Network Working Group P. Hallam-Baker Internet-Draft July 8, 2019 Intended status: Informational Expires: January 9, 2020 Mathematical Mesh Part VII: Security Considerations draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-01 Abstract The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data. This document is also available online at http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html [1] . Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.4. Structure: KeyOverlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.5. Structure: EscrowedKeySet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5.6. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.3. Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.4. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.6.5. Structure: ProfileMaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.6. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.7. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6.8. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.9. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.10. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.11. Connection Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.12. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.6.13. Structure: Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.15. Structure: ConnectionAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.6.16. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.17. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.18. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.19. Activation Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.20. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.21. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.22. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.7. Cataloged items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.7.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.7.2. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.7.3. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.7.4. Structure: Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.7.5. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.7.6. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.7.7. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.8. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption . . . . . . . . 17 2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplicationAccount . . . . . . . 18 2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.8.13. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 19 2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . . 19 2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 19 2.9. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.9.6. Structure: RequestContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.9.7. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.9.8. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.9.9. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3. Mesh Portal Service Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1. Request Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3. Imported Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.4. Common Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.5. Transaction: Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.9. Transaction: Get . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.9.1. Message: GetRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.9.2. Message: GetResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.10. Transaction: Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.11. Transaction: Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.16. Transaction: Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4. Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.1. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3. Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.1.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.2. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5.3.1. Data loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5.3.2. Partial data survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.1. End point Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1. Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1.1. Triple lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1.5. Profile Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1.6. Identity Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.1. Ingress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.2. Egress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.3. Security Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.4. Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1.1. DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1.2. TLS Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1.4. Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1.5. Response Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.2. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.2.1. Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.2.2. Session Key Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 11.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 1. Introduction 2. Definitions This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language. 2.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] . 2.2. Defined Terms The terms of art used in this document are described in the Mesh Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] . 2.3. Related Specifications The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the Mesh Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] . The Mesh Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 documentation set and related specifications are described in this document. 2.4. Implementation Status The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] . 2.5. Shared Classes The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile specifications. 2.5.1. Classes describing keys 2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey The PublicKey class is used to describe public key pairs and trust assertions associated with a public key. UDF: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters/ X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain. X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request. 2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite Service: String (Optional) Service holding the additional contribution 2.5.4. Structure: KeyOverlay UDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the resulting composite key (to allow verification) BaseUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint specifying the base key 2.5.5. Structure: EscrowedKeySet A set of escrowed keys. [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.5.6. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey UDF: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the encryption key RecryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional) The recryption key EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The decryption key encrypted under the user's device key. 2.6. Assertion classes Classes that are derived from an assertion. 2.6.1. Structure: Assertion Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other forms of abuse. Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last modified. NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was created. 2.6.2. Structure: Condition Parent class from which all condition classes are derived. [No fields] 2.6.3. Profile Classes Profiles are self signed assertions. 2.6.4. Structure: Profile Inherits: Assertion Parent class from which all profile classes are derived KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The permanent signature key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by definition, Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any circumstance. The only case in which a OnlineSignatureKeys: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal profile contains at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration application profiles. 2.6.5. Structure: ProfileMaster Inherits: Profile Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal profile. MasterEscrowKeys: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal Profile MAY contain one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for stored data. KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry 2.6.6. Structure: ProfileDevice Inherits: Profile Describes a mesh device. Description: String (Optional) Description of the device KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate requests made by the device. 2.6.7. Structure: ProfileService Inherits: Profile Profile of a Mesh Service AuthenticationKey: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.6.8. Structure: ProfileAccount Inherits: Profile Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the account. ServiceIDs: String [0..Many] Service address(es). MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional) Master profile of the account being registered. AccountEncryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under this profile 2.6.9. Structure: ProfileGroup Inherits: Profile Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to other administrators over time. [No fields] 2.6.10. Structure: ProfileHost Inherits: Profile Inherits: Profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate service connections. 2.6.11. Connection Classes 2.6.12. Structure: Connection Inherits: Assertion Inherits: Assertion SubjectUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target. AuthorityUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.6.13. Structure: Permission Name: String (Optional) Name: String (Optional) Role: String (Optional) Role: String (Optional) Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional) Keys or key contributions enabling the operation to be performed 2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice Inherits: Connection Inherits: Connection Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the device has been granted. KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the device under the profile KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of the device under the profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for use of the device under the profile 2.6.15. Structure: ConnectionAccount Inherits: Connection Inherits: Connection Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the device has been granted. KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the device under the profile KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of the device under the profile KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for use of the device under the profile Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.6.16. Structure: ConnectionService Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.6.17. Structure: ConnectionHost Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.6.18. Structure: ConnectionApplication Inherits: Connection [No fields] 2.6.19. Activation Classes 2.6.20. Structure: Activation Inherits: Assertion Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application running on a specific device [No fields] 2.6.21. Structure: ActivationDevice Inherits: Assertion Inherits: Assertion EnvelopedAssertionDeviceConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The signed AssertionDeviceConnection. KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate the account signature key from the device signature key KeyEncryption: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate the account encryption key from the device encryption key KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate the account authentication key from the device authentication key Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.6.22. Structure: ActivationAccount Inherits: Activation Inherits: Activation AccountUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the account EnvelopedAssertionAccountConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account connection assertion KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional) The key contribution for the decryption key for the device. NB this is NOT an overlay on the device signature key, it is an overlay on the corresponding recryption key. KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate the account authentication key from the device authentication key KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate the account signature key from the device signature key 2.7. Cataloged items 2.7.1. Data Structures Classes describing data used in cataloged data. 2.7.2. Structure: Contact Inherits: Assertion Inherits: Assertion Identifier: String (Optional) Identifier: String (Optional) FullName: String (Optional) FullName: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) First: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 First: String (Optional) Middle: String (Optional) Middle: String (Optional) Last: String (Optional) Last: String (Optional) Suffix: String (Optional) Suffix: String (Optional) Labels: String [0..Many] Labels: String [0..Many] AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many] AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many] Addresses: Address [0..Many] Addresses: Address [0..Many] Locations: Location [0..Many] Locations: Location [0..Many] Roles: Role [0..Many] 2.7.3. Structure: Role CompanyName: String (Optional) CompanyName: String (Optional) Addresses: Address [0..Many] Addresses: Address [0..Many] Locations: Location [0..Many] Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.7.4. Structure: Address URI: String (Optional) URI: String (Optional) Labels: String [0..Many] 2.7.5. Structure: Location Appartment: String (Optional) Appartment: String (Optional) Street: String (Optional) Street: String (Optional) District: String (Optional) District: String (Optional) Locality: String (Optional) Locality: String (Optional) County: String (Optional) County: String (Optional) Postcode: String (Optional) Postcode: String (Optional) Country: String (Optional) 2.7.6. Structure: Reference MessageID: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a response ResponseID: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response to the original (optional). Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be Read, Unread, Accept, Reject. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.7.7. Structure: Task Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Start: DateTime (Optional) Start: DateTime (Optional) Finish: DateTime (Optional) Finish: DateTime (Optional) StartTravel: String (Optional) StartTravel: String (Optional) FinishTravel: String (Optional) FinishTravel: String (Optional) TimeZone: String (Optional) TimeZone: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Description: String (Optional) Description: String (Optional) Location: String (Optional) Location: String (Optional) Trigger: String [0..Many] Trigger: String [0..Many] Conference: String [0..Many] Conference: String [0..Many] Repeat: String (Optional) Repeat: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 Busy: Boolean (Optional) 2.8. Catalog Entries 2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry Base class for cataloged Mesh data. [No fields] 2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice Inherits: CatalogedEntry Public device entry, indexed under the device ID AccountIDs: String [0..Many] The accounts to which this device is bound. UDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the Mesh DeviceUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile EnvelopedDeviceConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The public assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh EnvelopedDevicePrivate: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile 2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedCredential Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 Password: String (Optional) 2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedNetwork Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry Protocol: String (Optional) Protocol: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Service: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Username: String (Optional) Password: String (Optional) 2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedContact Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user who created the catalog. To be valid, such an entry MUST be signed by an administration key for the Mesh profile containing the account to which the catalog belongs. Key: String (Optional) Unique key. Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the contact has been granted. EnvelopedContact: DareEnvelope (Optional) The (signed) contact data. 2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption Inherits: CatalogedContact [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedBookmark Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry Uri: String (Optional) Uri: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Title: String (Optional) Path: String (Optional) 2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedTask Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional) EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional) Key: String (Optional) Unique key. 2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedApplication Inherits: CatalogedEntry Inherits: CatalogedEntry Key: String (Optional) 2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplicationAccount Wrapper for a signed AccountAssertion Inherits: CatalogedApplication Inherits: CatalogedApplication EnvelopedAccountAssertion: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account assertion Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedMember UDF: String (Optional) UDF: String (Optional) Inherits: CatalogedEntry 2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedGroup Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.8.13. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork Inherits: CatalogedApplication [No fields] 2.9. Messages 2.9.1. Structure: Message MessageID: String (Optional) MessageID: String (Optional) Sender: String (Optional) Sender: String (Optional) Recipient: String (Optional) Recipient: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 References: Reference [0..Many] 2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete Inherits: Message [No fields] 2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN Account: String (Optional) Account: String (Optional) Inherits: Message Inherits: Message Expires: DateTime (Optional) Expires: DateTime (Optional) PIN: String (Optional) 2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection Connection request message. This message contains the information Inherits: Message Inherits: Message ServiceID: String (Optional) ServiceID: String (Optional) EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) Device profile of the device making the request. ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) PinUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the PIN value used to authenticate the request. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a valid MessageConnectionRequestClient Inherits: Message Inherits: Message EnvelopedMessageConnectionRequest: DareEnvelope (Optional) The client connection request. ServerNonce: Binary (Optional) ServerNonce: Binary (Optional) Witness: String (Optional) 2.9.6. Structure: RequestContact Inherits: Message Inherits: Message Reply: Boolean (Optional) Reply: Boolean (Optional) Self: DareEnvelope (Optional) The contact data. 2.9.7. Structure: RequestConfirmation Inherits: Message Inherits: Message Text: String (Optional) 2.9.8. Structure: ResponseConfirmation Inherits: Message Inherits: Message ResponseID: String (Optional) ResponseID: String (Optional) Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 Accept: Boolean (Optional) 2.9.9. Structure: RequestTask Inherits: Message [No fields] 3. Mesh Portal Service Reference HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or any other transaction. 3.1. Request Messages A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding, the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host field. 3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest Base class for all request messages. Portal: String (Optional) Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which the request is directed. 3.2. Response Messages A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding, the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP response message. However the response code returned in the payload object MUST always be considered authoritative. 3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code and status description fields. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 [No fields] 3.3. Imported Objects The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications. 3.4. Common Structures The following common structures are used in the protocol messages: 3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records matching one or more selection criteria. Key: String (Optional) The data retrieval key. Value: String (Optional) The data value to match. 3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc. NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) Only data published on or after the specified time instant is requested. Before: DateTime (Optional) Only data published before the specified time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the specified time instant. MaxEntries: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data entries to return. MaxBytes: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data bytes to return. PageKey: String (Optional) Specifies a page key returned in a previous search operation in which the number of responses exceeded the specified bounds. When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.5. Transaction: Hello Request: HelloRequest Request: HelloRequest Response: HelloResponse Report service and version information. The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by the service. 3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount Request: ValidateRequest Request: ValidateRequest Response: ValidateResponse Request validation of a proposed name for a new account. For validation of a user's account name during profile creation. 3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions of the protocol. Account: String (Optional) Account name requested Reserve: Boolean (Optional) If true, request a reservation for the specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to honor reservation requests. Language: String [0..Many] List of ISO language codes in order of preference. For creating explanatory text. 3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and (optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid. Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility that the account namecould be requested by another user between the Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of current accounts rather than a cached copy. Valid: Boolean (Optional) If true, the specified account identifier is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected. Minimum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the minimum length of an account name. Maximum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the maximum length of an account name. InvalidCharacters: String (Optional) A list of characters that the service does not accept in account names. The list of characters MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in the proposed account name. Reason: String (Optional) Text explaining the reason an account name was rejected. 3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount Request: CreateRequest Request: CreateRequest Response: CreateResponse Request creation of a new portal account. Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile can be published. 3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated with the account. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Account: String (Optional) Account identifier requested. 3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction. [No fields] 3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount Request: DeleteRequest Request: DeleteRequest Response: DeleteResponse Request deletion of a portal account. Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once registered, profiles are permanent. 3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier. Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Account: String (Optional) Account identifier to be deleted. 3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction. [No fields] Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.9. Transaction: Get Request: GetRequest Request: GetRequest Response: GetResponse Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties described by a sequence of key/value pairs. 3.9.1. Message: GetRequest Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived. Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Identifier: String (Optional) Lookup by profile ID Account: String (Optional) Lookup by Account ID KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many] List of KeyValue pairs specifying the conditions to be met SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. Multiple: Boolean (Optional) If true return multiple responses if available Full: Boolean (Optional) If true, the client requests that the full Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the publication of the Mesh entry to be verified. 3.9.2. Message: GetResponse Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries matching the request. Inherits: MeshResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. 3.10. Transaction: Publish Request: PublishRequest Request: PublishRequest Response: PublishResponse Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh. 3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry. Inherits: MeshRequest [No fields] 3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction. Inherits: MeshResponse [No fields] 3.11. Transaction: Status Request: StatusRequest Request: StatusRequest Response: StatusResponse Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which it is directed. The response to the status request contains the last signed checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have been checkpointed. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 [Not currently implemented] 3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Initiates a status transaction. [No fields] 3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction. Inherits: MeshResponse Inherits: MeshResponse LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last write update was made to the Mesh LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last Mesh checkpoint was calculated. NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time at which the next Mesh checkpoint should be calculated. CheckpointValue: String (Optional) Last checkpoint value. 3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart Request: ConnectStartRequest Request: ConnectStartRequest Response: ConnectStartResponse Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile 3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Initial device connection request. SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional) Device connection request signed by thesignature key of the device requesting connection. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier of account to which the device is requesting connection. 3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest [No fields] 3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus Request: ConnectStatusRequest Request: ConnectStatusRequest Response: ConnectStatusResponse Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a mesh profile 3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Request status information for a pending request posted previously. AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier for which pending connection information is requested. DeviceID: String (Optional) Device identifier of device requesting status information. 3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The signed ConnectionResult object. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending Request: ConnectPendingRequest Request: ConnectPendingRequest Response: ConnectPendingResponse Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile. 3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Specify the criteria for pending requests. AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier of the account for which pending connection requests are requested. SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. 3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many] A list of pending requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. 3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete Request: ConnectCompleteRequest Request: ConnectCompleteRequest Response: ConnectCompleteResponse Post response to a pending connection request. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction. Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The connection result to be posted to the portal. The result MUST be signed by a valid administration key for the Mesh profile. AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier to which the connection result is posted. 3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse Inherits: MeshRequest Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction. [No fields] 3.16. Transaction: Transfer Request: TransferRequest Request: TransferRequest Response: TransferResponse Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization [Not currently implemented] 3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization Inherits: MeshRequest Inherits: MeshRequest SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse Inherits: MeshResponse Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred. DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the request. PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits. 4. Assets 4.1. Data 4.2. Credentials 4.3. Reputation 4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () 5. Risks 5.1. Confidentiality Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA 5.1.1. Privacy Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use Unintended use within an organization may put it in default GDPR HIPPA 5.2. Integrity Modification of data enables control breaches Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 5.3. Availability 5.3.1. Data loss Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5 5.3.2. Partial data survivability Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried Aunt Agatha. 5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) 6. Threats 6.1. End point Compromise 6.2. 7. Controls 7.1. Cryptographic 7.1.1. Triple lock 7.1.1.1. Transport Security Traffic analysis protection 7.1.1.2. Message Security Access control Authentication / Integrity 7.1.1.3. Data Level Security Data Confidentiality Non-Repudiation 7.1.2. Key Protection Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques presenting a high degree of resistance. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 7.1.2.1. Windows Use encrypted key store Preferably use BitLocker 7.1.2.2. OSX Use Key Ring 7.1.2.3. iOS Use ??? 7.1.2.4. Linux Use the DBUS mechanism 7.1.2.5. Android Hope and prayers. 7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC??? Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised 7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery Master profile keys should be escrowed Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users may want some but not all their data assets to survive them. 7.1.5. Profile Verification Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration device and that the administration device was properly authorized by the master profile. Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device. Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 7.1.6. Identity Validation See the separate document on the trust model 7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability Cert transparency type techniques 7.2. Mesh Messaging 7.2.1. Ingress Control Every message is subject to access control Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified in their contacts catalog. 7.2.2. Egress Control Some applications may require egress control For example, classified environments Mail too stupid to send 7.2.3. Security Signal Confirmation messages requiring payments Need Accountability Need to know the source of the accountability assertions Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message 7.2.3.1. Brand If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this should be signaled to both sender and receiver Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another party Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 7.2.4. Accountability Authentication and consequences 8. Security Considerations This document comprises the security considerations for the use and implementation of the Mathematical Mesh. 8.1. Integrity 8.1.1. DNS Spoofing 8.1.2. TLS Downgrade 8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation 8.1.4. Request Replay Attack 8.1.5. Response Replay Attack 8.2. Confidentiality 8.2.1. Side Channel Attack 8.2.2. Session Key Leakage 9. IANA Considerations All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document 10. Acknowledgements A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] . 11. References 11.1. Normative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide", draft-hallambaker-mesh- architecture-08 (work in progress), July 2019. Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference July 2019 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. 11.2. Informative References [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference Implementation", draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer-08 (work in progress), April 2019. 11.3. URIs [1] http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh- security.html Author's Address Phillip Hallam-Baker Email: phill@hallambaker.com Hallam-Baker Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 38]