Network Working Group J. Gersch Internet-Draft Secure64 SW Corp Intended status: Standards Track D. Massey Expires: September 1, 2012 Colorado State University E. Osterweil Verisign L. Zhang UCLA February 29, 2012 DNS Resource Records for BGP Routing Data draft-gersch-grow-revdns-bgp-00 Abstract This draft proposes the creation of two DNS record types for storing BGP routing information in the reverse DNS. The RLOCK record allows prefix owners to indicate whether the DNS is being used to publish routing data. The SRO record allows operators to indicate whether an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix ought to appear in global routing tables and identifies authorized origin Autonomous System Number(s) for that prefix. The published data can be used in a variety of contexts and can be extended to include additional information. This work is part of an on-going effort and is accessible in an active testbed. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 1] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Overview of Route Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Overview of Route Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. The RLOCK Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. RLOCK RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. RLOCK Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. RLOCK RR Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. The SRO Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. SRO RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.2. SRO RRDATA Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.3. SRO RR Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Discussion and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Prior Work on CIDR names for Routing . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.2. RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.1. Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.2. Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 2] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 1. Introduction 1.1. Overview This draft describes a method in which a prefix owner can exploit the existing reverse DNS tree structure, along with the authentication provided by DNSSEC [RFC4033], to publish information about whether a prefix can be announced and to identify the origin Autonomous System(s) that may originate a route to that prefix. This data is complementary to a variety of other data sources ranging from existing databases to new directions. Publishing route information in the Reverse DNS takes advantage of infrastructure that already exists and has been globally deployed. No new infrastructure deployment is required, in contrast with approaches that use purpose-built resource certification. Other key advantages to using the Reverse DNS are that it 1) has been in successful operation for many years, 2) has an existing operational model where prefix owners currently manage their IP address space (through various models from local operation to hosting companies), 3) has an existing operational model where both registries and providers delegate authority to entities receiving address space, 4) the resulting reverse DNS data can be authenticated using DNSSEC [RFC4033], and 5) the data can be easily checked using simple tools ranging from DNS query tools such as DIG to more elaborate systems. A prefix owner must OPT-IN to the approach. Prefix owners who do not take any action are not impacted, but also do not gain any advantages. Prefix owners that do choose to participate would thereby enable a number of tools to make use of the published data. The objective of this draft is to standardize the format for indicating participation and publishing data. A variety of potential uses for the data are discussed later in the document, but are provided only to illustrate the usefulness of the data and should not be taken as a comprehensive list of all possible applications. Examples taken directly from the current testbed are included in the appendix. 1.2. Scope The scope of this internet draft is purposely limited to the subject of BGP route origins. There are many other possible topics that could be explored: BGP path verification, BGP capacity constraints, man-in-the-middle attacks, routing policy, address ownership assignment and provenance, route ingress and egress filtering, Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 3] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 interface to internet routing registries, and so on. These are all reasonable extensions. We limit the scope of this internet draft to the prevention of origin and sub-prefix hijacks -- a capability that can be implemented and deployed in a reasonable time frame. Future expansion is readily made possible: the SRO record is kept simple for now, but may be expanded to incorporate additional fields. New RR types can also be added later for additional capabilities. The proposed naming structure and record types recommend that a unique entry be published for each prefix, not ranges as with RPKI. This can make routing security policy explicit and help minimize route table bloat. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 4] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 2. Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 5] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 3. Overview of Route Publishing This document defines two new DNS resource records types (RRTypes) 1. The RLOCK RRType (Route Lock) * Purpose: Indicates that the Reverse DNS zone has enabled BGP route publishing. * The presence of the RLOCK Record at the apex of a Reverse DNS zone indicates that a prefix owner has OPTED-IN to BGP Route Publishing. All route announcements that map to this zone will be denied as BOGUS unless an SRO record exists that specifically authorizes the announcement. 2. The SRO RRType (Secure Route Origin) * Purpose: Declare an authorized route origin ASN for comparison against BGP route announcements. * Placed in the Reverse DNS at the domain name corresponding to the associated CIDR address block. Organizations that have been assigned and/or allocated CIDR address blocks also have Reverse-DNS delegations assigned to them from either the Regional Internet Registries (RIPE, ARIN, APNIC, etc.) or from a sub-delegation. Address-block owners may use these new record types to declare authoritative data for route origins associated with that address block. This data may be declared statically, with a long TTL (Time To Live) if the routing data changes infrequently. Alternatively, dynamic DNS and short TTLs can be used to rapidly publish and disseminate the authoritative information on a world-wide basis in near real-time. The RLOCK and SRO records are to be stored in the reverse-DNS in zones with domain names that correspond to the associated CIDR address block. These domain names are to be constructed per the naming specification described in [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR]. The RLOCK and SRO records MUST be signed with DNSSEC and have a valid DNSSEC chain-of-trust. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 6] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 4. Overview of Route Verification Various applications could be written to use BGP records published in the Reverse DNS. One example is an application to perform near-real- time route origin verification that alerts operators of hijacks or directly interacts with a router to prevent the hijack. Another application could perform a nightly analysis that generates router prefix filters. A third application could cross-check data in the Internet Routing Registries (IRR) against the data in the reverse DNS. This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead aims to illustrate the potential uses of the published data. These applications analyze BGP announcements by performing DNS queries to classify route route announcements into one of the following three categories: 1. "VALID": a DNSSEC-validated SRO RRSET was received and one of the route origins in the RRSET matches the origin contained in the BGP route announcement. 2. "BOGUS": a route hijack was detected. A. The DNSSEC-validated SRO responses received did NOT match the origin of the route announcement. This is indicative of an origin hijack. B. There was no SRO record at the domain name corresponding to this address block, but the authoritative zone did contain an RLOCK statement. This is indicative of a sub-prefix hijacks. 3. "VIABLE": there was no SRO record for this prefix and no RLOCK record to protect the zone, or the data did not properly validate with DNSSEC. In this case, the algorithm cannot authoritatively state that the prefix is valid or bogus, so it is simply marked as viable. Most routes today are in this category, as it takes a specific action to OPT-IN to this methodology. This verification algorithm MUST "fail-safe". If a query for a DNS record fails, or if DNSSEC fails to validate the record, the algorithm MUST behave as if no DNS records were present in the first place. This results in marking a BGP announcement as "VIABLE". One could completely unplug a router verification application at any time and internet routing would continue to work just as it does today. The default state is always "viable". Note that this implies the verification algorithm MUST use DNSSEC- enabled queries (set the DO bit) and MUST check for a validated response (the AD bit). A successful DNSSEC-downgrade attack would Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 7] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 result in classifying records as "viable". However the redundancy in DNS would allow checking of multiple slave DNS servers should DNSSEC fail to validate. The core of the verification algorithm can be summarized as follows: 1. Upon receipt of a BGP announcement, perform a DNSSEC-validated query for the SRO records at the domain name corresponding to the CIDR prefix in the BGP announcement. 2. Case 1: If no records exist (NXDOMAIN or NOERROR with number of answers=0), use the AUTHORITY section of the answer to determine the covering zone. Perform a query to that domain name (the zone apex) for an RLOCK record. There are two possible responses to the RLOCK query: A. NOERROR, answer=0: the RLOCK does not exist; the zone owner has not opted in. Mark the announcement as "VIABLE". B. RLOCK exists: the zone owner has OPTED-IN. Mark the announcement as "BOGUS" since no SRO record exists to vouch for the announcement. This may be an example of a sub-prefix hijack. 3. Case 2: One or more SRO records were returned from the query. Loop through each SRO in the RRSET to compare the origin with the data in the route announcement. If a record with a matching set of data is found, mark the announcement as "VALID". If no match is found, mark the announcement as "BOGUS". This algorithm can be extended to handle the case of "overlapping" domain names at octet boundaries. Consider the example where a /16 zone has 256 zone delegations for each of its /24 children. For ease of implementation the zone author may wish to place an SRO or RLOCK statement at the overlapping domain name contained in the parent zone rather than create data within the 256 child zones. In this example, the algorithm should check for BGP data in the /24 zone as normal. If data is found, it is considered authoritative and the algorithm stops. If no SRO or RLOCK is found in this /24 zone, the algorithm queries the "overlapping name" as defined in [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR] for an SRO record. If no records are found, it then queries the parent zone (as defined by the AUTHORITY portion of the DNS answer) for an RLOCK statement. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 8] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 5. The RLOCK Resource Record The RLOCK resource record indicates "Route Lock". This record is placed at the apex of a reverse-DNS zone to indicate that the zone is being used to publish routing information. If this record is present, all route announcements for the CIDR address block covered by this zone MUST be marked as "bogus" unless they are specifically authorized by a SRO record. The main purpose of the RLOCK statement is to indicate participation (OPT-IN) and as a side-effect prevent sub-prefix route hijacks. Applications that query for an SRO record may get an NXDOMAIN or NOERROR with 0 answers. In this case, the application queries the domain name specified in the AUTHORITY section for an RLOCK record (this will be at the zone apex). If the RLOCK is present, the route announcement MUST be marked as "bogus". Otherwise there is no SRO and no RLOCK, so the route announcement MUST be marked as "viable" (with the possible exception outlined next regarding "overlapping" octet boundaries). The RLOCK statement may also be present at zone cuts created at octet or nibble boundaries. The "overlapping domain name" specified in [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR] is used to specify the CIDR address block. This type of RLOCK allows the zone author to create one parent zone with 256 delegations to the next octet and add an RLOCK for each one of the child zones. The alternative is to edit all 256 child zones to place the RLOCK at each zone apex. Applications that search for an RLOCK should also search the parent zone to see if there is an RLOCK at the overlapping name. The effective span of control for an RLOCK is dependent on the structure of the Reverse DNS zone. To be more specific, a Reverse DNS zone that has no delegations will have a span of control that covers all prefixes at or below the CIDR prefix specified by the domain name at the zone apex. Any zone delegation (also known as a "cut point") starts a new zone authority. Those prefixes in the delegated zone will not be covered by the parent zone's RLOCK. As an example, consider the zone at 129.82.0.0/16 and assume that it has only one delegation at 129.82.138.0/24. The /16 RLOCK covers all prefixes within the /16 to /32 range with the exception of prefixes within the 129.82.138.0/24 through /32 range. The child zone would need to have its own RLOCK, either directly, or with an "overlapping" domain name. The RLOCK record MUST be signed with DNSSEC and have an associated RRSIG record. If a resolving DNS server cannot validate the DNSSEC signature, the SRO record should be ignored as if it were not even present in the zone. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 9] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 The Type value for the RLOCK RR type is currently unassigned. We are temporarily using private RRTYPE TYPE65400 until a formal number is assigned by IANA. The RLOCK RR is class independent. The RLOCK RR has no special TTL requirements. Example use of RLOCK records, taken directly from the current testbed, are included in the appendix. 5.1. RLOCK RDATA Wire Format The RLOCK record contains no RRData (RDLength field = 0). 5.2. RLOCK Presentation Format Since there is no RRDATA, the presentation format of the RDATA portion is simply the RLOCK keyword with no extra fields. 5.3. RLOCK RR Examples The following example shows an RLOCK RR enabling routing security for the zone covering 129.82.0.0/16. 82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK The following example shows RLOCK at "overlapping /24" address blocks. The domain name uses the reverse-DNS naming convention for CIDR address blocks specified in [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR]. 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.m.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK 0.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns1.org.edu 1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.m.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK 1.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns1.org.edu 0.1.0.0.0.0.0.0.m.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK 2.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns1.org.edu 1.1.0.0.0.0.0.0.m.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK 3.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns1.org.edu . . . Continuing to 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.m.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN RLOCK 255.82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns1.org.edu Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 10] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 6. The SRO Resource Record Zones that participate in this approach use "Secure Route Origin" (SRO) resource records to indicate that a prefix may be announced. This record contains a mandatory ORIGIN ASN field. Both 32 and 64 bit AS numbers are accommodated. The ORIGIN AS indicates an AS number that is authorized to originate a route announcement for the CIDR address block associated with the SRO record's Reverse DNS domain name. The SRO record MUST be signed with DNSSEC [RFC4033] and have an associated RRSIG record. If a resolving DNS server cannot validate the DNSSEC signature, the SRO record should be ignored and an attempt should be made to query an alternate DNS server. If all servers fail, the route prefix should be classified as "VIABLE". The Type value for the SRO RR type is currently unassigned. We are temporarily using TYPE65401 until a formal number is assigned by IANA. The SRO RR is class independent. The SRO RR has no special TTL requirements. 6.1. SRO RDATA Wire Format The SRO RDATA wire format MUST contain a minimum of 4 octets which specify the ORIGIN AS number. 2-octet AS Numbers MUST be encoded with leading zeroes to construct a complete 4-octet field. The SRO record type is intended to evolve over time; in the future there may be optional extensions to indicate a version numbers and other fields such as last hop, system capacity, IRR information, etc. The value of the RDLength provides the flexibility to determine whether additional fields are present or not. In this first version of the SRO record, the the RDLENGTH will be 4. Applications MUST always interpret the first 4 octets as the ORIGIN AS number. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ORIGIN AS Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 11] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 6.2. SRO RRDATA Presentation Format The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows: AS Numbers are represented in asdot notation which is a combination of asplain and asdot+ notation. That is, any ASN in the 2-octet range is represented in asplain (simple decimal representation of the ASN). Any ASN above the 2-octet range is represented in asdot+ notation which breaks an ASN into two 16-bit values separated by a dot. For example, AS65535 will be represented by the decimal number "65535" while AS65536 will be represented as "1.0". The ORIGIN AS field MUST be present. 6.3. SRO RR Examples The following example shows an SRO RR authorizing AS14041 as the origin for CIDR address block 129.82.0.0/16 in the reverse DNS. 82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN SRO 12145 The next example shows two separate origins to be authorized for a prefix. This example also illustrates the use of the asdot notation. 82.129.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN SRO 12145 86400 IN SRO 3.1858 Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 12] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 7. Discussion and Related Work This work is not the first to propose entering routing data in the Reverse DNS and there are also many other proposed approaches for publishing routing data. We first review some of the past work and then discusses the differences presented in this approach. 7.1. Prior Work on CIDR names for Routing Over a decade ago, [I-D.bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif] proposed to use the reverse DNS to verify the origin AS associated with a prefix. This requires both a naming convention for converting the name into a prefix and additional resource record types for storing origin information, along with recommendations on their use. More recently [I-D.donnerhacke-sidr-bgp-verification-dnssec] including links to IRR data and also includes the notion of policy in adjacency, but this approach also introduces a new reverse DNS tree under "BGP.ARPA." CNAME and DNAME records must be used in publishing the data. Our approach differs in several respects. We rely on the existing reverse DNS tree without creating a new hierarchy such as "BGP.ARPA.". We exploit the naming convention in [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR] so one does not need to introduce CNAME or DNAME records (though an operator could choose to do so if so desired). We assume optional participation and introduce the concept of an RLOCK resource record to indicate participation. We currently limit our approach to detecting false sub-prefix and false origin route announcements. Extensions to include links to other databases such as IRR can be achieved in combination with or in lieu of an SRO record and further path validation can be included, but the scope of this document is intentionally limited, both for clarity and to match actual implementation. Finally, we separate the publishing technique which is specified in this document from the variety of ways in which one may make use of the data, recognizing that different operators will make different choices on how to make use of the data. 7.2. RPKI A great deal of work has been done in the sidr working group on Resource Public Key Infrastructure [RFC6480][RFC6481][RFC6482][RFC6483]. RPKI, also known as Resource Certification, is a specialized public key infrastructure (PKI) framework designed to secure Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). RPKI provides a way to connect Internet number resource information (such as Autonomous System numbers and IP Addresses) to a trust anchor. The certificate structure mirrors the Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 13] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 way in which Internet number resources are distributed. That is, resources are initially distributed by the IANA to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), who in turn distribute them to Local Internet Registries (LIRs), who then distribute the resources to their customers. RPKI can be used by the legitimate holders of the resources to control the operation of Internet routing protocols to prevent route hijacking and other attacks. [cited from Wikipedia]. The publication of BGP route origin information in the reverse-DNS is a complementary technique to RPKI. While there is some overlap in the techniques, there are also different goals for the reverse-DNS. The Reverse-DNS publication method uses DNSSEC as its base trust model, not a chain of certificates. If an organization has a DNSSEC- signed delegation for a reverse-DNS address block, that organization is the legitimate owner and may place SRO and RLOCK statements in their zone without the interaction of any other organization. If an address block is sold or transferred, either the RIR (Regional Internet Registry) will change its signed delegation records to reflect the change, or the organization itself may independently implement a signed sub-delegation. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 14] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 8. Security Considerations Applications that query the DNS for SRO and RLOCK records MUST request them from DNSSEC-enabled servers and have the DO bit set. Responses that are returned MUST be checked to verify that the D bit is set indicating that the responses have been validated. Otherwise the response should be ignored. The absence of DNSSEC or the inability to contact any nameservers MUST indicate the route is viable. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 15] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 9. IANA Considerations RRType numbers need to be assigned for the SRO and RLOCK records. The current testbed temporarily substitutes TYPE65400 for the RLOCK record and TYPE65401 for the SRO record. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 16] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 10. Acknowledgments We would like to thank Danny McPherson for his comments and suggestions. In addition, this document was aided via numerous discussions at NANOG, IETF and private meetings with ISPs, telecomm carriers, and research organizations too numerous to mention by name. Thanks to all for your comments and advice. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 17] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 11. References 11.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 11.2. Informative References [I-D.bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif] Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based NLRI origin AS verification in BGP", draft-bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif-00 (work in progress), January 1998. [I-D.donnerhacke-sidr-bgp-verification-dnssec] Donnerhacke, L. and W. Wijngaards, "DNSSEC protected routing announcements for BGP", draft-donnerhacke-sidr-bgp-verification-dnssec-04 (work in progress), May 2008. [I-D.gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR] Gersch, J. and D. Massey, "Reverse DNS Naming Convention for CIDR Address Blocks", draft-gersch-dnsop-revDNS-CIDR-00 (work in progress), February 2012. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, March 2005. [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012. [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6483, February 2012. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 18] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 Appendix A. Examples A.1. Example 1 This example shows data entered for the prefix 129.82.0.0/16. The prefix owner has authorized the announcement of 129.82.0.0/16 and the four /18's at 129.82.0.0/18, 129.82.64.0/18, 129.82.128.0/18, and 129.82.192.0/18. All the prefixes originate from AS12145. Finally, the example shows a record for a 129.82.177/24 so that the parent zone can manage this for the child zone at 177.82.129.in- addr.arpa. Any entry in the child zone would override the data stored at the parent. Note: this data is directly cut and paste from actual deployment. TYPE 65400 is being used for RLOCK and TYPE 65401 for SRO records. This draft requests IANA to assign numbers for RLOCK and SRO, the values here are purely for illustrative purposes. Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 19] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 $TTL 3600 $ORIGIN 82.129.in-addr.arpa. @ IN SOA rush.colostate.edu. dnsadmin.colostate.edu. ( 2012021300 ; serial number 900 ; refresh, 15 minutes 600 ; update retry, 10 minutes 86400 ; expiry, 1 day 3600 ; minimum, 1 hour ) IN NS dns1.colostate.edu. IN NS dns2.colostate.edu. @ IN TYPE65400 \# 0 ; RLOCK OPT-IN; deny all route announcements ; except those authorized @ IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00002f71 ; 129.82.0.0/16 SRO 12145 0.0.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00002f71 ; 129.82.0.0/18 SRO 12145 1.0.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00002f71 ; 129.82.64.0/18 SRO 12145 0.1.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00002f71 ; 129.82.128.0/18 SRO 12145 1.1.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00002f71 ; 129.82.192.0/18 SRO 12145 1.0.0.0.1.1.0.1.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 00004070 ; 129.82.177.0/24 SRO 16496 ; delegations required for 256 /24 zones which contain PTR records 1 IN NS dns1.colostate.edu. IN NS dns2.colostate.edu. 2 IN NS dns1.colostate.edu. IN NS dns2.colostate.edu. ; continuation to 255 is left out for the sake of brevity Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 20] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 A.2. Example 2 This example shows data entered for the prefix 216.17.128.0/17. The prefix owner has authorized the announcement of 216.17.128.0/17. The prefix originates from AS6582. 1.m.17.216.in-addr.arpa NS ns.frii.net This delegation refers to the new /17 zone and the domain name is not in conflict with any of the pre-existing /24 zones at IN-ADDR.ARPA. This delegation is to be placed at the IN-ADDR.ARPA zone. $TTL 3600 $ORIGIN 1.m.17.216.in-addr.arpa. @ IN SOA ns1.frii.net. hostmaster.frii.net. ( 2012021300 ; serial number 14400 ; refresh, 4 hours 3600 ; update retry, 1 hour 604800 ; expiry, 7 days 600 ; minimum, 10 minutes ) IN NS ns1.frii.net. IN NS ns2.frii.net. $ORIGIN 17.216.in-addr.arpa. 1.m IN TYPE65400 \# 0 ; RLOCK OPT-IN; deny all route announcements ; except those authorized 1.m IN TYPE65401 \# 4 000019b6 ; 216.17.128.0/17 SRO 6582 ; no other delegations or PTR records are needed in this zone file ; since the /24 delegations are at ARIN at xxx.17.216.IN-ADDR.ARPA Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 21] Internet-Draft BGP Resource Records February 2012 Authors' Addresses Joe Gersch Secure64 SW Corp Fort Collins, CO US Email: joe.gersch@secure64.com Dan Massey Colorado State University Fort Collins, CO US Email: massey@cs.colostate.edu Eric Osterweil Verisign Reston, VA US Email: eosterweil@verisign.com Lixia Zhang UCLA Los Angeles, CA US Email: lixia@cs.ucla.edu Gersch, et al. Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 22]