A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates

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Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the associated Resource Certificate.

1. Introduction
    1.1. Terminology
2. Describing Resources in Certificates
3. Resource Certificate Fields
    3.1. Version
    3.2. Serial number
    3.3. Signature Algorithm
    3.4. Issuer
    3.5. Subject
    3.6. Valid From
    3.7. Valid To
    3.8. Subject Public Key Info
    3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
        3.9.1. Basic Constraints
        3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
        3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
        3.9.4. Key Usage
        3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
        3.9.6. Authority Information Access
        3.9.7. Subject Information Access
        3.9.8. Certificate Policies
        3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name
        3.9.10. IP Resources
        3.9.11. AS Resources
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
    4.1. Version
    4.2. Issuer Name
    4.3. This Update
    4.4. Next Update
    4.5. Signature
    4.6. Revoked Certificate List
        4.6.1. Serial Number
        4.6.2. Revocation Date
    4.7. CRL Extensions
        4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier
        4.7.2. CRL Number
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile
    5.1. PCKS#10 Profile
        5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
    5.2. CRMF Profile
        5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
        5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
    5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
6. Resource Certificate Validation
    6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates
    6.2. Resource Extension Validation
    6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation
7. Security Considerations
8. IANA Considerations
9. Acknowledgements
10. Normative References
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List
§ Authors' Addresses
§ Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements

1. Introduction

A Resource Certificate describes an action by the certificate issuer that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the certificate's issuer.

In the context of the public Internet, and use of public number resources in this context, it is intended that Resource Certificates are used in a manner that is aligned to the public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this allocation can be described by a Resource Certificate that is issued by the registry with a subject corresponding to the entity that is the recipient of this number assignment or allocation. In the context of the public number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path from a "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate.

Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related use contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing Registries for nominated routing objects, validation of routing requests, and detection of potential unauthorized used of IP addresses.

This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.

1.1. Terminology

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2. Describing Resources in Certificates

There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in this profile:

A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate form a sequence of encompassing relationships.

3. Resource Certificate Fields

3.1. Version

Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this field is 2).

3.2. Serial number

3.3. Signature Algorithm

3.4. Issuer

This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of the CA bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the immediate superior certificate.

3.5. Subject

This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.

In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name that is unique per issuer.

3.6. Valid From

In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time other than the current time.

3.7. Valid To

In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time other than the current time.

Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate.

3.8. Subject Public Key Info

This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, accordingly, the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. A minimum key size of 1024 bits is mandated in this profile. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits. Subordinates of these subordinate certificates, in the context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits.

In the application of this profile to certification of public number resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the Regional Internet Registries used a key size of 2048 bits, and that their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits.

3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming Resource Certificate.

3.9.1. Basic Constraints

The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification paths that include this certificate.

The issuer determines whether the cA boolean is set. If this bit is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is permitted be a CA).

The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST NOT be present.

The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present.

3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier

The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.

The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the subject of this certificate).

3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier

The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This extension is non-critical.

3.9.4. Key Usage

This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical extension, and it MUST be present.

In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and must be the only bits set to TRUE. In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points

This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] (Tridgell, A., “rsync,” April 2006.) that references a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.

In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield MUST be omitted.

The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the DistributionPointName set.

3.9.6. Authority Information Access

This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of all certificates that are issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA. This is specified in RFC3280 as a sequence of reference objects. In this profile a single reference object to the immediate superior's publication location MUST be used.

This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST reference the point of publication of all objects published by the issuer's immediate superior issuer. Other access method URIs referencing the same publication point MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension.

In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be present, and is non-critical.

3.9.7. Subject Information Access

This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information and service collection will include all current valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the subject's corresponding private key.

This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension.

This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-critical. Where the subject is not a CA this field MUST NOT be present.

3.9.8. Certificate Policies

This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource Certificates.

3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name

This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by the issuer.

3.9.10. IP Resources

This field contains the list of IP address resources as per [RFC3779] (Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, “X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers,” June 2004.). The value may specify the "inherit" element for a particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both extensions.

3.9.11. AS Resources

4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile

An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's validity period.

The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with different scope by a single CA.

No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.

4.1. Version

Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the integer value of this field is 1).

4.2. Issuer Name

The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.

4.3. This Update

This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

4.4. Next Update

This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

4.5. Signature

This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be present.

4.6. Revoked Certificate List

When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate list MUST be absent.

For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

4.6.1. Serial Number

4.6.2. Revocation Date

The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

4.7. CRL Extensions

The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be present in a CRL.

4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier

4.7.2. CRL Number

The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within the scope of this profile.

5. Resource Certificate Request Profile

5.1. PCKS#10 Profile

This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field.

5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that may appear in a CertificationRequest Object:

5.2. CRMF Profile

This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.

With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field.

5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:

5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests

This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10 and CRMF Certificate Request:

With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field.

6. Resource Certificate Validation

To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n certificates) satisfies the following conditions:

6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates

The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue a self-signed root certificate.

The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is a role undertaken by relying parties, and the structure of the resource certificate profile admits the same variety of trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2 (Resource Extension Validation).

6.2. Resource Extension Validation

Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource sets:

Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than 1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1.

6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation

Validation of signed resource data using a target resource certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions hold:

A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate. A candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate set where the resource extension validity constraint of "encompassing" is satisfied, and a valid candidate parent certificate is any candidate parent certificate that also matches validity conditions 1 through 6. A valid parent certificate is a valid candidate parent certificate that also matches validity condition 7.

Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.

There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration parameter.

In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of 100.

[Note - not for publication: There is no particular reason for suggesting this value other than the observation that it appears to be comfortably longer than any real distribution chain for public number resources, without being too long so as to pose potential DOS concerns for relying parties performing a validation operation.]

7. Security Considerations

8. IANA Considerations

9. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this document.

10. Normative References

Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate

Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer

Data:
  Version: 3
  Serial: 3
  Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
  Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
    E=ca@apnic.net
  Validity:
    Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
    Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
  Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
  Subject Key Identifier:
    86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
    8b:97:49:14
  Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
    hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      RSA Public Key: Modulus:
        c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
        59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
        0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
        f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
        b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
        5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
        e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
        4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
        56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
        c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
        dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
        f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
        92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
        d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
        24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
        03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
      RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
  Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
  Subject Info Access:
    caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
                          pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
                          q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
                          hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
  Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
  CRL Distribution Points:
    rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
           pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
           q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
           q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
  Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
    rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
           pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
           q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
  Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
    ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
    51:c2:a9:1c
  Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
    q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
  Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
  IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24,
        203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23
  IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32
  ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
  Signature:
    c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
    4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
    0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
    a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:
    11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
    92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
    f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
    e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
    26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
    4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
    5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
    81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
    33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
    bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
    1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
    52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d

Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List

CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl

Data:
  Version: 2
  Signature Algorithm:
    Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
  Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
    E=ca@apnic.net
  This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
  Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
  Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
    ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
    07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
  Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
    q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
  CRLNumber: 4
  Revoked Certificates: 1
    Serial Number: 1
    Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 2
    Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 4
    Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
  Signature:
    b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
    0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
    f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
    17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
    f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
    d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
    b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
    66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
    6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
    d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
    cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
    c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
    d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
    09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
    02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
    59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
    34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
    d9

Authors' Addresses

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[RFC0791]	Postel, J., “Internet Protocol,” STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981.
[RFC2050]	Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and J. Postel, “INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES,” BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC2985]	Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, “PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0,” RFC 2985, November 2000.
[RFC2986]	Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, “PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7,” RFC 2986, November 2000.
[RFC3280]	Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile,” RFC 3280, April 2002.
[RFC3779]	Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, “X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers,” RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4055]	Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, “Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile,” RFC 4055, June 2005.
[RFC4158]	Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. Nicholas, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building,” RFC 4158, September 2005.
[RFC4211]	Schaad, J., “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),” RFC 4211, September 2005.
[RFC4291]	Hinden, R. and S. Deering, “IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture,” RFC 4291, February 2006.
[rsync]	Tridgell, A., “rsync,” April 2006.

	Geoff Huston
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email:	gih@apnic.net
URI:	http://www.apnic.net

	George Michaelson
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email:	ggm@apnic.net
URI:	http://www.apnic.net

	Robert Loomans
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email:	robertl@apnic.net
URI:	http://www.apnic.net

A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificatesdraft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-02.txt

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