in the DNS reply message along with the public key itself, provided there is space available in the message. The authentication chain specified in the original DNS security extensions proceeded from signed KEY record to signed KEY record, as necessary, and finally to the queried RRset. The current specification adds a new Delegation Signer (DS) RR type to simplify some of the administrative tasks involved in signing delegations across organizational boundaries. The DS RRset resides at a delegation point in a parent zone and indicates the key or keys used by the delegated child zone to self-sign the KEY RRset at the child zone's apex. The child zone, in turn, uses one or more of the keys in this KEY RRset to sign its zone data. The authentication chain is therefore KEY->[DS->KEY]*->RRset, where "*" denotes zero or more DS- >KEY subchains. This authentication chain is normally constructed from the root of the DNS hierarchy down to the leaf zones, and is normally based on preconfigured knowledge of the public key for the root. Local policy, however, may also allow a security-aware resolver to trust one or more preconfigured keys other than the root key, or may not provide preconfigured knowledge of the root key, or may even prevent the resolver from trusting particular keys for arbitrary reasons even if those keys are properly signed with verifiable signatures. DNSSEC provides mechanisms by which a security-aware resolver can determine whether an RRset's signature is "valid" within the meaning of DNSSEC, but authentication and trust, in the final analysis, are matters of local policy, which may extend or even override the protocol extensions defined in this document set. 3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-Existence The security mechanism described in Section 3.1 only provides a way to sign existing RRsets in a zone. The problem of providing negative responses with the same level of authentication and integrity requires the use of another new resource record type, the NXT record. The NXT record allows a security-aware resolver to authenticate a negative reply for either name or type non-existence via the same mechanisms used to authenticate other DNS replies. Use of NXT records require a canonical representation and ordering for domain names in zones. Chains of NXT records explicitly describe the gaps, or "empty space", between domain names in a zone, as well as listing Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 7] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 the types of RRsets present at existing names. Each NXT record is signed and authenticated using the mechanisms described in Section 3.1. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 8] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 4. Services Not Provided by DNS Security DNS was originally designed with the assumptions that the DNS will return the same answer to any given query regardless of who may have issued the query, and that all data in the DNS is thus visible. Accordingly, DNSSEC is not designed to provide confidentiality, access control lists, or other means of differentiating between inquirers. DNSSEC provides no protection against denial of service attacks. Security-aware resolvers and security-aware name servers are vulnerable to an additional class of denial of service attacks based on cryptographic operations. Please see Section 11 for details. The DNS security extensions provide data and origin authentication for DNS data. The mechanisms outlined above extend no protection to operations such as zone transfers and dynamic update [16]. Message authentication schemes described in [5] and [7] address security operations that pertain to these transactions. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 9] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 5. Resolver Considerations A security-aware resolver needs to be able to perform necessary cryptographic functions to verify digital signatures using at least the mandatory-to-implement algorithms. Security-aware resolvers must also be capable of forming a authentication chain from a newly learned zone back to a authentication key, as described above. This process might require additional queries to intermediate DNS zones to obtain necessary KEY, DS and SIG records. A security-aware resolver should be configured with at least one authentication key as the starting point from which it will attempt to establish authentication chains. If a security-aware resolver is separated from the relevant authoritative name servers by a recursive name server or by any sort of device which acts as a proxy for DNS, and if the recursive name server or proxy is not security-aware, the security-aware resolver may not be able to operate in a secure mode. For example, if a security-aware resolver's packets are routed through a network address translation device that includes a DNS proxy which is not security-aware the security-aware resolver may find it difficult or impossible to obtain or validate signed DNS data. If a security-aware resolver must rely on an unsigned zone or a name server that is not security aware, the resolver may not be able to validate DNS responses, and will need a local policy on whether to accept unverified responses. A security-aware resolver should take a signature's validation period into consideration when determining the TTL of data in its cache, to avoid caching signed data beyond the validity period of the signature, but should also allow for the possibility that the security-aware resolver's own clock is wrong. Thus, a security-aware resolver which is part of a security-aware recursive name server will need to pay careful attention to the DNSSEC "checking disabled" (CD) bit [13] in order to avoid blocking valid signatures from getting through to other security-aware resolvers which are clients of this recursive name server and which are capable of performing their own DNSSEC validity checks. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 10] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 6. Stub Resolver Considerations Although not strictly required to do so by the protocol, most DNS queries originate from stub resolvers. Stub resolvers, by definition, are minimal DNS resolvers which use recursive query mode to offload most of the work of DNS resolution to a recursive name server. Given the widespread use of stub resolvers, the DNSSEC architecture has to take stub resolvers into account, but the security features needed in a stub resolver differ in some respects from those needed in a full security-aware resolver. Even an unaugmented stub resolver may get some benefit from DNSSEC if the recursive name servers it uses are security-aware, but for the stub resolver to place any real reliance on DNSSEC services, the stub resolver must trust both the recursive name servers in question and the communication channels between itself and those name servers. The first of these issues is a local policy issue: in essence, a stub resolver has no real choice but to place itself at the mercy of the recursive name servers that it uses, since it does not perform DNSSEC validity checks on its own. The second issue requires some kind of channel security mechanism; proper use of DNS transaction authentication mechanisms such as SIG(0) or TSIG would suffice, as would appropriate use of IPsec, and particular implementations may have other choices available, such as operating system specific interprocess communication mechanisms. Confidentiality is not needed for this channel, but data integrity and message authentication are. {{AD bit currently ratholed, update this when its fate is settled}} There is one more step which a security-aware stub resolver can take if, for whatever reason, it is not able to establish a useful trust relationship with the recursive name servers which it uses: it can perform its own signature validation, by setting the Checking Disabled (CD) bit in its query messages. Upon taking this step, the resolver is no longer really a stub resolver at all anymore (in the terminology used in this document set, anyway), and is now a security-aware resolver with somewhat limited functionality. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 11] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 7. Zone Considerations There are several differences between signed and unsigned zones. A signed zone will contain additional security-related records (SIG, KEY, DS and NXT records). SIG and NXT records may be generated by a signing process prior to serving the zone. The SIG records that accompany zone data have defined inception and expiration times, which establish a validity period for the signatures and the zone data the signatures cover. 7.1 TTL values vs. SIG validity period It is important to note the distinction between an RRset's TTL value and the signature validity period specified by the SIG RR covering that RRset. DNSSEC does not change the definition or function of the TTL value, which is intended to maintain database coherency in caches. A caching resolver purges RRsets from its cache no later than the end of the time period specified by the TTL fields of those RRsets, regardless of whether or not the resolver is security-aware. The inception and expiration fields in the SIG RR [13], on the other hand, specify the time period during which the signature can be used to validate the RRset that it covers. The signatures associated with signed zone data are only valid for the time period specified by these fields in the SIG RRs in question. TTL values cannot extend the validity period of signed RRsets in a resolver's cache, but the resolver may use the time remaining before expiration of the signature validity period of a signed RRset as an upper bound for the TTL of the signed RRset and its associated SIG RR in the resolver's cache. 7.2 New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones Information in a signed zone has a temporal dependency which did not exist in the original DNS protocol. A signed zone requires regular maintenance to ensure that each RRset in the zone has a current valid SIG RR. The signature validity period of a SIG RR is a interval during which the signature for one particular signed RRset can be considered valid, and the signatures of different RRsets in a zone may expire at different times. Re-signing one or more RRsets in a zone will change one or more SIG RRs, which in turn will require incrementing the zone's SOA serial number to indicate that a zone change has occurred and re-signing the SOA RRset itself. Thus, re- signing any RRset in a zone may also trigger DNS NOTIFY messages and zone transfers operations. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 12] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 8. Name Server Considerations A security-aware name server should include the appropriate DNSSEC records (SIG, KEY, DS and NXT) in all responses to queries from resolvers which have signaled their willingness to receive such records via use of the DO bit in the EDNS header, subject to message size limitations. For this reason a security-aware name server must support the EDNS mechanism size extension, since otherwise inclusion of DNSSEC RRs could easily cause UDP message truncation and fallback to TCP. If possible, the private half of each DNSSEC key pair should be kept offline, but this will not be possible for a zone for which DNS dynamic update has been enabled. In the dynamic update case, the primary master server for the zone will have to re-sign the zone when updated, so the private half of the zone signing key will have to be kept online. This is an example of a situation where the ability to separate the zone's KEY RRset into zone signing key(s) and key signing key(s) may be useful, since the key singing key(s) in such a case can still be kept offline. DNSSEC, by itself, is not enough to protect the integrity of an entire zone during zone transfer operations, since even a signed zone contains some unsigned data, so zone maintenance operations will require some additional mechanisms (most likely some form of channel security, such as TSIG, SIG(0), or IPsec). Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 13] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 9. DNS Security Document Family The DNSSEC set of documents can be partitioned into five main groups as depicted in Figure 1. All these documents are in turn under the larger umbrella of the DNS base protocol documents described in [18]. 9.1 DNS Security Document Roadmap --------------------------------------------------------------------- +----------------------------------+ | Base DNS Protocol Documents | | [RFC1035, RFC2181, et sequentia] | +----------------------------------+ | | +-----------+ +----------+ | DNSSEC | | New | | Protocol |--------->| Security | | Documents | | Uses | +-----------+ +----------+ | | +---------------- - - - - - - -+ | . | . +------------------+ . | Digital | +------------------+ | Signature | | Transaction | | Algorithm | | Authentication | | Implementations | | Implementations | +------------------+ +------------------+ Figure 1: DNSSEC Document Roadmap --------------------------------------------------------------------- 9.2 Categories of DNS Security Documents The "DNSSEC protocol document set" refers to the three documents which form the core of the DNS security extensions: 1. DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (this document) 2. Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions [13] Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 14] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 3. Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions [14] The "Digital Signature Algorithm Implementations" document set refers to the group of documents that describe how specific digital signature algorithms should be implemented to fit the DNSSEC resource record format. Each of these documents deals with a specific digital signature algorithm. The "Transaction Authentication Implementations" document set refers to the group of documents that deal with DNS message authentication, including secret key establishment and verification. While not strictly part of the DNSSEC specification as defined in this set of documents, this group is noted to show its relationship to DNSSEC. The final document set, "New Security Uses", refers to documents that seek to use proposed DNS Security extensions for other security related purposes. DNSSEC does not provide any direct security for these new uses, but may be used to support them. Documents that fall in this category include the use of DNS in the storage and distribution of certificates [15] and individual user public keys (PGP, e-mail, and so forth) [17]. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 15] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 10. IANA Considerations This document introduces no new IANA considerations. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 16] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 11. Security Considerations This document introduces the DNS security extensions and describes the document set that contains the new security records and DNS protocol modifications. This document discusses the capabilities and limitations of these extensions. The extensions provide data origin authentication and data integrity using digital signatures over resource record sets. In order for a security-aware resolver to validate a DNS response, all of the intermediate zones must be signed, and all of the intermediate name servers must be security-aware, as defined in this document set. A security-aware resolver cannot verify responses originating from an unsigned zone, from a zone not served by a security-aware name server, or for any DNS data which the resolver is only able to obtain through a recursive name server which is not security-aware. If there is a break in the authentication chain such that a security-aware resolver cannot obtain and validate the authentication keys it needs, then the security-aware resolver cannot validate the affected DNS data. This document briefly discusses other methods of adding security to a DNS query, such as using a channel secured by IPsec or using a DNS transaction authentication mechanism, but transaction security is not part of DNSSEC per se. A security-aware stub resolver, by definition, does not perform DNSSEC signature validation on its own, and thus is vulnerable both to attacks on (and by) the security-aware recursive name servers which perform these checks on its behalf and also to attacks on its communication with those security-aware recursive name servers. Security-aware stub resolvers should use some form of channel security to defend against the latter threat. The only known defense against the former threat would be for the security-aware stub resolver to perform its own signature validation, at which point, again by definition, it would no longer be a security-aware stub resolver. DNSSEC does not protect against denial of service attacks. DNSSEC makes DNS vulnerable to a new class of denial of service attacks based on cryptographic operations against security-aware resolvers and security-aware name servers, since an attacker can attempt to use DNSSEC mechanisms to consume a victim's resources. This class of attacks takes at least two forms. An attacker may be able to consume resources in a security-aware resolver's signature validation code by tampering with SIG RRs in response messages or by constructing needlessly complex signature chains. An attacker may also be able to consume resources in a security-aware name server which supports DNS Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 17] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 dynamic update, by sending a stream of update messages that force the security-aware name server to re-sign some RRsets in the zone more frequently than would otherwise be necessary. DNSSEC add the ability for a hostile party to enumerate all the names in a zone by following the NXT chain. NXT RRs assert which names do not exist in a zone by linking from existing name to existing name along a canonical ordering of all the names within a zone. Thus, an attacker can query these NXT RRs in sequence to obtain all the names in a zone. While not an attack on the DNS itself, this could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other resources by enumerating the contents of a zone. DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality, due to a deliberate design choice. DNSSEC does not protect against tampering with unsigned zone data. Non-authoritative data at zone cuts (glue and NS RRs in the parent zone) are not signed. Thus, while DNSSEC can provide data origin authentication and data integrity for RRsets, it cannot do so for zones, and other mechanisms must be used to protect zone transfer operations. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 18] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 12. Acknowledgements This document was created from the input and ideas of several members of the DNS Extensions Working Group. The authors would like to acknowledge (in alphabetical order) the following people for their contributions and comments on this document: Derek Atkins Donald Eastlake Miek Gieben Olafur Gudmundsson Olaf Kolkman Ed Lewis Ted Lindgreen Bill Manning Brian Wellington Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 19] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 Normative References [1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. [2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. [3] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 2535, March 1999. [4] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2671, August 1999. [5] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000. [6] Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000. [7] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000. [8] Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC", RFC 3225, December 2001. [9] Gudmundsson, O., "DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver message size requirements", RFC 3226, December 2001. [10] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002. [11] Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis Of The Domain Name System", draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-02 (work in progress), February 2002. [12] Kolkman, O. and J. Schlyter, "KEY RR Key Signing Key (KSK) Flag", draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-05 (work in progress), December 2002. [13] Arends, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec- records-02 (work in progress), November 2002. [14] Arends, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", draft-ietf- dnsext-dnssec-protocol-00 (work in progress), October 2002. Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 20] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 Informative References [15] Eastlake, D. and O. Gudmundsson, "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2538, March 1999. [16] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update", RFC 3007, November 2000. [17] Schlyter, J., "Storing application public keys in the DNS", draft-schlyter-appkey-02 (work in progress), February 2002. [18] Rose, S., "DNS Security Document Roadmap", draft-ietf-dnsext- dnssec-roadmap-06 (work in progress), November 2001. Authors' Addresses Roy Arends Telematica Instituut Drienerlolaan 5 7522 NB Enschede NL EMail: roy.arends@telin.nl Rob Austein Internet Software Consortium 40 Gavin Circle Reading, MA 01867 USA EMail: sra@isc.org Matt Larson VeriSign, Inc. 21345 Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA 20166-6503 USA EMail: mlarson@verisign.com Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 21] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 Dan Massey USC Information Sciences Institute 3811 N. Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22203 USA EMail: masseyd@isi.edu Scott Rose National Institute for Standards and Technology 100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8920 USA EMail: scott.rose@nist.gov Arends, et al. Expires August 15, 2003 [Page 22] Internet-Draft DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements February 2003 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. 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