Big data security on .nl: infrastructure and one application

Giovane C. M. Moura, Maarten Wullink, Moritz Mueller, and Cristian Hesselman SIDN Labs first.lastname@sidn.nl

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Open .nl DNS datasets

http://stats.sidnlabs.nl/

SIDN is the .nl registry; nonprofit

- 5.6M domains registered; 5th ccTLD in zone size
- 2.5M DNSSec signed domains; 1st worldwide
- aggregated .nl auth servers data (DNS/IP/DNSSEC...)
 - 18 months + ; daily updated
- open for research collab: talk to me
 - giovane.moura@sidn.nl



Background

- SIDN is the .nl registry; nonprofit
- SIDN Labs \rightarrow research arm
- This presentation: big data security
- Contains parts of material submitted to NOMS 2016 and PAM 2016 conferences
- Mini-bio: joined SIDN last May; in academia before



Introduction

 Newly registered malicious domains have an abnormal initial DNS lookup [1]




Figure: .nl DNS lookups - 20K Random vs Netcraft Phishing



Introduction

- Why is that?
 - Assumption: spam-based business model
 - Automated
 - Maximize profit before being taken down
- Question: can we use this to improve security in the.nl zone?
 - Or build an early warning system for newly registered domains?
- We have both registration and DNS traffic data
 - Registry role
 - Privacy framework and board that oversees it



Introduction

- What we need:
 - 1. High-performance data analytics platform
 - 2. Efficient algorithm that can be used in production
- This presentation covers both things



ENTRADA: our big data platform

- ► Hadoop cluster data streaming warehouse → interactive response times
- 5K USD/EUR per node; low cost
- Store traffic data from .nl auth servers
- Enable production applications
- Based on open-source, can be deployed even in a cloud environment
 - only one part (one converter) we develop in house
 - studying open-source it



ENTRADA: our big data platform

 By definition, a data-streaming warehouse must deliver interactive response times

- pcap storage& analysis wouldn't fly
- not at low cost
- So, what are the alternatives?
- Our requirements:
 - Usability = SQL
 - Extensibility: no vendor lock-in
 - Security:
 - Dependability
 - Low cost
 - High performance



ENTRADA: our big data platform

| Engine | Usab. | Exten. | Perf. | Scal. | Dep. |
|------------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|------|
| HBase(HDFS) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Elasticsearch | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| MongoDB | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Hadoop+MapReduce(HDFS) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| PostgreSQL | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Impala+Parquet(HDFS) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Table: Comparison of Data Query Engines (1 = matches our requirements, 0 does not match)

- Two Core parts:
 - 1. Optimized Apache Parquet file format (based on Google's Dremel [2])
 - Column-based storage; reads only necessary columns
 - convert pcap to parquet
 - 2. MPP query engine (Impala [3])
 - multi parallel queries



ENTRADA: data flow




Figure: ENTRADA data sequence flow



ENTRADA: evaluation

- > Query: select concat_ws('-',day,month,year), count(1) from dns.queries where ipv=4 and year = 'X' and month = 'Y' and day='Z' group by concat_ws('-',day,month,year).
- 10 parallel queries (1 per day)
- \sim 52 TB of pcap data = 2.2 TB of parquet;
- Time: 3.5 minutes on 4 data nodes
- Conclusion: fast, and cheap; and open-source



Part 2: Early Warning System




Figure: nDEWS Architecture

- "Bad" domains are likely to be more popular
- k-means clustering algorithm: unsupervised, classifies according to features
- $\sum Req$, $\sum IPs$, $\sum CC$, $\sum ASes$
- Run it every day



Evaluation

- 1,5+ years of DNS data on ENTRADA
- 78B DNS request/responses
- All registration database

| Кеу | Value | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Interval | Jan 1st, 2015 to Aug 30th 2015 | | |
| Average .nl zone size | \sim 5,500,000 | | |
| \sum new domains | 586,201 | | |
| New domains - first timers | 476,040(81.2%) | | |
| New domains - re-registered | 110,161 (18.8%) | | |
| Total DNS Requests | 32,864,402,270 | | |
| DNS request new domains (24h) | 826,740 | | |
| DNS request new domains - first-timers (24h) | 420,362 | | |

Table: Evaluated datasets (from one .nl auth server)



Evaluation

| Cluster | Size | $\sum Req$ | \sum IPs | $\sum CC$ | $\sum ASes$ |
|------------|---------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| Normal | 132,425 | 4.31 | 3.06 | 1.64 | 1.43 |
| Suspicious | 2,956 | 55.03 | 27.87 | 4.99 | 7.43 |

Table: Mean values for features and clusters - excluding domains with 1 request - 1st Timers




Validation

- Were those "suspicious" domains really malicious?
- Very hard to verify on historical data: if they had pages; they might be gone or diff by now
- Results on historical data:
 - Content analysis: 148 "shoes stores", 17 adult/malware
 - 19 phishing domains (out of 49 reported by Netcraft on the same period)
 - VirusTotal: 25 domains matched
- Results on current data:
 - By far the "shoes" sites dominate it
 - Adult and malware is also detected; we now download screenshots and content as we classify
 - False positives: rapidly popular political websites and others



Discussion

- Why so many (5–10) new shoes stores per day?
- Probably concocted websites [4]
- Automatically created; spam based



SON labs SON

Why shoes?

- Most counterfeit product = ~ 40% of US Border seizures [5]
- Large demand
- Re-current registration suggest profitability; one site down does not affect operations
- Online fraud is the NL: 5.3 billion EUR in 2 years; many from site websites [6]
- Evade industry's tools/techniques:
 - Solutions for phishing and malware exist
 - Users left unprotected
- Shoes are a smart play: high demand, and low penalties
- Currently: studying how to share/handle this



Summary

- We showed ENTRADA, our data streaming warehouse
 - Fast & cheap
 - Anyone can deploy it; even on a cloud
- We showed one application of it: new malicious domains early warning system
 - Under the radar abuse form (shoes)
 - Can be detected by their lookup patterns
- Run it on a daily basis; have to reduce false positives
- Studying pilot studies to handle that information
- More big-data based security applications to come



Questions?

Contact:

- http://sidnlabs.nl
- giovane.moura@sidn.nl
- Looking for collaboration to :
 - build and validate systems to improve security;
 - write measurement papers
- Thank you for your attention



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