MIPSHOP Working Group W. Haddad
Internet-Draft S. Krishnan
Expires: September 7, 2006 Ericsson Research
H. Soliman
Flarion Technologies
March 6, 2006
Combining Cryptographically Generated Address and Crypto-Based
Identifiers to Secure HMIPv6 (HMIPv6sec)
draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-02
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This memo describes a method for establishing a security association
between the mobile node and the selected mobility anchor point in an
hierarchical mobile IPv6 domain. The suggested solution is based on
combining the cryptographically generated address (CGA) and crypto-
based identifiers (CBID) technologies.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. New Messages and Options Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. The Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message Format . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Third Party Shared Key (TPSK) Option . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. The Cypto Identifier Option (CIO) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. The MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS) Option . . . . . . 12
5.5. Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS) Option . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. The Session Mobility Secret (SMS) Option . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
The Hirarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management [HMIPv6] did not
specify nor favor any particular mechanism for establishing a
Security Association (SA) between the Mobile Node (MN) and the
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) located within an HMIPv6 domain.
This memo describes a method allowing to establish an SA between the
MN and the selected MAP. The suggested solution is based on
combining the Cyptographically Generated Addresses [CGA] and Crypto-
Based Identifiers [CBID].
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2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [TERM].
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3. Glossary
Access Router
The Access Router is the Mobile Node's default router. The AR
aggregates the outband traffic of mobile nodes.
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP)
A Mobility Anchor Point is a router located in a network visited
by the mobile node, which is used by the MN as a local Home Agent
(HA).
Regional Care-of Address (RCoA)
A Regional Care-of Address is an address obtained by the MN from
the visited network. An RCoA is an address on the MAP's subnet
and is auto-configured by the MN when receiving the MAP option.
On-link Care-of Address (LCoA)
The LCoA is the on-link CoA configured on a mobile node's
interface based on the prefix advertised by its default router.
Local Binding Update (LBU) Message
The MN sends a Local Binding Update message to the MAP in order to
establish a binding between the RCoA and the LCoA.
Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message
The MN's default router sends a Pre-Binding Update message to the
MAP upon receiving a Router Solicitation (RtSol) message carrying
a 128-bit CBID and a valid CGA signature.
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
A technique described in [CGA] whereby an IPv6 address of a node
is cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function
from the node's public key (Kp) and some other parameters.
Crypto-Based Identifier (CBID)
A technique described in [CBID] whereby a non-routable identifier
is cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function
from the node's public key and an imprint.
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Binding Acknowledgment (BA) Message
The MAP sends a binding acknowledgment message to the MN in
response to an LBU message.
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4. Proposed Solution
We assume that the MN's LCoA is always computed based on the CGA
technology, in order to allow the MN to run the secure neighbor
discovery protocol described in [SEND]. Such assumption has also
been made in [FMIPsec], in order to provide a security mechanism for
the [FMIPv6] protocol and in the [OptiSEND] protocol, in order to
optimize SEND.
In addition, we assume that the MN can discover the presence of an
HMIPv6 domain before sending a RtSol message, e.g., by using
technologies described in [FRD]. However, the proposed solution
works without such assumption. In fact, our motivation behind the
FRD protocol aims above all to reduce the handoff latency.
Based on that, we suppose in the following and as an example only
that an FRD technology is implemented in all Access Points (APs).
The suggested solution introduces a new signaling message, i.e., the
Pre-Binding Update (PBU) message, which is sent by the AR to the MAP
upon receiving a RtSol message from the MN, which carries a valid
signature (i.e., the message is signed with the MN's CGA private key)
and a 128-bit CBID.
Note that the Crypto-based ID (CBID) is used to provide the MAP
sufficient proof of ownership of the MN's suggested RCoA.
The following figure shows the signaling diagram for establishing a
bidirectional SA between the MN and the MAP:
1. MN to AR: Router Solicitation [CGA Signature + CBID] (RtSol)
2a. AR to MN: Router Acknowledgement [Ks] (RtAdv)
2b. AR to MAP: Pre-Binding Update [Ks + Kp + LCoA + CBID] (PBU)
3. MN to MAP: Local Binding Update [DH value (X)] (LBU)
4. MAP to MN: Binding Acknowledgment [HKs + DH value (Y)] (BA)
The suggested solution is described in the following steps:
o When the MN discovers that it has entered an HMIPv6 domain, it
computes an LCoA address by using its CGA key pair, and a 128-bit
CBID by hashing the CGA public key (Kp) together with a 64-bit
imprint.
o The MN inserts the CBID in a new option (Crypto-Identifier Option
(CIO)), which is carried by the RtSol message, then signs the
message as described in SEND and sends it to the AR.
o Upon receiving a valid unicast RtSol message carrying a CBID, the
AR replies immediately by sending a unicast RtAdv message to the
MN and in parallel, a PBU message to the MAP. For this purpose,
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the AR MUST compute a secret (Ks), encrypts it with the MN's CGA
public key and sends it in the unicast RtAdv message. The shared
secret is inserted in a new option (Third Party Shared Key
(TSPK)), which is carried by the unicast RtAdv message.
The AR MUST also send Ks to the MAP in the PBU message, in
addition to sending the MN's CGA public key, its LCoA and CBID.
Note that it is assumed that the PBU messages are signed by the
ARs and the paths between the ARs and the MAP are secure.
o After receiving the PBU message, the MAP creates a BCE for the MN,
in which it stores the LCoA, Ks and the CGA public key carried by
the PBU message. Once the BCE is created, the MAP waits for a
limited amount of time for the owner of the LCoA to send the LBU
message.
o When the MN gets a valid RtAdv message, it configures its RCoA by
using as interface identifier (IID), the 64-bit imprint, which has
been used to generate the CBID. Then, it initiates a Diffie-
Hellman (DH) procedure with the MAP by sending its DH public value
(X) in a new option (Session Mobility Secret (SMS)), which is
carried by the first LBU message sent to the MAP. The first LBU
message is also used to request the MAP to bind its LCoA to its
new RCoA.
o Upon receiving an LBU message, the MAP searches its BCEs table for
an LCoA, which matches the one sent in the LBU message. If the
same LCoA is found, then the MAP hashes the RCoA IID, i.e., the
imprint, with the stored CGA public key and compares it to the
CBID. If the two hash values are the same, then the MAP completes
the DH exchange by sending its own DH public value (Y) in a new
option (MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS)), which is carried by
the BA message sent to the MN. In addition, the MAP MUST send in
the BA message the hash of Ks (i.e., hash(Ks) = HKs), which will
be carried in another new option (Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS)).
By sending (Y) to the MN, the MAP will complete the DH exchange,
which in turn allows both nodes to compute the session mobility
key (Ksm), i.e., from values (X) and (Y).
Note that if the two hash values are not equal then the MAP simply
discards the LBU message.
o When the MN gets a BA message, it searches first if it carries
HKs. If the correct HKs is found, then the MN computes Ksm and
establishes a bidirectional SA with the MAP.
o Finally, both nodes MUST use Ksm only to authenticate all
subsequent LBU/BA messages exchanged between them.
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Note that the SA lifetime is set to 24 hours, after which the MN has
to request the MAP to renew it.
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5. New Messages and Options Format
In the following, we describe the PBU message structure and the
format of the five new options.
5.1. The Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message Format
When the AR receives a RtSol message carrying a valid RSA signature
and a CBID, it sends a PBU message to the MAP, which carries the MN's
LCoA, CGA public key, CBID and Ks.
The format of the PBU message is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ LCoA +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ CBID +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Ks .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. CGA Public Key (Kp) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
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Code 0
Checksum
The ICMP checksum. For more details see [ICMPv6].
Reserved
This field is unused. It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender
and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
LCoA
This field contains the MN's LCoA.
CBID
This field contains the MN's 128-bit CBID.
Ks
The shared secret sent by the AR to the MN and to the MAP
Kp
The CGA public key
5.2. Third Party Shared Key (TPSK) Option
The Third Party Shared Key Option is carried by the unicast RtAdv
message sent by the AR to the MN, in response to a RtSol message
carrying a valid signature and a CBID. The TPSK option MUST carry
the shared secret Ks.
When used, the TPSK option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = Ks .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
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Option Data
This field contains the shared secret Ks.
5.3. The Cypto Identifier Option (CIO)
The CIO option contains the 128-bit CBID. It is carried by the RtSol
message sent by the MN to the AR and signed with the CGA private key.
As mentioned above, a RtSol message carrying a 128-bit CBID and a
valid RSA signature triggers the AR to generate a shared secret Ks
and send it to the MN and the MAP.
When used, the CIO has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Option Data = CBID +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option: 16 octets
Option Data
This field contains the 128-bit CBID sent by the MN to the AR.
5.4. The MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS) Option
The MSS Option is used by the MAP to carry the DH public value (Y)
sent in the BA message, in response to the first LBU message carrying
an SMS option sent by the MN to the MAP. Note that the first BA
message sent by the MAP to the MN MUST be authenticated with Ks.
The MSMS option has the following format:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = (Y) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the DH public value (Y) sent by the
MAP to the MN in the BA message.
5.5. Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS) Option
When sending a BA message carrying an MSS option, the MAP MUST insert
the hash of Ks (HKs) in the BA message. For this purpose, the TPHS
option is used to carry the HKs in the BA message.
The TPHS option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = HKs .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the hash of Ks.
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5.6. The Session Mobility Secret (SMS) Option
The SMS option is carried by the first LBU message sent by the MN to
the MAP after receiving an unicast RtAdv message carrying a TPSK
option. The SMS option contains the DH public value (X) sent by the
MN to the MAP to initiate a DH exchange, which will allow both nodes
to compute a shared secret (Ksm). Note that the first LBU message
sent by the MN to the MAP MUST be authenticated with Ks.
The SMS option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = (X) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the DH public value (X) sent by the MN
to the MAP in the first LBU message.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document introduces 5 new types of options and one new type of
message. The values of these types are 8-bit unsigned integers.
These values are allocated according to the Standards Actions or IESG
approval policies defined in [IANA].
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7. Security Considerations
This proposal suggests using the CBID and CGA technologies in order
to avoid increasing the number of messages that need to be signed
with an RSA key beyond the SEND procedure. This is recommended due
to the fact that public key signature is a computationally expensive
and lengthy procedure.
The suggested proposal does not create nor enhance any new and/or
existing threats. In particular, launching a man-in-the middle
attack against the MN is not possible because the attacker is not
aware of the shared secret Ks. In addition, launching a denial of
service (DoS) attack against the MAP or the MN is not easy due to the
fact that both nodes can quickly scan incoming messages for a partial
authenticity before processing the entire message.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[CGA] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[HMIPv6] Soliman, H., Castelluccia, C., El Malki, K., and L.
Bellier, "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6)", RFC 4140,
August 2005.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alverstrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434, BCP 26,
October 1998.
[ICMPv6] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, July 2005.
[SEND] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Nikander, P., and B. Zill, "Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[TERM] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP , March 1997.
8.2. Informative References
[CBID] Montenegro, G. and C. Castelluccia, "Crypto-Based
Identifiers (CBID): Concepts and Applications", ACM
Transaction on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
February 2004.
[FMIPsec] Kempf, J. and R. Koodli, "Bootstrapping a Symmetric IPv6
Key Handover Key from SEND", Internet
Draft, draft-kempf-mobopts-handover-key-01.txt, July 2005.
[FMIPv6] Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", Internet
Draft, draft-koodli-mipshop-rfc4068bis-00.txt, July 2005.
[FRD] Choi, J., Chin, D., and W. Haddad, "Fast Router Discovery
with L2 Support", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-dna-frd-00.txt, October 2005.
[OptiSEND]
Haddad, W., Krishnan, S., and J. Choi, "Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) Optimization and Adaptation for Mobility:
The OptiSEND Protocol", Internet
Draft, draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend-01.txt, March 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Wassim Haddad
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 #2334
Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900
Email: Suresh.Krishnan@ericsson.com
Hesham Soliman
Flarion Technologies
135 Rte. 202/206 South
Bedminster, NJ 07921
USA
Email: H.Soliman@flarion.com
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