Internet Engineering Task Force                          P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                         Comodo Group Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                         October 2, 2012
Expires: April 5, 2013


                   HTTP Authentication Considerations
                     draft-hallambaker-httpauth-00

Abstract

   This draft is input to the HTTP Working Group discussion of HTTP
   authentication schemes.

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Table of Contents

   1.  What is Wrong in Web Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Password Promiscuity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       1.1.1.  Password Recovery Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       1.1.2.  Password Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.2.  Provider Lock In  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.3.  Strong Credentials Compromised by Weak Binding  . . . . . . 3
       1.3.1.  Confirmation vs Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  User Authentication is Three Separate Problems  . . . . . . . . 3
     2.1.  Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.2.  Credential Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.3.  Message Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Deployment Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Password Managers as Transition Path  . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.2.  Non-Transferable Credentials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     4.1.  Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     4.2.  Credential Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     4.3.  Credential Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     4.4.  Randomness of Secret Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4



























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1.  What is Wrong in Web Authentication

1.1.  Password Promiscuity

1.1.1.  Password Recovery Schemes

1.1.2.  Password Recovery

1.2.  Provider Lock In

1.3.  Strong Credentials Compromised by Weak Binding

1.3.1.  Confirmation vs Authentication


2.  User Authentication is Three Separate Problems

2.1.  Registration

2.2.  Credential Presentation

2.3.  Message Authentication


3.  Deployment Approach

3.1.  Password Managers as Transition Path

3.2.  Non-Transferable Credentials


4.  Security Considerations

4.1.  Impersonation

4.2.  Credential Disclosure

4.3.  Credential Oracle

4.4.  Randomness of Secret Key


5.  IANA Considerations








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6.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


Author's Address

   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.

   Email: philliph@comodo.com







































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