Network Working Group J. Gould
Internet-Draft R. Wilhelm
Intended status: Best Current Practice VeriSign, Inc.
Expires: December 28, 2019 June 26, 2019
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Secure Authorization Information
for Transfer
draft-gould-regext-secure-authinfo-transfer-01
Abstract
The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in RFC 5730, defines the
use of authorization information to authorize a transfer. The
authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in
the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in RFC 5731, and the EPP Contact
Mapping, in RFC 5733, as password-based authorization information.
Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the
password-based authorization information has been used at the time of
object create, managed with the object update, and used to authorize
an object transfer request. What has not been fully considered is
the security of the authorization information that includes the
complexity of the authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL)
of the authorization information, and where and how the authorization
information is stored. This document defines an operational
practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong random
authorization information values that are short-lived, that are not
stored by the client, and that are stored using a cryptographic hash
by the server to provide for secure authorization information used
for transfers.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2019.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Registrant, Registrar, Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Secure Authorization Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Secure Random Authorization Information . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL) . . . . . . 7
3.3. Authorization Information Storage and Transport . . . . . 7
4. Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information . . . 7
4.1. Create Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Update Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Info Command and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Transfer Request Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Verisign EPP SDK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. RegistryEngine EPP Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Change from 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in [RFC5730], defines the
use of authorization information to authorize a transfer. The
authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in
the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in [RFC5731], and the EPP Contact
Mapping, in [RFC5733], as password-based authorization information.
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Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the
password-based authorization information has been used at the time of
object create, managed with the object update, and used to authorize
an object transfer request. What has not been considered is the
security of the authorization information that includes the
complexity of the authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL)
of the authorization information, and where and how the authorization
information is stored. This document defines an operational
practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong,
random authorization information values that are short-lived, that
are not stored by the client, and that are stored by the server using
a cryptographic hash to provide, for secure authorization information
used for transfers. This operational practice can be used to support
transfers of any EPP object, where the domain name object defined in
[RFC5731] is used in this document for illustration purposes.
The overall goal is to have strong, random authorization information
values, that are short-lived, and that are either not stored or
stored as a cryptographic hash values by the non-responsible parties.
In a registrant, registrar, and registry model, the registrant
registers the object through the registrar to the registry. The
registrant is the responsible party and the registrar and the
registry are the non-responsible parties. EPP is a protocol between
the registrar and the registry, where the registrar is referred to as
the client and the registry is referred to as the server. The
following are the elements of the operational practice and how the
existing features of the EPP RFCs can be leveraged to satisfy them:
"Strong Random Authorization Information": The EPP RFCs define the
password-based authorization information value using an XML
schema "normalizedString" type, so they don't restrict what can
be used in any way. This operational practice defines the
recommended mechanism for creating a strong random authorization
value, that would be generated by the client.
"Short-Lived Authorization Information": The EPP RFCs don't
explicitly support short-lived authorization information or a
time-to-live (TTL) for authorization information, but there are
EPP RFC features that can be leveraged to support short-lived
authorization information. If authorization information is set
only when there is a transfer in process, the server needs to
support empty authorization information on create, support
setting and unsetting authorization information, and support
automatically unsetting the authorization information upon a
successful transfer. All of these features can be supported by
the EPP RFCs.
"Storing Authorization Information Securely": The EPP RFCs don't
specify where and how the authorization information is stored in
the client or the server, so there are no restrictions to define
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an operational practice for storing the authorization information
securely. The operational practice will not require the client
to store the authorization information and will require the
server to store the authorization information using a
cryptographic hash. Returning the authorization information set
in an EPP info response will not be supported.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented in order to develop a conforming
implementation.
In examples, "C:" represents lines returned by a protocol client.
Indentation and white space in examples are provided only to
illustrate element relationships and are not a REQUIRED feature of
this protocol.
The examples reference XML namespace prefixes that are used for the
associated XML namespaces. Implementations MUST NOT depend on the
example XML namespaces and instead employ a proper namespace-aware
XML parser and serializer to interpret and output the XML documents.
The example namespace prefixes used and their associated XML
namespaces include:
"domain": urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
"contact": urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:contact-1.0
2. Registrant, Registrar, Registry
The EPP RFCs refer to client and server, but when it comes to
transfers, there are three actors that are involved. This document
will refer to the actors as registrant, registrar, and registry.
[RFC8499] defines these terms formally for the Domain Name System
(DNS). The terms are further described below to cover their roles as
actors of using the authorization information in the transfer process
of any object in the registry, such as a domain name or a contact:
"registrant": [RFC8499] defines the registrant as "an individual or
organization on whose behalf a name in a zone is registered by
the registry". The registrant can be the owner of any object in
the registry, such as a domain name or a contact. The registrant
interfaces with the registrar for provisioning the objects. A
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transfer is coordinated by the registrant to transfer the
sponsorship of the object from one registrar to another. The
authorization information is meant to authenticate the registrant
as the owner of the object to the non-sponsoring registrar and to
authorize the transfer.
"registrar": [RFC8499] defines the registrar as "a service provider
that acts as a go-between for registrants and registries". The
registrar interfaces with the registrant for the provisioning of
objects, such as domain names and contacts, and with the
registries to satisfy the registrant's provisioning requests. A
registrar may directly interface with the registrant or may
indirectly interface with the registrant, typically through one
or more resellers. Implementing a transfer using secure
authorization information extends through the registrar's
reseller channel up to the direct interface with the registrant.
The registrar's interface with the registries uses EPP. The
registrar's interface with its reseller channel or the registrant
is registrar-specific. In the EPP RFCs, the registrar is
referred to as the "client", since EPP is the protocol used
between the registrar and the registry. The sponsoring registrar
is the authorized registrar to manage objects on behalf of the
registrant. A non-sponsoring registrar is not authorized to
manage objects on behalf of the registrant. A transfer of an
object's sponsorship is from one registrar, referred to as the
losing registrar, to another registrar, referred to as the
gaining registrar.
"registry": [RFC8499] defines the registry as "the administrative
operation of a zone that allows registration of names within the
zone". The registry typically interfaces with the registrars
over EPP and generally does not interact directly with the
registrant. In the EPP RFCs, the registry is referred to as the
"server", since EPP is the protocol used between the registrar
and the registry. The registry has a record of the sponsoring
registrar for each object and provides the mechanism (over EPP)
to coordinate a transfer of an object's sponsorship between
registrars.
3. Secure Authorization Information
The authorization information in the EPP RFCs ([RFC5731] and
[RFC5733]) that support transfer use password-based authorization
information. Other EPP objects that support password-based
authorization information for transfer can use the Secure
Authorization Information defined in this document. For the
authorization information to be secure it must be a strong random
value and must have a short time-to-live (TTL). The security of the
authorization information is defined in the following sections.
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3.1. Secure Random Authorization Information
For authorization information to be secure, it MUST be generated
using a secure random value. The authorization information is
treated as a password, where according to [RFC4086] a high-security
password must have at least 49 bits of randomness or entropy. The
required length L of a password, rounded up to the largest whole
number, is based on the set of characters N and the desired entropy
H, in the equation L = ROUNDUP(H / log2 N). With a target entropy of
49, the required length can be calculated after deciding on the set
of characters that will be randomized. The following are a set of
possible character sets and the calculation of the required length.
Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with
the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which
consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E.
ROUNDUP(49 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(49 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(7.48) = 8
Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with
the set of case-insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists
of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9).
ROUNDUP(49 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(49 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(9.48) = 10
Considering the age of [RFC4086], the evolution of security
practices, and that the authorization information is a machine-
generated value, the recommendation is to use at least 128 bits of
entropy. The lengths are recalculated below using 128 bits of
entropy.
Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with
the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which
consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E.
ROUNDUP(128 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(128 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(19.54) = 20
Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with
the set of case insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists
of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9).
ROUNDUP(128 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(128 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(24.76) = 25
The strength of the random authorization information is dependent on
the actual entropy of the underlying random number generator. For
the random number generator, the practices defined in [RFC4086] and
section 4.7.1 of the NIST Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) Publication 140-2 [1] SHOULD be followed to produce random
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values that will be resistant to attack. A random number generator
(RNG) is preferable over the use of a pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) to reduce the predictability of the authorization information.
The more predictable the random number generator is, the lower the
true entropy, and the longer the required length for the
authorization information.
3.2. Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL)
The authorization information SHOULD only be set when there is a
transfer in process. This implies that the authorization information
has a Time-To-Live (TTL) by which the authorization information is
cleared when the TTL expires. The EPP RFCs have no definition of
TTL, but since the server supports the setting and unsetting of the
authorization information by the sponsoring registrar, then the
sponsoring registrar can apply a TTL based on client policy. The TTL
client policy may be based on proprietary registrar-specific criteria
which provides for a transfer-specific TTL tuned for the particular
circumstances of the transaction. The sponsoring registrar will be
aware of the TTL and the sponsoring registrar MUST inform the
registrant of the TTL when the authorization information is provided
to the registrant.
3.3. Authorization Information Storage and Transport
To protect the disclosure of the authorization information, the
authorization information MUST be stored by the registry using a
strong one-way cryptographic hash and MUST NOT be stored by the
registrar. The plain text version of the authorization information
MUST NOT be written to any logs by the registrar or the registry.
All communication that includes the authorization information MUST be
over an encrypted channel, such as [RFC5734] for EPP. The
registrar's interface for communicating the authorization information
with the registrant MUST be over an authenticated and encrypted
channel.
4. Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information
To make the transfer process secure using secure authorization
information, as defined in Section 3, the client and server need to
implement steps where the authorization information is set only when
a transfer is actively in process and ensure that the authorization
information is stored securely and transported only over secure
channels. The steps in management of the authorization information
for transfers include:
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1. Registrant requests to register the object with the registrar.
Registrar sends the create command, with empty authorization
information, to the registry, as defined in Section 4.1.
2. Registrant requests from the losing registrar the authorization
information to provide to the gaining registrar.
3. Losing registrar generates a secure random authorization
information value, sends it to the registry as defined in
Section 4.2, and provides it to the registrant.
4. Registrant provides the authorization information value to the
gaining registrar.
5. Gaining registrar optionally verifies the authorization
information with the info command to the registry, as defined in
Section 4.3.
6. Gaining registrar sends the transfer request with the
authorization information to the registry, as defined in
Section 4.4.
7. If the transfer successfully completes, the registry
automatically unsets the authorization information; otherwise the
losing registrar unsets the authorization information when the
TTL expires, as defined in Section 4.2.
The following sections outline the practices of the EPP commands and
responses between the registrar and the registry that supports secure
authorization information for transfer.
4.1. Create Command
For a Create Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of an
empty authorization information and MAY disallow for the passing of a
non-empty authorization information. By having an empty
authorization information on create, the object is initially not in
the transfer process. Any EPP object extension that supports setting
the authorization information with a "eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element,
can have an empty authorization information passed, such as [RFC5731]
and [RFC5733].
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Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5731]
domain name create command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example.com
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345
C:
C:
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Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5733]
contact create command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: sh8013
C:
C: John Doe
C: Example Inc.
C:
C: 123 Example Dr.
C: Suite 100
C: Dulles
C: VA
C: 20166-6503
C: US
C:
C:
C: +1.7035555555
C: +1.7035555556
C: jdoe@example.com
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345
C:
C:
4.2. Update Command
For an Update Command, the registry MUST allow for the setting and
unsetting of the authorization information. The registrar sets the
authorization information by first generating a strong, random
authorization information value, based on Section 3.1, and setting it
in the registry in the update command. The registry SHOULD validate
the randomness of the authorization information based on the length
and character set required by the registry. For example, a registry
that requires 20 random printable ASCII characters except space
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(0x20), should validate that the authorization information contains
at least one upper case alpha character, one lower case alpha
character, and one non-alpha numeric character. If the authorization
information fails the randomness validation, the registry MUST return
an EPP error result code of 2202.
Often the registrar has the "clientTransferProhibited" status set, so
to start the transfer process, the "clientTransferProhibited" status
needs to be removed, and the strong, random authorization information
value needs to be set. The registrar MUST define a time-to-live
(TTL), as defined in Section 3.2, where if the TTL expires the
registrar will unset the authorization information.
Example of removing the "clientTransferProhibited" status and setting
the authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update
command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example.com
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345-XYZ
C:
C:
When the registrar-defined TTL expires, the sponsoring registrar
cancels the transfer process by unsetting the authorization
information value and may add back statuses like the
"clientTransferProbited" status. Any EPP object extension that
supports setting the authorization information with a
"eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element, can have an empty authorization
information passed, such as [RFC5731] and [RFC5733]. Setting an
empty authorization information unsets the value. [RFC5731] supports
an explicit mechanism of unsetting the authorization information, by
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passing the authorization information value. The
registry MUST support unsetting the authorization information by
accepting an empty authorization information value and accepting an
explicit unset element if it is supported by the object extension.
Example of unsetting the authorization information explicitly in an
[RFC5731] domain name update command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example.com
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345-XYZ
C:
C:
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Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty
authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example.com
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345-XYZ
C:
C:
Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty
authorization information in an [RFC5733] contact update command.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: sh8013
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345-XYZ
C:
C:
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4.3. Info Command and Response
For an Info Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of a
non-empty authorization information for verification. The gaining
registrar can pre-verify the authorization information provided by
the registrant prior to submitting the transfer request with the use
of the Info Command. The registry compares the hash of the passed
authorization information with the hashed authorization information
value stored for the object. When the authorization information is
not set or the passed authorization information does not match the
previously set value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result
code of 2202 [RFC5730].
Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an
[RFC5731] domain name info command to verify the authorization
information value.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example.com
C:
C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345
C:
C:
The Info Response in object extensions, such as [RFC5731] and
[RFC5733], MUST NOT include the optional authorization information
element. The authorization information is stored as a hash in the
registry, so returning the plain text authorization information is
not possible. The registry MUST NOT return any indication of whether
the authorization information is set or unset by not returning the
authorization information element in the response.
4.4. Transfer Request Command
For a Transfer Request Command, the registry MUST allow for the
passing of a non-empty authorization information to authorize a
transfer. The registry compares the hash of the passed authorization
information with the hashed authorization information value stored
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for the object. When the authorization information is not set or the
passed authorization information does not match the previously set
value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result code of 2202
[RFC5730]. Whether the transfer occurs immediately or is pending is
up to server policy. When the transfer occurs immediately, the
registry MUST return the EPP success result code of 1000 and when the
transfer is pending, the registry MUST return the EPP success result
code of 1001. The losing registrar MUST be informed of a successful
transfer request using an EPP poll message.
Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an
[RFC5731] domain name transfer request command to authorize the
transfer.
C:
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: example1.com
C:
C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
C:
C:
C:
C:
C: ABC-12345
C:
C:
Upon successful completion of the transfer, the registry MUST
automatically unset the authorization information. If the transfer
does not complete within the time-to-live (TTL) (Section 3.2), the
registrar MUST unset the authorization information as defined in
Section 4.2.
5. Implementation Status
Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and the reference to
RFC 7942 [RFC7942] before publication.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
[RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing
drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual
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implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information
presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not
intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available
implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that
other implementations may exist.
According to RFC 7942 [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and
working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the
benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this
information as they see fit".
5.1. Verisign EPP SDK
Organization: Verisign Inc.
Name: Verisign EPP SDK
Description: The Verisign EPP SDK includes both a full client
implementation and a full server stub implementation of draft-gould-
regext-secure-authinfo-transfer.
Level of maturity: Development
Coverage: All aspects of the protocol are implemented.
Licensing: GNU Lesser General Public License
Contact: jgould@verisign.com
URL: https://www.verisign.com/en_US/channel-resources/domain-
registry-products/epp-sdks
5.2. RegistryEngine EPP Service
Organization: CentralNic
Name: RegistryEngine EPP Service
Description: Generic high-volume EPP service for gTLDs, ccTLDs and
SLDs
Level of maturity: Deployed in CentralNic's production environment as
well as two other gTLD registry systems, and two ccTLD registry
systems.
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Coverage: Auhtorization Information is "write only" in that the
registrars can set the Auhtorization Information, but not get the
Auhtorization Information in the Info Response.
Licensing: Proprietary In-House software
Contact: epp@centralnic.com
URL: https://www.centralnic.com
6. Security Considerations
TBD
7. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the following persons for their feedback
and suggestions:
o Scott Hollenbeck
o Matthew Pozun
o Srikanth Veeramachaneni
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, .
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, .
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, .
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[RFC5733] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Contact Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5733, DOI 10.17487/RFC5733,
August 2009, .
[RFC5734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009, .
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, .
8.2. URIs
[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final
Appendix A. Change History
A.1. Change from 00 to 01
1. Filled in the "Implementation Status" section with the inclusion
of the "Verisign EPP SDK" and "RegistryEngine EPP Service"
implementations.
2. Made small wording corrections based on private feedback.
3. Added content to the "Acknowledgements" section.
Authors' Addresses
James Gould
VeriSign, Inc.
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
US
Email: jgould@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisign.com
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Richard Wilhelm
VeriSign, Inc.
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
US
Email: rwilhelm@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisign.com
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