Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com Intended status: Informational 9 March 2020 Expires: 10 September 2020 Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-04 Abstract The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data. [Note to Readers] Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh. This document is also available online at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.5. Structure: KeyOverlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5.6. Structure: EscrowedKeySet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.4. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.5. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.6. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.7. Structure: Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.8. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.9. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.10. Structure: ProfileMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.11. Mesh Device Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.12. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.13. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.15. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.16. Mesh Account Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.17. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.18. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.20. Structure: AccountEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.21. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6.22. Mesh Group Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6.23. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6.25. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6.26. Mesh Service Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.6.27. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.6.28. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.6.29. Mesh Host Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.6.30. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.6.31. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7. Cataloged items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7.2. Structure: ContactMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7.3. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7.4. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.7.5. Structure: Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.7.6. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.7.7. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.7.8. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.8. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 18 2.9. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.6. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.7. Structure: OfferGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.8. Structure: RequestContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.9. Structure: ReplyContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3. Mesh Portal Service Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1. Request Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.2. Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3. Imported Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.4. Common Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.5. Transaction: Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.9. Transaction: Get . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.9.1. Message: GetRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.9.2. Message: GetResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.10. Transaction: Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.11. Transaction: Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.16. Transaction: Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4. Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.1. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.3. Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.1.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.2. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.3.1. Data loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.3.2. Partial data survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.1. End point Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.1. Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.1.1. Triple lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.1.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1.5. Profile Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1.6. Identity Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.2. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.1. Ingress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.2. Egress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.3. Security Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.4. Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8.1. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.1.1. DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.1.2. TLS Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.1.4. Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.1.5. Response Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.2. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.2.1. Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.2.2. Session Key Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1. Introduction 2. Definitions This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language. 2.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.2. Defined Terms The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. 2.3. Related Specifications The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh documentation set and related specifications are described in this document. 2.4. Implementation Status The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. 2.5. Shared Classes The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile specifications. 2.5.1. Classes describing keys 2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey The PublicKey class is used to describe public key pairs and trust assertions associated with a public key. UDF: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters/ X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain. X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request. 2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite Service: String (Optional) Service holding the additional contribution 2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey UDF: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the encryption key Contact: Contact (Optional) The User's Mesh contact information Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 RecryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional) The recryption key EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The decryption key encrypted under the user's device key. 2.5.5. Structure: KeyOverlay UDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the resulting composite key (to allow verification) BaseUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint specifying the base key 2.5.6. Structure: EscrowedKeySet A set of escrowed keys. [No fields] 2.6. Assertion classes Classes that are derived from an assertion. 2.6.1. Structure: Assertion Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other forms of abuse. Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last modified. NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was created. 2.6.2. Structure: Condition Parent class from which all condition classes are derived. [No fields] 2.6.3. Base Classes Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection classes are derrived. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.6.4. Structure: Profile Inherits: Assertion Parent class from which all profile classes are derived KeyOfflineSignature: PublicKey (Optional) The permanent signature key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any circumstance. The only case in which a KeysOnlineSignature: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal profile contains at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration application profiles. 2.6.5. Structure: Connection Inherits: Assertion SubjectUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target. AuthorityUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source. 2.6.6. Structure: Activation Inherits: Assertion Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application running on a specific device EnvelopedConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The signed AssertionDev iceConnection. ActivationKey: String (Optional) The master secret from which all the key contributions are derrived. 2.6.7. Structure: Permission Name: String (Optional) Role: String (Optional) Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional) Keys or key contributions enabling the operation to be performed Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.6.8. Structure: CatalogedEntry Base class for cataloged Mesh data. [No fields] 2.6.9. Mesh Profile Classes A Mesh profile does not have activation or connection classes associated with it. It might be more consistent to represent administation devices as activations on the ProfileMesh class though. 2.6.10. Structure: ProfileMesh Inherits: Profile Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal profile. KeysMasterEscrow: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal Profile MAY contain one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for stored data. KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry 2.6.11. Mesh Device Classes 2.6.12. Structure: ProfileDevice Inherits: Profile Describes a mesh device. Description: String (Optional) Description of the device KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate requests made by the device. 2.6.13. Structure: ActivationDevice Inherits: Activation Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 [No fields] 2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice Inherits: Connection Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the device has been granted. KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the device under the profile KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of the device under the profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for use of the device under the profile 2.6.15. Structure: CatalogedDevice Inherits: CatalogedEntry Public device entry, indexed under the device ID UDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the Mesh EnvelopedProfileMesh: DareEnvelope (Optional) The Mesh profile DeviceUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile EnvelopedConnectionDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The public assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh EnvelopedActivationDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activations of the device within the Mesh Accounts: AccountEntry [0..Many] The accounts that this device is connected to 2.6.16. Mesh Account Classes 2.6.17. Structure: ProfileAccount Inherits: Profile Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the account. ServiceIDs: String [0..Many] Service address(es). MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional) Master profile of the account being registered. KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under this profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate requests made by the device. 2.6.18. Structure: ActivationAccount Inherits: Activation AccountUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the account KeyGroup: KeyComposite (Optional) The key contribution for the decryption key for the device. NB this is NOT an overlay on the device signature key, it is an overlay on the corresponding recryption key. 2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionAccount Inherits: Connection ServiceID: String [0..Many] The list of service identifiers. Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the device has been granted. KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the device under the profile KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of the device under the profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for use of the device under the profile 2.6.20. Structure: AccountEntry Contains the Account information for an account with a CatalogedDevice. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 AccountUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the account profile EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account profile EnvelopedConnectionAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The connection of this device to the account EnvelopedActivationAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activation data for this device to the account 2.6.21. Structure: ConnectionApplication Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.6.22. Mesh Group Classes 2.6.23. Structure: ProfileGroup Inherits: Profile Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to other administrators over time. ServiceIDs: String [0..Many] Service address(es). KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt data under this profile 2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup Inherits: Activation GroupUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the group 2.6.25. Structure: ConnectionGroup Describes the connection of a member to a group. Inherits: Connection KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional) The decryption key for the user within the group 2.6.26. Mesh Service Classes Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.6.27. Structure: ProfileService Inherits: Profile Profile of a Mesh Service KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. 2.6.28. Structure: ConnectionService Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.6.29. Mesh Host Classes 2.6.30. Structure: ProfileHost Inherits: Profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. 2.6.31. Structure: ConnectionHost Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.7. Cataloged items 2.7.1. Data Structures Classes describing data used in cataloged data. 2.7.2. Structure: ContactMesh UDF: String (Optional) ServiceID: String [0..Many] 2.7.3. Structure: Contact Inherits: Assertion MeshAccounts: DareEnvelope [0..Many] The Mesh Account Connection - the main event really Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 Email: String (Optional) Identifier: String (Optional) FullName: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) First: String (Optional) Middle: String (Optional) Last: String (Optional) Suffix: String (Optional) Labels: String [0..Many] AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many] Addresses: Address [0..Many] Locations: Location [0..Many] Roles: Role [0..Many] 2.7.4. Structure: Role CompanyName: String (Optional) Addresses: Address [0..Many] Locations: Location [0..Many] 2.7.5. Structure: Address URI: String (Optional) Labels: String [0..Many] 2.7.6. Structure: Location Appartment: String (Optional) Street: String (Optional) District: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 Locality: String (Optional) County: String (Optional) Postcode: String (Optional) Country: String (Optional) 2.7.7. Structure: Reference MessageID: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a response ResponseID: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response to the original (optional). Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be Read, Unread, Accept, Reject. 2.7.8. Structure: Task Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Start: DateTime (Optional) Finish: DateTime (Optional) StartTravel: String (Optional) FinishTravel: String (Optional) TimeZone: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Description: String (Optional) Location: String (Optional) Trigger: String [0..Many] Conference: String [0..Many] Repeat: String (Optional) Busy: Boolean (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.8. Catalog Entries 2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedCredential Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Password: String (Optional) 2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedNetwork Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Password: String (Optional) 2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedContact Inherits: CatalogedEntry Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user who created the catalog. To be valid, such an entry MUST be signed by an administration key for the Mesh profile containing the account to which the catalog belongs. Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the contact has been granted. EnvelopedContact: DareEnvelope (Optional) The (signed) contact data. 2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption Inherits: CatalogedContact [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedBookmark Inherits: CatalogedEntry Uri: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Path: String (Optional) 2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedTask Inherits: CatalogedEntry EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Key: String (Optional) Unique key. 2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedApplication Inherits: CatalogedEntry Key: String (Optional) 2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedMember UDF: String (Optional) Inherits: CatalogedEntry 2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedGroup Inherits: CatalogedApplication Profile: ProfileGroup (Optional) 2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail Inherits: CatalogedApplication Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 [No fields] 2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.9. Messages 2.9.1. Structure: Message MessageID: String (Optional) Sender: String (Optional) Recipient: String (Optional) References: Reference [0..Many] 2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete Inherits: Message [No fields] 2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN Account: String (Optional) Inherits: Message Expires: DateTime (Optional) PIN: String (Optional) 2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection Connection request message. This message contains the information Inherits: Message ServiceID: String (Optional) EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) Device profile of the device making the request. ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 PinUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the PIN value used to authenticate the request. 2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a valid MessageConnectionRequestClient Inherits: Message EnvelopedRequestConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The client connection request. ServerNonce: Binary (Optional) Witness: String (Optional) 2.9.6. Structure: RespondConnection Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the connection request. Inherits: Message Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of "Accept", "Reject" or "Pending". CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information. MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be absent or null otherwise. 2.9.7. Structure: OfferGroup Inherits: Message [No fields] 2.9.8. Structure: RequestContact Inherits: Message Reply: Boolean (Optional) Subject: String (Optional) Self: DareEnvelope (Optional) The contact data. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 2.9.9. Structure: ReplyContact Inherits: RequestContact [No fields] 2.9.10. Structure: GroupInvitation Inherits: Message Text: String (Optional) EncryptedPartDecrypt: DareEnvelope (Optional) 2.9.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation Inherits: Message Text: String (Optional) 2.9.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation Inherits: Message Request: RequestConfirmation (Optional) Accept: Boolean (Optional) 2.9.13. Structure: RequestTask Inherits: Message [No fields] 3. Mesh Portal Service Reference HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or any other transaction. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.1. Request Messages A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding, the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host field. 3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest Base class for all request messages. Portal: String (Optional) Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which the request is directed. 3.2. Response Messages A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding, the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP response message. However the response code returned in the payload object MUST always be considered authoritative. 3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code and status description fields. [No fields] 3.3. Imported Objects The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications. 3.4. Common Structures The following common structures are used in the protocol messages: 3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records matching one or more selection criteria. Key: String (Optional) The data retrieval key. Value: String (Optional) The data value to match. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc. NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) Only data published on or after the specified time instant is requested. Before: DateTime (Optional) Only data published before the specified time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the specified time instant. MaxEntries: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data entries to return. MaxBytes: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data bytes to return. PageKey: String (Optional) Specifies a page key returned in a previous search operation in which the number of responses exceeded the specified bounds. When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query. 3.5. Transaction: Hello Request: HelloRequest Response: HelloResponse Report service and version information. The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by the service. 3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount Request: ValidateRequest Response: ValidateResponse Request validation of a proposed name for a new account. For validation of a user's account name during profile creation. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions of the protocol. Account: String (Optional) Account name requested Reserve: Boolean (Optional) If true, request a reservation for the specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to honor reservation requests. Language: String [0..Many] List of ISO language codes in order of preference. For creating explanatory text. 3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse Inherits: MeshResponse States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and (optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid. Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility that the account namecould be requested by another user between the Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of current accounts rather than a cached copy. Valid: Boolean (Optional) If true, the specified account identifier is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected. Minimum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the minimum length of an account name. Maximum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the maximum length of an account name. InvalidCharacters: String (Optional) A list of characters that the service does not accept in account names. The list of characters MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in the proposed account name. Reason: String (Optional) Text explaining the reason an account name was rejected. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount Request: CreateRequest Response: CreateResponse Request creation of a new portal account. Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile can be published. 3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated with the account. Inherits: MeshRequest Account: String (Optional) Account identifier requested. 3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction. [No fields] 3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount Request: DeleteRequest Response: DeleteResponse Request deletion of a portal account. Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once registered, profiles are permanent. 3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier. Inherits: MeshRequest Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 Account: String (Optional) Account identifier to be deleted. 3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction. [No fields] 3.9. Transaction: Get Request: GetRequest Response: GetResponse Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties described by a sequence of key/value pairs. 3.9.1. Message: GetRequest Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived. Inherits: MeshRequest Identifier: String (Optional) Lookup by profile ID Account: String (Optional) Lookup by Account ID KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many] List of KeyValue pairs specifying the conditions to be met SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. Multiple: Boolean (Optional) If true return multiple responses if available Full: Boolean (Optional) If true, the client requests that the full Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the publication of the Mesh entry to be verified. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.9.2. Message: GetResponse Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries matching the request. Inherits: MeshResponse DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. 3.10. Transaction: Publish Request: PublishRequest Response: PublishResponse Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh. 3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry. Inherits: MeshRequest [No fields] 3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction. Inherits: MeshResponse [No fields] 3.11. Transaction: Status Request: StatusRequest Response: StatusResponse Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which it is directed. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 The response to the status request contains the last signed checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have been checkpointed. [Not currently implemented] 3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Initiates a status transaction. [No fields] 3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction. Inherits: MeshResponse LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last write update was made to the Mesh LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last Mesh checkpoint was calculated. NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time at which the next Mesh checkpoint should be calculated. CheckpointValue: String (Optional) Last checkpoint value. 3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart Request: ConnectStartRequest Response: ConnectStartResponse Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile 3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Initial device connection request. SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional) Device connection request signed by thesignature key of the device requesting connection. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier of account to which the device is requesting connection. 3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest [No fields] 3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus Request: ConnectStatusRequest Response: ConnectStatusResponse Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a mesh profile 3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Request status information for a pending request posted previously. AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier for which pending connection information is requested. DeviceID: String (Optional) Device identifier of device requesting status information. 3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The signed ConnectionResult object. 3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending Request: ConnectPendingRequest Response: ConnectPendingResponse Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Specify the criteria for pending requests. AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier of the account for which pending connection requests are requested. SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. 3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many] A list of pending requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. 3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete Request: ConnectCompleteRequest Response: ConnectCompleteResponse Post response to a pending connection request. 3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The connection result to be posted to the portal. The result MUST be signed by a valid administration key for the Mesh profile. AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier to which the connection result is posted. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse Inherits: MeshRequest Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction. [No fields] 3.16. Transaction: Transfer Request: TransferRequest Response: TransferResponse Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization [Not currently implemented] 3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization Inherits: MeshRequest SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. 3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred. DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 4. Assets 4.1. Data 4.2. Credentials 4.3. Reputation 4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () 5. Risks 5.1. Confidentiality Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA 5.1.1. Privacy Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use Unintended use within an organization may put it in default GDPR HIPPA 5.2. Integrity Modification of data enables control breaches 5.3. Availability 5.3.1. Data loss Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5 5.3.2. Partial data survivability Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried Aunt Agatha. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) 6. Threats 6.1. End point Compromise 7. Controls 7.1. Cryptographic 7.1.1. Triple lock 7.1.1.1. Transport Security Traffic analysis protection 7.1.1.2. Message Security Access control Authentication / Integrity 7.1.1.3. Data Level Security Data Confidentiality Non-Repudiation 7.1.2. Key Protection Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques presenting a high degree of resistance. 7.1.2.1. Windows Use encrypted key store Preferably use BitLocker 7.1.2.2. OSX Use Key Ring Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 7.1.2.3. iOS Use ??? 7.1.2.4. Linux Use the DBUS mechanism 7.1.2.5. Android Hope and prayers. 7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC??? Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised 7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery Master profile keys should be escrowed Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users may want some but not all their data assets to survive them. 7.1.5. Profile Verification Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration device and that the administration device was properly authorized by the master profile. Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device. Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks. 7.1.6. Identity Validation See the separate document on the trust model 7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability Cert transparency type techniques Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 7.2. Mesh Messaging 7.2.1. Ingress Control Every message is subject to access control Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified in their contacts catalog. 7.2.2. Egress Control Some applications may require egress control For example, classified environments Mail too stupid to send 7.2.3. Security Signal Confirmation messages requiring payments Need Accountability Need to know the source of the accountability assertions Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message 7.2.3.1. Brand If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this should be signaled to both sender and receiver Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another party Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique. 7.2.4. Accountability Authentication and consequences 8. Security Considerations This document comprises the security considerations for the use and implementation of the Mathematical Mesh. Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 8.1. Integrity 8.1.1. DNS Spoofing 8.1.2. TLS Downgrade 8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation 8.1.4. Request Replay Attack 8.1.5. Response Replay Attack 8.2. Confidentiality 8.2.1. Side Channel Attack 8.2.2. Session Key Leakage 9. IANA Considerations All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document 10. Acknowledgements A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. 11. Normative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12, 16 January 2020, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 12. Informative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference March 2020 Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- hallambaker-mesh-developer-09, 23 October 2019, . Hallam-Baker Expires 10 September 2020 [Page 36]