rfc9528.original   rfc9528.txt 
LAKE Working Group G. Selander Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Selander
Internet-Draft J. Preuß Mattsson Request for Comments: 9528 J. Preuß Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini Category: Standards Track F. Palombini
Expires: 25 July 2024 Ericsson ISSN: 2070-1721 Ericsson
22 January 2024 March 2024
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-23
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a
very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication,
forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for
usage in constrained scenarios and a main use case is to establish an usage in constrained scenarios, and a main use case is to establish
OSCORE security context. By reusing COSE for cryptography, CBOR for an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
encoding, and CoAP for transport, the additional code size can be security context. By reusing CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
kept very low. (COSE) for cryptography, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
for encoding, and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for
transport, the additional code size can be kept very low.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 July 2024. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9528.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Motivation
1.2. Message Size Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Message Size Examples
1.3. Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Document Structure
1.4. Terminology and Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. Terminology and Requirements Language
2. EDHOC Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. EDHOC Outline
3. Protocol Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Protocol Elements
3.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. General
3.2. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2. Method
3.3. Connection Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Connection Identifiers
3.4. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4. Transport
3.5. Authentication Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5. Authentication Parameters
3.6. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.6. Cipher Suites
3.7. Ephemeral Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.7. Ephemeral Public Keys
3.8. External Authorization Data (EAD) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.8. External Authorization Data (EAD)
3.9. Application Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.9. Application Profile
4. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4. Key Derivation
4.1. Keys for EDHOC Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.1. Keys for EDHOC Message Processing
4.2. Keys for EDHOC Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.2. Keys for EDHOC Applications
5. Message Formatting and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. Message Formatting and Processing
5.1. EDHOC Message Processing Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.1. EDHOC Message Processing Outline
5.2. EDHOC Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.2. EDHOC Message 1
5.3. EDHOC Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.3. EDHOC Message 2
5.4. EDHOC Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.4. EDHOC Message 3
5.5. EDHOC Message 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.5. EDHOC Message 4
6. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6. Error Handling
6.1. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.1. Success
6.2. Unspecified Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.2. Unspecified Error
6.3. Wrong Selected Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6.3. Wrong Selected Cipher Suite
6.4. Unknown Credential Referenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.4. Unknown Credential Referenced
7. EDHOC Message Deduplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7. EDHOC Message Deduplication
8. Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8. Compliance Requirements
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 9. Security Considerations
9.1. Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 9.1. Security Properties
9.2. Cryptographic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 9.2. Cryptographic Considerations
9.3. Cipher Suites and Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . 53 9.3. Cipher Suites and Cryptographic Algorithms
9.4. Post-Quantum Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 9.4. Post-Quantum Considerations
9.5. Unprotected Data and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 9.5. Unprotected Data and Privacy
9.6. Updated Internet Threat Model Considerations . . . . . . 55 9.6. Updated Internet Threat Model Considerations
9.7. Denial-of-Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 9.7. Denial of Service
9.8. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 9.8. Implementation Considerations
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 10.1. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry
10.2. EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 10.2. EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry
10.3. EDHOC Method Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 10.3. EDHOC Method Type Registry
10.4. EDHOC Error Codes Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10.4. EDHOC Error Codes Registry
10.5. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry . . . . . . . 63 10.5. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry
10.6. COSE Header Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.6. COSE Header Parameters Registry
10.7. The Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.7. Well-Known URI Registry
10.8. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.8. Media Types Registry
10.9. CoAP Content-Formats Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.9. CoAP Content-Formats Registry
10.10. Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values 10.10. Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.11. Expert Review Instructions
10.11. Expert Review Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 11. References
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.1. Normative References
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.2. Informative References
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Appendix A. Use with OSCORE and Transfer over CoAP
Appendix A. Use with OSCORE and Transfer over CoAP . . . . . . . 76 A.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context
A.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . 76 A.2. Transferring EDHOC over CoAP
A.2. Transferring EDHOC over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Appendix B. Compact Representation
Appendix B. Compact Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Appendix C. Use of CBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC
Appendix C. Use of CBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC . . . . . . . . 83 C.1. CBOR and CDDL
C.1. CBOR and CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 C.2. CDDL Definitions
C.2. CDDL Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 C.3. COSE
C.3. COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Appendix D. Authentication-Related Verifications
Appendix D. Authentication Related Verifications . . . . . . . . 88 D.1. Validating the Authentication Credential
D.1. Validating the Authentication Credential . . . . . . . . 88 D.2. Identities
D.2. Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 D.3. Certification Path and Trust Anchors
D.3. Certification Path and Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . 90 D.4. Revocation Status
D.4. Revocation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 D.5. Unauthenticated Operation
D.5. Unauthenticated Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Appendix E. Use of External Authorization Data
Appendix E. Use of External Authorization Data . . . . . . . . . 91 Appendix F. Application Profile Example
Appendix F. Application Profile Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Appendix G. Long PLAINTEXT_2
Appendix G. Long PLAINTEXT_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Appendix H. EDHOC_KeyUpdate
Appendix H. EDHOC_KeyUpdate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Appendix I. Example Protocol State Machine
Appendix I. Example Protocol State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . 96 I.1. Initiator State Machine
I.1. Initiator State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 I.2. Responder State Machine
I.2. Responder State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Acknowledgments
Appendix J. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Authors' Addresses
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation 1.1. Motivation
Many Internet of Things (IoT) deployments require technologies which Many Internet of Things (IoT) deployments require technologies that
are highly performant in constrained environments [RFC7228]. IoT are highly performant in constrained environments [RFC7228]. IoT
devices may be constrained in various ways, including memory, devices may be constrained in various ways, including memory,
storage, processing capacity, and power. The connectivity for these storage, processing capacity, and power. The connectivity for these
settings may also exhibit constraints such as unreliable and lossy settings may also exhibit constraints, such as unreliable and lossy
channels, highly restricted bandwidth, and dynamic topology. The channels, highly restricted bandwidth, and dynamic topology. The
IETF has acknowledged this problem by standardizing a range of IETF has acknowledged this problem by standardizing a range of
lightweight protocols and enablers designed for the IoT, including lightweight protocols and enablers designed for the IoT, including
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP, [RFC7252]), Concise the CoAP [RFC7252], CBOR [RFC8949], and Static Context Header
Binary Object Representation (CBOR, [RFC8949]), and Static Context Compression (SCHC) [RFC8724].
Header Compression (SCHC, [RFC8724]).
The need for special protocols targeting constrained IoT deployments The need for special protocols targeting constrained IoT deployments
extends also to the security domain [I-D.ietf-lake-reqs]. Important extends also to the security domain [LAKE-REQS]. Important
characteristics in constrained environments are the number of round characteristics in constrained environments are the number of round
trips and protocol message sizes, which if kept low can contribute to trips and protocol message sizes, which (if kept low) can contribute
good performance by enabling transport over a small number of radio to good performance by enabling transport over a small number of
frames, reducing latency due to fragmentation or duty cycles, etc. radio frames, reducing latency due to fragmentation, duty cycles,
Another important criterion is code size, which may be prohibitively etc. Another important criterion is code size, which may be
large for certain deployments due to device capabilities or network prohibitively large for certain deployments due to device
load during firmware update. Some IoT deployments also need to capabilities or network load during firmware updates. Some IoT
support a variety of underlying transport technologies, potentially deployments also need to support a variety of underlying transport
even with a single connection. technologies, potentially even with a single connection.
Some security solutions for such settings exist already. CBOR Object Some security solutions for such settings exist already. COSE
Signing and Encryption (COSE, [RFC9052]) specifies basic application- [RFC9052] specifies basic application-layer security services
layer security services efficiently encoded in CBOR. Another example efficiently encoded in CBOR. Another example is OSCORE [RFC8613],
is Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE, which is a lightweight communication security extension to CoAP using
[RFC8613]) which is a lightweight communication security extension to CBOR and COSE. In order to establish good quality cryptographic keys
CoAP using CBOR and COSE. In order to establish good quality for security protocols such as COSE and OSCORE, the two endpoints may
cryptographic keys for security protocols such as COSE and OSCORE, run an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, from which
the two endpoints may run an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key shared secret keying material can be derived. Such a key exchange
exchange protocol, from which shared secret keying material can be protocol should also be lightweight to prevent bad performance in
derived. Such a key exchange protocol should also be lightweight; to case of repeated use, e.g., due to device rebooting or frequent
prevent bad performance in case of repeated use, e.g., due to device rekeying for security reasons or to avoid latencies in a network
rebooting or frequent rekeying for security reasons; or to avoid formation setting with many devices authenticating at the same time.
latencies in a network formation setting with many devices
authenticating at the same time.
This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a
lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol providing good lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol providing good
security properties including forward secrecy, identity protection, security properties including forward secrecy, identity protection,
and cipher suite negotiation. Authentication can be based on raw and cipher suite negotiation. Authentication can be based on raw
public keys (RPK) or public key certificates and requires the public keys (RPKs) or public key certificates and requires the
application to provide input on how to verify that endpoints are application to provide input on how to verify that endpoints are
trusted. This specification supports the referencing of credentials trusted. This specification supports the referencing of credentials
in order to reduce message overhead, but credentials may in order to reduce message overhead, but credentials may
alternatively be embedded in the messages. EDHOC does not currently alternatively be embedded in the messages. EDHOC does not currently
support pre-shared key (PSK) authentication as authentication with support Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication as authentication with
static Diffie-Hellman public keys by reference produces equally small static Diffie-Hellman public keys by reference produces equally small
message sizes but with much simpler key distribution and identity message sizes but with much simpler key distribution and identity
protection. protection.
EDHOC makes use of known protocol constructions, such as SIGMA EDHOC makes use of known protocol constructions, such as SIGn-and-MAc
[SIGMA], the Noise XX pattern [Noise], and Extract-and-Expand [SIGMA], the Noise XX pattern [Noise], and Extract-and-Expand
[RFC5869]. EDHOC uses COSE for cryptography and identification of [RFC5869]. EDHOC uses COSE for cryptography and identification of
credentials (including COSE_Key, CBOR Web Token (CWT), CWT Claims Set credentials (including COSE_Key, CBOR Web Token (CWT), CWT Claims Set
(CCS), X.509, and CBOR encoded X.509 (C509) certificates, see (CCS), X.509, and CBOR-encoded X.509 (C509) certificates; see
Section 3.5.2). COSE provides crypto agility and enables the use of Section 3.5.2). COSE provides crypto agility and enables the use of
future algorithms and credential types targeting IoT. future algorithms and credential types targeting IoT.
EDHOC is designed for highly constrained settings making it EDHOC is designed for highly constrained settings, making it
especially suitable for low-power networks [RFC8376] such as Cellular especially suitable for low-power networks [RFC8376] such as Cellular
IoT, 6TiSCH, and LoRaWAN. A main objective for EDHOC is to be a IoT, IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH), and LoRaWAN.
lightweight authenticated key exchange for OSCORE, i.e., to provide A main objective for EDHOC is to be a lightweight authenticated key
authentication and session key establishment for IoT use cases such exchange for OSCORE, i.e., to provide authentication and session key
as those built on CoAP [RFC7252] involving 'things' with embedded establishment for IoT use cases such as those built on CoAP [RFC7252]
microcontrollers, sensors, and actuators. By reusing the same involving 'things' with embedded microcontrollers, sensors, and
lightweight primitives as OSCORE (CBOR, COSE, CoAP) the additional actuators. By reusing the same lightweight primitives as OSCORE
code size can be kept very low. Note that while CBOR and COSE (CBOR, COSE, and CoAP), the additional code size can be kept very
primitives are built into the protocol messages, EDHOC is not bound low. Note that while CBOR and COSE primitives are built into the
to a particular transport. protocol messages, EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport.
A typical setting is when one of the endpoints is constrained or in a A typical setting is when one of the endpoints is constrained or in a
constrained network, and the other endpoint is a node on the Internet constrained network and the other endpoint is a node on the Internet
(such as a mobile phone). Thing-to-thing interactions over (such as a mobile phone). Thing-to-thing interactions over
constrained networks are also relevant since both endpoints would constrained networks are also relevant since both endpoints would
then benefit from the lightweight properties of the protocol. EDHOC then benefit from the lightweight properties of the protocol. EDHOC
could, e.g., be run when a device connects for the first time, or to could, e.g., be run when a device connects for the first time or to
establish fresh keys which are not revealed by a later compromise of establish fresh keys that are not revealed by a later compromise of
the long-term keys. the long-term keys.
1.2. Message Size Examples 1.2. Message Size Examples
Examples of EDHOC message sizes are shown in Figure 1, using Examples of EDHOC message sizes are shown in Table 1, which use
different kinds of authentication keys and COSE header parameters for different kinds of authentication keys and COSE header parameters for
identification: static Diffie-Hellman keys or signature keys, either identification, i.e., static Diffie-Hellman keys or signature keys,
in CBOR Web Token (CWT) / CWT Claims Set (CCS) [RFC8392] identified either in CWT/CCS [RFC8392] identified by a key identifier using
by a key identifier using 'kid' [RFC9052], or in X.509 certificates 'kid' [RFC9052] or in X.509 certificates identified by a hash value
identified by a hash value using 'x5t' [RFC9360]. As a comparison, using 'x5t' [RFC9360]. EDHOC always uses ephemeral-ephemeral key
in the case of RPK authentication, the EDHOC message size when exchange. As a comparison, in the case of RPK authentication and
transferred in CoAP can be less than 1/7 of the DTLS 1.3 handshake when transferred in CoAP, the EDHOC message size can be less than 1/7
[RFC9147] with ECDHE and connection ID, see Section 2 of of the DTLS 1.3 handshake [RFC9147] with Ephemeral Elliptic Curve
[I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison]. Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) and connection ID; see Section 2 of
[CoAP-SEC-PROT].
---------------------------------------------------------- +===========+================+================+
Static DH Keys Signature Keys | | Static DH Keys | Signature Keys |
---------------- ---------------- +===========+==========+=====+==========+=====+
kid x5t kid x5t | | kid | x5t | kid | x5t |
---------------------------------------------------------- +===========+==========+=====+==========+=====+
message_1 37 37 37 37 | message_1 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
message_2 45 58 102 115 +-----------+----------+-----+----------+-----+
message_3 19 33 77 90 | message_2 | 45 | 58 | 102 | 115 |
---------------------------------------------------------- +-----------+----------+-----+----------+-----+
Total 101 128 216 242 | message_3 | 19 | 33 | 77 | 90 |
---------------------------------------------------------- +-----------+----------+-----+----------+-----+
| Total | 101 | 128 | 216 | 242 |
+-----------+----------+-----+----------+-----+
Figure 1: Examples of EDHOC message sizes in bytes. Table 1: Examples of EDHOC Message Sizes in
Bytes
1.3. Document Structure 1.3. Document Structure
The remainder of the document is organized as follows: Section 2 The remainder of the document is organized as follows: Section 2
outlines EDHOC authenticated with signature keys, Section 3 describes outlines EDHOC authenticated with signature keys; Section 3 describes
the protocol elements of EDHOC, including formatting of the ephemeral the protocol elements of EDHOC, including formatting of the ephemeral
public keys, Section 4 specifies the key derivation, Section 5 public keys; Section 4 specifies the key derivation; Section 5
specifies message processing for EDHOC authenticated with signature specifies message processing for EDHOC authenticated with signature
keys or static Diffie-Hellman keys, Section 6 describes the error keys or static Diffie-Hellman keys; Section 6 describes the error
messages, Section 7 describes EDHOC support for transport that does messages; Section 7 describes EDHOC support for transport that does
not handle message duplication, and Section 8 lists compliance not handle message duplication; and Section 8 lists compliance
requirements. Note that normative text is also used in appendices, requirements. Note that normative text is also used in appendices,
in particular Appendix A. in particular Appendix A.
1.4. Terminology and Requirements Language 1.4. Terminology and Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in CBOR [RFC8949], CBOR Sequences [RFC8742], COSE described in CBOR [RFC8949], CBOR Sequences [RFC8742], COSE
structures and processing [RFC9052], COSE algorithms [RFC9053], CWT Structures and Processing [RFC9052], COSE Algorithms [RFC9053], CWT
and CWT Claims Set [RFC8392], and the Concise Data Definition and CCS [RFC8392], and the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)
Language (CDDL, [RFC8610]), which is used to express CBOR data [RFC8610], which is used to express CBOR data structures. Examples
structures. Examples of CBOR and CDDL are provided in Appendix C.1. of CBOR and CDDL are provided in Appendix C.1. When referring to
When referring to CBOR, this specification always refers to CBOR, this specification always refers to Deterministically Encoded
Deterministically Encoded CBOR as specified in Sections 4.2.1 and CBOR, as specified in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949]. The
4.2.2 of [RFC8949]. The single output from authenticated encryption single output from authenticated encryption (including the
(including the authentication tag) is called "ciphertext", following authentication tag) is called "ciphertext", following [RFC5116].
[RFC5116].
2. EDHOC Outline 2. EDHOC Outline
EDHOC specifies different authentication methods of the ephemeral- EDHOC specifies different authentication methods of the ephemeral-
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange: signature keys and static ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, i.e., signature keys and
Diffie-Hellman keys. This section outlines the signature key based static Diffie-Hellman keys. This section outlines the signature-key-
method. Further details of protocol elements and other based method. Further details of protocol elements and other
authentication methods are provided in the remainder of this authentication methods are provided in the remainder of this
document. document.
SIGMA (SIGn-and-MAc) is a family of theoretical protocols with a SIGn-and-MAc (SIGMA) is a family of theoretical protocols with a
large number of variants [SIGMA]. Like in IKEv2 [RFC7296] and (D)TLS number of variants [SIGMA]. Like in Internet Key Exchange Protocol
1.3 [RFC8446][RFC9147], EDHOC authenticated with signature keys is Version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296] and (D)TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] [RFC9147], EDHOC
built on a variant of the SIGMA protocol, SIGMA-I, which provides authenticated with signature keys is built on a variant of the SIGMA
identity protection against active attacks on the party initiating protocol, SIGMA-I, which provides identity protection against active
the protocol. Also like IKEv2, EDHOC implements the MAC-then-Sign attacks on the party initiating the protocol. Also like IKEv2, EDHOC
variant of the SIGMA-I protocol. The message flow (excluding an implements the MAC-then-Sign variant of the SIGMA-I protocol. The
optional fourth message) is shown in Figure 2. message flow (excluding an optional fourth message) is shown in
Figure 1.
Initiator Responder Initiator Responder
| G_X | | G_X |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| | | |
| G_Y, Enc( ID_CRED_R, Sig( R; MAC( CRED_R, G_X, G_Y ) ) ) | | G_Y, Enc( ID_CRED_R, Sig( R; MAC( CRED_R, G_X, G_Y ) ) ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------------------+ |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Sig( I; MAC( CRED_I, G_Y, G_X ) ) ) | | AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Sig( I; MAC( CRED_I, G_Y, G_X ) ) ) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| | | |
Figure 2: MAC-then-Sign variant of the SIGMA-I protocol used by Figure 1: MAC-then-Sign Variant of the SIGMA-I Protocol Used by
EDHOC method 0. the EDHOC Method 0
The parties exchanging messages in an EDHOC session are called The parties exchanging messages in an EDHOC session are called the
Initiator (I) and Responder (R), where the Initiator sends message_1 Initiator (I) and the Responder (R), where the Initiator sends
(see Section 3). They exchange ephemeral public keys, compute a message_1 (see Section 3). They exchange ephemeral public keys,
shared secret session key PRK_out, and derive symmetric application compute a shared secret session key PRK_out, and derive symmetric
keys used to protect application data. application keys used to protect application data.
* G_X and G_Y are the ECDH ephemeral public keys of I and R, * G_X and G_Y are the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) ephemeral
respectively. public keys of I and R, respectively.
* CRED_I and CRED_R are the authentication credentials containing * CRED_I and CRED_R are the authentication credentials containing
the public authentication keys of I and R, respectively. the public authentication keys of I and R, respectively.
* ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are used to identify and optionally * ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are used to identify and optionally
transport the credentials of the Initiator and the Responder, transport the credentials of I and R, respectively.
respectively.
* Sig(I; . ) and Sig(R; . ) denote signatures made with the private * Sig(I; . ) and Sig(R; . ) denote signatures made with the private
authentication key of I and R, respectively. authentication key of I and R, respectively.
* Enc(), AEAD(), and MAC() denotes encryption, authenticated * Enc(), AEAD(), and MAC() denote encryption, Authenticated
encryption with additional data, and message authentication code - Encryption with Associated Data, and Message Authentication Code
crypto algorithms applied with keys derived from one or more -- crypto algorithms applied with keys derived from one or more
shared secrets calculated during the protocol. shared secrets calculated during the protocol.
In order to create a "full-fledged" protocol some additional protocol In order to create a "full-fledged" protocol, some additional
elements are needed. EDHOC adds: protocol elements are needed. EDHOC adds:
* Transcript hashes (hashes of message data) TH_2, TH_3, TH_4 used * transcript hashes (hashes of message data), TH_2, TH_3, and TH_4,
for key derivation and as additional authenticated data. used for key derivation and as additional authenticated data,
* Computationally independent keys derived from the ECDH shared * computationally independent keys derived from the ECDH shared
secret and used for authenticated encryption of different secret and used for authenticated encryption of different
messages. messages,
* An optional fourth message giving key confirmation to I in * an optional fourth message giving key confirmation to I in
deployments where no protected application data is sent from R to deployments where no protected application data is sent from R to
I. I,
* A keying material exporter and a key update function with forward * a keying material exporter and a key update function with forward
secrecy. secrecy,
* Secure negotiation of cipher suite. * secure negotiation of the cipher suite,
* Method types, error handling, and padding. * method types, error handling, and padding,
* Selection of connection identifiers C_I and C_R which may be used * a selection of connection identifiers, C_I and C_R, which may be
in EDHOC to identify protocol state. used in EDHOC to identify the protocol state, and
* Transport of external authorization data. * transport of external authorization data.
EDHOC is designed to encrypt and integrity protect as much EDHOC is designed to encrypt and integrity protect as much
information as possible. Symmetric keys and random material used in information as possible. Symmetric keys and random material used in
EDHOC are derived using EDHOC_KDF with as much previous information EDHOC are derived using EDHOC_KDF with as much previous information
as possible, see Figure 8. EDHOC is furthermore designed to be as as possible; see Figure 6. EDHOC is furthermore designed to be as
compact and lightweight as possible, in terms of message sizes, compact and lightweight as possible, in terms of message sizes,
processing, and the ability to reuse already existing CBOR, COSE, and processing, and the ability to reuse already existing CBOR, COSE, and
CoAP libraries. Like in (D)TLS, authentication is the responsibility CoAP libraries. Like in (D)TLS, authentication is the responsibility
of the application. EDHOC identifies (and optionally transports) of the application. EDHOC identifies (and optionally transports)
authentication credentials, and provides proof-of-possession of the authentication credentials and provides proof-of-possession of the
private authentication key. private authentication key.
To simplify for implementors, the use of CBOR and COSE in EDHOC is To simplify for implementors, the use of CBOR and COSE in EDHOC is
summarized in Appendix C. Test vectors including CBOR diagnostic summarized in Appendix C. Test vectors, including CBOR diagnostic
notation are provided in [I-D.ietf-lake-traces]. notation, are provided in [RFC9529].
3. Protocol Elements 3. Protocol Elements
3.1. General 3.1. General
The EDHOC protocol consists of three mandatory messages (message_1, The EDHOC protocol consists of three mandatory messages (message_1,
message_2, message_3), an optional fourth message (message_4), and an message_2, and message_3), an optional fourth message (message_4),
error message, between an Initiator (I) and a Responder (R). The odd and an error message, between an Initiator (I) and a Responder (R).
messages are sent by I, the even by R. Both I and R can send error The odd messages are sent by I, the even by R. Both I and R can send
messages. The roles have slightly different security properties error messages. The roles have slightly different security
which should be considered when the roles are assigned, see properties that should be considered when the roles are assigned; see
Section 9.1. All EDHOC messages are CBOR Sequences [RFC8742], and Section 9.1. All EDHOC messages are CBOR Sequences [RFC8742] and are
are defined to be deterministically encoded CBOR as specified in defined to be deterministically encoded CBOR as specified in
Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949]. Figure 3 illustrates an EDHOC message Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949]. Figure 2 illustrates an EDHOC message
flow with the optional fourth message as well as the content of each flow with the optional fourth message as well as the content of each
message. The protocol elements in the figure are introduced in message. The protocol elements in the figure are introduced in
Section 3 and Section 5. Message formatting and processing are Sections 3 and 5. Message formatting and processing are specified in
specified in Section 5 and Section 6. Sections 5 and 6.
Application data may be protected using the agreed application Application data may be protected using the agreed application
algorithms (AEAD, hash) in the selected cipher suite (see algorithms (AEAD, hash) in the selected cipher suite (see
Section 3.6) and the application can make use of the established Section 3.6), and the application can make use of the established
connection identifiers C_I and C_R (see Section 3.3). Media types connection identifiers C_I and C_R (see Section 3.3). Media types
that may be used for EDHOC are defined in Section 10.8. that may be used for EDHOC are defined in Section 10.8.
The Initiator can derive symmetric application keys after creating The Initiator can derive symmetric application keys after creating
EDHOC message_3, see Section 4.2.1. Protected application data can EDHOC message_3; see Section 4.2.1. Protected application data can
therefore be sent in parallel or together with EDHOC message_3. therefore be sent in parallel or together with EDHOC message_3.
EDHOC message_4 is typically not sent. EDHOC message_4 is typically not sent.
Initiator Responder Initiator Responder
| METHOD, SUITES_I, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | | METHOD, SUITES_I, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_1 | | message_1 |
| | | |
| G_Y, Enc( C_R, ID_CRED_R, Signature_or_MAC_2, EAD_2 ) | | G_Y, Enc( C_R, ID_CRED_R, Signature_or_MAC_2, EAD_2 ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------------------+ |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
| message_2 | | message_2 |
| | | |
| AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Signature_or_MAC_3, EAD_3 ) | | AEAD( ID_CRED_I, Signature_or_MAC_3, EAD_3 ) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_3 | | message_3 |
| | | |
| AEAD( EAD_4 ) | | AEAD( EAD_4 ) |
|<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
| message_4 | | message_4 |
Figure 3: EDHOC message flow including the optional fourth message. Figure 2: EDHOC Message Flow Including the Optional Fourth Message
3.2. Method 3.2. Method
The data item METHOD in message_1 (see Section 5.2.1), is an integer The data item METHOD in message_1 (see Section 5.2.1) is an integer
specifying the authentication method. EDHOC supports authentication specifying the authentication method. EDHOC supports authentication
with signature or static Diffie-Hellman keys, as defined in the four with signature or static Diffie-Hellman keys, as defined in the four
authentication methods: 0, 1, 2, and 3, see Figure 4. When using a authentication methods: 0, 1, 2, and 3; see Table 2. When using a
static Diffie-Hellman key the authentication is provided by a Message static Diffie-Hellman key, the authentication is provided by a
Authentication Code (MAC) computed from an ephemeral-static ECDH Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed from an ephemeral-static
shared secret which enables significant reductions in message sizes. ECDH shared secret that enables significant reductions in message
Note that also in the static Diffie-Hellman based authentication sizes. Note that, also in the static Diffie-Hellman-based
methods there is an ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. authentication methods, there is an ephemeral-ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman key exchange.
The Initiator and the Responder need to have agreed on a single The Initiator and Responder need to have agreed on a single method to
method to be used for EDHOC, see Section 3.9. be used for EDHOC; see Section 3.9.
+-------------+--------------------+--------------------+ +===================+====================+====================+
| Method Type | Initiator | Responder | | Method Type Value | Initiator | Responder |
| Value | Authentication Key | Authentication Key | | | Authentication Key | Authentication Key |
+=============+====================+====================+ +===================+====================+====================+
| 0 | Signature Key | Signature Key | | 0 | Signature Key | Signature Key |
| 1 | Signature Key | Static DH Key | +-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 2 | Static DH Key | Signature Key | | 1 | Signature Key | Static DH Key |
| 3 | Static DH Key | Static DH Key | +-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
+-------------+--------------------+--------------------+ | 2 | Static DH Key | Signature Key |
+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 3 | Static DH Key | Static DH Key |
+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
| 23 | Reserved | Reserved |
+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
Figure 4: Authentication keys for method types. Table 2: Authentication Keys for Method Types
EDHOC does not have a dedicated message field to indicate the EDHOC does not have a dedicated message field to indicate the
protocol version. Breaking changes to EDHOC can be introduced by protocol version. Breaking changes to EDHOC can be introduced by
specifying and registering new methods. specifying and registering new methods.
3.3. Connection Identifiers 3.3. Connection Identifiers
EDHOC includes the selection of connection identifiers (C_I, C_R) EDHOC includes the selection of connection identifiers (C_I and C_R)
identifying a connection for which keys are agreed. identifying a connection for which keys are agreed.
Connection identifiers may be used to correlate EDHOC messages and Connection identifiers may be used to correlate EDHOC messages and
facilitate the retrieval of protocol state during an EDHOC session facilitate the retrieval of protocol state during an EDHOC session
(see Section 3.4), or may be used in applications of EDHOC, e.g., in (see Section 3.4) or may be used in applications of EDHOC, e.g., in
OSCORE (see Section 3.3.3). The connection identifiers do not have OSCORE (see Section 3.3.3). The connection identifiers do not have
any cryptographic purpose in EDHOC and only facilitate the retrieval any cryptographic purpose in EDHOC and only facilitate the retrieval
of security data associated with the protocol state. of security data associated with the protocol state.
Connection identifiers in EDHOC are intrinsically byte strings. Most Connection identifiers in EDHOC are intrinsically byte strings. Most
constrained devices only have a few connections for which short constrained devices only have a few connections for which short
identifiers may be sufficient. In some cases minimum length identifiers may be sufficient. In some cases, minimum length
identifiers are necessary to comply with overhead requirements. identifiers are necessary to comply with overhead requirements.
However, CBOR byte strings - with the exception of the empty byte However, CBOR byte strings -- with the exception of the empty byte
string h’’ which encodes as one byte (0x40) - are encoded as two or string h'', which encodes as one byte (0x40) -- are encoded as two or
more bytes. To enable one-byte encoding of certain byte strings more bytes. To enable one-byte encoding of certain byte strings
while maintaining CBOR encoding, EDHOC represents certain identifiers while maintaining CBOR encoding, EDHOC represents certain identifiers
as CBOR integers on the wire, see Section 3.3.2. as CBOR integers on the wire; see Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1. Selection of Connection Identifiers 3.3.1. Selection of Connection Identifiers
C_I and C_R are chosen by I and R, respectively. The Initiator C_I and C_R are chosen by I and R, respectively. The Initiator
selects C_I and sends it in message_1 for the Responder to use as a selects C_I and sends it in message_1 for the Responder to use as a
reference to the connection in communication with the Initiator. The reference to the connection in communications with the Initiator.
Responder selects C_R and sends it in message_2 for the Initiator to The Responder selects C_R and sends it in message_2 for the Initiator
use as a reference to the connection in communications with the to use as a reference to the connection in communications with the
Responder. Responder.
If connection identifiers are used by an application protocol for If connection identifiers are used by an application protocol for
which EDHOC establishes keys then the selected connection identifiers which EDHOC establishes keys, then the selected connection
SHALL adhere to the requirements for that protocol, see Section 3.3.3 identifiers SHALL adhere to the requirements for that protocol; see
for an example. Section 3.3.3 for an example.
3.3.2. Representation of Byte String Identifiers 3.3.2. Representation of Byte String Identifiers
To allow identifiers with minimal overhead on the wire, certain byte To allow identifiers with minimal overhead on the wire, certain byte
strings used in connection identifiers and credential identifiers strings used in connection identifiers and credential identifiers
(see Section Section 3.5.3) are defined to have integer (see Section 3.5.3) are defined to have integer representations.
representations.
The integers with one-byte CBOR encoding are -24, ..., 23, see The integers with one-byte CBOR encoding are -24, ..., 23; see
Figure 5. Figure 3.
Integer: -24 -23 ... -11 ... -2 -1 0 1 ... 15 ... 23 Integer: -24 -23 ... -11 ... -2 -1 0 1 ... 15 ... 23
Encoding: 37 36 ... 2A ... 21 20 00 01 ... 0F ... 17 Encoding: 37 36 ... 2A ... 21 20 00 01 ... 0F ... 17
Figure 5: One-byte CBOR encoded integers. Figure 3: One-Byte CBOR-Encoded Integers
The byte strings which coincide with a one-byte CBOR encoding of an The byte strings that coincide with a one-byte CBOR encoding of an
integer MUST be represented by the CBOR encoding of that integer. integer MUST be represented by the CBOR encoding of that integer.
Other byte strings are simply encoded as CBOR byte strings. Other byte strings are simply encoded as CBOR byte strings.
For example: For example:
* 0x21 is represented by 0x21 (CBOR encoding of the integer -2), not * 0x21 is represented by 0x21 (CBOR encoding of the integer -2), not
by 0x4121 (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x21). by 0x4121 (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x21).
* 0x0D is represented by 0x0D (CBOR encoding of the integer 13), not * 0x0D is represented by 0x0D (CBOR encoding of the integer 13), not
by 0x410D (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x0D). by 0x410D (CBOR encoding of the byte string 0x0D).
skipping to change at page 12, line 12 skipping to change at line 534
* 0x18 is represented by 0x4118 (CBOR encoding of the byte string * 0x18 is represented by 0x4118 (CBOR encoding of the byte string
0x18). 0x18).
* 0x38 is represented by 0x4138 (CBOR encoding of the byte string * 0x38 is represented by 0x4138 (CBOR encoding of the byte string
0x38). 0x38).
* 0xABCD is represented by 0x42ABCD (CBOR encoding of the byte * 0xABCD is represented by 0x42ABCD (CBOR encoding of the byte
string 0xABCD). string 0xABCD).
One may view this representation of byte strings as a transport One may view this representation of byte strings as a transport
encoding: a byte string which parses as the one-byte CBOR encoding of encoding, i.e., a byte string that parses as the one-byte CBOR
an integer (i.e., integer in the interval -24, ..., 23) is just encoding of an integer (i.e., integer in the interval -24, ..., 23)
copied directly into the message, a byte string which does not is is just copied directly into the message, and a byte string that does
encoded as a CBOR byte string during transport. not is encoded as a CBOR byte string during transport.
Implementation Note: When implementing the byte string identifier | Implementation Note: When implementing the byte string
representation, it can in some programming languages help to define a | identifier representation, in some programming languages, it
new type, or other data structure, which (in its user facing API) | can help to define a new type or other data structure, which
behaves like a byte string, but when serializing to CBOR produces a | (in its user-facing API) behaves like a byte string but when
CBOR byte string or a CBOR integer depending on its value. | serializing to CBOR produces a CBOR byte string or a CBOR
| integer depending on its value.
3.3.3. Use of Connection Identifiers with OSCORE 3.3.3. Use of Connection Identifiers with OSCORE
For OSCORE, the choice of connection identifier results in the For OSCORE, the choice of connection identifier results in the
endpoint selecting its Recipient ID, see Section 3.1 of [RFC8613], endpoint selecting its Recipient ID (see Section 3.1 of [RFC8613])
for which certain uniqueness requirements apply, see Section 3.3 of for which certain uniqueness requirements apply (see Section 3.3 of
[RFC8613]. Therefore, the Initiator and the Responder MUST NOT [RFC8613]). Therefore, the Initiator and Responder MUST NOT select
select connection identifiers such that it results in the same OSCORE connection identifiers such that it results in the same OSCORE
Recipient ID. Since the connection identifier is a byte string, it Recipient ID. Since the connection identifier is a byte string, it
is converted to an OSCORE Recipient ID equal to the byte string. is converted to an OSCORE Recipient ID equal to the byte string.
Examples: Examples:
* A connection identifier 0xFF (represented in the EDHOC message as * A connection identifier 0xFF (represented in the EDHOC message as
0x41FF, see Section 3.3.2) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID 0x41FF; see Section 3.3.2) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID
0xFF. 0xFF.
* A connection identifier 0x21 (represented in the EDHOC message as * A connection identifier 0x21 (represented in the EDHOC message as
0x21, see Section 3.3.2) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID 0x21; see Section 3.3.2) is converted to the OSCORE Recipient ID
0x21. 0x21.
3.4. Transport 3.4. Transport
Cryptographically, EDHOC does not put requirements on the underlying Cryptographically, EDHOC does not put requirements on the underlying
layers. Received messages are processed as the expected next message layers. Received messages are processed as the expected next message
according to protocol state, see Section 5. If processing fails for according to the protocol state; see Section 5. If processing fails
any reason then, typically, an error message is attempted to be sent for any reason, then typically an error message is attempted to be
and the EDHOC session is aborted. sent and the EDHOC session is aborted.
EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer and can even be EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer and can even be
used in environments without IP. Ultimately, the application is free used in environments without IP. Ultimately, the application is free
to choose how to transport EDHOC messages including errors. In order to choose how to transport EDHOC messages including errors. In order
to avoid unnecessary message processing or protocol termination, it to avoid unnecessary message processing or protocol termination, it
is RECOMMENDED to use reliable transport, such as CoAP in reliable is RECOMMENDED to use reliable transport, such as CoAP in reliable
mode, which is the default transport, see Appendix A.2. In general, mode, which is the default transport; see Appendix A.2. In general,
the transport SHOULD handle: the transport SHOULD handle:
* message loss, * message loss,
* message duplication, see Section 7 for an alternative, * message duplication (see Section 7 for an alternative),
* flow control, * flow control,
* congestion control, * congestion control,
* fragmentation and reassembly, * fragmentation and reassembly,
* demultiplexing EDHOC messages from other types of messages, * demultiplexing EDHOC messages from other types of messages,
* denial-of-service mitigation, * denial-of-service mitigation, and
* message correlation, see Section 3.4.1. * message correlation (see Section 3.4.1).
EDHOC does not require error free transport since a change in message EDHOC does not require error-free transport since a change in message
content is detected through the transcript hashes in a subsequent content is detected through the transcript hashes in a subsequent
integrity verification, see Section 5. The transport does not integrity verification; see Section 5. The transport does not
require additional means to handle message reordering because of the require additional means to handle message reordering because of the
lockstep processing of EDHOC. lockstep processing of EDHOC.
EDHOC is designed to enable an authenticated key exchange with small EDHOC is designed to enable an authenticated key exchange with small
messages, where the minimum message sizes are of the order messages, where the minimum message sizes are of the order
illustrated in the first column of Figure 1. There is no maximum illustrated in the first column of Table 1. There is no maximum
message size specified by the protocol; this is for example dependent message size specified by the protocol; for example, this is
on the size of authentication credentials (if they are transported, dependent on the size of the authentication credentials (if they are
see Section 3.5). transported, see Section 3.5).
The use of transport is specified in the application profile, which The use of transport is specified in the application profile, which
in particular may specify limitations in message sizes, see in particular, may specify limitations in message sizes; see
Section 3.9. Section 3.9.
3.4.1. EDHOC Message Correlation 3.4.1. EDHOC Message Correlation
Correlation between EDHOC messages is needed to facilitate the Correlation between EDHOC messages is needed to facilitate the
retrieval of protocol state and security context during an EDHOC retrieval of the protocol state and security context during an EDHOC
session. It is also helpful for the Responder to get an indication session. It is also helpful for the Responder to get an indication
that a received EDHOC message is the beginning of a new EDHOC that a received EDHOC message is the beginning of a new EDHOC
session, such that no existing protocol state or security context session, such that no existing protocol state or security context
needs to be retrieved. needs to be retrieved.
Correlation may be based on existing mechanisms in the transport Correlation may be based on existing mechanisms in the transport
protocol, for example, the CoAP Token may be used to correlate EDHOC protocol; for example, the CoAP Token may be used to correlate EDHOC
messages in a CoAP response and in an associated CoAP request. The messages in a CoAP response and in an associated CoAP request. The
connection identifiers may also be used to correlate EDHOC messages. connection identifiers may also be used to correlate EDHOC messages.
If correlation between consecutive messages is not provided by other If correlation between consecutive messages is not provided by other
means then the transport binding SHOULD mandate prepending of an means, then the transport binding SHOULD mandate prepending of an
appropriate connection identifier (when available from the EDHOC appropriate connection identifier (when available from the EDHOC
protocol) to the EDHOC message. If message_1 indication is not protocol) to the EDHOC message. If message_1 indication is not
provided by other means, then the transport binding SHOULD mandate provided by other means, then the transport binding SHOULD mandate
prepending of message_1 with the CBOR simple value true (0xf5). prepending of message_1 with the CBOR simple value true (0xf5).
Transport of EDHOC in CoAP payloads is described in Appendix A.2, Transport of EDHOC in CoAP payloads is described in Appendix A.2,
including how to use connection identifiers and message_1 indication including how to use connection identifiers and message_1 indication
with CoAP. A similar construction is possible for other client- with CoAP. A similar construction is possible for other client-
server protocols. Protocols that do not provide any correlation at server protocols. Protocols that do not provide any correlation at
all can prescribe prepending of the peer's connection identifier to all can prescribe prepending of the peer's connection identifier to
all messages. all messages.
Note that correlation between EDHOC messages may be obtained without Note that correlation between EDHOC messages may be obtained without
transport support or connection identifiers, for example if the transport support or connection identifiers, for example, if the
endpoints only accept a single instance of the protocol at a time, endpoints only accept a single instance of the protocol at a time and
and execute conditionally on a correct sequence of messages. execute conditionally on a correct sequence of messages.
3.5. Authentication Parameters 3.5. Authentication Parameters
EDHOC supports various settings for how the other endpoint's EDHOC supports various settings for how the other endpoint's
authentication (public) key may be transported, identified, and authentication (public) key may be transported, identified, and
trusted. trusted.
EDHOC performs the following authentication related operations: EDHOC performs the following authentication-related operations:
* EDHOC transports information about credentials in ID_CRED_I and * EDHOC transports information about credentials in ID_CRED_I and
ID_CRED_R (described in Section 3.5.3). Based on this ID_CRED_R (described in Section 3.5.3). Based on this
information, the authentication credentials CRED_I and CRED_R information, the authentication credentials CRED_I and CRED_R
(described in Section 3.5.2) can be obtained. EDHOC may also (described in Section 3.5.2) can be obtained. EDHOC may also
transport certain authentication related information as External transport certain authentication-related information as external
Authorization Data (see Section 3.8). authorization data (see Section 3.8).
* EDHOC uses the authentication credentials in two ways (see * EDHOC uses the authentication credentials in two ways (see
Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.4.2): Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2):
- The authentication credential is input to the integrity - The authentication credential is input to the integrity
verification using the MAC fields. verification using the MAC fields.
- The authentication key of the authentication credential is used - The authentication key of the authentication credential is used
with the Signature_or_MAC field to verify proof-of-possession with the Signature_or_MAC field to verify proof-of-possession
of the private key. of the private key.
Other authentication related verifications are out of scope for Other authentication-related verifications are out of scope for EDHOC
EDHOC, and is the responsibility of the application. In particular, and are the responsibility of the application. In particular, the
the authentication credential needs to be validated in the context of authentication credential needs to be validated in the context of the
the connection for which EDHOC is used, see Appendix D. EDHOC MUST connection for which EDHOC is used; see Appendix D. EDHOC MUST allow
allow the application to read received information about credential the application to read received information about credentials in
(ID_CRED_R, ID_CRED_I). EDHOC MUST have access to the authentication ID_CRED_R and ID_CRED_I. EDHOC MUST have access to the
key and the authentication credential. authentication key and the authentication credential.
Note that the type of authentication key, authentication credential, Note that the type of authentication key, the type of authentication
and the identification of the credential have a large impact on the credential, and the identification of the credential have a large
message size. For example, the Signature_or_MAC field is much impact on the message size. For example, the Signature_or_MAC field
smaller with a static DH key than with a signature key. A CWT Claims is much smaller with a static DH key than with a signature key. A
Set (CCS) is much smaller than a self-signed certificate/CWT, but if CWT Claims Set (CCS) is much smaller than a self-signed certificate /
it is possible to reference the credential with a COSE header like CWT, but if it is possible to reference the credential with a COSE
'kid', then that is in turn much smaller than a CCS. header like 'kid', then that is in turn much smaller than a CCS.
3.5.1. Authentication Keys 3.5.1. Authentication Keys
The authentication key (i.e., the public key used for authentication) The authentication key (i.e., the public key used for authentication)
MUST be a signature key or static Diffie-Hellman key. The Initiator MUST be a signature key or a static Diffie-Hellman key. The
and the Responder MAY use different types of authentication keys, Initiator and Responder MAY use different types of authentication
e.g., one uses a signature key and the other uses a static Diffie- keys, e.g., one uses a signature key and the other uses a static
Hellman key. Diffie-Hellman key.
The authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the The authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the
method and the selected cipher suite (see Section 3.6). The method and the selected cipher suite (see Section 3.6). The
authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the EDHOC authentication key algorithm needs to be compatible with the EDHOC
key exchange algorithm when static Diffie-Hellman authentication is key exchange algorithm when static Diffie-Hellman authentication is
used, and compatible with the EDHOC signature algorithm when used and compatible with the EDHOC signature algorithm when signature
signature authentication is used. authentication is used.
Note that for most signature algorithms, the signature is determined Note that for most signature algorithms, the signature is determined
by the signature algorithm and the authentication key algorithm by the signature algorithm and the authentication key algorithm
together. When using static Diffie-Hellman keys the Initiator's and together. When using static Diffie-Hellman keys, the Initiator's and
Responder's private authentication keys are denoted as I and R, the Responder's private authentication keys are denoted as I and R,
respectively, and the public authentication keys are denoted G_I and respectively, and the public authentication keys are denoted G_I and
G_R, respectively. G_R, respectively.
For X.509 certificates the authentication key is represented by a For X.509 certificates, the authentication key is represented by a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo field. For CWT and CCS (see Section 3.5.2)) the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field. For CWT and CCS (see Section 3.5.2), the
authentication key is represented by a 'cnf' claim [RFC8747] authentication key is represented by a 'cnf' claim [RFC8747]
containing a COSE_Key [RFC9052]. In EDHOC, a raw public key (RPK) is containing a COSE_Key [RFC9052]. In EDHOC, a raw public key (RPK) is
an authentication key encoded as a COSE_Key wrapped in a CCS. an authentication key encoded as a COSE_Key wrapped in a CCS.
3.5.2. Authentication Credentials 3.5.2. Authentication Credentials
The authentication credentials, CRED_I and CRED_R, contains the The authentication credentials, CRED_I and CRED_R, contain the public
public authentication key of the Initiator and the Responder, authentication key of the Initiator and Responder, respectively. We
respectively. We use the notation CRED_x to refer to CRED_I or use the notation CRED_x to refer to CRED_I or CRED_R. Requirements
CRED_R. Requirements on CRED_x applies both to CRED_I and to CRED_R. on CRED_x applies both to CRED_I and to CRED_R. The authentication
The authentication credential typically also contains other credential typically also contains other parameters that needs to be
parameters that needs to be verified by the application, see verified by the application (see Appendix D) and in particular
Appendix D, and in particular information about the identity information about the identity ("subject") of the endpoint to prevent
("subject") of the endpoint to prevent misbinding attacks, see misbinding attacks (see Appendix D.2).
Appendix D.2.
EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials (see EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials (see
Section 3.5.3), for example X.509 certificates [RFC9360], C509 Section 3.5.3), for example, X.509 certificates [RFC9360], C509
certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], CWTs [RFC8392] and certificates [C509-CERTS], CWTs [RFC8392], and CCSs [RFC8392]. When
CWT Claims Sets (CCS) [RFC8392]. When the identified credential is a the identified credential is a chain or a bag, the authentication
chain or a bag, the authentication credential CRED_x is just the end credential CRED_x is just the end entity X.509 or C509 certificate /
entity X.509 or C509 certificate / CWT. In the choice between chain CWT. In the choice between a chain or a bag, it is RECOMMENDED to
or bag it is RECOMMENDED to use a chain, since the certificates in a use a chain, since the certificates in a bag are unordered and may
bag are unordered and may contain self-signed and extraneous contain self-signed and extraneous certificates, which can add
certificates, which can add complexity to the process of extracting complexity to the process of extracting the end entity certificate.
the end entity certificate. The Initiator and the Responder MAY use The Initiator and Responder MAY use different types of authentication
different types of authentication credentials, e.g., one uses an RPK credentials, e.g., one uses an RPK and the other uses a public key
and the other uses a public key certificate. certificate.
Since CRED_R is used in the integrity verification, see Since CRED_R is used in the integrity verification (see
Section 5.3.2, it needs to be specified such that it is identical Section 5.3.2), it needs to be specified such that it is identical
when used by Initiator or Responder. Similarly for CRED_I, see when used by the Initiator or Responder. Similarly for CRED_I, see
Section 5.4.2. The Initiator and Responder are expected to agree on Section 5.4.2. The Initiator and Responder are expected to agree on
the specific encoding of the authentication credentials, see the specific encoding of the authentication credentials; see
Section 3.9. It is RECOMMENDED that the COSE 'kid' parameter, when Section 3.9. It is RECOMMENDED that the COSE 'kid' parameter, when
used to identify the authentication credential, refers to a such a used to identify the authentication credential, refers to such a
specific encoding of the authentication credential. The Initiator specific encoding of the authentication credential. The Initiator
and Responder SHOULD use an available authentication credential and Responder SHOULD use an available authentication credential
(transported in EDHOC or otherwise provisioned) without re-encoding. (transported in EDHOC or otherwise provisioned) without re-encoding.
If for some reason re-encoding of an authentication credential passed If for some reason re-encoding of an authentication credential passed
by reference may occur, then a potential common encoding for CBOR by reference may occur, then a potential common encoding for CBOR-
based credentials is deterministically encoded CBOR as specified in based credentials is deterministically encoded CBOR, as specified in
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949]. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949]. Authentication credentials
passed by value are used as is without re-encoding.
* When the authentication credential is an X.509 certificate, CRED_x * When the authentication credential is an X.509 certificate, CRED_x
SHALL be the DER encoded certificate, encoded as a bstr [RFC9360]. SHALL be the DER-encoded certificate, encoded as a bstr [RFC9360].
* When the authentication credential is a C509 certificate, CRED_x * When the authentication credential is a C509 certificate, CRED_x
SHALL be the C509Certificate [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. SHALL be the C509 certificate [C509-CERTS].
* When the authentication credential is a CWT including a COSE_Key, * When the authentication credential is a CWT including a COSE_Key,
CRED_x SHALL be the untagged CWT. CRED_x SHALL be the untagged CWT.
* When the authentication credential includes a COSE_Key but is not * When the authentication credential includes a COSE_Key but is not
in a CWT, CRED_x SHALL be an untagged CWT Claims Set (CCS). This in a CWT, CRED_x SHALL be an untagged CCS. This is how RPKs are
is how RPKs are encoded, see Figure 6 for an example. encoded, see Figure 4 for an example.
- Naked COSE_Keys are thus dressed as CCS when used in EDHOC, in - Naked COSE_Keys are thus dressed as CCS when used in EDHOC in
its simplest form by prefixing the COSE_Key with 0xA108A101 (a its simplest form by prefixing the COSE_Key with 0xA108A101 (a
map with a 'cnf' claim). In that case the resulting map with a 'cnf' claim). In that case, the resulting
authentication credential contains no other identity than the authentication credential contains no other identity than the
public key itself, see Appendix D.2. public key itself; see Appendix D.2.
An example of CRED_x is shown below: An example of CRED_x is shown below:
{ /CCS/ { /CCS/
2 : "42-50-31-FF-EF-37-32-39", /sub/ 2 : "42-50-31-FF-EF-37-32-39", /sub/
8 : { /cnf/ 8 : { /cnf/
1 : { /COSE_Key/ 1 : { /COSE_Key/
1 : 1, /kty/ 1 : 1, /kty/
2 : h'00', /kid/ 2 : h'00', /kid/
-1 : 4, /crv/ -1 : 4, /crv/
-2 : h'b1a3e89460e88d3a8d54211dc95f0b90 /x/ -2 : h'b1a3e89460e88d3a8d54211dc95f0b90 /x/
3ff205eb71912d6db8f4af980d2db83a' 3ff205eb71912d6db8f4af980d2db83a'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 6: CWT Claims Set (CCS) containing an X25519 static Figure 4: CCS Containing an X25519 Static Diffie-Hellman Key and
Diffie-Hellman key and an EUI-64 identity. an EUI-64 Identity
3.5.3. Identification of Credentials 3.5.3. Identification of Credentials
The ID_CRED fields, ID_CRED_R and ID_CRED_I, are transported in The ID_CRED fields, ID_CRED_R and ID_CRED_I, are transported in
message_2 and message_3, respectively, see Section 5.3.2 and message_2 and message_3, respectively; see Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2.
Section 5.4.2. We use the notation ID_CRED_x to refer to ID_CRED_I We use the notation ID_CRED_x to refer to ID_CRED_I or ID_CRED_R.
or ID_CRED_R. Requirements on ID_CRED_x applies both to ID_CRED_I Requirements on ID_CRED_x applies both to ID_CRED_I and to ID_CRED_R.
and to ID_CRED_R. The ID_CRED fields are used to identify and The ID_CRED fields are used to identify and optionally transport
optionally transport credentials: credentials:
* ID_CRED_R is intended to facilitate for the Initiator retrieving * ID_CRED_R is intended to facilitate for the Initiator retrieving
the authentication credential CRED_R and the authentication key of the authentication credential CRED_R and the authentication key of
R. R.
* ID_CRED_I is intended to facilitate for the Responder retrieving * ID_CRED_I is intended to facilitate for the Responder retrieving
the authentication credential CRED_I and the authentication key of the authentication credential CRED_I and the authentication key of
I. I.
ID_CRED_x may contain the authentication credential CRED_x, for x = I ID_CRED_x may contain the authentication credential CRED_x, for x = I
or R, but for many settings it is not necessary to transport the or R, but for many settings, it is not necessary to transport the
authentication credential within EDHOC. For example, it may be pre- authentication credential within EDHOC. For example, it may be pre-
provisioned or acquired out-of-band over less constrained links. provisioned or acquired out-of-band over less constrained links.
ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R do not have any cryptographic purpose in ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R do not have any cryptographic purpose in
EDHOC since the authentication credentials are integrity protected. EDHOC since the authentication credentials are integrity protected by
the Signature_or_MAC field.
EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials and supports EDHOC relies on COSE for identification of credentials and supports
all credential types for which COSE header parameters are defined all credential types for which COSE header parameters are defined,
including X.509 certificates ([RFC9360]), C509 certificates including X.509 certificates [RFC9360], C509 certificates
([I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]), CWT (see Section 3.5.3.1) and [C509-CERTS], CWTs (Section 3.5.3.1) and CCSs (Section 3.5.3.1).
CWT Claims Set (see Section 3.5.3.1).
ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are of type COSE header_map, as defined in ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are of type COSE header_map, as defined in
Section 3 of [RFC9052], and contains one or more COSE header Section 3 of [RFC9052], and contain one or more COSE header
parameters. If a map contains several header paramerers, the labels parameters. If a map contains several header parameters, the labels
do not need to be sorted in bytewise lexicographic order. ID_CRED_I do not need to be sorted in bytewise lexicographic order. ID_CRED_I
and ID_CRED_R MAY contain different header parameters. The header and ID_CRED_R MAY contain different header parameters. The header
parameters typically provide some information about the format of the parameters typically provide some information about the format of the
credential. credential.
Example: X.509 certificates can be identified by a hash value using Example: X.509 certificates can be identified by a hash value using
the 'x5t' parameter, see Section 2 of [RFC9360]: the 'x5t' parameter; see Section 2 of [RFC9360]:
* ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R, * ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R
Example: CWT or CCS can be identified by a key identifier using the Example: CWT or CCS can be identified by a key identifier using the
'kid' parameter, see Section 3.1 of [RFC9052]: 'kid' parameter; see Section 3.1 of [RFC9052]:
* ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I or R. * ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I or R
Note that COSE header parameters in ID_CRED_x are used to identify Note that COSE header parameters in ID_CRED_x are used to identify
the message sender's credential. There is therefore no reason to use the message sender's credential. Therefore, there is no reason to
the "-sender" header parameters, such as x5t-sender, defined in use the "-sender" header parameters, such as x5t-sender, defined in
Section 3 of [RFC9360]. Instead, the corresponding parameter without Section 3 of [RFC9360]. Instead, the corresponding parameter without
"-sender", such as x5t, SHOULD be used. "-sender", such as x5t, SHOULD be used.
As stated in Section 3.1 of [RFC9052], applications MUST NOT assume As stated in Section 3.1 of [RFC9052], applications MUST NOT assume
that 'kid' values are unique and several keys associated with a 'kid' that 'kid' values are unique and several keys associated with a 'kid'
may need to be checked before the correct one is found. Applications may need to be checked before the correct one is found. Applications
might use additional information such as 'kid context' or lower might use additional information such as 'kid context' or lower
layers to determine which key to try first. Applications should layers to determine which key to try first. Applications should
strive to make ID_CRED_x as unique as possible, since the recipient strive to make ID_CRED_x as unique as possible, since the recipient
may otherwise have to try several keys. may otherwise have to try several keys.
See Appendix C.3 for more examples. See Appendix C.3 for more examples.
3.5.3.1. COSE Header Parameters for CWT and CWT Claims Set 3.5.3.1. COSE Header Parameters for CWT and CWT Claims Set
This document registers two new COSE header parameters 'kcwt' and This document registers two new COSE header parameters, 'kcwt' and
'kccs' for use with CBOR Web Token (CWT, [RFC8392]) and CWT Claims 'kccs', for use with CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] and CWT Claims
Set (CCS, [RFC8392]), respectively. The CWT/CCS MUST contain a Set (CCS) [RFC8392], respectively. The CWT/CCS MUST contain a
COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim [RFC8747]. There may be any number of COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim [RFC8747]. There may be any number of
additional claims present in the CWT/CCS. additional claims present in the CWT/CCS.
CWTs sent in 'kcwt' are protected using a MAC or a signature and are CWTs sent in 'kcwt' are protected using a MAC or a signature and are
similar to a certificate (when with public key cryptography) or a similar to a certificate (when used with public key cryptography) or
Kerberos ticket (when used with symmetric key cryptography). CCSs a Kerberos ticket (when used with symmetric key cryptography). CCSs
sent in 'kccs' are not protected and are therefore similar to raw sent in 'kccs' are not protected and are therefore similar to raw
public keys or self-signed certificates. public keys or self-signed certificates.
Security considerations for 'kcwt' and 'kccs' are made in Security considerations for 'kcwt' and 'kccs' are made in
Section 9.8. Section 9.8.
3.5.3.2. Compact Encoding of ID_CRED Fields for 'kid' 3.5.3.2. Compact Encoding of ID_CRED Fields for 'kid'
To comply with the LAKE message size requirements, see To comply with the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE)
[I-D.ietf-lake-reqs], two optimizations are made for the case when message size requirements (see [LAKE-REQS]), two optimizations are
ID_CRED_x, for x = I or R, contains a single 'kid' parameter. made for the case when ID_CRED_x, for x = I or R, contains a single
'kid' parameter.
1. The CBOR map { 4 : kid_x } is replaced by the byte string kid_x. 1. The CBOR map { 4 : kid_x } is replaced by the byte string kid_x.
2. The representation of identifiers specified in Section 3.3.2 is 2. The representation of identifiers specified in Section 3.3.2 is
applied to kid_x. applied to kid_x.
These optimizations MUST be applied if and only if ID_CRED_x = { 4 : These optimizations MUST be applied if and only if ID_CRED_x = { 4 :
kid_x } and ID_CRED_x in PLAINTEXT_y of message_y, y = 2 or 3, see kid_x } and ID_CRED_x in PLAINTEXT_y of message_y, y = 2 or 3; see
Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.4.2. Note that these optimizations are Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2. Note that these optimizations are not
not applied to instances of ID_CRED_x which have no impact on message applied to instances of ID_CRED_x that have no impact on message
size, e.g., context_y, or the COSE protected header. Examples: size, e.g., context_y, or the COSE protected header. For example:
* For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'FF' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is not * For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'FF' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is not
the CBOR map 0xA10441FF but the CBOR byte string h'FF', i.e., the CBOR map 0xA10441FF but the CBOR byte string h'FF', i.e.,
0x41FF. 0x41FF.
* For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'21' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is * For ID_CRED_x = { 4 : h'21' }, the encoding in PLAINTEXT_y is
neither the CBOR map 0xA1044121, nor the CBOR byte string h'21', neither the CBOR map 0xA1044121 nor the CBOR byte string h'21',
i.e., 0x4121, but the CBOR integer 0x21. i.e., 0x4121, but the CBOR integer 0x21.
3.6. Cipher Suites 3.6. Cipher Suites
An EDHOC cipher suite consists of an ordered set of algorithms from An EDHOC cipher suite consists of an ordered set of algorithms from
the "COSE Algorithms" and "COSE Elliptic Curves" registries as well the "COSE Algorithms" and "COSE Elliptic Curves" registries as well
as the EDHOC MAC length. All algorithm names and definitions follow as the EDHOC MAC length. All algorithm names and definitions follow
from COSE algorithms [RFC9053]. Note that COSE sometimes uses COSE Algorithms [RFC9053]. Note that COSE sometimes uses peculiar
peculiar names such as ES256 for ECDSA with SHA-256, A128 for AES- names such as ES256 for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
128, and Ed25519 for the curve edwards25519. Algorithms need to be (ECDSA) with SHA-256, A128 for AES-128, and Ed25519 for the curve
specified with enough parameters to make them completely determined. edwards25519. Algorithms need to be specified with enough parameters
The EDHOC MAC length MUST be at least 8 bytes. Any cryptographic to make them completely determined. The EDHOC MAC length MUST be at
algorithm used in the COSE header parameters in ID_CRED fields is least 8 bytes. Any cryptographic algorithm used in the COSE header
selected independently of the selected cipher suite. EDHOC is parameters in ID_CRED fields is selected independently of the
currently only specified for use with key exchange algorithms of type selected cipher suite. EDHOC is currently only specified for use
ECDH curves, but any Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), including Post- with key exchange algorithms of type ECDH curves, but any Key
Quantum Cryptography (PQC) KEMs, can be used in method 0, see Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), including Post-Quantum Cryptography
Section 9.4. Use of other types of key exchange algorithms to (PQC) KEMs, can be used in method 0; see Section 9.4. Use of other
replace static DH authentication (method 1,2,3) would likely require types of key exchange algorithms to replace static DH authentication
a specification updating EDHOC with new methods. (methods 1, 2, and 3) would likely require a specification updating
EDHOC with new methods.
EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE. Just like EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE. Just like
in (D)TLS 1.3 [RFC8446][RFC9147] and IKEv2 [RFC7296], a signature in in (D)TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] [RFC9147] and IKEv2 [RFC7296], a signature in
COSE is determined by the signature algorithm and the authentication COSE is determined by the signature algorithm and the authentication
key algorithm together, see Section 3.5.1. The exact details of the key algorithm together; see Section 3.5.1. The exact details of the
authentication key algorithm depend on the type of authentication authentication key algorithm depend on the type of authentication
credential. COSE supports different formats for storing the public credential. COSE supports different formats for storing the public
authentication keys including COSE_Key and X.509, which use different authentication keys including COSE_Key and X.509, which use different
names and ways to represent the authentication key and the names and ways to represent the authentication key and the
authentication key algorithm. authentication key algorithm.
An EDHOC cipher suite consists of the following parameters: An EDHOC cipher suite consists of the following parameters:
* EDHOC AEAD algorithm * EDHOC AEAD algorithm,
* EDHOC hash algorithm * EDHOC hash algorithm,
* EDHOC MAC length in bytes (Static DH) * EDHOC MAC length in bytes (Static DH),
* EDHOC key exchange algorithm (ECDH curve) * EDHOC key exchange algorithm (ECDH curve),
* EDHOC signature algorithm * EDHOC signature algorithm,
* Application AEAD algorithm * application AEAD algorithm, and
* Application hash algorithm * application hash algorithm.
Each cipher suite is identified with a pre-defined integer label. Each cipher suite is identified with a predefined integer label.
EDHOC can be used with all algorithms and curves defined for COSE. EDHOC can be used with all algorithms and curves defined for COSE.
Implementations can either use any combination of COSE algorithms and Implementations can either use any combination of COSE algorithms and
parameters to define their own private cipher suite, or use one of parameters to define their own private cipher suite or use one of the
the pre-defined cipher suites. Private cipher suites can be predefined cipher suites. Private cipher suites can be identified
identified with any of the four values -24, -23, -22, -21. The pre- with any of the four values: -24, -23, -22, and -21. The predefined
defined cipher suites are listed in the IANA registry (Section 10.2) cipher suites are listed in the IANA registry (Section 10.2) with the
with initial content outlined here: initial content outlined here:
* Cipher suites 0-3, based on AES-CCM, are intended for constrained * Cipher suites 0-3, based on AES-CCM, are intended for constrained
IoT where message overhead is a very important factor. Note that IoT where a message overhead is a very important factor. Note
AES-CCM-16-64-128 and AES-CCM-16-128-128 are compatible with the that AES-CCM-16-64-128 and AES-CCM-16-128-128 are compatible with
IEEE CCM* mode. the IEEE Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)* mode.
- Cipher suites 1 and 3 use a larger tag length (128-bit) in - Cipher suites 1 and 3 use a larger tag length (128 bits) in
EDHOC than in the Application AEAD algorithm (64-bit). EDHOC than in the application AEAD algorithm (64 bits).
* Cipher suites 4 and 5, based on ChaCha20, are intended for less * Cipher suites 4 and 5, based on ChaCha20, are intended for less
constrained applications and only use 128-bit tag lengths. constrained applications and only use 128-bit tag lengths.
* Cipher suite 6, based on AES-GCM, is for general non-constrained * Cipher suite 6, based on AES-GCM, is for general non-constrained
applications. It consists of high performance algorithms that are applications. It consists of high-performance algorithms that are
widely used in non-constrained applications. widely used in non-constrained applications.
* Cipher suites 24 and 25 are intended for high security * Cipher suites 24 and 25 are intended for high security
applications such as government use and financial applications. applications such as government use and financial applications.
These cipher suites do not share any algorithms. Cipher suite 24 These cipher suites do not share any algorithms. Cipher suite 24
consists of algorithms from the CNSA 1.0 suite [CNSA]. consists of algorithms from the Commercial National Security
Algorithm (CNSA) 1.0 suite [CNSA].
The different methods (Section 3.2) use the same cipher suites, but The different methods (Section 3.2) use the same cipher suites, but
some algorithms are not used in some methods. The EDHOC signature some algorithms are not used in some methods. The EDHOC signature
algorithm is not used in methods without signature authentication. algorithm is not used in methods without signature authentication.
The Initiator needs to have a list of cipher suites it supports in The Initiator needs to have a list of cipher suites it supports in
order of preference. The Responder needs to have a list of cipher order of preference. The Responder needs to have a list of cipher
suites it supports. SUITES_I contains cipher suites supported by the suites it supports. SUITES_I contains cipher suites supported by the
Initiator, formatted and processed as detailed in Section 5.2.1 to Initiator and formatted and processed as detailed in Section 5.2.1 to
secure the cipher suite negotiation. Examples of cipher suite secure the cipher suite negotiation. Examples of cipher suite
negotiation are given in Section 6.3.2. negotiation are given in Section 6.3.2.
3.7. Ephemeral Public Keys 3.7. Ephemeral Public Keys
The ephemeral public keys in EDHOC (G_X and G_Y) use compact The ephemeral public keys in EDHOC (G_X and G_Y) use compact
representation of elliptic curve points, see Appendix B. In COSE, representation of elliptic curve points; see Appendix B. In COSE,
compact representation is achieved by formatting the ECDH ephemeral compact representation is achieved by formatting the ECDH ephemeral
public keys as COSE_Keys of type EC2 or OKP according to Sections 7.1 public keys as COSE_Keys of type EC2 or Octet Key Pair (OKP)
and 7.2 of [RFC9053], but only including the 'x' parameter in G_X and according to Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of [RFC9053] but only including the
G_Y. For Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2, compact representation MAY 'x' parameter in G_X and G_Y. For Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2,
be used also in the COSE_Key. COSE always uses compact output for compact representation MAY be used also in the COSE_Key. COSE always
Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2. If the COSE implementation requires uses compact output for Elliptic Curve Keys of type EC2. If the COSE
a 'y' parameter, the value y = false or a calculated y-coordinate can implementation requires a 'y' parameter, the value y = false or a
be used, see Appendix B. calculated y-coordinate can be used; see Appendix B.
3.8. External Authorization Data (EAD) 3.8. External Authorization Data (EAD)
In order to reduce round trips and the number of messages, or to In order to reduce round trips and the number of messages or to
simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated
into EDHOC by transporting authorization related data in the into EDHOC by transporting authorization-related data in the
messages. messages.
EDHOC allows processing of external authorization data (EAD) to be EDHOC allows processing of external authorization data (EAD) to be
defined in a separate specification, and sent in dedicated fields of defined in a separate specification and sent in dedicated fields of
the four EDHOC messages (EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3, EAD_4). EAD is opaque the four EDHOC messages: EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4. EAD is
data to EDHOC. opaque data to EDHOC.
Each EAD field, EAD_x for x = 1, 2, 3 or 4, is a CBOR sequence (see Each EAD field, EAD_x, for x = 1, 2, 3, or 4, is a CBOR sequence (see
Appendix C.1) consisting of one or more EAD items. An EAD item ead Appendix C.1) consisting of one or more EAD items. EAD item ead is a
is a CBOR sequence of an ead_label and an optional ead_value, see CBOR sequence of an ead_label and an optional ead_value; see Figure 5
Figure 7 and Appendix C.2 for the CDDL definitions. and Appendix C.2 for the CDDL definitions.
ead = ( ead = (
ead_label : int, ead_label : int,
? ead_value : bstr, ? ead_value : bstr,
) )
Figure 7: EAD item. Figure 5: EAD Item
A security application may register one or more EAD labels, see A security application may register one or more EAD labels (see
Section 10.5, and specify the associated processing and security Section 10.5) and specify the associated processing and security
considerations. The IANA registry contains the absolute value of the considerations. The IANA registry contains the absolute value of the
ead_label, |ead_label|; the same ead_value applies independently of ead_label, |ead_label|; the same ead_value applies independently of
sign of ead_label. the sign of the ead_label.
An EAD item can be either critical or non-critical, determined by the An EAD item can be either critical or non-critical, determined by the
sign of the ead_label in the EAD item transported in the EAD field. sign of the ead_label in the EAD item transported in the EAD field.
A negative value indicates that the EAD item is critical and a non- A negative value indicates that the EAD item is critical, and a
negative value indicates that the EAD item is non-critical. nonnegative value indicates that the EAD item is non-critical.
If an endpoint receives a critical EAD item it does not recognize, or If an endpoint receives a critical EAD item it does not recognize or
a critical EAD item that contains information that it cannot process, a critical EAD item that contains information that it cannot process,
then the endpoint MUST send an EDHOC error message back as defined in then the endpoint MUST send an EDHOC error message back as defined in
Section 6, and the EDHOC session MUST be aborted. The EAD item Section 6, and the EDHOC session MUST be aborted. The EAD item
specification defines the error processing. A non-critical EAD item specification defines the error processing. A non-critical EAD item
can be ignored. can be ignored.
The security application registering a new EAD item needs to describe The security application registering a new EAD item needs to describe
under what conditions the EAD item is critical or non-critical, and under what conditions the EAD item is critical or non-critical, and
thus whether the ead_label is used with negative or positive sign. thus whether the ead_label is used with a negative or positive sign.
ead_label = 0 is used for padding, see Section 3.8.1. ead_label = 0 is used for padding; see Section 3.8.1.
The security application may define multiple uses of certain EAD The security application may define multiple uses of certain EAD
items, e.g., the same EAD item may be used in different EDHOC items, e.g., the same EAD item may be used in different EDHOC
messages. Multiple occurrences of an EAD item in one EAD field may messages. Multiple occurrences of an EAD item in one EAD field may
also be specified, but the criticality of the repeated EAD item is also be specified, but the criticality of the repeated EAD item is
expected to be the same. expected to be the same.
The EAD fields of EDHOC MUST only be used with registered EAD items, The EAD fields of EDHOC MUST only be used with registered EAD items;
see Section 10.5. Examples of the use of EAD are provided in see Section 10.5. Examples of the use of EAD are provided in
Appendix E. Appendix E.
3.8.1. Padding 3.8.1. Padding
EDHOC message_1 and the plaintext of message_2, message_3 and EDHOC message_1 and the plaintext of message_2, message_3, and
message_4 can be padded with the use of the corresponding EAD_x message_4 can be padded with the use of the corresponding EAD_x
field, for x = 1, 2, 3, 4. Padding in EAD_1 mitigates amplification field, for x = 1, 2, 3, or 4. Padding in EAD_1 mitigates
attacks (see Section 9.7), and padding in EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4 amplification attacks (see Section 9.7), and padding in EAD_2, EAD_3,
hides the true length of the plaintext (see Section 9.6). Padding and EAD_4 hides the true length of the plaintext (see Section 9.6).
MUST be ignored and discarded by the receiving application. Padding MUST be ignored and discarded by the receiving application.
Padding is obtained by using an EAD item with ead_label = 0 and a Padding is obtained by using an EAD item with ead_label = 0 and a
(pseudo-)randomly generated byte string of appropriate length as (pseudo)randomly generated byte string of appropriate length as
ead_value, noting that the ead_label and the CBOR encoding of ead_value, noting that the ead_label and the CBOR encoding of
ead_value also add bytes. Examples: ead_value also add bytes. For example:
* One byte padding (optional ead_value omitted): * One-byte padding (optional ead_value omitted):
- EAD_x = 0x00 EAD_x = 0x00
* Two bytes padding, using the empty byte string (0x40) as * Two-byte padding, using the empty byte string (0x40) as ead_value:
ead_value:
- EAD_x = 0x0040 EAD_x = 0x0040
* Three bytes padding, constructed from the pseudorandomly generated * Three-byte padding, constructed from the pseudorandomly generated
ead_value 0xe9 encoded as byte string: ead_value 0xe9 encoded as byte string:
- EAD_x = 0x0041e9 EAD_x = 0x0041e9
Multiple occurrences of EAD items with ead_label = 0 are allowed. Multiple occurrences of EAD items with ead_label = 0 are allowed.
Certain padding lengths require the use of at least two such EAD Certain padding lengths require the use of at least two such EAD
items. items.
Note that padding is non-critical because the intended behaviour when Note that padding is non-critical because the intended behavior when
receiving is to ignore it. receiving is to ignore it.
3.9. Application Profile 3.9. Application Profile
EDHOC requires certain parameters to be agreed upon between Initiator EDHOC requires certain parameters to be agreed upon between the
and Responder. Some parameters can be negotiated through the Initiator and Responder. Some parameters can be negotiated through
protocol execution (specifically, cipher suite, see Section 3.6) but the protocol execution (specifically, cipher suite; see Section 3.6),
other parameters are only communicated and may not be negotiated but other parameters are only communicated and may not be negotiated
(e.g., which authentication method is used, see Section 3.2). Yet (e.g., which authentication method is used; see Section 3.2). Yet,
other parameters need to be known out-of-band to ensure successful other parameters need to be known out-of-band to ensure successful
completion, e.g., whether message_4 is used or not. The application completion, e.g., whether message_4 is used or not. The application
decides which endpoint is Initiator and which is Responder. decides which endpoint is the Initiator and which is the Responder.
The purpose of an application profile is to describe the intended use The purpose of an application profile is to describe the intended use
of EDHOC to allow for the relevant processing and verifications to be of EDHOC to allow for the relevant processing and verifications to be
made, including things like: made, including things like the following:
1. How the endpoint detects that an EDHOC message is received. This 1. How the endpoint detects that an EDHOC message is received. This
includes how EDHOC messages are transported, for example in the includes how EDHOC messages are transported, for example, in the
payload of a CoAP message with a certain Uri-Path or Content- payload of a CoAP message with a certain Uri-Path or Content-
Format; see Appendix A.2. Format; see Appendix A.2.
* The method of transporting EDHOC messages may also describe The method of transporting EDHOC messages may also describe data
data carried along with the messages that are needed for the carried along with the messages that are needed for the transport
transport to satisfy the requirements of Section 3.4, e.g., to satisfy the requirements of Section 3.4, e.g., connection
connection identifiers used with certain messages, see identifiers used with certain messages; see Appendix A.2.
Appendix A.2.
2. Authentication method (METHOD; see Section 3.2). 2. Authentication method (METHOD; see Section 3.2).
3. Profile for authentication credentials (CRED_I, CRED_R; see 3. Profile for authentication credentials (CRED_I and CRED_R; see
Section 3.5.2), e.g., profile for certificate or CCS, including Section 3.5.2), e.g., profile for certificate or CCS, including
supported authentication key algorithms (subject public key supported authentication key algorithms (subject public key
algorithm in X.509 or C509 certificate). algorithm in X.509 or C509 certificate).
4. Type used to identify credentials (ID_CRED_I, ID_CRED_R; see 4. Type used to identify credentials (ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R; see
Section 3.5.3). Section 3.5.3).
5. Use and type of external authorization data (EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3, 5. Use and type of external authorization data (EAD_1, EAD_2, EAD_3,
EAD_4; see Section 3.8). and EAD_4; see Section 3.8).
6. Identifier used as the identity of the endpoint; see 6. Identifier used as the identity of the endpoint; see
Appendix D.2. Appendix D.2.
7. If message_4 shall be sent/expected, and if not, how to ensure a 7. If message_4 shall be sent/expected, and if not, how to ensure a
protected application message is sent from the Responder to the protected application message is sent from the Responder to the
Initiator; see Section 5.5. Initiator; see Section 5.5.
The application profile may also contain information about supported The application profile may also contain information about supported
cipher suites. The procedure for selecting and verifying a cipher cipher suites. The procedure for selecting and verifying a cipher
suite is still performed as described in Section 5.2.1 and suite is still performed as described in Sections 5.2.1 and 6.3, but
Section 6.3, but it may become simplified by this knowledge. EDHOC it may become simplified by this knowledge. EDHOC messages can be
messages can be processed without the application profile, i.e., the processed without the application profile, i.e., the EDHOC messages
EDHOC messages includes information about the type and length of all include information about the type and length of all fields.
fields.
An example of an application profile is shown in Appendix F. An example of an application profile is shown in Appendix F.
For some parameters, like METHOD, type of ID_CRED field or EAD, the For some parameters, like METHOD, the type of the ID_CRED field, or
receiver of an EDHOC message is able to verify compliance with the EAD, the receiver of an EDHOC message is able to verify compliance
application profile, and if it needs to fail because of lack of with the application profile and, if it needs to fail because of the
compliance, to infer the reason why the EDHOC session failed. lack of compliance, to infer the reason why the EDHOC session failed.
For other encodings, like the profiling of CRED_x in the case that it For other encodings, like the profiling of CRED_x in the case that it
is not transported, it may not be possible to verify that lack of is not transported, it may not be possible to verify that the lack of
compliance with the application profile was the reason for failure: compliance with the application profile was the reason for failure,
Integrity verification in message_2 or message_3 may fail not only i.e., integrity verification in message_2 or message_3 may fail not
because of a wrong credential. For example, in case the Initiator only because of a wrong credential. For example, in case the
uses a public key certificate by reference (i.e., not transported Initiator uses a public key certificate by reference (i.e., not
within the protocol) then both endpoints need to use an identical transported within the protocol), then both endpoints need to use an
data structure as CRED_I or else the integrity verification will identical data structure as CRED_I or else the integrity verification
fail. will fail.
Note that it is not necessary for the endpoints to specify a single Note that it is not necessary for the endpoints to specify a single
transport for the EDHOC messages. For example, a mix of CoAP and transport for the EDHOC messages. For example, a mix of CoAP and
HTTP may be used along the path, and this may still allow correlation HTTP may be used along the path, and this may still allow correlation
between messages. between messages.
The application profile may be dependent on the identity of the other The application profile may be dependent on the identity of the other
endpoint, or other information carried in an EDHOC message, but it endpoint or other information carried in an EDHOC message, but it
then applies only to the later phases of the protocol when such then applies only to the later phases of the protocol when such
information is known. (The Initiator does not know the identity of information is known. (The Initiator does not know the identity of
the Responder before having verified message_2, and the Responder the Responder before having verified message_2, and the Responder
does not know the identity of the Initiator before having verified does not know the identity of the Initiator before having verified
message_3.) message_3.)
Other conditions may be part of the application profile, such as what Other conditions may be part of the application profile, such as what
is the target application or use (if there is more than one is the target application or use (if there is more than one
application/use) to the extent that EDHOC can distinguish between application/use) to the extent that EDHOC can distinguish between
them. In case multiple application profiles are used, the receiver them. In case multiple application profiles are used, the receiver
needs to be able to determine which is applicable for a given EDHOC needs to be able to determine which is applicable for a given EDHOC
session, for example based on URI to which the EDHOC message is sent, session, for example, based on the URI to which the EDHOC message is
or external authorization data type. sent, or external authorization data type.
4. Key Derivation 4. Key Derivation
4.1. Keys for EDHOC Message Processing 4.1. Keys for EDHOC Message Processing
EDHOC uses Extract-and-Expand [RFC5869] with the EDHOC hash algorithm EDHOC uses Extract-and-Expand [RFC5869] with the EDHOC hash algorithm
in the selected cipher suite to derive keys used in message in the selected cipher suite to derive keys used in message
processing. This section defines EDHOC_Extract (Section 4.1.1) and processing. This section defines EDHOC_Extract (Section 4.1.1) and
EDHOC_Expand (Section 4.1.2), and how to use them to derive PRK_out EDHOC_Expand (Section 4.1.2) and how to use them to derive PRK_out
(Section 4.1.3) which is the shared secret session key resulting from (Section 4.1.3), which is the shared secret session key resulting
a completed EDHOC session. from a completed EDHOC session.
EDHOC_Extract is used to derive fixed-length uniformly pseudorandom EDHOC_Extract is used to derive fixed-length uniformly pseudorandom
keys (PRK) from ECDH shared secrets. EDHOC_Expand is used to define keys (PRKs) from ECDH shared secrets. EDHOC_Expand is used to define
EDHOC_KDF for generating MACs and for deriving output keying material EDHOC_KDF for generating MACs and for deriving output keying material
(OKM) from PRKs. (OKM) from PRKs.
In EDHOC a specific message is protected with a certain pseudorandom In EDHOC, a specific message is protected with a certain PRK, but how
key, but how the key is derived depends on the authentication method the key is derived depends on the authentication method
(Section 3.2) as detailed in Section 5. (Section 3.2), as detailed in Section 5.
4.1.1. EDHOC_Extract 4.1.1. EDHOC_Extract
The pseudorandom keys (PRKs) used for EDHOC message processing are The pseudorandom keys (PRKs) used for EDHOC message processing are
derived using EDHOC_Extract: derived using EDHOC_Extract:
PRK = EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM ) PRK = EDHOC_Extract( salt, IKM )
where the input keying material (IKM) and salt are defined for each where the input keying material (IKM) and salt are defined for each
PRK below. PRK below.
The definition of EDHOC_Extract depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm The definition of EDHOC_Extract depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm
of the selected cipher suite: of the selected cipher suite:
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Extract( salt,
IKM ) = HKDF-Extract( salt, IKM ) [RFC5869] IKM ) = HKDF-Extract( salt, IKM ) [RFC5869].
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Extract( salt,
IKM ) = KMAC128( salt, IKM, 256, "" ) IKM ) = KMAC128( salt, IKM, 256, "" ).
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Extract( salt, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Extract( salt,
IKM ) = KMAC256( salt, IKM, 512, "" ) IKM ) = KMAC256( salt, IKM, 512, "" ).
where the Keccak message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in where the Keccak Message Authentication Code (KMAC) is specified in
[SP800-185]. [SP800-185].
The rest of the section defines the pseudorandom keys PRK_2e, The rest of the section defines the pseudorandom keys PRK_2e,
PRK_3e2m and PRK_4e3m; their use is shown in Figure 8. The index of PRK_3e2m, and PRK_4e3m; their use is shown in Figure 6. The index of
a PRK indicates its use or in what message protection operation it is a PRK indicates its use or in what message protection operation it is
involved. For example, PRK_3e2m is involved in the encryption of involved. For example, PRK_3e2m is involved in the encryption of
message 3 and in calculating the MAC of message 2. message 3 and in calculating the MAC of message 2.
4.1.1.1. PRK_2e 4.1.1.1. PRK_2e
The pseudorandom key PRK_2e is derived with the following input: The pseudorandom key PRK_2e is derived with the following input:
* The salt SHALL be TH_2. * The salt SHALL be TH_2.
* The IKM SHALL be the ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH shared secret G_XY * The IKM SHALL be the ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH shared secret G_XY
(calculated from G_X and Y or G_Y and X) as defined in (calculated from G_X and Y or G_Y and X) as defined in
Section 6.3.1 of [RFC9053]. The use of G_XY gives forward Section 6.3.1 of [RFC9053]. The use of G_XY gives forward secrecy
secrecy, in the sense that compromise of the private in the sense that compromise of the private authentication keys
authentication keys does not compromise past session keys. does not compromise past session keys.
Example: Assuming the use of curve25519, the ECDH shared secret G_XY Example: Assuming the use of curve25519, the ECDH shared secret G_XY
is the output of the X25519 function [RFC7748]: is the output of the X25519 function [RFC7748]:
G_XY = X25519( Y, G_X ) = X25519( X, G_Y ) G_XY = X25519( Y, G_X ) = X25519( X, G_Y )
Example: Assuming the use of SHA-256 the extract phase of HKDF Example: Assuming the use of SHA-256, the extract phase of the Key
produces PRK_2e as follows: Derivation Function (HKDF) produces PRK_2e as follows:
PRK_2e = HMAC-SHA-256( TH_2, G_XY ) PRK_2e = HMAC-SHA-256( TH_2, G_XY )
4.1.1.2. PRK_3e2m 4.1.1.2. PRK_3e2m
The pseudorandom key PRK_3e2m is derived as follows: The pseudorandom key PRK_3e2m is derived as follows:
If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then
PRK_3e2m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_3e2m, G_RX ), where PRK_3e2m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_3e2m, G_RX ), where
* SALT_3e2m is derived from PRK_2e, see Section 4.1.2, and * SALT_3e2m is derived from PRK_2e (see Section 4.1.2) and
* G_RX is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_R and X, or G_X * G_RX is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_R and X, or G_X
and R (the Responder's private authentication key, see and R (the Responder's private authentication key; see
Section 3.5.1), Section 3.5.1),
else PRK_3e2m = PRK_2e. else PRK_3e2m = PRK_2e.
4.1.1.3. PRK_4e3m 4.1.1.3. PRK_4e3m
The pseudorandom key PRK_4e3m is derived as follows: The pseudorandom key PRK_4e3m is derived as follows:
If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key, then
PRK_4e3m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_4e3m, G_IY ), where PRK_4e3m = EDHOC_Extract( SALT_4e3m, G_IY ), where
* SALT_4e3m is derived from PRK_3e2m, see Section 4.1.2, and * SALT_4e3m is derived from PRK_3e2m (see Section 4.1.2) and
* G_IY is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_I and Y, or G_Y * G_IY is the ECDH shared secret calculated from G_I and Y, or G_Y
and I (the Initiator's private authentication key, see and I (the Initiator's private authentication key; see
Section 3.5.1), Section 3.5.1),
else PRK_4e3m = PRK_3e2m. else PRK_4e3m = PRK_3e2m.
4.1.2. EDHOC_Expand and EDHOC_KDF 4.1.2. EDHOC_Expand and EDHOC_KDF
The output keying material (OKM) - including keys, IVs, and salts - The output keying material (OKM) -- including keys, initialization
are derived from the PRKs using the EDHOC_KDF, which is defined vectors (IVs), and salts -- are derived from the PRKs using the
through EDHOC_Expand: EDHOC_KDF, which is defined through EDHOC_Expand:
OKM = EDHOC_KDF( PRK, info_label, context, length ) OKM = EDHOC_KDF( PRK, info_label, context, length )
= EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length ) = EDHOC_Expand( PRK, info, length )
where info is encoded as the CBOR sequence where info is encoded as the CBOR sequence:
info = ( info = (
info_label : int, info_label : int,
context : bstr, context : bstr,
length : uint, length : uint,
) )
where where:
* info_label is an int * info_label is an int,
* context is a bstr * context is a bstr, and
* length is the length of OKM in bytes * length is the length of OKM in bytes.
When EDHOC_KDF is used to derive OKM for EDHOC message processing, When EDHOC_KDF is used to derive OKM for EDHOC message processing,
then context includes one of the transcript hashes TH_2, TH_3, or then the context includes one of the transcript hashes, TH_2, TH_3,
TH_4 defined in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2. or TH_4, defined in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2.
The definition of EDHOC_Expand depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm of The definition of EDHOC_Expand depends on the EDHOC hash algorithm of
the selected cipher suite: the selected cipher suite:
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK,
info, length ) = HKDF-Expand( PRK, info, length ) [RFC5869] info, length ) = HKDF-Expand( PRK, info, length ) [RFC5869].
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE128, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK,
info, length ) = KMAC128( PRK, info, L, "" ) info, length ) = KMAC128( PRK, info, L, "" ).
* if the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK, * If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHAKE256, then EDHOC_Expand( PRK,
info, length ) = KMAC256( PRK, info, L, "" ) info, length ) = KMAC256( PRK, info, L, "" ).
where L = 8 ⋅ length, the output length in bits. where L = 8 ⋅ length, the output length in bits.
Figure 8 lists derivations made with EDHOC_KDF, where Figure 6 lists derivations made with EDHOC_KDF, where:
* hash_length - length of output size of the EDHOC hash algorithm of * hash_length is the length of output size of the EDHOC hash
the selected cipher suite algorithm of the selected cipher suite,
* key_length - length of the encryption key of the EDHOC AEAD * key_length is the length of the encryption key of the EDHOC AEAD
algorithm of the selected cipher suite algorithm of the selected cipher suite, and
* iv_length - length of the initialization vector of the EDHOC AEAD * iv_length is the length of the initialization vector of the EDHOC
algorithm of the selected cipher suite AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite
Further details of the key derivation and how the output keying Further details of the key derivation and how the output keying
material is used are specified in Section 5. material is used are specified in Section 5.
KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 0, TH_2, plaintext_length ) KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 0, TH_2, plaintext_length )
SALT_3e2m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 1, TH_2, hash_length ) SALT_3e2m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, 1, TH_2, hash_length )
MAC_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 2, context_2, mac_length_2 ) MAC_2 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 2, context_2, mac_length_2 )
K_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 3, TH_3, key_length ) K_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 3, TH_3, key_length )
IV_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 4, TH_3, iv_length ) IV_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 4, TH_3, iv_length )
SALT_4e3m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 5, TH_3, hash_length ) SALT_4e3m = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_3e2m, 5, TH_3, hash_length )
MAC_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 6, context_3, mac_length_3 ) MAC_3 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 6, context_3, mac_length_3 )
PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 7, TH_4, hash_length ) PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 7, TH_4, hash_length )
K_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 8, TH_4, key_length ) K_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 8, TH_4, key_length )
IV_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 9, TH_4, iv_length ) IV_4 = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_4e3m, 9, TH_4, iv_length )
PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length ) PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length )
Figure 8: Key derivations using EDHOC_KDF. h'' is CBOR diagnostic Figure 6: Key Derivations Using EDHOC_KDF
notation for the empty byte string, 0x40.
h'' is CBOR diagnostic notation for the empty byte string, 0x40.
4.1.3. PRK_out 4.1.3. PRK_out
The pseudorandom key PRK_out, derived as shown in Figure 8, is the The pseudorandom key PRK_out, derived as shown in Figure 6, is the
output session key of a completed EDHOC session. output session key of a completed EDHOC session.
Keys for applications are derived using EDHOC_Exporter (see Keys for applications are derived using EDHOC_Exporter (see
Section 4.2.1) from PRK_exporter, which in turn is derived from Section 4.2.1) from PRK_exporter, which in turn is derived from
PRK_out as shown in Figure 8. For the purpose of generating PRK_out as shown in Figure 6. For the purpose of generating
application keys, it is sufficient to store PRK_out or PRK_exporter. application keys, it is sufficient to store PRK_out or PRK_exporter.
(Note that the word "store" used here does not imply that the (Note that the word "store" used here does not imply that the
application has access to the plaintext PRK_out since that may be application has access to the plaintext PRK_out since that may be
reserved for code within a Trusted Execution Environment, see reserved for code within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE); see
Section 9.8). Section 9.8.)
4.2. Keys for EDHOC Applications 4.2. Keys for EDHOC Applications
This section defines EDHOC_Exporter in terms of EDHOC_KDF and This section defines EDHOC_Exporter in terms of EDHOC_KDF and
PRK_exporter. A key update function is defined in Appendix H. PRK_exporter. A key update function is defined in Appendix H.
4.2.1. EDHOC_Exporter 4.2.1. EDHOC_Exporter
Keying material for the application can be derived using the Keying material for the application can be derived using the
EDHOC_Exporter interface defined as: EDHOC_Exporter interface defined as:
EDHOC_Exporter(exporter_label, context, length) EDHOC_Exporter(exporter_label, context, length)
= EDHOC_KDF(PRK_exporter, exporter_label, context, length) = EDHOC_KDF(PRK_exporter, exporter_label, context, length)
where where:
* exporter_label is a registered uint from the EDHOC_Exporter Label * exporter_label is a registered uint from the "EDHOC Exporter
registry (Section 10.1) Labels" registry (Section 10.1),
* context is a bstr defined by the application * context is a bstr defined by the application, and
* length is a uint defined by the application * length is a uint defined by the application.
The (exporter_label, context) pair used in EDHOC_Exporter must be The (exporter_label, context) pair used in EDHOC_Exporter must be
unique, i.e., an (exporter_label, context) MUST NOT be used for two unique, i.e., an (exporter_label, context) MUST NOT be used for two
different purposes. However, an application can re-derive the same different purposes. However, an application can re-derive the same
key several times as long as it is done securely. For example, in key several times as long as it is done securely. For example, in
most encryption algorithms the same key can be reused with different most encryption algorithms, the same key can be reused with different
nonces. The context can for example be the empty CBOR byte string. nonces. The context can, for example, be the empty CBOR byte string.
Examples of use of the EDHOC_Exporter are given in Appendix A. Examples of use of the EDHOC_Exporter are given in Appendix A.
5. Message Formatting and Processing 5. Message Formatting and Processing
This section specifies formatting of the messages and processing This section specifies formatting of the messages and processing
steps. Error messages are specified in Section 6. Annotated traces steps. Error messages are specified in Section 6. Annotated traces
of EDHOC sessions are provided in [I-D.ietf-lake-traces]. of EDHOC sessions are provided in [RFC9529].
An EDHOC message is encoded as a sequence of CBOR data items (CBOR An EDHOC message is encoded as a sequence of CBOR data items (CBOR
Sequence, [RFC8742]). Additional optimizations are made to reduce Sequence [RFC8742]). Additional optimizations are made to reduce
message overhead. message overhead.
While EDHOC uses the COSE_Key, COSE_Sign1, and COSE_Encrypt0 While EDHOC uses the COSE_Key, COSE_Sign1, and COSE_Encrypt0
structures, only a subset of the parameters is included in the EDHOC structures, only a subset of the parameters is included in the EDHOC
messages, see Appendix C.3. In order to recreate the COSE object, messages; see Appendix C.3. In order to recreate the COSE object,
the recipient endpoint may need to add parameters to the COSE headers the recipient endpoint may need to add parameters to the COSE headers
not included in the EDHOC message, for example the parameter 'alg' to not included in the EDHOC message, for example, the parameter 'alg'
COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Encrypt0. to COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Encrypt0.
5.1. EDHOC Message Processing Outline 5.1. EDHOC Message Processing Outline
For each new/ongoing EDHOC session, the endpoints are assumed to keep For each new/ongoing EDHOC session, the endpoints are assumed to keep
an associated protocol state containing identifiers, keying material, an associated protocol state containing identifiers, keying material,
etc. used for subsequent processing of protocol related data. The etc. used for subsequent processing of protocol-related data. The
protocol state is assumed to be associated with an application protocol state is assumed to be associated with an application
profile (Section 3.9) which provides the context for how messages are profile (Section 3.9) that provides the context for how messages are
transported, identified, and processed. transported, identified, and processed.
EDHOC messages SHALL be processed according to the current protocol EDHOC messages SHALL be processed according to the current protocol
state. The following steps are expected to be performed at reception state. The following steps are expected to be performed at reception
of an EDHOC message: of an EDHOC message:
1. Detect that an EDHOC message has been received, for example by 1. Detect that an EDHOC message has been received, for example, by
means of port number, URI, or media type (Section 3.9). means of a port number, URI, or media type (Section 3.9).
2. Retrieve the protocol state according to the message correlation, 2. Retrieve the protocol state according to the message correlation;
see Section 3.4.1. If there is no protocol state, in the case of see Section 3.4.1. If there is no protocol state, in the case of
message_1, a new protocol state is created. The Responder message_1, a new protocol state is created. The Responder
endpoint needs to make use of available denial-of-service endpoint needs to make use of available denial-of-service
mitigation (Section 9.7). mitigation (Section 9.7).
3. If the message received is an error message, then process it 3. If the message received is an error message, then process it
according to Section 6, else process it as the expected next according to Section 6, else process it as the expected next
message according to the protocol state. message according to the protocol state.
The message processing steps SHALL be processed in order, unless The message processing steps SHALL be processed in order, unless
otherwise stated. If the processing fails for some reason then, otherwise stated. If the processing fails for some reason, then
typically, an error message is sent, the EDHOC session is aborted, typically an error message is sent, the EDHOC session is aborted, and
and the protocol state erased. When the composition and sending of the protocol state is erased. When the composition and sending of
one message is completed and before the next message is received, one message is completed and before the next message is received,
error messages SHALL NOT be sent. error messages SHALL NOT be sent.
After having successfully processed the last message (message_3 or After having successfully processed the last message (message_3 or
message_4 depending on application profile) the EDHOC session is message_4 depending on application profile), the EDHOC session is
completed, after which no error messages are sent and EDHOC session completed; after which, no error messages are sent and EDHOC session
output MAY be maintained even if error messages are received. output MAY be maintained even if error messages are received.
Further details are provided in the following subsections and in Further details are provided in the following subsections and in
Section 6. Section 6.
Different instances of the same message MUST NOT be processed in one Different instances of the same message MUST NOT be processed in one
EDHOC session. Note that processing will fail if the same message EDHOC session. Note that processing will fail if the same message
appears a second time for EDHOC processing in the same EDHOC session appears a second time for EDHOC processing in the same EDHOC session
because the state of the protocol has moved on and now expects because the state of the protocol has moved on and now expects
something else. Message deduplication MUST be done by the transport something else. Message deduplication MUST be done by the transport
protocol (see Section 3.4) or, if not supported by the transport, as protocol (see Section 3.4) or, if not supported by the transport, as
described in Section 7. described in Section 7.
5.2. EDHOC Message 1 5.2. EDHOC Message 1
5.2.1. Formatting of Message 1 5.2.1. Formatting of Message 1
message_1 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1) as defined message_1 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1), as defined
below below.
message_1 = ( message_1 = (
METHOD : int, METHOD : int,
SUITES_I : suites, SUITES_I : suites,
G_X : bstr, G_X : bstr,
C_I : bstr / -24..23, C_I : bstr / -24..23,
? EAD_1, ? EAD_1,
) )
suites = [ 2* int ] / int suites = [ 2* int ] / int
EAD_1 = 1* ead EAD_1 = 1* ead
where: where:
* METHOD - authentication method, see Section 3.2. * METHOD is an authentication method; see Section 3.2,
* SUITES_I - array of cipher suites which the Initiator supports * SUITES_I is an array of cipher suites that the Initiator supports
constructed as specified in Section 5.2.2. constructed as specified in Section 5.2.2,
* G_X - the ephemeral public key of the Initiator * G_X is the ephemeral public key of the Initiator, and
* C_I - variable length connection identifier. Note that connection * C_I is the variable-length connection identifier (note that
identifiers are byte strings but certain values are represented as connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values are
integers in the message, see Section 3.3.2. represented as integers in the message; see Section 3.3.2), and
* EAD_1 - external authorization data, see Section 3.8. * EAD_1 is the external authorization data; see Section 3.8.
5.2.2. Initiator Composition of Message 1 5.2.2. Initiator Composition of Message 1
The processing steps are detailed below and in Section 6.3. The processing steps are detailed below and in Section 6.3.
The Initiator SHALL compose message_1 as follows: The Initiator SHALL compose message_1 as follows:
* Construct SUITES_I as an array of cipher suites supported by I in * Construct SUITES_I as an array of cipher suites supported by I in
order of preference by I with the first cipher suite in the array order of preference by I with the first cipher suite in the array
being the most preferred by I, and the last being the one selected being the most preferred by I and the last being the one selected
by I for this EDHOC session. If the cipher suite most preferred by I for this EDHOC session. If the cipher suite most preferred
by I is selected then SUITES_I contains only that cipher suite and by I is selected, then SUITES_I contains only that cipher suite
is encoded as an int. All cipher suites, if any, preferred by I and is encoded as an int. All cipher suites, if any, preferred by
over the selected one MUST be included. (See also Section 6.3.) I over the selected one MUST be included. (See also Section 6.3.)
- The selected suite is based on what the Initiator can assume to - The selected suite is based on what the Initiator can assume to
be supported by the Responder; if the Initiator previously be supported by the Responder; if the Initiator previously
received from the Responder an error message with error code 2 received from the Responder has an error message with error
containing SUITES_R (see Section 6.3) indicating cipher suites code 2 containing SUITES_R (see Section 6.3) indicating cipher
supported by the Responder, then the Initiator SHOULD select suites supported by the Responder, then the Initiator SHOULD
its most preferred supported cipher suite among those (bearing select its most preferred supported cipher suite among those
in mind that error messages may be forged). (bearing in mind that error messages may be forged).
- The Initiator MUST NOT change its order of preference for - The Initiator MUST NOT change its order of preference for
cipher suites, and MUST NOT omit a cipher suite preferred to cipher suites and MUST NOT omit a cipher suite preferred to the
the selected one because of previous error messages received selected one because of previous error messages received from
from the Responder. the Responder.
* Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the * Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the
selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_X be the selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_X be the
'x' parameter of the COSE_Key. 'x' parameter of the COSE_Key.
* Choose a connection identifier C_I and store it during the EDHOC * Choose a connection identifier C_I and store it during the EDHOC
session. session.
* Encode message_1 as a sequence of CBOR encoded data items as * Encode message_1 as a sequence of CBOR-encoded data items as
specified in Section 5.2.1 specified in Section 5.2.1
5.2.3. Responder Processing of Message 1 5.2.3. Responder Processing of Message 1
The Responder SHALL process message_1 in the following order: The Responder SHALL process message_1 in the following order:
* Decode message_1 (see Appendix C.1). 1. Decode message_1 (see Appendix C.1).
* Process message_1, in particular verify that the selected cipher 2. Process message_1. In particular, verify that the selected
suite is supported and that no prior cipher suite as ordered in cipher suite is supported and that no prior cipher suite as
SUITES_I is supported. ordered in SUITES_I is supported.
* If all processing completed successfully, and if EAD_1 is present, 3. If all processing completed successfully, and if EAD_1 is
then make it available to the application for EAD processing. present, then make it available to the application for EAD
processing.
If any processing step fails, then the Responder MUST send an EDHOC If any processing step fails, then the Responder MUST send an EDHOC
error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session
MUST be aborted. MUST be aborted.
5.3. EDHOC Message 2 5.3. EDHOC Message 2
5.3.1. Formatting of Message 2 5.3.1. Formatting of Message 2
message_2 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1) as defined message_2 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1), as defined
below below.
message_2 = ( message_2 = (
G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 : bstr, G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 : bstr,
) )
where: where:
* G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 - the concatenation of G_Y (i.e., the ephemeral * G_Y_CIPHERTEXT_2 is the concatenation of G_Y (i.e., the ephemeral
public key of the Responder) and CIPHERTEXT_2. public key of the Responder) and CIPHERTEXT_2.
5.3.2. Responder Composition of Message 2 5.3.2. Responder Composition of Message 2
The Responder SHALL compose message_2 as follows: The Responder SHALL compose message_2 as follows:
* Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the * Generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair using the curve in the
selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_Y be the selected cipher suite and format it as a COSE_Key. Let G_Y be the
'x' parameter of the COSE_Key. 'x' parameter of the COSE_Key.
* Choose a connection identifier C_R and store it for the length of * Choose a connection identifier C_R and store it for the length of
the EDHOC session. the EDHOC session.
* Compute the transcript hash TH_2 = H( G_Y, H(message_1) ) where * Compute the transcript hash TH_2 = H( G_Y, H(message_1) ), where
H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The
input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that
H(message_1) can be computed and cached already in the processing H(message_1) can be computed and cached already in the processing
of message_1. of message_1.
* Compute MAC_2 as in Section 4.1.2 with context_2 = << C_R, * Compute MAC_2 as in Section 4.1.2 with context_2 = << C_R,
ID_CRED_R, TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> (see Appendix C.1 for ID_CRED_R, TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> (see Appendix C.1 for
notation) notation).
- If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key - If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key
(method equals 1 or 3), then mac_length_2 is the EDHOC MAC (method equals 1 or 3), then mac_length_2 is the EDHOC MAC
length of the selected cipher suite. If the Responder length of the selected cipher suite. If the Responder
authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 2), then authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 2), then
mac_length_2 is equal to hash_length. mac_length_2 is equal to hash_length.
- C_R - variable length connection identifier. Note that - C_R is a variable-length connection identifier. Note that
connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values are connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values are
represented as integers in the message, see Section 3.3.2. represented as integers in the message; see Section 3.3.2.
- ID_CRED_R - identifier to facilitate the retrieval of CRED_R, - ID_CRED_R is the identifier to facilitate the retrieval of
see Section 3.5.3 CRED_R; see Section 3.5.3.
- CRED_R - CBOR item containing the authentication credential of - CRED_R is the CBOR item containing the authentication
the Responder, see Section 3.5.2 credential of the Responder; see Section 3.5.2.
- EAD_2 - external authorization data, see Section 3.8 - EAD_2 is the external authorization data; see Section 3.8.
* If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key * If the Responder authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key
(method equals 1 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is MAC_2. If the (method equals 1 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is MAC_2. If the
Responder authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or Responder authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or
2), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is the 'signature' field of a 2), then Signature_or_MAC_2 is the 'signature' field of a
COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified in Section 4.4 of COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified in Section 4.4 of
[RFC9053] using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher [RFC9052] and using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher
suite, the private authentication key of the Responder, and the suite, the private authentication key of the Responder, and the
following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3 for an overview of following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3 for an overview of
COSE and Appendix C.1 for notation): COSE and Appendix C.1 for notation):
- protected = << ID_CRED_R >> - protected = << ID_CRED_R >>
- external_aad = << TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> - external_aad = << TH_2, CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >>
- payload = MAC_2 - payload = MAC_2
* CIPHERTEXT_2 is calculated with a binary additive stream cipher, * CIPHERTEXT_2 is calculated with a binary additive stream cipher,
using a keystream generated with EDHOC_Expand, and the following using a keystream generated with EDHOC_Expand and the following
plaintext: plaintext:
- PLAINTEXT_2 = ( C_R, ID_CRED_R / bstr / -24..23, - PLAINTEXT_2 = ( C_R, ID_CRED_R / bstr / -24..23,
Signature_or_MAC_2, ? EAD_2 ) Signature_or_MAC_2, ? EAD_2 )
o If ID_CRED_R contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e., o If ID_CRED_R contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e.,
ID_CRED_R = { 4 : kid_R }, then the compact encoding is ID_CRED_R = { 4 : kid_R }, then the compact encoding is
applied, see Section 3.5.3.2. applied; see Section 3.5.3.2.
o C_R - variable length connection identifier. Note that o C_R is the variable-length connection identifier. Note that
connection identifiers are byte strings but certain values connection identifiers are byte strings, but certain values
are represented as integers in the message, see are represented as integers in the message; see
Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.2.
- Compute KEYSTREAM_2 as in Section 4.1.2, where plaintext_length - Compute KEYSTREAM_2 as in Section 4.1.2, where plaintext_length
is the length of PLAINTEXT_2. For the case of plaintext_length is the length of PLAINTEXT_2. For the case of plaintext_length
exceeding the EDHOC_KDF output size, see Appendix G. exceeding the EDHOC_KDF output size, see Appendix G.
- CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2 - CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2
* Encode message_2 as a sequence of CBOR encoded data items as * Encode message_2 as a sequence of CBOR-encoded data items as
specified in Section 5.3.1. specified in Section 5.3.1.
5.3.3. Initiator Processing of Message 2 5.3.3. Initiator Processing of Message 2
The Initiator SHALL process message_2 in the following order: The Initiator SHALL process message_2 in the following order:
* Decode message_2 (see Appendix C.1). 1. Decode message_2 (see Appendix C.1).
* Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation 2. Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation
(e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_I, see (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_I; see
Section 3.4.1). Section 3.4.1).
* Decrypt CIPHERTEXT_2, see Section 5.3.2. 3. Decrypt CIPHERTEXT_2; see Section 5.3.2.
* If all processing completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_R and 4. If all processing is completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_R
(if present) EAD_2 available to the application for and (if present) EAD_2 available to the application for
authentication- and EAD processing. When and how to perform authentication and EAD processing. When and how to perform
authentication is up to the application. authentication is up to the application.
* Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_R) and the 5. Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_R) and the
authentication key of R from the application (or by other means). authentication key of R from the application (or by other means).
* Verify Signature_or_MAC_2 using the algorithm in the selected 6. Verify Signature_or_MAC_2 using the algorithm in the selected
cipher suite. The verification process depends on the method, see cipher suite. The verification process depends on the method;
Section 5.3.2. Make the result of the verification available to see Section 5.3.2. Make the result of the verification available
the application. to the application.
If any processing step fails, then the Initiator MUST send an EDHOC If any processing step fails, then the Initiator MUST send an EDHOC
error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session
MUST be aborted. MUST be aborted.
5.4. EDHOC Message 3 5.4. EDHOC Message 3
5.4.1. Formatting of Message 3 5.4.1. Formatting of Message 3
message_3 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1) as defined message_3 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1), as defined
below below.
message_3 = ( message_3 = (
CIPHERTEXT_3 : bstr, CIPHERTEXT_3 : bstr,
) )
5.4.2. Initiator Composition of Message 3 5.4.2. Initiator Composition of Message 3
The Initiator SHALL compose message_3 as follows: The Initiator SHALL compose message_3 as follows:
* Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2, CRED_R) * Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2, CRED_R),
where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher
suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note
that TH_3 can be computed and cached already in the processing of that TH_3 can be computed and cached already in the processing of
message_2. message_2.
* Compute MAC_3 as in Section 4.1.2, with context_3 = << ID_CRED_I, * Compute MAC_3 as in Section 4.1.2, with context_3 = << ID_CRED_I,
TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >> TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >>
- If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key - If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key
(method equals 2 or 3), then mac_length_3 is the EDHOC MAC (method equals 2 or 3), then mac_length_3 is the EDHOC MAC
length of the selected cipher suite. If the Initiator length of the selected cipher suite. If the Initiator
authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 1), then authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or 1), then
mac_length_3 is equal to hash_length. mac_length_3 is equal to hash_length.
- ID_CRED_I - identifier to facilitate the retrieval of CRED_I, - ID_CRED_I is the identifier to facilitate the retrieval of
see Section 3.5.3 CRED_I; see Section 3.5.3.
- CRED_I - CBOR item containing the authentication credential of - CRED_I is the CBOR item containing the authentication
the Initiator, see Section 3.5.2 credential of the Initiator; see Section 3.5.2.
- EAD_3 - external authorization data, see Section 3.8 - EAD_3 is the external authorization data; see Section 3.8.
* If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key * If the Initiator authenticates with a static Diffie-Hellman key
(method equals 2 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is MAC_3. If the (method equals 2 or 3), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is MAC_3. If the
Initiator authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or Initiator authenticates with a signature key (method equals 0 or
1), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is the 'signature' field of a 1), then Signature_or_MAC_3 is the 'signature' field of a
COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified in Section 4.4 of COSE_Sign1 object, computed as specified in Section 4.4 of
[RFC9052] using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher [RFC9052] and using the signature algorithm of the selected cipher
suite, the private authentication key of the Initiator, and the suite, the private authentication key of the Initiator, and the
following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3): following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3):
- protected = << ID_CRED_I >> - protected = << ID_CRED_I >>
- external_aad = << TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >> - external_aad = << TH_3, CRED_I, ? EAD_3 >>
- payload = MAC_3 - payload = MAC_3
* Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 object as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 * Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 object as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3
skipping to change at page 37, line 50 skipping to change at line 1752
- external_aad = TH_3 - external_aad = TH_3
- K_3 and IV_3 are defined in Section 4.1.2 - K_3 and IV_3 are defined in Section 4.1.2
- PLAINTEXT_3 = ( ID_CRED_I / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3, - PLAINTEXT_3 = ( ID_CRED_I / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3,
? EAD_3 ) ? EAD_3 )
o If ID_CRED_I contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e., o If ID_CRED_I contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e.,
ID_CRED_I = { 4 : kid_I }, then the compact encoding is ID_CRED_I = { 4 : kid_I }, then the compact encoding is
applied, see Section 3.5.3.2. applied; see Section 3.5.3.2.
CIPHERTEXT_3 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0. CIPHERTEXT_3 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0.
* Compute the transcript hash TH_4 = H(TH_3, PLAINTEXT_3, CRED_I) * Compute the transcript hash TH_4 = H(TH_3, PLAINTEXT_3, CRED_I),
where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher
suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. suite. The input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence.
* Calculate PRK_out as defined in Figure 8. The Initiator can now * Calculate PRK_out as defined in Figure 6. The Initiator can now
derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter interface, see derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter interface; see
Section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.1.
* Encode message_3 as a CBOR data item as specified in * Encode message_3 as a CBOR data item as specified in
Section 5.4.1. Section 5.4.1.
* Make the connection identifiers (C_I, C_R) and the application * Make the connection identifiers (C_I and C_R) and the application
algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the
application. application.
After creating message_3, the Initiator can compute PRK_out, see After creating message_3, the Initiator can compute PRK_out (see
Section 4.1.3, and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter Section 4.1.3) and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter
interface, see Section 4.2.1. The Initiator SHOULD NOT persistently interface (see Section 4.2.1). The Initiator SHOULD NOT persistently
store PRK_out or application keys until the Initiator has verified store PRK_out or application keys until the Initiator has verified
message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such
as an OSCORE message, from the Responder and the application has as an OSCORE message, from the Responder and the application has
authenticated the Responder. This is similar to waiting for an authenticated the Responder. This is similar to waiting for an
acknowledgment (ACK) in a transport protocol. The Initiator SHOULD acknowledgment (ACK) in a transport protocol. The Initiator SHOULD
NOT send protected application data until the application has NOT send protected application data until the application has
authenticated the Responder. authenticated the Responder.
5.4.3. Responder Processing of Message 3 5.4.3. Responder Processing of Message 3
The Responder SHALL process message_3 in the following order: The Responder SHALL process message_3 in the following order:
* Decode message_3 (see Appendix C.1). 1. Decode message_3 (see Appendix C.1).
* Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation 2. Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation
(e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_R, see (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_R; see
Section 3.4.1). Section 3.4.1).
* Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2 3. Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2
and 5.3 of [RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the and 5.3 of [RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the
selected cipher suite, and the parameters defined in selected cipher suite and the parameters defined in
Section 5.4.2. Section 5.4.2.
* If all processing completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_I and 4. If all processing completed successfully, then make ID_CRED_I and
(if present) EAD_3 available to the application for (if present) EAD_3 available to the application for
authentication- and EAD processing. When and how to perform authentication and EAD processing. When and how to perform
authentication is up to the application. authentication is up to the application.
* Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_I) and the 5. Obtain the authentication credential (CRED_I) and the
authentication key of I from the application (or by other means). authentication key of I from the application (or by other means).
* Verify Signature_or_MAC_3 using the algorithm in the selected 6. Verify Signature_or_MAC_3 using the algorithm in the selected
cipher suite. The verification process depends on the method, see cipher suite. The verification process depends on the method;
Section 5.4.2. Make the result of the verification available to see Section 5.4.2. Make the result of the verification available
the application. to the application.
* Make the connection identifiers (C_I, C_R) and the application 7. Make the connection identifiers (C_I and C_R) and the application
algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the algorithms in the selected cipher suite available to the
application. application.
After processing message_3, the Responder can compute PRK_out, see After processing message_3, the Responder can compute PRK_out (see
Section 4.1.3, and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter Section 4.1.3) and derive application keys using the EDHOC_Exporter
interface, see Section 4.2.1. The Responder SHOULD NOT persistently interface (see Section 4.2.1). The Responder SHOULD NOT persistently
store PRK_out or application keys until the application has store PRK_out or application keys until the application has
authenticated the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD NOT send protected authenticated the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD NOT send protected
application data until the application has authenticated the application data until the application has authenticated the
Initiator. Initiator.
If any processing step fails, then the Responder MUST send an EDHOC If any processing step fails, then the Responder MUST send an EDHOC
error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session
MUST be aborted. MUST be aborted.
5.5. EDHOC Message 4 5.5. EDHOC Message 4
This section specifies message_4 which is OPTIONAL to support. Key This section specifies message_4, which is OPTIONAL to support. Key
confirmation is normally provided by sending an application message confirmation is normally provided by sending an application message
from the Responder to the Initiator protected with a key derived with from the Responder to the Initiator protected with a key derived with
the EDHOC_Exporter, e.g., using OSCORE (see Appendix A). In the EDHOC_Exporter, e.g., using OSCORE (see Appendix A). In
deployments where no protected application message is sent from the deployments where no protected application message is sent from the
Responder to the Initiator, message_4 MUST be supported and MUST be Responder to the Initiator, message_4 MUST be supported and MUST be
used. Two examples of such deployments are: used. Two examples of such deployments are:
1. When EDHOC is only used for authentication and no application 1. when EDHOC is only used for authentication and no application
data is sent. data is sent and
2. When application data is only sent from the Initiator to the 2. when application data is only sent from the Initiator to the
Responder. Responder.
Further considerations about when to use message_4 are provided in Further considerations about when to use message_4 are provided in
Section 3.9 and Section 9.1. Sections 3.9 and 9.1.
5.5.1. Formatting of Message 4 5.5.1. Formatting of Message 4
message_4 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1) as defined message_4 SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1), as defined
below below.
message_4 = ( message_4 = (
CIPHERTEXT_4 : bstr, CIPHERTEXT_4 : bstr,
) )
5.5.2. Responder Composition of Message 4 5.5.2. Responder Composition of Message 4
The Responder SHALL compose message_4 as follows: The Responder SHALL compose message_4 as follows:
* Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of * Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of
[RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher [RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher
suite, using the encryption key K_4, the initialization vector suite, using the encryption key K_4, the initialization vector
IV_4 (if used by the AEAD algorithm), the plaintext PLAINTEXT_4, IV_4 (if used by the AEAD algorithm), the plaintext PLAINTEXT_4,
and the following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3): and the following parameters as input (see Appendix C.3):
- protected = h'' - protected = h''
- external_aad = TH_4 - external_aad = TH_4
- K_4 and IV_4 are defined in Section 4.1.2 - K_4 and IV_4 are defined in Section 4.1.2
- PLAINTEXT_4 = ( ? EAD_4 ) - PLAINTEXT_4 = ( ? EAD_4 )
o EAD_4 - external authorization data, see Section 3.8. o EAD_4 is the external authorization data; see Section 3.8.
CIPHERTEXT_4 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0. CIPHERTEXT_4 is the 'ciphertext' of COSE_Encrypt0.
* Encode message_4 as a CBOR data item as specified in * Encode message_4 as a CBOR data item as specified in
Section 5.5.1. Section 5.5.1.
5.5.3. Initiator Processing of Message 4 5.5.3. Initiator Processing of Message 4
The Initiator SHALL process message_4 as follows: The Initiator SHALL process message_4 as follows:
* Decode message_4 (see Appendix C.1). * Decode message_4 (see Appendix C.1).
* Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation * Retrieve the protocol state using available message correlation
(e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_I, see (e.g., the CoAP Token, the 5-tuple, or the prepended C_I; see
Section 3.4.1). Section 3.4.1).
* Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2 * Decrypt and verify the COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2
and 5.3 of [RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the and 5.3 of [RFC9052], with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm in the
selected cipher suite, and the parameters defined in selected cipher suite and the parameters defined in Section 5.5.2.
Section 5.5.2.
* Make (if present) EAD_4 available to the application for EAD * Make (if present) EAD_4 available to the application for EAD
processing. processing.
If any processing step fails, then the Initiator MUST send an EDHOC If any processing step fails, then the Initiator MUST send an EDHOC
error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session error message back as defined in Section 6, and the EDHOC session
MUST be aborted. MUST be aborted.
After verifying message_4, the Initiator is assured that the After verifying message_4, the Initiator is assured that the
Responder has calculated the key PRK_out (key confirmation) and that Responder has calculated the key PRK_out (key confirmation) and that
no other party can derive the key. no other party can derive the key.
6. Error Handling 6. Error Handling
This section defines the format for error messages, and the This section defines the format for error messages and the processing
processing associated with the currently defined error codes. associated with the currently defined error codes. Additional error
Additional error codes may be registered, see Section 10.4. codes may be registered; see Section 10.4.
Many kinds of errors that can occur during EDHOC processing. As in Many kinds of errors can occur during EDHOC processing. As in CoAP,
CoAP, an error can be triggered by errors in the received message or an error can be triggered by errors in the received message or
internal errors in the receiving endpoint. Except for processing and internal errors in the receiving endpoint. Except for processing and
formatting errors, it is up to the application when to send an error formatting errors, it is up to the application when to send an error
message. Sending error messages is essential for debugging but MAY message. Sending error messages is essential for debugging but MAY
be skipped if, for example, an EDHOC session cannot be found or due be skipped if, for example, an EDHOC session cannot be found or due
to denial-of-service reasons, see Section 9.7. Error messages in to denial-of-service reasons; see Section 9.7. Error messages in
EDHOC are always fatal. After sending an error message, the sender EDHOC are always fatal. After sending an error message, the sender
MUST abort the EDHOC session. The receiver SHOULD treat an error MUST abort the EDHOC session. The receiver SHOULD treat an error
message as an indication that the other party likely has aborted the message as an indication that the other party likely has aborted the
EDHOC session. But since error messages might be forged, the EDHOC session. But since error messages might be forged, the
receiver MAY try to continue the EDHOC session. receiver MAY try to continue the EDHOC session.
An EDHOC error message can be sent by either endpoint as a reply to An EDHOC error message can be sent by either endpoint as a reply to
any non-error EDHOC message. How errors at the EDHOC layer are any non-error EDHOC message. How errors at the EDHOC layer are
transported depends on lower layers, which need to enable error transported depends on lower layers, which need to enable error
messages to be sent and processed as intended. messages to be sent and processed as intended.
error SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1) as defined below error SHALL be a CBOR Sequence (see Appendix C.1), as defined below.
error = ( error = (
ERR_CODE : int, ERR_CODE : int,
ERR_INFO : any, ERR_INFO : any,
) )
Figure 9: EDHOC error message. Figure 7: EDHOC Error Message
where: where:
* ERR_CODE - error code encoded as an integer. The value 0 is * ERR_CODE is an error code encoded as an integer. The value 0 is
reserved for success and can only be used internally, all other reserved for success and can only be used internally; all other
values (negative or positive) indicate errors. values (negative or positive) indicate errors.
* ERR_INFO - error information. Content and encoding depend on * ERR_INFO is the error information. Content and encoding depend on
error code. the error code.
The remainder of this section specifies the currently defined error The remainder of this section specifies the currently defined error
codes, see Figure 10. Additional error codes and corresponding error codes; see Table 3. Additional error codes and corresponding error
information may be specified. information may be specified.
+----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ +==========+===============+===============================+
| ERR_CODE | ERR_INFO Type | Description | | ERR_CODE | ERR_INFO Type | Description |
+==========+===============+========================================+ +==========+===============+===============================+
| 0 | | This value is reserved | | 0 | | Reserved for success |
+----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ +----------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| 1 | tstr | Unspecified error | | 1 | tstr | Unspecified error |
+----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ +----------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| 2 | suites | Wrong selected cipher suite | | 2 | suites | Wrong selected cipher suite |
+----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ +----------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| 3 | true | Unknown credential referenced | | 3 | true | Unknown credential referenced |
+----------+---------------+----------------------------------------+ +----------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| 23 | | Reserved |
+----------+---------------+-------------------------------+
Figure 10: EDHOC error codes and error information. Table 3: EDHOC Error Codes and Error Information
6.1. Success 6.1. Success
Error code 0 MAY be used internally in an application to indicate Error code 0 MAY be used internally in an application to indicate
success, i.e., as a standard value in case of no error, e.g., in success, i.e., as a standard value in case of no error, e.g., in
status reporting or log files. Error code 0 MUST NOT be used as part status reporting or log files. Error code 0 MUST NOT be used as part
of the EDHOC message exchange. If an endpoint receives an error of the EDHOC message exchange. If an endpoint receives an error
message with error code 0, then it MUST abort the EDHOC session and message with error code 0, then it MUST abort the EDHOC session and
MUST NOT send an error message. MUST NOT send an error message.
6.2. Unspecified Error 6.2. Unspecified Error
Error code 1 is used for errors that do not have a specific error Error code 1 is used for errors that do not have a specific error
code defined. ERR_INFO MUST be a text string containing a human- code defined. ERR_INFO MUST be a text string containing a human-
readable diagnostic message which SHOULD be written in English, for readable diagnostic message that SHOULD be written in English, for
example "Method not supported". The diagnostic text message is example, "Method not supported". The diagnostic text message is
mainly intended for software engineers that during debugging need to mainly intended for software engineers who during debugging need to
interpret it in the context of the EDHOC specification. The interpret it in the context of the EDHOC specification. The
diagnostic message SHOULD be provided to the calling application diagnostic message SHOULD be provided to the calling application
where it SHOULD be logged. where it SHOULD be logged.
6.3. Wrong Selected Cipher Suite 6.3. Wrong Selected Cipher Suite
Error code 2 MUST only be used when replying to message_1 in case the Error code 2 MUST only be used when replying to message_1 in case the
cipher suite selected by the Initiator is not supported by the cipher suite selected by the Initiator is not supported by the
Responder, or if the Responder supports a cipher suite more preferred Responder or if the Responder supports a cipher suite more preferred
by the Initiator than the selected cipher suite, see Section 5.2.3. by the Initiator than the selected cipher suite; see Section 5.2.3.
In this case, ERR_INFO = SUITES_R and is of type suites, see In this case, ERR_INFO = SUITES_R and is of type suites; see
Section 5.2.1. If the Responder does not support the selected cipher Section 5.2.1. If the Responder does not support the selected cipher
suite, then SUITES_R MUST include one or more supported cipher suite, then SUITES_R MUST include one or more supported cipher
suites. If the Responder supports a cipher suite in SUITES_I other suites. If the Responder supports a cipher suite in SUITES_I other
than the selected cipher suite (independently of if the selected than the selected cipher suite (independently of if the selected
cipher suite is supported or not) then SUITES_R MUST include the cipher suite is supported or not), then SUITES_R MUST include the
supported cipher suite in SUITES_I which is most preferred by the supported cipher suite in SUITES_I, which is most preferred by the
Initiator. SUITES_R MAY include a single cipher suite, in which case Initiator. SUITES_R MAY include a single cipher suite; in which
it is encoded as an int. If the Responder does not support any case, it is encoded as an int. If the Responder does not support any
cipher suite in SUITES_I, then it SHOULD include all its supported cipher suite in SUITES_I, then it SHOULD include all its supported
cipher suites in SUITES_R. cipher suites in SUITES_R.
In contrast to SUITES_I, the order of the cipher suites in SUITES_R In contrast to SUITES_I, the order of the cipher suites in SUITES_R
has no significance. has no significance.
6.3.1. Cipher Suite Negotiation 6.3.1. Cipher Suite Negotiation
After receiving SUITES_R, the Initiator can determine which cipher After receiving SUITES_R, the Initiator can determine which cipher
suite to select (if any) for the next EDHOC run with the Responder. suite to select (if any) for the next EDHOC run with the Responder.
If the Initiator intends to contact the Responder in the future, the The Initiator needs to remember which selected cipher suite to use
Initiator SHOULD remember which selected cipher suite to use until until the next message_1 has been sent; otherwise, the Initiator and
the next message_1 has been sent, otherwise the Initiator and Responder will run into an infinite loop where the Initiator selects
Responder will likely run into an infinite loop where the Initiator its most preferred cipher suite and the Responder sends an error with
selects its most preferred cipher suite and the Responder sends an supported cipher suites. After a completed EDHOC session, the
error with supported cipher suites. After a completed EDHOC session, Initiator MAY remember the selected cipher suite to use in future
the Initiator MAY remember the selected cipher suite to use in future
EDHOC sessions. Note that if the Initiator or Responder is updated EDHOC sessions. Note that if the Initiator or Responder is updated
with new cipher suite policies, any cached information may be with new cipher suite policies, any cached information may be
outdated. outdated.
Note that the Initiator's list of supported cipher suites and order Note that the Initiator's list of supported cipher suites and order
of preference is fixed (see Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2). of preference is fixed (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). Furthermore,
Furthermore, the Responder SHALL only accept message_1 if the the Responder SHALL only accept message_1 if the selected cipher
selected cipher suite is the first cipher suite in SUITES_I that the suite is the first cipher suite in SUITES_I that the Responder also
Responder also supports (see Section 5.2.3). Following this supports (see Section 5.2.3). Following this procedure ensures that
procedure ensures that the selected cipher suite is the most the selected cipher suite is the most preferred (by the Initiator)
preferred (by the Initiator) cipher suite supported by both parties. cipher suite supported by both parties. For examples, see
For examples, see Section 6.3.2. Section 6.3.2.
If the selected cipher suite is not the first cipher suite which the If the selected cipher suite is not the first cipher suite that the
Responder supports in SUITES_I received in message_1, then the Responder supports in SUITES_I received in message_1, then the
Responder MUST abort the EDHOC session, see Section 5.2.3. If Responder MUST abort the EDHOC session; see Section 5.2.3. If
SUITES_I in message_1 is manipulated, then the integrity verification SUITES_I in message_1 is manipulated, then the integrity verification
of message_2 containing the transcript hash TH_2 will fail and the of message_2 containing the transcript hash TH_2 will fail and the
Initiator will abort the EDHOC session. Initiator will abort the EDHOC session.
6.3.2. Examples 6.3.2. Examples
Assume that the Initiator supports the five cipher suites 5, 6, 7, 8, Assume that the Initiator supports the five cipher suites, 5, 6, 7,
and 9 in decreasing order of preference. Figures 11 and 12 show two 8, and 9, in decreasing order of preference. Figures 8 and 9 show
examples of how the Initiator can format SUITES_I and how SUITES_R is two examples of how the Initiator can format SUITES_I and how
used by Responders to give the Initiator information about the cipher SUITES_R is used by Responders to give the Initiator information
suites that the Responder supports. about the cipher suites that the Responder supports.
In Example 1 (Figure 11), the Responder supports cipher suite 6 but In Example 1 (Figure 8), the Responder supports cipher suite 6 but
not the initially selected cipher suite 5. The Responder rejects the not the initially selected cipher suite 5. The Responder rejects the
first message_1 with an error indicating support for suite 6 in first message_1 with an error indicating support for suite 6 in
SUITES_R. The Initiator also supports suite 6, and therefore selects SUITES_R. The Initiator also supports suite 6 and therefore selects
suite 6 in the second message_1. The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I suite 6 in the second message_1. The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I
the selected suite 6 with the more preferred suites, in this case the selected suite 6 with the more preferred suites, in this case
suite 5, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite suite 5, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite
negotiation. negotiation.
Initiator Responder Initiator Responder
| METHOD, SUITES_I = 5, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | | METHOD, SUITES_I = 5, G_X, C_I, EAD_1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_1 | | message_1 |
| | | |
| ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = 6 | | ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = 6 |
|<------------------------------------------------------------------+ |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
| error | | error |
| | | |
| METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_1 | | message_1 |
Figure 11: Cipher suite negotiation example 1. Figure 8: Cipher Suite Negotiation Example 1
In Example 2 (Figure 12), the Responder supports cipher suites 8 and In Example 2 (Figure 9), the Responder supports cipher suites 8 and 9
9 but not the more preferred (by the Initiator) cipher suites 5, 6 or but not the more preferred (by the Initiator) cipher suites 5, 6 or
7. To illustrate the negotiation mechanics we let the Initiator 7. To illustrate the negotiation mechanics, we let the Initiator
first make a guess that the Responder supports suite 6 but not suite first make a guess that the Responder supports suite 6 but not suite
5. Since the Responder supports neither 5 nor 6, it rejects the 5. Since the Responder supports neither 5 nor 6, it rejects the
first message_1 with an error indicating support for suites 8 and 9 first message_1 with an error indicating support for suites 8 and 9
in SUITES_R (in any order). The Initiator also supports suites 8 and in SUITES_R (in any order). The Initiator also supports suites 8 and
9, and prefers suite 8, so selects suite 8 in the second message_1. 9, and prefers suite 8, so it selects suite 8 in the second
The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I the selected suite 8 with the more message_1. The Initiator prepends in SUITES_I the selected suite 8
preferred suites in order of preference, in this case suites 5, 6 and with the more preferred suites in order of preference, in this case,
7, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite negotiation. suites 5, 6 and 7, to mitigate a potential attack on the cipher suite
negotiation.
Note 1. If the Responder had supported suite 5, then the first Note 1. If the Responder had supported suite 5, then the first
message_1 would not have been accepted either, since the Responder message_1 would not have been accepted either, since the
observes that suite 5 is more preferred by the Initiator than the Responder observes that suite 5 is more preferred by the
selected suite 6. In that case the Responder would have included Initiator than the selected suite 6. In that case, the
suite 5 in SUITES_R of the response, and it would then have become Responder would have included suite 5 in SUITES_R of the
the selected and only suite in the second message_1. response, and it would then have become the selected and
only suite in the second message_1.
Note 2. For each message_1 the Initiator MUST generate a new Note 2. For each message_1, the Initiator MUST generate a new
ephemeral ECDH key pair matching the selected cipher suite. ephemeral ECDH key pair matching the selected cipher suite.
Initiator Responder Initiator Responder
| METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_1 | | message_1 |
| | | |
| ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = [9, 8] | | ERR_CODE = 2, SUITES_R = [9, 8] |
|<------------------------------------------------------------------+ |<------------------------------------------------------------------+
| error | | error |
| | | |
| METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6, 7, 8], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 | | METHOD, SUITES_I = [5, 6, 7, 8], G_X, C_I, EAD_1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------>| +------------------------------------------------------------------>|
| message_1 | | message_1 |
Figure 12: Cipher suite negotiation example 2. Figure 9: Cipher Suite Negotiation Example 2
6.4. Unknown Credential Referenced 6.4. Unknown Credential Referenced
Error code 3 is used for errors due to a received credential Error code 3 is used for errors due to a received credential
identifier (ID_CRED_R in message_2 or ID_CRED_I message_3) containing identifier (ID_CRED_R in message_2 or ID_CRED_I message_3) containing
a reference to a credential which the receiving endpoint does not a reference to a credential that the receiving endpoint does not have
have access to. The intent with this error code is that the endpoint access to. The intent with this error code is that the endpoint who
who sent the credential identifier should for the next EDHOC session sent the credential identifier should, for the next EDHOC session,
try another credential identifier supported according to the try another credential identifier supported according to the
application profile. application profile.
For example, an application profile could list x5t and x5chain as For example, an application profile could list x5t and x5chain as
supported credential identifiers, and state that x5t should be used supported credential identifiers and state that x5t should be used if
if it can be assumed that the X.509 certificate is available at the it can be assumed that the X.509 certificate is available at the
receiving side. This error code thus enables the certificate chain receiving side. This error code thus enables the certificate chain
to be sent only when needed, bearing in mind that error messages are to be sent only when needed, bearing in mind that error messages are
not protected so an adversary can try to cause unnecessary large not protected so an adversary can try to cause unnecessary, large
credential identifiers. credential identifiers.
For the error code 3, the error information SHALL be the CBOR simple For the error code 3, the error information SHALL be the CBOR simple
value true (0xf5). Error code 3 MUST NOT be used when the received value true (0xf5). Error code 3 MUST NOT be used when the received
credential identifier type is not supported. credential identifier type is not supported.
7. EDHOC Message Deduplication 7. EDHOC Message Deduplication
EDHOC by default assumes that message duplication is handled by the By default, EDHOC assumes that message duplication is handled by the
transport, in this section exemplified with CoAP, see Appendix A.2. transport (which is exemplified by CoAP in this section); see
Appendix A.2.
Deduplication of CoAP messages is described in Section 4.5 of Deduplication of CoAP messages is described in Section 4.5 of
[RFC7252]. This handles the case when the same Confirmable (CON) [RFC7252]. This handles the case when the same Confirmable (CON)
message is received multiple times due to missing acknowledgment on message is received multiple times due to missing acknowledgment on
the CoAP messaging layer. The recommended processing in [RFC7252] is the CoAP messaging layer. The recommended processing in [RFC7252] is
that the duplicate message is acknowledged (ACK), but the received that the duplicate message is acknowledged, but the received message
message is only processed once by the CoAP stack. is only processed once by the CoAP stack.
Message deduplication is resource demanding and therefore not Message deduplication is resource demanding and therefore not
supported in all CoAP implementations. Since EDHOC is targeting supported in all CoAP implementations. Since EDHOC is targeting
constrained environments, it is desirable that EDHOC can optionally constrained environments, it is desirable that EDHOC can optionally
support transport layers which do not handle message duplication. support transport layers that do not handle message duplication.
Special care is needed to avoid issues with duplicate messages, see Special care is needed to avoid issues with duplicate messages; see
Section 5.1. Section 5.1.
The guiding principle here is similar to the deduplication processing The guiding principle here is similar to the deduplication processing
on the CoAP messaging layer: a received duplicate EDHOC message SHALL on the CoAP messaging layer, i.e., a received duplicate EDHOC message
NOT result in another instance of the next EDHOC message. The result SHALL NOT result in another instance of the next EDHOC message. The
MAY be that a duplicate next EDHOC message is sent, provided it is result MAY be that a duplicate next EDHOC message is sent, provided
still relevant with respect to the current protocol state. In any it is still relevant with respect to the current protocol state. In
case, the received message MUST NOT be processed more than once in any case, the received message MUST NOT be processed more than once
the same EDHOC session. This is called "EDHOC message in the same EDHOC session. This is called "EDHOC message
deduplication". deduplication".
An EDHOC implementation MAY store the previously sent EDHOC message An EDHOC implementation MAY store the previously sent EDHOC message
to be able to resend it. to be able to resend it.
In principle, if the EDHOC implementation would deterministically In principle, if the EDHOC implementation would deterministically
regenerate the identical EDHOC message previously sent, it would be regenerate the identical EDHOC message previously sent, it would be
possible to instead store the protocol state to be able to recreate possible to instead store the protocol state to be able to recreate
and resend the previously sent EDHOC message. However, even if the and resend the previously sent EDHOC message. However, even if the
protocol state is fixed, the message generation may introduce protocol state is fixed, the message generation may introduce
differences which compromise security. For example, in the differences that compromise security. For example, in the generation
generation of message_3, if I is performing a (non-deterministic) of message_3, if I is performing a (non-deterministic) ECDSA
ECDSA signature (say, method 0 or 1, cipher suite 2 or 3) then signature (say, method 0 or 1 and cipher suite 2 or 3), then
PLAINTEXT_3 is randomized, but K_3 and IV_3 are the same, leading to PLAINTEXT_3 is randomized, but K_3 and IV_3 are the same, leading to
a key and nonce reuse. a key and nonce reuse.
The EDHOC implementation MUST NOT store previous protocol state and The EDHOC implementation MUST NOT store the previous protocol state
regenerate an EDHOC message if there is a risk that the same key and and regenerate an EDHOC message if there is a risk that the same key
IV are used for two (or more) distinct messages. and IV are used for two (or more) distinct messages.
The previous message or protocol state MUST NOT be kept longer than The previous message or protocol state MUST NOT be kept longer than
what is required for retransmission, for example, in the case of CoAP what is required for retransmission, for example, in the case of CoAP
transport, no longer than the EXCHANGE_LIFETIME (see Section 4.8.2 of transport, no longer than the EXCHANGE_LIFETIME (see Section 4.8.2 of
[RFC7252]). [RFC7252]).
8. Compliance Requirements 8. Compliance Requirements
In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise: In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise:
An implementation MAY support only Initiator or only Responder. * An implementation MAY support only an Initiator or only a
Responder.
An implementation MAY support only a single method. None of the * An implementation MAY support only a single method. None of the
methods are mandatory-to-implement. methods are mandatory to implement.
Implementations MUST support 'kid' parameters. None of the other * Implementations MUST support 'kid' parameters. None of the other
COSE header parameters are mandatory-to-implement. COSE header parameters are mandatory to implement.
An implementation MAY support only a single credential type (CCS, * An implementation MAY support only a single credential type (CCS,
CWT, X.509, C509). None of the credential types are mandatory-to- CWT, X.509, or C509). None of the credential types are mandatory
implement. to implement.
Implementations MUST support the EDHOC_Exporter. * Implementations MUST support the EDHOC_Exporter.
Implementations MAY support message_4. Error codes (ERR_CODE) 1 and * Implementations MAY support message_4. Error codes (ERR_CODE) 1
2 MUST be supported. and 2 MUST be supported.
Implementations MUST support EAD. * Implementations MUST support EAD.
Implementations MUST support cipher suite 2 and 3. Cipher suites 2 * Implementations MUST support cipher suites 2 and 3. Cipher suites
(AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA- 2 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128,
256) and 3 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM- SHA-256) and 3 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256,
16-64-128, SHA-256) only differ in the size of the MAC length, so AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) only differ in the size of the MAC
supporting one or both of these is not significantly different. length, so supporting one or both of these is not significantly
Implementations only need to implement the algorithms needed for different. Implementations only need to implement the algorithms
their supported methods. needed for their supported methods.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
9.1. Security Properties 9.1. Security Properties
EDHOC has similar security properties as can be expected from the EDHOC has similar security properties as can be expected from the
theoretical SIGMA-I protocol [SIGMA] and the Noise XX pattern theoretical SIGMA-I protocol [SIGMA] and the Noise XX pattern
[Noise], which are similar to methods 0 and 3, respectively. Proven [Noise], which are similar to methods 0 and 3, respectively. Proven
security properties are detailed in the security analysis security properties are detailed in the security analysis
publications referenced at the end of this section. publications referenced at the end of this section.
Using the terminology from [SIGMA], EDHOC provides forward secrecy, Using the terminology from [SIGMA], EDHOC provides forward secrecy,
mutual authentication with aliveness, consistency, and peer mutual authentication with aliveness, consistency, and peer
awareness. As described in [SIGMA], message_3 provides peer awareness. As described in [SIGMA], message_3 provides peer
awareness to the Responder while message_4 provides peer awareness to awareness to the Responder, while message_4 provides peer awareness
the Initiator. By including the authentication credentials in the to the Initiator. By including the authentication credentials in the
transcript hash, EDHOC protects against Duplicate Signature Key transcript hash, EDHOC protects against an identity misbinding attack
Selection (DSKS)-like identity mis-binding attack that the MAC-then- like the Duplicate Signature Key Selection (DSKS) that the MAC-then-
Sign variant of SIGMA-I is otherwise vulnerable to. Sign variant of SIGMA-I is otherwise vulnerable to.
As described in [SIGMA], different levels of identity protection are As described in [SIGMA], different levels of identity protection are
provided to the Initiator and the Responder. EDHOC provides identity provided to the Initiator and Responder. EDHOC provides identity
protection of the Initiator against active attacks and identity protection of the Initiator against active attacks and identity
protection of the Responder against passive attacks. An active protection of the Responder against passive attacks. An active
attacker can get the credential identifier of the Responder by attacker can get the credential identifier of the Responder by
eavesdropping on the destination address used for transporting eavesdropping on the destination address used for transporting
message_1 and then sending its own message_1 to the same address. message_1 and then sending its own message_1 to the same address.
The roles should be assigned to protect the most sensitive identity/ The roles should be assigned to protect the most sensitive identity/
identifier, typically that which is not possible to infer from identifier, typically that which is not possible to infer from
routing information in the lower layers. routing information in the lower layers.
EDHOC messages might change in transit due to a noisy channel or EDHOC messages might change in transit due to a noisy channel or
through modification by an attacker. Changes in message_1 and through modification by an attacker. Changes in message_1 and
message_2 (except Signature_or_MAC_2 when the signature scheme is not message_2 (except Signature_or_MAC_2 when the signature scheme is not
strongly unforgeable) are detected when verifying Signature_or_MAC_2. strongly unforgeable) are detected when verifying Signature_or_MAC_2.
Changes to not strongly unforgeable Signature_or_MAC_2, and message_3 Changes to not strongly unforgeable Signature_or_MAC_2 and message_3
are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_3. Changes to message_4 are are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_3. Changes to message_4 are
detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_4. detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_4.
Compared to [SIGMA], EDHOC adds an explicit method type and expands Compared to [SIGMA], EDHOC adds an explicit method type and expands
the message authentication coverage to additional elements such as the message authentication coverage to additional elements such as
algorithms, external authorization data, and previous plaintext algorithms, external authorization data, and previous plaintext
messages. This protects against an attacker replaying messages or messages. This protects against an attacker replaying messages or
injecting messages from another EDHOC session. injecting messages from another EDHOC session.
EDHOC also adds selection of connection identifiers and downgrade EDHOC also adds a selection of connection identifiers and downgrades
protected negotiation of cryptographic parameters, i.e., an attacker protected negotiation of cryptographic parameters, i.e., an attacker
cannot affect the negotiated parameters. A single session of EDHOC cannot affect the negotiated parameters. A single session of EDHOC
does not include negotiation of cipher suites, but it enables the does not include negotiation of cipher suites, but it enables the
Responder to verify that the selected cipher suite is the most Responder to verify that the selected cipher suite is the most
preferred cipher suite by the Initiator which is supported by both preferred cipher suite by the Initiator that is supported by both the
the Initiator and the Responder, and to abort the EDHOC session if Initiator and Responder and to abort the EDHOC session if not.
not.
As required by [RFC7258], IETF protocols need to mitigate pervasive As required by [RFC7258], IETF protocols need to mitigate pervasive
monitoring when possible. EDHOC therefore only supports methods with monitoring when possible. Therefore, EDHOC only supports methods
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and provides a key update function (see with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and provides a key update function (see
Appendix H) for lightweight application protocol rekeying. Either of Appendix H) for lightweight application protocol rekeying. Either of
these provides forward secrecy, in the sense that compromise of the these provides forward secrecy, in the sense that compromise of the
private authentication keys does not compromise past session keys private authentication keys does not compromise past session keys
(PRK_out), and compromise of a session key does not compromise past (PRK_out) and compromise of a session key does not compromise past
session keys. Frequently re-running EDHOC with ephemeral Diffie- session keys. Frequently re-running EDHOC with ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman forces attackers to perform dynamic key exfiltration where Hellman forces attackers to perform dynamic key exfiltration where
the attacker must have continuous interactions with the collaborator, the attacker must have continuous interactions with the collaborator,
which is a significant sustained attack. which is a significant sustained attack.
To limit the effect of breaches, it is important to limit the use of To limit the effect of breaches, it is important to limit the use of
symmetric group keys for bootstrapping. EDHOC therefore strives to symmetric group keys for bootstrapping. Therefore, EDHOC strives to
make the additional cost of using raw public keys and self-signed make the additional cost of using raw public keys and self-signed
certificates as small as possible. Raw public keys and self-signed certificates as small as possible. Raw public keys and self-signed
certificates are not a replacement for a public key infrastructure certificates are not a replacement for a public key infrastructure
but SHOULD be used instead of symmetric group keys for bootstrapping. but SHOULD be used instead of symmetric group keys for bootstrapping.
Compromise of the long-term keys (private signature or static DH Compromise of the long-term keys (private signature or static DH
keys) does not compromise the security of completed EDHOC sessions. keys) does not compromise the security of completed EDHOC sessions.
Compromising the private authentication keys of one party lets an Compromising the private authentication keys of one party lets an
active attacker impersonate that compromised party in EDHOC sessions active attacker impersonate that compromised party in EDHOC sessions
with other parties but does not let the attacker impersonate other with other parties but does not let the attacker impersonate other
parties in EDHOC sessions with the compromised party. Compromise of parties in EDHOC sessions with the compromised party. Compromise of
the long-term keys does not enable a passive attacker to compromise the long-term keys does not enable a passive attacker to compromise
future session keys (PRK_out). Compromise of the HDKF input future session keys (PRK_out). Compromise of the HKDF input
parameters (ECDH shared secret) leads to compromise of all session parameters (ECDH shared secret) leads to compromise of all session
keys derived from that compromised shared secret. Compromise of one keys derived from that compromised shared secret. Compromise of one
session key does not compromise other session keys. Compromise of session key does not compromise other session keys. Compromise of
PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material derived with the PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material derived with the
EDHOC_Exporter. EDHOC_Exporter.
Based on the cryptographic algorithms requirements Section 9.3, EDHOC Based on the cryptographic algorithm requirements (Section 9.3),
provides a minimum of 64-bit security against online brute force EDHOC provides a minimum of 64-bit security against online brute
attacks and a minimum of 128-bit security against offline brute force force attacks and a minimum of 128-bit security against offline brute
attacks. To break 64-bit security against online brute force an force attacks. To break 64-bit security against online brute force,
attacker would on average have to send 4.3 billion messages per an attacker would on average have to send 4.3 billion messages per
second for 68 years, which is infeasible in constrained IoT radio second for 68 years, which is infeasible in constrained IoT radio
technologies. A forgery against a 64-bit MAC in EDHOC breaks the technologies. A forgery against a 64-bit MAC in EDHOC breaks the
security of all future application data, while a forgery against a security of all future application data, while a forgery against a
64-bit MAC in the subsequent application protocol (e.g., OSCORE 64-bit MAC in the subsequent application protocol (e.g., OSCORE
[RFC8613]) typically only breaks the security of the data in the [RFC8613]) typically only breaks the security of the data in the
forged packet. forged packet.
As the EDHOC session is aborted when verification fails, the security As the EDHOC session is aborted when verification fails, the security
against online attacks is given by the sum of the strength of the against online attacks is given by the sum of the strength of the
verified signatures and MACs (including MAC in AEAD). As an example, verified signatures and MACs (including MAC in AEAD). As an example,
if EDHOC is used with method 3, cipher suite 2, and message_4, the if EDHOC is used with method 3, cipher suite 2, and message_4, the
Responder is authenticated with 128-bit security against online Responder is authenticated with 128-bit security against online
attacks (the sum of the 64-bit MACs in message_2 and message_4). The attacks (the sum of the 64-bit MACs in message_2 and message_4). The
same principle applies for MACs in an application protocol keyed by same principle applies for MACs in an application protocol keyed by
EDHOC as long as EDHOC is rerun when verification of the first MACs EDHOC as long as EDHOC is re-run when verification of the first MACs
in the application protocol fails. As an example, if EDHOC with in the application protocol fails. As an example, if EDHOC with
method 3 and cipher suite 2 is used as in Figure 2 of method 3 and cipher suite 2 is used as in Figure 2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc], 128-bit mutual authentication against [EDHOC-CoAP-OSCORE], 128-bit mutual authentication against online
online attacks can be achieved after completion of the first OSCORE attacks can be achieved after completion of the first OSCORE request
request and response. and response.
After sending message_3, the Initiator is assured that no other party After sending message_3, the Initiator is assured that no other party
than the Responder can compute the key PRK_out. While the Initiator than the Responder can compute the key PRK_out. While the Initiator
can securely send protected application data, the Initiator SHOULD can securely send protected application data, the Initiator SHOULD
NOT persistently store the keying material PRK_out until the NOT persistently store the keying material PRK_out until the
Initiator has verified message_4 or a message protected with a Initiator has verified message_4 or a message protected with a
derived application key, such as an OSCORE message, from the derived application key, such as an OSCORE message, from the
Responder. After verifying message_3, the Responder is assured that Responder. After verifying message_3, the Responder is assured that
an honest Initiator has computed the key PRK_out. The Responder can an honest Initiator has computed the key PRK_out. The Responder can
securely derive and store the keying material PRK_out, and send securely derive and store the keying material PRK_out and send
protected application data. protected application data.
External authorization data sent in message_1 (EAD_1) or message_2 External authorization data sent in message_1 (EAD_1) or message_2
(EAD_2) should be considered unprotected by EDHOC, see Section 9.5. (EAD_2) should be considered unprotected by EDHOC; see Section 9.5.
EAD_2 is encrypted but the Responder has not yet authenticated the EAD_2 is encrypted, but the Responder has not yet authenticated the
Initiator and the encryption does not provide confidentiality against Initiator and the encryption does not provide confidentiality against
active attacks. active attacks.
External authorization data sent in message_3 (EAD_3) or message_4 External authorization data sent in message_3 (EAD_3) or message_4
(EAD_4) is protected between Initiator and Responder by the protocol, (EAD_4) is protected between the Initiator and Responder by the
but note that EAD fields may be used by the application before the protocol, but note that EAD fields may be used by the application
message verification is completed, see Section 3.8. Designing a before the message verification is completed; see Section 3.8.
secure mechanism that uses EAD is not necessarily straightforward. Designing a secure mechanism that uses EAD is not necessarily
This document only provides the EAD transport mechanism, but the straightforward. This document only provides the EAD transport
problem of agreeing on the surrounding context and the meaning of the mechanism, but the problem of agreeing on the surrounding context and
information passed to and from the application remains. Any new uses the meaning of the information passed to and from the application
of EAD should be subject to careful review. remains. Any new uses of EAD should be subject to careful review.
Key compromise impersonation (KCI): In EDHOC authenticated with Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI): In EDHOC authenticated with
signature keys, EDHOC provides KCI protection against an attacker signature keys, EDHOC provides KCI protection against an attacker
having access to the long-term key or the ephemeral secret key. With having access to the long-term key or the ephemeral secret key.
static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, KCI protection would be With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, KCI protection
provided against an attacker having access to the long-term Diffie- would be provided against an attacker having access to the long-
Hellman key, but not to an attacker having access to the ephemeral term Diffie-Hellman key but not to an attacker having access to
secret key. Note that the term KCI has typically been used for the ephemeral secret key. Note that the term KCI has typically
compromise of long-term keys, and that an attacker with access to the been used for compromise of long-term keys and that an attacker
ephemeral secret key can only attack that specific EDHOC session. with access to the ephemeral secret key can only attack that
specific EDHOC session.
Repudiation: If an endpoint authenticates with a signature, the other Repudiation: If an endpoint authenticates with a signature, the
endpoint can prove that the endpoint performed a run of the protocol other endpoint can prove that the endpoint performed a run of the
by presenting the data being signed as well as the signature itself. protocol by presenting the data being signed as well as the
With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, the authenticating signature itself. With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication,
endpoint can deny having participated in the protocol. the authenticating endpoint can deny having participated in the
protocol.
Earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed [Bruni18] Earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed [Bruni18]
[Norrman20] [CottierPointcheval22] [Jacomme23] [GuentherIlunga22] and [Norrman20] [CottierPointcheval22] [Jacomme23] [GuentherIlunga22],
the specification has been updated based on the analysis. and the specification has been updated based on the analysis.
9.2. Cryptographic Considerations 9.2. Cryptographic Considerations
The SIGMA protocol requires that the encryption of message_3 provides The SIGMA protocol requires that the encryption of message_3 provides
confidentiality against active attackers and EDHOC message_4 relies confidentiality against active attackers and EDHOC message_4 relies
on the use of authenticated encryption. Hence, the message on the use of authenticated encryption. Hence, the message
authenticating functionality of the authenticated encryption in EDHOC authenticating functionality of the authenticated encryption in EDHOC
is critical: authenticated encryption MUST NOT be replaced by plain is critical, i.e., authenticated encryption MUST NOT be replaced by
encryption only, even if authentication is provided at another level plain encryption only, even if authentication is provided at another
or through a different mechanism. level or through a different mechanism.
To reduce message overhead EDHOC does not use explicit nonces and To reduce message overhead, EDHOC does not use explicit nonces and
instead relies on the ephemeral public keys to provide randomness to instead relies on the ephemeral public keys to provide randomness to
each EDHOC session. A good amount of randomness is important for the each EDHOC session. A good amount of randomness is important for the
key generation, to provide liveness, and to protect against key generation to provide liveness and to protect against
interleaving attacks. For this reason, the ephemeral keys MUST NOT interleaving attacks. For this reason, the ephemeral keys MUST NOT
be used in more than one EDHOC message, and both parties SHALL be used in more than one EDHOC message, and both parties SHALL
generate fresh random ephemeral key pairs. Note that an ephemeral generate fresh, random ephemeral key pairs. Note that an ephemeral
key may be used to calculate several ECDH shared secrets. When key may be used to calculate several ECDH shared secrets. When
static Diffie-Hellman authentication is used the same ephemeral key static Diffie-Hellman authentication is used, the same ephemeral key
is used in both ephemeral-ephemeral and ephemeral-static ECDH. is used in both ephemeral-ephemeral and ephemeral-static ECDH.
As discussed in [SIGMA], the encryption of message_2 does only need As discussed in [SIGMA], the encryption of message_2 only needs to
to protect against passive attacker as active attackers can always protect against a passive attacker since active attackers can always
get the Responder's identity by sending their own message_1. EDHOC get the Responder's identity by sending their own message_1. EDHOC
uses the EDHOC_Expand function (typically HKDF-Expand) as a binary uses the EDHOC_Expand function (typically HKDF-Expand) as a binary
additive stream cipher which is proven secure as long as the expand additive stream cipher that is proven secure as long as the expand
function is a PRF. HKDF-Expand is not often used as a stream cipher function is a Pseudorandom Function (PRF). HKDF-Expand is not often
as it is slow on long messages, and most applications require both used as a stream cipher as it is slow on long messages, and most
confidentiality with indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext applications require both confidentiality with indistinguishability
(IND-CCA) as well as integrity protection. For the encryption of under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) as well as
message_2, any speed difference is negligible, IND-CCA does not integrity protection. For the encryption of message_2, any speed
increase security, and integrity is provided by the inner MAC (and difference is negligible, IND-CCA2 does not increase security, and
signature depending on method). integrity is provided by the inner MAC (and signature depending on
method).
Requirements for how to securely generate, validate, and process the Requirements for how to securely generate, validate, and process the
public keys depend on the elliptic curve. For X25519 and X448, the public keys depend on the elliptic curve. For X25519 and X448, the
requirements are defined in [RFC7748]. For X25519 and X448, the requirements are defined in [RFC7748]. For X25519 and X448, the
check for all-zero output as specified in Section 6 of [RFC7748] MUST check for all-zero output as specified in Section 6 of [RFC7748] MUST
be done. For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the requirements be done. For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the requirements
are defined in Section 5 of [SP-800-56A]. For secp256r1, secp384r1, are defined in Section 5 of [SP-800-56A]. For secp256r1, secp384r1,
and secp521r1, at least partial public-key validation MUST be done. and secp521r1, at least partial public key validation MUST be done.
The same authentication credential MAY be used for both the Initiator The same authentication credential MAY be used for both the Initiator
and Responder roles. As noted in Section 12 of [RFC9052] the use of and Responder roles. As noted in Section 12 of [RFC9052], the use of
a single key for multiple algorithms is strongly discouraged unless a single key for multiple algorithms is strongly discouraged unless
proven secure by a dedicated cryptographic analysis. In particular proven secure by a dedicated cryptographic analysis. In particular,
this recommendation applies to using the same private key for static this recommendation applies to using the same private key for static
Diffie-Hellman authentication and digital signature authentication. Diffie-Hellman authentication and digital signature authentication.
A preliminary conjecture is that a minor change to EDHOC may be A preliminary conjecture is that a minor change to EDHOC may be
sufficient to fit the analysis of secure shared signature and ECDH sufficient to fit the analysis of a secure shared signature and ECDH
key usage in [Degabriele11] and [Thormarker21]. key usage in [Degabriele11] and [Thormarker21]. Note that
Section 5.6.3.2 of [SP-800-56A] allows a key agreement key pair to be
used with a signature algorithm in certificate requests.
The property that a completed EDHOC session implies that another The property that a completed EDHOC session implies that another
identity has been active is upheld as long as the Initiator does not identity has been active is upheld as long as the Initiator does not
have its own identity in the set of Responder identities it is have its own identity in the set of Responder identities it is
allowed to communicate with. In Trust on first use (TOFU) use cases, allowed to communicate with. In trust-on-first-use (TOFU) use cases
see Appendix D.5, the Initiator should verify that the Responder's (see Appendix D.5), the Initiator should verify that the Responder's
identity is not equal to its own. Any future EDHOC methods using identity is not equal to its own. Any future EDHOC methods using,
e.g., pre-shared keys might need to mitigate this in other ways. e.g., PSKs might need to mitigate this in other ways. However, an
However, an active attacker can gain information about the set of active attacker can gain information about the set of identities an
identities an Initiator is willing to communicate with. If the Initiator is willing to communicate with. If the Initiator is
Initiator is willing to communicate with all identities except its willing to communicate with all identities except its own, an
own an attacker can determine that a guessed Initiator identity is attacker can determine that a guessed Initiator identity is correct.
correct. To not leak any long-term identifiers, using a freshly To not leak any long-term identifiers, using a freshly generated
generated authentication key as identity in each initial TOFU session authentication key as an identity in each initial TOFU session is
is RECOMMENDED. RECOMMENDED.
NIST SP 800-56A [SP-800-56A] forbids deriving secret and non-secret NIST SP 800-56A [SP-800-56A] forbids deriving secret and non-secret
randomness from the same KDF instance, but this decision has been randomness from the same Key Derivation Function (KDF) instance, but
criticized by Krawczyk [HKDFpaper] and doing so is common practice. this decision has been criticized by Krawczyk in [HKDFpaper] and
In addition to IVs, other examples are the challenge in EAP-TTLS, the doing so is common practice. In addition to IVs, other examples are
RAND in 3GPP AKAs, and the Session-Id in EAP-TLS 1.3. Note that part the challenge in Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled
of KEYSTREAM_2 is also non-secret randomness as it is known or Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS), the RAND in 3GPP Authentication
predictable to an attacker. The more recent NIST SP 800-108 and Key Agreement (AKA), and the Session-Id in EAP-TLS 1.3. Note
[SP-800-108] aligns with [HKDFpaper] and states that for a secure that part of KEYSTREAM_2 is also non-secret randomness, as it is
known or predictable to an attacker. The more recent NIST SP 800-108
[SP-800-108] aligns with [HKDFpaper] and states that, for a secure
KDF, the revelation of one portion of the derived keying material KDF, the revelation of one portion of the derived keying material
must not degrade the security of any other portion of that keying must not degrade the security of any other portion of that keying
material. material.
9.3. Cipher Suites and Cryptographic Algorithms 9.3. Cipher Suites and Cryptographic Algorithms
When using private cipher suite or registering new cipher suites, the When using a private cipher suite or registering new cipher suites,
choice of key length used in the different algorithms needs to be the choice of the key length used in the different algorithms needs
harmonized, so that a sufficient security level is maintained for to be harmonized so that a sufficient security level is maintained
authentication credentials, the EDHOC session, and the protection of for authentication credentials, the EDHOC session, and the protection
application data. The Initiator and the Responder should enforce a of application data. The Initiator and Responder should enforce a
minimum security level. minimum security level.
The output size of the EDHOC hash algorithm MUST be at least The output size of the EDHOC hash algorithm MUST be at least 256
256-bits, i.e., the hash algorithms SHA-1 and SHA-256/64 (SHA-256 bits, i.e., the hash algorithms SHA-1 and SHA-256/64 (SHA-256
truncated to 64-bits) SHALL NOT be supported for use in EDHOC except truncated to 64 bits) SHALL NOT be supported for use in EDHOC except
for certificate identification with x5t and c5t. For security for certificate identification with x5t and c5t. For security
considerations of SHA-1, see [RFC6194]. As EDHOC integrity protects considerations of SHA-1, see [RFC6194]. As EDHOC integrity protects
the whole authentication credentials, the choice of hash algorithm in all the authentication credentials, the choice of hash algorithm in
x5t and c5t does not affect security, and using the same hash x5t and c5t does not affect security and using the same hash
algorithm as in the cipher suite, but with as much truncation as algorithm as in the cipher suite, but with as much truncation as
possible, is RECOMMENDED. That is, when the EDHOC hash algorithm is possible, is RECOMMENDED. That is, when the EDHOC hash algorithm is
SHA-256, using SHA-256/64 in x5t and c5t is RECOMMENDED. The EDHOC SHA-256, using SHA-256/64 in x5t and c5t is RECOMMENDED. The EDHOC
MAC length MUST be at least 8 bytes and the tag length of the EDHOC MAC length MUST be at least 8 bytes and the tag length of the EDHOC
AEAD algorithm MUST be at least 64-bits. Note that secp256k1 is only AEAD algorithm MUST be at least 64 bits. Note that secp256k1 is only
defined for use with ECDSA and not for ECDH. Note that some COSE defined for use with ECDSA and not for ECDH. Note that some COSE
algorithms are marked as not recommended in the COSE IANA registry. algorithms are marked as not recommended in the COSE IANA registry.
9.4. Post-Quantum Considerations 9.4. Post-Quantum Considerations
As of the publication of this specification, it is unclear when or As of the publication of this specification, it is unclear when or
even if a quantum computer of sufficient size and power to exploit even if a quantum computer of sufficient size and power to exploit
public key cryptography will exist. Deployments that need to public key cryptography will exist. Deployments that need to
consider risks decades into the future should transition to Post- consider risks decades into the future should transition to Post-
Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the not-too-distant future. Many other Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the not-too-distant future. Many other
systems should take a slower wait-and-see approach where PQC is systems should take a slower wait-and-see approach where PQC is
phased in when the quantum threat is more imminent. Current PQC phased in when the quantum threat is more imminent. Current PQC
algorithms have limitations compared to Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithms have limitations compared to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) and the data sizes would be problematic in many constrained IoT (ECC), and the data sizes would be problematic in many constrained
systems. IoT systems.
Symmetric algorithms used in EDHOC such as SHA-256 and AES-CCM- Symmetric algorithms used in EDHOC, such as SHA-256 and AES-CCM-
16-64-128 are practically secure against even large quantum 16-64-128, are practically secure against even large quantum
computers. Two of NIST's security levels for quantum-resistant computers. Two of NIST's security levels for quantum-resistant
public-key cryptography are based on AES-128 and SHA-256. Quantum public key cryptography are based on AES-128 and SHA-256. A quantum
computer will likely be expensive, slow due to heavy error computer will likely be expensive and slow due to heavy error
correction, and Grover’s algorithm, which is proven to be optimal, correction. Grover's algorithm, which is proven to be optimal,
cannot effectively be parallelized. Grover’s algorithm will provide cannot effectively be parallelized. It will provide little or no
little or no advantage in attacking AES, and AES-128 will remain advantage in attacking AES, and AES-128 will remain secure for
secure for decades to come [NISTPQC]. decades to come [NISTPQC].
EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE, including EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by COSE, including
PQC signature algorithms such as HSS-LMS. EDHOC is currently only PQC signature algorithms such as HSS-LMS. EDHOC is currently only
specified for use with key exchange algorithms of type ECDH curves, specified for use with key exchange algorithms of type ECDH curves,
but any Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), including PQC KEMs, can be but any Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), including PQC KEMs, can be
used in method 0. While the key exchange in method 0 is specified used in method 0. While the key exchange in method 0 is specified
with terms of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the key exchange adheres with the terms of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the key exchange
to a KEM interface: G_X is then the public key of the Initiator, G_Y adheres to a KEM interface: G_X is then the public key of the
is the encapsulation, and G_XY is the shared secret. Use of PQC KEMs Initiator, G_Y is the encapsulation, and G_XY is the shared secret.
to replace static DH authentication would likely require a Use of PQC KEMs to replace static DH authentication would likely
specification updating EDHOC with new methods. require a specification updating EDHOC with new methods.
9.5. Unprotected Data and Privacy 9.5. Unprotected Data and Privacy
The Initiator and the Responder must make sure that unprotected data The Initiator and Responder must make sure that unprotected data and
and metadata do not reveal any sensitive information. This also metadata do not reveal any sensitive information. This also applies
applies for encrypted data sent to an unauthenticated party. In for encrypted data sent to an unauthenticated party. In particular,
particular, it applies to EAD_1, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, and error it applies to EAD_1, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, and error messages. Using the
messages. Using the same EAD_1 in several EDHOC sessions allows same EAD_1 in several EDHOC sessions allows passive eavesdroppers to
passive eavesdroppers to correlate the different sessions. Note that correlate the different sessions. Note that even if ead_value is
even if ead_value is encrypted outside of EDHOC, the ead_labels in encrypted outside of EDHOC, the ead_labels in EAD_1 is revealed to
EAD_1 is revealed to passive attackers and the ead_labels in EAD_2 is passive attackers and the ead_labels in EAD_2 is revealed to active
revealed to active attackers. Another consideration is that the list attackers. Another consideration is that the list of supported
of supported cipher suites may potentially be used to identify the cipher suites may potentially be used to identify the application.
application. The Initiator and the Responder must also make sure The Initiator and Responder must also make sure that unauthenticated
that unauthenticated data does not trigger any harmful actions. In data does not trigger any harmful actions. In particular, this
particular, this applies to EAD_1 and error messages. applies to EAD_1 and error messages.
An attacker observing network traffic may use connection identifiers An attacker observing network traffic may use connection identifiers
sent in clear in EDHOC or the subsequent application protocol to sent in clear in EDHOC or the subsequent application protocol to
correlate packets sent on different paths or at different times. The correlate packets sent on different paths or at different times. The
attacker may use this information for traffic flow analysis or to attacker may use this information for traffic flow analysis or to
track an endpoint. Application protocols using connection track an endpoint. Application protocols using connection
identifiers from EDHOC SHOULD provide mechanisms to update the identifiers from EDHOC SHOULD provide mechanisms to update the
connection identifiers and MAY provide mechanisms to issue several connection identifiers and MAY provide mechanisms to issue several
simultaneously active connection identifiers. See [RFC9000] for a simultaneously active connection identifiers. See [RFC9000] for a
non-constrained example of such mechanisms. Connection identifiers non-constrained example of such mechanisms. Connection identifiers
can e.g., be chosen randomly among the set of unused 1-byte can, e.g., be chosen randomly among the set of unused 1-byte
connection identifiers. Connection identity privacy mechanisms are connection identifiers. Connection identity privacy mechanisms are
only useful when there are not fixed identifiers such as IP address only useful when there are not fixed identifiers, such as IP address
or MAC address in the lower layers. or MAC address in the lower layers.
9.6. Updated Internet Threat Model Considerations 9.6. Updated Internet Threat Model Considerations
Since the publication of [RFC3552] there has been an increased Since the publication of [RFC3552], there has been an increased
awareness of the need to protect against endpoints that are awareness of the need to protect against endpoints that are
compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not align with compromised or malicious or whose interests simply do not align with
the interests of users the interests of users [THREAT-MODEL-GUIDANCE]. [RFC7624] describes
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance]. [RFC7624] describes an updated threat model for Internet confidentiality; see
an updated threat model for Internet confidentiality, see Section 9.1. [THREAT-MODEL-GUIDANCE] further expands the threat
Section 9.1. [I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance] further model. Implementations and users should take these threat models
expands the threat model. Implementations and users should take into account and consider actions to reduce the risk of tracking by
these threat models into account and consider actions to reduce the other endpoints. In particular, even data sent protected to the
risk of tracking by other endpoints. In particular, even data sent other endpoint, such as ID_CRED fields and EAD fields, can be used
protected to the other endpoint such as ID_CRED fields and EAD fields for tracking; see Section 2.7 of [THREAT-MODEL-GUIDANCE].
can be used for tracking, see Section 2.7 of
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance].
The fields ID_CRED_I, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4 have The fields ID_CRED_I, ID_CRED_R, EAD_2, EAD_3, and EAD_4 have
variable length, and information regarding the length may leak to an variable length, and information regarding the length may leak to an
attacker. A passive attacker may, e.g., be able to differentiate attacker. A passive attacker may, e.g., be able to differentiate
endpoints using identifiers of different length. To mitigate this endpoints using identifiers of different length. To mitigate this
information leakage an implementation may ensure that the fields have information leakage, an implementation may ensure that the fields
fixed length or use padding. An implementation may, e.g., only use have a fixed length or use padding. An implementation may, e.g.,
fixed length identifiers like 'kid' of length 1. Alternatively, only use fixed length identifiers like 'kid' of length 1.
padding may be used (see Section 3.8.1) to hide the true length of, Alternatively, padding may be used (see Section 3.8.1) to hide the
e.g., certificates by value in 'x5chain' or 'c5c'. true length of, e.g., certificates by value in 'x5chain' or 'c5c'.
9.7. Denial-of-Service 9.7. Denial of Service
EDHOC itself does not provide countermeasures against denial-of- EDHOC itself does not provide countermeasures against denial-of-
service attacks. In particular, by sending a number of new or service attacks. In particular, by sending a number of new or
replayed message_1 an attacker may cause the Responder to allocate replayed message_1, an attacker may cause the Responder to allocate
state, perform cryptographic operations, and amplify messages. To the state, perform cryptographic operations, and amplify messages.
mitigate such attacks, an implementation SHOULD make use of available To mitigate such attacks, an implementation SHOULD make use of
lower layer mechanisms. For instance, when EDHOC is transferred as available lower layer mechanisms. For instance, when EDHOC is
an exchange of CoAP messages, the CoAP server can use the Echo option transferred as an exchange of CoAP messages, the CoAP server can use
defined in [RFC9175] which forces the CoAP client to demonstrate the Echo option defined in [RFC9175], which forces the CoAP client to
reachability at its apparent network address. To avoid an additional demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. To avoid
roundtrip the Initiator can reduce the amplification factor by an additional round trip, the Initiator can reduce the amplification
padding message_1, i.e., using EAD_1, see Section 3.8.1. Note that factor by padding message_1, i.e., using EAD_1; see Section 3.8.1.
while the Echo option mitigates some resource exhaustion aspects of Note that while the Echo option mitigates some resource exhaustion
spoofing, it does not protect against a distributed denial-of-service aspects of spoofing, it does not protect against a distributed
attack made by real, potentially compromised, clients. Similarly, denial-of-service attack made by real, potentially compromised,
limiting amplification only reduces the impact, which still may be clients. Similarly, limiting amplification only reduces the impact,
significant because of a large number of clients engaged in the which still may be significant because of a large number of clients
attack. engaged in the attack.
An attacker can also send faked message_2, message_3, message_4, or An attacker can also send a faked message_2, message_3, message_4, or
error in an attempt to trick the receiving party to send an error error in an attempt to trick the receiving party to send an error
message and abort the EDHOC session. EDHOC implementations MAY message and abort the EDHOC session. EDHOC implementations MAY
evaluate if a received message is likely to have been forged by an evaluate if a received message is likely to have been forged by an
attacker and ignore it without sending an error message or aborting attacker and ignore it without sending an error message or aborting
the EDHOC session. the EDHOC session.
9.8. Implementation Considerations 9.8. Implementation Considerations
The availability of a secure random number generator is essential for The availability of a secure random number generator is essential for
the security of EDHOC. If no true random number generator is the security of EDHOC. If no true random number generator is
available, a random seed MUST be provided from an external source and available, a random seed MUST be provided from an external source and
used with a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator. used with a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator.
As each pseudorandom number must only be used once, an implementation As each pseudorandom number must only be used once, an implementation
needs to get a unique input to the pseudorandom number generator needs to get a unique input to the pseudorandom number generator
after reboot, or continuously store state in nonvolatile memory. after reboot or continuously store state in nonvolatile memory.
Appendix B.1.1 in [RFC8613] describes issues and solution approaches Appendix B.1.1 of [RFC8613] describes issues and solution approaches
for writing to nonvolatile memory. Intentionally or unintentionally for writing to nonvolatile memory. Intentionally or unintentionally
weak or predictable pseudorandom number generators can be abused or weak or predictable pseudorandom number generators can be abused or
exploited for malicious purposes. [RFC8937] describes a way for exploited for malicious purposes. [RFC8937] describes a way for
security protocol implementations to augment their (pseudo)random security protocol implementations to augment their (pseudo)random
number generators using a long-term private key and a deterministic number generators using a long-term private key and a deterministic
signature function. This improves randomness from broken or signature function. This improves randomness from broken or
otherwise subverted random number generators. The same idea can be otherwise subverted random number generators. The same idea can be
used with other secrets and functions such as a Diffie-Hellman used with other secrets and functions, such as a Diffie-Hellman
function or a symmetric secret and a PRF like HMAC or KMAC. It is function or a symmetric secret, and a PRF like HMAC or KMAC. It is
RECOMMENDED to not trust a single source of randomness and to not put RECOMMENDED to not trust a single source of randomness and to not put
unaugmented random numbers on the wire. unaugmented random numbers on the wire.
For many constrained IoT devices it is problematic to support several For many constrained IoT devices, it is problematic to support
crypto primitives. Existing devices can be expected to support several crypto primitives. Existing devices can be expected to
either ECDSA or EdDSA. If ECDSA is supported, "deterministic ECDSA" support either ECDSA or Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
as specified in [RFC6979] MAY be used. Pure deterministic elliptic- (EdDSA). If ECDSA is supported, "deterministic ECDSA", as specified
curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have gained in [RFC6979], MAY be used. Pure deterministic elliptic-curve
popularity over randomized ECDSA as their security do not depend on a signatures, such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA, have gained
source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however found popularity over randomized ECDSA as their security does not depend on
that implementations of these signature algorithms may be vulnerable a source of high-quality randomness. Recent research has however
to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to their found that implementations of these signature algorithms may be
determinism. See e.g., Section 1 of vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault injection attacks due to
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise] for a list of attack papers. As their determinism. For example, see Section 1 of [HEDGED-ECC-SIGS]
suggested in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9053] this can be addressed by for a list of attack papers. As suggested in Section 2.1.1 of
combining randomness and determinism. [RFC9053], this can be addressed by combining randomness and
determinism.
Appendix D of [I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations] describes how Appendix D of [CURVE-REPR] describes how Montgomery curves, such as
Montgomery curves such as X25519 and X448 and (twisted) Edwards X25519 and X448, and (twisted) Edwards curves, such as Ed25519 and
curves as curves such as Ed25519 and Ed448 can be mapped to and from Ed448, can be mapped to and from short-Weierstrass form for
short-Weierstrass form for implementation on platforms that implementations on platforms that accelerate elliptic curve group
accelerate elliptic curve group operations in short-Weierstrass form. operations in short-Weierstrass form.
All private keys, symmetric keys, and IVs MUST be secret. Only the All private keys, symmetric keys, and IVs MUST be secret. Only the
Responder SHALL have access to the Responder's private authentication Responder SHALL have access to the Responder's private authentication
key and only the Initiator SHALL have access to the Initiator's key, and only the Initiator SHALL have access to the Initiator's
private authentication key. Implementations should provide private authentication key. Implementations should provide
countermeasures to side-channel attacks such as timing attacks. countermeasures to side-channel attacks, such as timing attacks.
Intermediate computed values such as ephemeral ECDH keys and ECDH Intermediate computed values, such as ephemeral ECDH keys and ECDH
shared secrets MUST be deleted after key derivation is completed. shared secrets, MUST be deleted after key derivation is completed.
The Initiator and the Responder are responsible for verifying the The Initiator and Responder are responsible for verifying the
integrity and validity of certificates. Verification of validity may integrity and validity of certificates. Verification of validity may
require the use of a Real-Time Clock (RTC). The selection of trusted require the use of a Real-Time Clock (RTC). The selection of trusted
CAs should be done very carefully and certificate revocation should certification authorities (CAs) should be done very carefully and
be supported. The choice of revocation mechanism is left to the certificate revocation should be supported. The choice of revocation
application. For example, in case of X.509 certificates, Certificate mechanism is left to the application. For example, in case of X.509
Revocation Lists [RFC5280] or OCSP [RFC6960] may be used. certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists [RFC5280] or the Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960] may be used.
Similar considerations as for certificates are needed for CWT/CCS. Similar considerations as for certificates are needed for CWT/CCS.
The endpoints are responsible for verifying the integrity and The endpoints are responsible for verifying the integrity and
validity of CWT/CCS, and to handle revocation. The application needs validity of CWT/CCS and to handle revocation. The application needs
to determine what trust anchors are relevant, and have a well-defined to determine what trust anchors are relevant and have a well-defined
trust-establishment process. A self-signed certificate/CWT or CCS trust-establishment process. A self-signed certificate / CWT or CCS
appearing in the protocol cannot be a trigger to modify the set of appearing in the protocol cannot be a trigger to modify the set of
trust anchors. One common way for a new trust anchor to be added to trust anchors. One common way for a new trust anchor to be added to
(or removed from) a device is by means firmware upgrade. See (or removed from) a device is by means firmware upgrade. See
[RFC9360] for a longer discussion on trust and validation in [RFC9360] for a longer discussion on trust and validation in
constrained devices. constrained devices.
Just like for certificates, the contents of the COSE header Just like for certificates, the contents of the COSE header
parameters 'kcwt' and 'kccs' defined in Section 10.6 must be parameters 'kcwt' and 'kccs' defined in Section 10.6 must be
processed as untrusted input. Endpoints that intend to rely on the processed as untrusted inputs. Endpoints that intend to rely on the
assertions made by a CWT/CCS obtained from any of these methods need assertions made by a CWT/CCS obtained from any of these methods need
to validate the contents. For 'kccs', which enables transport of raw to validate the contents. For 'kccs', which enables transport of raw
public keys, the data structure used does not include any protection public keys, the data structure used does not include any protection
or verification data. 'kccs' may be used for unauthenticated or verification data. 'kccs' may be used for unauthenticated
operations, e.g. trust on first use, with the limitations and caveats operations, e.g., trust on first use, with the limitations and
entailed, see Appendix D.5. caveats entailed; see Appendix D.5.
The Initiator and the Responder are allowed to select the connection The Initiator and Responder are allowed to select connection
identifier C_I and C_R, respectively, for the other party to use in identifiers C_I and C_R, respectively, for the other party to use in
the ongoing EDHOC session as well as in a subsequent application the ongoing EDHOC session as well as in a subsequent application
protocol (e.g., OSCORE [RFC8613]). The choice of connection protocol (e.g., OSCORE [RFC8613]). The choice of the connection
identifier is not security critical in EDHOC but intended to simplify identifier is not security critical in EDHOC but intended to simplify
the retrieval of the right security context in combination with using the retrieval of the right security context in combination with using
short identifiers. If the wrong connection identifier of the other short identifiers. If the wrong connection identifier of the other
party is used in a protocol message it will result in the receiving party is used in a protocol message, it will result in the receiving
party not being able to retrieve a security context (which will abort party not being able to retrieve a security context (which will abort
the EDHOC session) or retrieve the wrong security context (which also the EDHOC session) or retrieve the wrong security context (which also
aborts the EDHOC session as the message cannot be verified). aborts the EDHOC session as the message cannot be verified).
If two nodes unintentionally initiate two simultaneous EDHOC sessions If two nodes unintentionally initiate two simultaneous EDHOC sessions
with each other even if they only want to complete a single EDHOC with each other, even if they only want to complete a single EDHOC
session, they MAY abort the EDHOC session with the lexicographically session, they MAY abort the EDHOC session with the lexicographically
smallest G_X. Note that in cases where several EDHOC sessions with smallest G_X. Note that in cases where several EDHOC sessions with
different parameter sets (method, COSE headers, etc.) are used, an different parameter sets (method, COSE headers, etc.) are used, an
attacker can affect which parameter set will be used by blocking some attacker can affect which parameter set will be used by blocking some
of the parameter sets. of the parameter sets.
If supported by the device, it is RECOMMENDED that at least the long- If supported by the device, it is RECOMMENDED that at least the long-
term private keys are stored in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE, term private keys are stored in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
see for example [RFC9397]) and that sensitive operations using these (for example, see [RFC9397]) and that sensitive operations using
keys are performed inside the TEE. To achieve even higher security these keys are performed inside the TEE. To achieve even higher
it is RECOMMENDED that additional operations such as ephemeral key security, it is RECOMMENDED that additional operations such as
generation, all computations of shared secrets, and storage of the ephemeral key generation, all computations of shared secrets, and
PRK keys can be done inside the TEE. The use of a TEE aims at storage of the PRK keys can be done inside the TEE. The use of a TEE
preventing code within that environment to be tampered with, and aims at preventing code within that environment to be tampered with
preventing data used by such code to be read or tampered with by code and preventing data used by such code to be read or tampered with by
outside that environment. code outside that environment.
Note that HKDF-Expand has a relatively small maximum output length of Note that HKDF-Expand has a relatively small maximum output length of
255 ⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the output size in bytes of 255 ⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the output size in bytes of
the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. This means the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. This means
that when SHA-256 is used as hash algorithm, PLAINTEXT_2 cannot be that when SHA-256 is used as a hash algorithm, PLAINTEXT_2 cannot be
longer than 8160 bytes. This is probably not a limitation for most longer than 8160 bytes. This is probably not a limitation for most
intended applications, but to be able to support for example long intended applications, but to be able to support, for example, long
certificate chains or large external authorization data, there is a certificate chains or large external authorization data, there is a
backwards compatible method specified in Appendix G. backwards compatible method specified in Appendix G.
The sequence of transcript hashes in EDHOC (TH_2, TH_3, TH_4) does The sequence of transcript hashes in EDHOC (TH_2, TH_3, and TH_4)
not make use of a so-called running hash. This is a design choice as does not make use of a so-called running hash. This is a design
running hashes are often not supported on constrained platforms. choice, as running hashes are often not supported on constrained
platforms.
When parsing a received EDHOC message, implementations MUST abort the When parsing a received EDHOC message, implementations MUST abort the
EDHOC session if the message does not comply with the CDDL for that EDHOC session if the message does not comply with the CDDL for that
message. Implementations are not required to support non- message. Implementations are not required to support non-
deterministic encodings and MAY abort the EDHOC session if the deterministic encodings and MAY abort the EDHOC session if the
received EDHOC message is not encoded using deterministic CBOR. received EDHOC message is not encoded using deterministic CBOR.
Implementations MUST abort the EDHOC session if validation of a Implementations MUST abort the EDHOC session if validation of a
received public key fails or if any cryptographic field has the wrong received public key fails or if any cryptographic field has the wrong
length. length. It is RECOMMENDED to abort the EDHOC session if the received
EDHOC message is not encoded using deterministic CBOR.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This Section gives IANA Considerations and, unless otherwise noted, This section gives IANA considerations and, unless otherwise noted,
conforms with [RFC8126]. conforms with [RFC8126].
10.1. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry 10.1. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry under the new registry IANA has created a new registry under the new registry group
group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows: "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Registry Name: EDHOC Exporter Label
Reference: [[this document]]
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| Label | Description | Reference |
+=============+==============================+===================+
| 0 | Derived OSCORE Master Secret | [[this document]] |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| 1 | Derived OSCORE Master Salt | [[this document]] |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| 2-22 | Unassigned | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| 23 | Reserved | [[this document]] |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| 24-32767 | Unassigned | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
| 32768-65535 | Private Use | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-------------------+
Figure 13: EDHOC exporter label.
+-------------+-------------------------------------+
| Range | Registration Procedures |
+=============+=====================================+
| 0 to 23 | Standards Action |
+-------------+-------------------------------------+
| 24 to 32767 | Expert Review |
+-------------+-------------------------------------+
10.2. EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry under the new registry
group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Registry Name: EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry Name: EDHOC Exporter Labels
Reference: [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
The columns of the registry are Value, Array and Description, where +=============+==============================+===========+
Value is an integer and the other columns are text strings. The | Label | Description | Reference |
initial contents of the registry are: +=============+==============================+===========+
| 0 | Derived OSCORE Master Secret | RFC 9528 |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 1 | Derived OSCORE Master Salt | RFC 9528 |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 2-22 | Unassigned | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 23 | Reserved | RFC 9528 |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 24-32767 | Unassigned | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
| 32768-65535 | Reserved for Private Use | |
+-------------+------------------------------+-----------+
Value: -24 Table 4: EDHOC Exporter Labels
Array: N/A
Description: Private Use
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: -23 This registry also has a "Change Controller" field. For
Array: N/A registrations made by IETF documents, the IETF is listed.
Description: Private Use
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: -22
Array: N/A
Description: Private Use
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: -21 +=============+=========================+
Array: N/A | Range | Registration Procedures |
Description: Private Use +=============+=========================+
Reference: [[this document]] | 0-23 | Standards Action |
+-------------+-------------------------+
| 24-32767 | Expert Review |
+-------------+-------------------------+
| 32768-65535 | Private Use |
+-------------+-------------------------+
Value: 0 Table 5: Registration Procedures for
Array: 10, -16, 8, 4, -8, 10, -16 EDHOC Exporter Labels
Description: AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, X25519, EdDSA,
AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 1 10.2. EDHOC Cipher Suites Registry
Array: 30, -16, 16, 4, -8, 10, -16
Description: AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA,
AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 2 IANA has created a new registry under the new registry group
Array: 10, -16, 8, 1, -7, 10, -16 "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Description: AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256,
AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 3 Registry Name: EDHOC Cipher Suites
Array: 30, -16, 16, 1, -7, 10, -16
Description: AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256,
AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 4 Reference: RFC 9528
Array: 24, -16, 16, 4, -8, 24, -16
Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA,
ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 5 The columns of the registry are Value, Array, Description, and
Array: 24, -16, 16, 1, -7, 24, -16 Reference, where Value is an integer and the other columns are text
Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, strings. The initial contents of the registry are:
ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 6
Array: 1, -16, 16, 4, -7, 1, -16
Description: A128GCM, SHA-256, 16, X25519, ES256,
A128GCM, SHA-256
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 23 +=======+================+=============================+===========+
Reserved | Value | Array | Description | Reference |
Reference: [[this document]] +=======+================+=============================+===========+
| -24 | N/A | Private Use | RFC 9528 |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| -23 | N/A | Private Use | RFC 9528 |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| -22 | N/A | Private Use | RFC 9528 |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| -21 | N/A | Private Use | RFC 9528 |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 0 | 10, -16, 8, 4, | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, | RFC 9528 |
| | -8, 10, -16 | 8, X25519, EdDSA, | |
| | | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 1 | 30, -16, 16, | AES-CCM-16-128-128, | RFC 9528 |
| | 4, -8, 10, -16 | SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA, | |
| | | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 2 | 10, -16, 8, 1, | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, | RFC 9528 |
| | -7, 10, -16 | 8, P-256, ES256, | |
| | | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 3 | 30, -16, 16, | AES-CCM-16-128-128, | RFC 9528 |
| | 1, -7, 10, -16 | SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, | |
| | | AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 4 | 24, -16, 16, | ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, | RFC 9528 |
| | 4, -8, 24, -16 | 16, X25519, EdDSA, | |
| | | ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 5 | 24, -16, 16, | ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256, | RFC 9528 |
| | 1, -7, 24, -16 | 16, P-256, ES256, | |
| | | ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 6 | 1, -16, 16, 4, | A128GCM, SHA-256, 16, | RFC 9528 |
| | -7, 1, -16 | X25519, ES256, A128GCM, | |
| | | SHA-256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 23 | Reserved | | RFC 9528 |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 24 | 3, -43, 16, 2, | A256GCM, SHA-384, 16, | RFC 9528 |
| | -35, 3, -43 | P-384, ES384, A256GCM, | |
| | | SHA-384 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 25 | 24, -45, 16, | ChaCha20/Poly1305, | RFC 9528 |
| | 5, -8, 24, -45 | SHAKE256, 16, X448, EdDSA, | |
| | | ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256 | |
+-------+----------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
Value: 24 Table 6: EDHOC Cipher Suites
Array: 3, -43, 16, 2, -35, 3, -43
Description: A256GCM, SHA-384, 16, P-384, ES384,
A256GCM, SHA-384
Reference: [[this document]]
Value: 25 +===============+=====================================+
Array: 24, -45, 16, 5, -8, 24, -45 | Range | Registration Procedures |
Description: ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256, 16, X448, EdDSA, +===============+=====================================+
ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256 | -65536 to -25 | Specification Required |
Reference: [[this document]] +---------------+-------------------------------------+
| -24 to -21 | Private Use |
+---------------+-------------------------------------+
| -20 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review |
+---------------+-------------------------------------+
| 24 to 65535 | Specification Required |
+---------------+-------------------------------------+
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ Table 7: Registration Procedures for EDHOC Cipher
| Range | Registration Procedures | Suites
+================+=====================================+
| -65536 to -25 | Specification Required |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+
| -20 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+
| 24 to 65535 | Specification Required |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+
10.3. EDHOC Method Type Registry 10.3. EDHOC Method Type Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry under the new registry IANA has created a new registry under the new registry group
group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows: "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Registry Name: EDHOC Method Type Registry Name: EDHOC Method Types
Reference: [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
The columns of the registry are Value, Initiator Authentication Key, The columns of the registry are Value, Initiator Authentication Key,
and Responder Authentication Key, and Reference, where Value is an Responder Authentication Key, and Reference, where Value is an
integer and the key columns are text strings describing the integer and the key columns are text strings describing the
authentication keys. authentication keys.
The initial contents of the registry are shown in Figure 4. Method The initial contents of the registry are shown in Table 2. Method 23
23 is Reserved. is Reserved.
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +===============+=====================================+
| Range | Registration Procedures | | Range | Registration Procedures |
+================+=====================================+ +===============+=====================================+
| -65536 to -25 | Specification Required | | -65536 to -25 | Specification Required |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------------------+
| -24 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review | | -24 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------------------+
| 24 to 65535 | Specification Required | | 24 to 65535 | Specification Required |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------------------+
Table 8: Registration Procedures for EDHOC Method Types
10.4. EDHOC Error Codes Registry 10.4. EDHOC Error Codes Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry under the new registry IANA has created a new registry under the new registry group
group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows: "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Registry Name: EDHOC Error Codes Registry Name: EDHOC Error Codes
Reference: [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
The columns of the registry are ERR_CODE, ERR_INFO Type, Description, The columns of the registry are ERR_CODE, ERR_INFO Type, Description,
and Reference, where ERR_CODE is an integer, ERR_INFO is a CDDL Change Controller, and Reference, where ERR_CODE is an integer,
defined type, and Description is a text string. The initial contents ERR_INFO is a CDDL defined type, and Description is a text string.
of the registry are shown in Figure 10. Error code 23 is Reserved. The initial contents of the registry are shown in Table 3. Error
code 23 is Reserved. This registry also has a "Change Controller"
field. For registrations made by IETF documents, the IETF is listed.
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +===============+=========================+
| Range | Registration Procedures | | Range | Registration Procedures |
+================+=====================================+ +===============+=========================+
| -65536 to -25 | Expert Review | | -65536 to -25 | Expert Review |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------+
| -24 to 23 | Standards Action | | -24 to 23 | Standards Action |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------+
| 24 to 65535 | Expert Review | | 24 to 65535 | Expert Review |
+----------------+-------------------------------------+ +---------------+-------------------------+
Table 9: Registration Procedures for
EDHOC Error Codes
10.5. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry 10.5. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry under the new registry IANA has created a new registry under the new registry group
group "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows: "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" as follows:
Registry Name: EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry Name: EDHOC External Authorization Data
Reference: [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
The columns of the registry are Name, Label, Description, and The columns of the registry are Name, Label, Description, and
Reference, where Label is a non-negative integer and the other Reference, where Label is a nonnegative integer and the other columns
columns are text strings. The initial contents of the registry is are text strings. The initial contents of the registry are shown in
shown in Figure 14. EAD label 23 is Reserved. Table 10. EAD label 23 is Reserved.
+-----------+-------+------------------------+-------------------+ +=========+=======+====================+===============+
| Name | Label | Description | Reference | | Name | Label | Description | Reference |
+===========+=======+========================+===================+ +=========+=======+====================+===============+
| Padding | 0 | Randomly generated | [[this document]] | | Padding | 0 | Randomly generated | RFC 9528, |
| | | CBOR byte string | Section 3.8.1 | | | | CBOR byte string | Section 3.8.1 |
+-----------+-------+------------------------+-------------------+ +---------+-------+--------------------+---------------+
| | 23 | Reserved | RFC 9528 |
+---------+-------+--------------------+---------------+
Figure 14: EAD labels. Table 10: EDHOC EAD Labels
+-------------+-------------------------------------+ +=============+=====================================+
| Range | Registration Procedures | | Range | Registration Procedures |
+=============+=====================================+ +=============+=====================================+
| 0 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review | | 0 to 23 | Standards Action with Expert Review |
+-------------+-------------------------------------+ +-------------+-------------------------------------+
| 24 to 65535 | Specification Required | | 24 to 65535 | Specification Required |
+-------------+-------------------------------------+ +-------------+-------------------------------------+
Table 11: Registration procedures for EDHOC EAD
Labels
10.6. COSE Header Parameters Registry 10.6. COSE Header Parameters Registry
IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "COSE IANA has registered the following entries in the "COSE Header
Header Parameters" registry under the registry group "CBOR Object Parameters" registry under the registry group "CBOR Object Signing
Signing and Encryption (COSE)" (see Figure 15): The value of the and Encryption (COSE)" (see Table 12). The value of the 'kcwt'
'kcwt' header parameter is a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392], and the header parameter is a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392], and the value
value of the 'kccs' header parameter is a CWT Claims Set (CCS), see of the 'kccs' header parameter is a CWT Claims Set (CCS); see
Section 1.4. The CWT/CCS must contain a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim Section 1.4. The CWT/CCS must contain a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim
[RFC8747]. The Value Registry for this item is empty and omitted [RFC8747]. The Value Registry column for this item is empty and
from the table below. omitted from the table below.
+------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ +======+=======+===============+===============================+
| Name | Label | Value Type | Description | | Name | Label | Value Type | Description |
+======+=======+===============+====================================+ +======+=======+===============+===============================+
| kcwt | TBD1 | COSE_Messages | A CBOR Web Token (CWT) containing | | kcwt | 13 | COSE_Messages | A CBOR Web Token (CWT) |
| | | | a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim and | | | | | containing a COSE_Key in a |
| | | | possibly other claims. CWT is | | | | | 'cnf' claim and possibly |
| | | | defined in RFC 8392. COSE_Messages | | | | | other claims. CWT is defined |
| | | | is defined in RFC 9052. | | | | | in RFC 8392. COSE_Messages |
+------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | is defined in RFC 9052. |
| kccs | TBD2 | map | A CWT Claims Set (CCS) containing | +------+-------+---------------+-------------------------------+
| | | | a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim and | | kccs | 14 | map | A CWT Claims Set (CCS) |
| | | | possibly other claims. CCS is | | | | | containing a COSE_Key in a |
| | | | defined in RFC 8392. | | | | | 'cnf' claim and possibly |
+------+-------+---------------+------------------------------------+ | | | | other claims. CCS is defined |
| | | | in RFC 8392. |
+------+-------+---------------+-------------------------------+
Figure 15: COSE header parameter labels. Table 12: COSE Header Parameter Labels
10.7. The Well-Known URI Registry 10.7. Well-Known URI Registry
IANA is requested to add the well-known URI "edhoc" to the "Well- IANA has added the well-known URI "edhoc" to the "Well-Known URIs"
Known URIs" registry. registry.
* URI suffix: edhoc URI Suffix: edhoc
* Change controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
* Specification document(s): [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
* Related information: None Related Information: None
10.8. Media Types Registry 10.8. Media Types Registry
IANA is requested to add the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" IANA has added the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" and
and "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "Media Types" registry. "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "Media Types" registry.
10.8.1. application/edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration 10.8.1. application/edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration
* Type name: application Type name: application
* Subtype name: edhoc+cbor-seq Subtype name: edhoc+cbor-seq
* Required parameters: N/A Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: binary Encoding considerations: binary
* Security considerations: See Section 7 of this document. Security considerations: See Section 7 of RFC 9528.
* Interoperability considerations: N/A Interoperability considerations: N/A
* Published specification: [[this document]] (this document) Published specification: RFC 9528
* Applications that use this media type: To be identified Applications that use this media type: To be identified
* Fragment identifier considerations: N/A Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
* Additional information: Additional information:
- Magic number(s): N/A Magic number(s): N/A
- File extension(s): N/A File extension(s): N/A
- Macintosh file type code(s): N/A Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
* Person & email address to contact for further information: See Person & email address to contact for further information: See
"Authors' Addresses" section. "Authors' Addresses" section in RFC 9528.
* Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: N/A Restrictions on usage: N/A
* Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section. Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section.
* Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IETF
10.8.2. application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration 10.8.2. application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq Media Type Registration
* Type name: application Type name: application
* Subtype name: cid-edhoc+cbor-seq Subtype name: cid-edhoc+cbor-seq
* Required parameters: N/A Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: binary Encoding considerations: binary
* Security considerations: See Section 7 of this document. Security considerations: See Section 7 of RFC 9528.
* Interoperability considerations: N/A Interoperability considerations: N/A
* Published specification: [[this document]] (this document) Published specification: RFC 9528
* Applications that use this media type: To be identified Applications that use this media type: To be identified
* Fragment identifier considerations: N/A Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
* Additional information: Additional information:
- Magic number(s): N/A Magic number(s): N/A
- File extension(s): N/A File extension(s): N/A
- Macintosh file type code(s): N/A Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
* Person & email address to contact for further information: See Person & email address to contact for further information: See
"Authors' Addresses" section. "Authors' Addresses" section in RFC 9528.
* Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: N/A Restrictions on usage: N/A
* Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section.
* Change Controller: IESG Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section.
Change Controller: IETF
10.9. CoAP Content-Formats Registry 10.9. CoAP Content-Formats Registry
IANA is requested to add the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" IANA has added the media types "application/edhoc+cbor-seq" and
and "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq" to the "CoAP Content-Formats"
registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments
(CoRE) Parameters". (CoRE) Parameters".
+--------------------------------+----------+------+-------------------+ +================================+================+====+===========+
| Media Type | Encoding | ID | Reference | | Content Type | Content Coding | ID | Reference |
+================================+==========+======+===================+ +================================+================+====+===========+
| application/edhoc+cbor-seq | - | TBD5 | [[this document]] | | application/edhoc+cbor-seq | - | 64 | RFC 9528 |
| application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | - | TBD6 | [[this document]] | +--------------------------------+----------------+----+-----------+
+--------------------------------+----------+------+-------------------+ | application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | - | 65 | RFC 9528 |
+--------------------------------+----------------+----+-----------+
Figure 16: CoAP Content-Format IDs Table 13: CoAP Content-Format IDs
10.10. Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry 10.10. Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry
IANA is requested to add the resource type "core.edhoc" to the IANA has added the resource type "core.edhoc" to the "Resource Type
"Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" registry under the registry group
registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters". "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters".
* Value: "core.edhoc" Value: "core.edhoc"
* Description: EDHOC resource. Description: EDHOC resource.
* Reference: [[this document]] Reference: RFC 9528
10.11. Expert Review Instructions 10.11. Expert Review Instructions
The IANA Registries established in this document are defined as The IANA registries established in this document are defined as
"Expert Review", "Specification Required" or "Standards Action with "Expert Review", "Specification Required", or "Standards Action with
Expert Review". This section gives some general guidelines for what Expert Review". This section gives some general guidelines for what
the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as
experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude. experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.
Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points: Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:
* Clarity and correctness of registrations. Experts are expected to * The clarity and correctness of registrations. Experts are
check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested entries. expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested
Expert needs to make sure the values of algorithms are taken from entries. Expert needs to make sure the values of algorithms are
the right registry, when that is required. Experts should taken from the right registry when that is required. Experts
consider requesting an opinion on the correctness of registered should consider requesting an opinion on the correctness of
parameters from relevant IETF working groups. Encodings that do registered parameters from relevant IETF working groups.
not meet these objective of clarity and completeness should not be Encodings that do not meet these objectives of clarity and
registered. completeness should not be registered.
* Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when * The expected usage of fields when approving code point assignment.
approving code point assignment. The length of the encoded value The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many
should be weighed against how many code points of that length are code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be
left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that
code points left that encode to that size. size.
* Even for "Expert Review" specifications are recommended. When * The fact that even "Expert Review" specifications are recommended.
specifications are not provided for a request where Expert Review When specifications are not provided for a request where Expert
is the assignment policy, the description provided needs to have Review is the assignment policy, the description provided needs to
sufficient information to verify the code points above. have sufficient information to verify the code points above.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
skipping to change at page 71, line 19 skipping to change at line 3284
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[Bruni18] Bruni, A., Sahl Jørgensen, T., Grønbech Petersen, T., and [Bruni18] Bruni, A., Sahl Jørgensen, T., Grønbech Petersen, T., and
C. Schürmann, "Formal Verification of Ephemeral Diffie- C. Schürmann, "Formal Verification of Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", November 2018, Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", November 2018,
<https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/formal- <https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/formal-
verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose- verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose-
edhoc/16284348>. edhoc/16284348>.
[CborMe] Bormann, C., "CBOR Playground", May 2018, [C509-CERTS]
<https://cbor.me/>. Preuß Mattsson, J., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J.,
and M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509
[CNSA] NSA, "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite",
August 2015, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Commercial_National_Security_Algorithm_Suite>.
[CottierPointcheval22]
Cottier, B. and D. Pointcheval, "Security Analysis of the
EDHOC protocol", September 2022,
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03599>.
[Degabriele11]
Degabriele, J. P., Lehmann, A., Paterson, K. G., Smart, N.
P., and M. Strefler, "On the Joint Security of Encryption
and Signature in EMV", December 2011,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615>.
[GuentherIlunga22]
Günther, F. and M. Ilunga, "Careful with MAc-then-SIGn: A
Computational Analysis of the EDHOC Lightweight
Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol", December 2022,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1705>.
[HKDFpaper]
Krawczyk, H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key
Derivation: The HKDF Scheme", May 2010,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf>.
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Internet Threat Model
Guidance", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-
arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00, 12 July 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-arch-
internet-threat-model-guidance-00>.
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc]
Palombini, F., Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Hristozov, S., and
G. Selander, "Using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE
(EDHOC) with the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
and Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-oscore-edhoc-10, 29 November 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
oscore-edhoc-10>.
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update]
Höglund, R. and M. Tiloca, "Key Update for OSCORE
(KUDOS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-oscore-key-update-06, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
oscore-key-update-06>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J., and
M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509
Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-07, 20 October 2023, ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-07, 20 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
cbor-encoded-cert-07>. cbor-encoded-cert-07>.
[I-D.ietf-iotops-security-protocol-comparison] [CborMe] Bormann, C., "CBOR Playground", <https://cbor.me/>.
[CNSA] Wikipedia, "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite",
October 2023, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=
Commercial_National_Security_Algorithm_Suite&oldid=1181333
611>.
[CoAP-SEC-PROT]
Mattsson, J. P., Palombini, F., and M. Vučinić, Mattsson, J. P., Palombini, F., and M. Vučinić,
"Comparison of CoAP Security Protocols", Work in Progress, "Comparison of CoAP Security Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-iotops-security-protocol- Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-iotops-security-protocol-
comparison-03, 23 October 2023, comparison-04, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-iotops- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-iotops-
security-protocol-comparison-03>. security-protocol-comparison-04>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-reqs]
Vučinić, M., Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and D. Garcia-
Carillo, "Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for OSCORE",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-reqs-04,
8 June 2020, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-lake-reqs-04>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-traces] [CottierPointcheval22]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Serafin, M., Tiloca, M., Cottier, B. and D. Pointcheval, "Security Analysis of the
and M. Vučinić, "Traces of EDHOC", Work in Progress, EDHOC protocol", September 2022,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-traces-08, 22 September <https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03599>.
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
lake-traces-08>.
[I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations] [CURVE-REPR]
Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations", Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve- Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
representations-23, 21 January 2022, representations-23, 21 January 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-
curve-representations-23>. curve-representations-23>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [Degabriele11]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Degabriele, J., Lehmann, A., Paterson, K., Smart, N., and
M. Strefler, "On the Joint Security of Encryption and
Signature in EMV", December 2011,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615>.
[EAT] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-25, 15 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-25, 15
January 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ January 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-eat-25>. draft-ietf-rats-eat-25>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise] [EDHOC-CoAP-OSCORE]
Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa, Palombini, F., Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Hristozov, S., and
G. Selander, "Using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE
(EDHOC) with the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
and Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-oscore-edhoc-10, 29 November 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
oscore-edhoc-10>.
[GuentherIlunga22]
Günther, F. and M. Mukendi, "Careful with MAc-then-SIGn: A
Computational Analysis of the EDHOC Lightweight
Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol", December 2022,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1705>.
[HEDGED-ECC-SIGS]
Preuß Mattsson, J., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa,
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional "Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional
Randomness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf- Randomness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-00, 8 August 2022, cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-00, 8 August 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
det-sigs-with-noise-00>. det-sigs-with-noise-00>.
[I-D.selander-lake-authz] [HKDFpaper]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Vučinić, M., Richardson, Krawczyk, H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key
M., and A. Schellenbaum, "Lightweight Authorization using Derivation: The HKDF Scheme", May 2010,
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE", Work in Progress, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf>.
Internet-Draft, draft-selander-lake-authz-03, 7 July 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-selander-
lake-authz-03>.
[Jacomme23] [Jacomme23]
Jacomme, C., Klein, E., Kremer, S., and M. Racouchot, "A Jacomme, C., Klein, E., Kremer, S., and M. Racouchot, "A
comprehensive, formal and automated analysis of the EDHOC comprehensive, formal and automated analysis of the EDHOC
protocol", October 2022, protocol", October 2022,
<https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03810102/>. <https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03810102/>.
[NISTPQC] "Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQs", August 2023, [KUDOS] Höglund, R. and M. Tiloca, "Key Update for OSCORE
(KUDOS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-oscore-key-update-07, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
oscore-key-update-07>.
[LAKE-AUTHZ]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Vučinić, M., Fedrecheski,
G., and M. Richardson, "Lightweight Authorization using
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-authz-01, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-
authz-01>.
[LAKE-REQS]
Vučinić, M., Selander, G., Preuß Mattsson, J., and D.
Garcia-Carillo, "Requirements for a Lightweight AKE for
OSCORE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
lake-reqs-04, 8 June 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-
reqs-04>.
[NISTPQC] National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST), "Post-
Quantum Cryptography FAQs",
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/
faqs>. faqs>.
[Noise] Perrin, T., "The Noise Protocol Framework, Revision 34", [Noise] Perrin, T., "The Noise Protocol Framework", Revision 34,
July 2018, <https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html>. July 2018, <https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html>.
[Norrman20] [Norrman20]
Norrman, K., Sundararajan, V., and A. Bruni, "Formal Norrman, K., Sundararajan, V., and A. Bruni, "Formal
Analysis of EDHOC Key Establishment for Constrained IoT Analysis of EDHOC Key Establishment for Constrained IoT
Devices", September 2020, Devices", September 2020,
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427>. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
skipping to change at page 75, line 43 skipping to change at line 3477
[RFC9176] Amsüss, C., Ed., Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and [RFC9176] Amsüss, C., Ed., Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and
P. van der Stok, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) P. van der Stok, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Resource Directory", RFC 9176, DOI 10.17487/RFC9176, April Resource Directory", RFC 9176, DOI 10.17487/RFC9176, April
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9176>. 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9176>.
[RFC9397] Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, [RFC9397] Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", RFC 9397, DOI 10.17487/RFC9397, July 2023, Architecture", RFC 9397, DOI 10.17487/RFC9397, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9397>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9397>.
[SECG] "Standards for Efficient Cryptography 1 (SEC 1)", May [RFC9529] Selander, G., Preuß Mattsson, J., Serafin, M., Tiloca, M.,
2009, <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. and M. Vučinić, "Traces of Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over
COSE (EDHOC)", RFC RFC9529, DOI 10.17487/RFC9529, March
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9529>.
[SIGMA] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA - The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to [SECG] Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography, May 2009,
<https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SIGMA] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: the 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE- Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-
Protocols", June 2003, Protocols", June 2003,
<https://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2003/ <https://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2003/
CRYPTO/1495/1495.pdf>. CRYPTO/1495/1495.pdf>.
[SP-800-108] [SP-800-108]
Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108 Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108
Revision 1, August 2022, Revision 1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1, August
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1>. 2022, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1>.
[SP-800-56A] [SP-800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R. Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, April 2018, NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.
[SP800-185] [SP800-185]
John Kelsey, Shu-jen Chang, and Ray Perlner, "SHA-3 Kelsey, J., Chang, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 Derived
Derived Functions cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and Functions cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash",
ParallelHash", NIST Special Publication 800-185, December NIST Special Publication 800-185,
2016, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185>. DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185, December 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185>.
[Thormarker21] [Thormarker21]
Thormarker, E., "On using the same key pair for Ed25519 Thormarker, E., "On using the same key pair for Ed25519
and an X25519 based KEM", April 2021, and an X25519 based KEM", April 2021,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509.pdf>. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509.pdf>.
[THREAT-MODEL-GUIDANCE]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Internet Threat Model
Guidance", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-
arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00, 12 July 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-arch-
internet-threat-model-guidance-00>.
Appendix A. Use with OSCORE and Transfer over CoAP Appendix A. Use with OSCORE and Transfer over CoAP
This appendix describes how to derive an OSCORE security context when This appendix describes how to derive an OSCORE security context when
EDHOC is used to key OSCORE, and how to transfer EDHOC messages over EDHOC is used to key OSCORE and how to transfer EDHOC messages over
CoAP. The use of CoAP or OSCORE with EDHOC is optional, but if you CoAP. The use of CoAP or OSCORE with EDHOC is optional, but if you
are using CoAP or OSCORE, then certain normative requirements apply are using CoAP or OSCORE, then certain normative requirements apply
as detailed in the subsections. as detailed in the subsections.
A.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context A.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context
This section specifies how to use EDHOC output to derive the OSCORE This section specifies how to use EDHOC output to derive the OSCORE
security context. security context.
After successful processing of EDHOC message_3, Client and Server After successful processing of EDHOC message_3, the Client and Server
derive Security Context parameters for OSCORE as follows (see derive security context parameters for OSCORE as follows (see
Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]): Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]):
* The Master Secret and Master Salt SHALL be derived by using the * The Master Secret and Master Salt SHALL be derived by using the
EDHOC_Exporter interface, see Section 4.2.1: EDHOC_Exporter interface (see Section 4.2.1):
- The EDHOC Exporter Labels for deriving the OSCORE Master Secret - The EDHOC Exporter Labels for deriving the OSCORE Master Secret
and the OSCORE Master Salt, are the uints 0 and 1, and OSCORE Master Salt are the uints 0 and 1, respectively.
respectively.
- The context parameter is h'' (0x40), the empty CBOR byte - The context parameter is h'' (0x40), the empty CBOR byte
string. string.
- By default, oscore_key_length is the key length (in bytes) of - By default, oscore_key_length is the key length (in bytes) of
the application AEAD Algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the application AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite for
the EDHOC session. Also by default, oscore_salt_length has the EDHOC session. Also by default, oscore_salt_length has
value 8. The Initiator and Responder MAY agree out-of-band on value 8. The Initiator and Responder MAY agree out-of-band on
a longer oscore_key_length than the default, and on shorter or a longer oscore_key_length than the default and on shorter or
longer than the default oscore_salt_length. longer than the default oscore_salt_length.
Master Secret = EDHOC_Exporter( 0, h'', oscore_key_length ) Master Secret = EDHOC_Exporter( 0, h'', oscore_key_length )
Master Salt = EDHOC_Exporter( 1, h'', oscore_salt_length ) Master Salt = EDHOC_Exporter( 1, h'', oscore_salt_length )
* The AEAD Algorithm SHALL be the application AEAD algorithm of the * The AEAD algorithm SHALL be the application AEAD algorithm of the
selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session.
* The HKDF Algorithm SHALL be the one based on the application hash * The HKDF algorithm SHALL be the one based on the application hash
algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. For algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. For
example, if SHA-256 is the application hash algorithm of the example, if SHA-256 is the application hash algorithm of the
selected cipher suite, HKDF SHA-256 is used as HKDF Algorithm in selected cipher suite, HKDF SHA-256 is used as the HKDF algorithm
the OSCORE Security Context. in the OSCORE security context.
* The relationship between identifiers in OSCORE and EDHOC is * The relationship between identifiers in OSCORE and EDHOC is
specified in Section 3.3.3. The OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID specified in Section 3.3.3. The OSCORE Sender ID and Recipient ID
SHALL be determined by the EDHOC connection identifiers C_R and SHALL be determined by EDHOC connection identifiers C_R and C_I
C_I for the EDHOC session as shown in Figure 17. for the EDHOC session as shown in Table 14.
+-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ +=================+==================+=====================+
| | OSCORE Sender ID | OSCORE Recipient ID | | | OSCORE Sender ID | OSCORE Recipient ID |
+=================+==================+=====================+ +=================+==================+=====================+
| EDHOC Initiator | C_R | C_I | | EDHOC Initiator | C_R | C_I |
+-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ +-----------------+------------------+---------------------+
| EDHOC Responder | C_I | C_R | | EDHOC Responder | C_I | C_R |
+-----------------+------------------+---------------------+ +-----------------+------------------+---------------------+
Figure 17: Usage of connection identifiers in OSCORE. Table 14: Usage of Connection Identifiers in OSCORE
Client and Server SHALL use the parameters above to establish an The Client and Server SHALL use the parameters above to establish an
OSCORE Security Context, as per Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]. OSCORE security context, as per Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].
From then on, Client and Server retrieve the OSCORE protocol state From then on, the Client and Server retrieve the OSCORE protocol
using the Recipient ID, and optionally other transport information state using the Recipient ID and optionally other transport
such as the 5-tuple. information such as the 5-tuple.
A.2. Transferring EDHOC over CoAP A.2. Transferring EDHOC over CoAP
This section specifies how EDHOC can be transferred as an exchange of This section specifies how EDHOC can be transferred as an exchange of
CoAP [RFC7252] messages. CoAP provides a reliable transport that can CoAP [RFC7252] messages. CoAP provides a reliable transport that can
preserve packet ordering, provides flow and congestion control, and preserve packet ordering, provides flow and congestion control, and
handles message duplication. CoAP can also perform fragmentation and handles message duplication. CoAP can also perform fragmentation and
mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks. The underlying CoAP mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks. The underlying CoAP
transport should be used in reliable mode, in particular when transport should be used in reliable mode, in particular, when
fragmentation is used, to avoid, e.g., situations with hanging fragmentation is used, to avoid, e.g., situations with hanging
endpoints waiting for each other. endpoints waiting for each other.
EDHOC may run with the Initiator either being CoAP client or CoAP EDHOC may run with the Initiator either being a CoAP client or CoAP
server. We denote the former by the "forward message flow" (see server. We denote the former by the "forward message flow" (see
Appendix A.2.1) and the latter by the "reverse message flow" (see Appendix A.2.1) and the latter by the "reverse message flow" (see
Appendix A.2.2). By default, we assume the forward message flow, but Appendix A.2.2). By default, we assume the forward message flow, but
the roles SHOULD be chosen to protect the most sensitive identity, the roles SHOULD be chosen to protect the most sensitive identity;
see Section 9. see Section 9.
According to this specification, EDHOC is transferred in POST According to this specification, EDHOC is transferred in POST
requests to the Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" (see Section 10.7), requests to the Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" (see Section 10.7) and
and 2.04 (Changed) responses. An application may define its own path 2.04 (Changed) responses. An application may define its own path
that can be discovered, e.g., using a resource directory [RFC9176]. that can be discovered, e.g., using a resource directory [RFC9176].
Client applications can use the resource type "core.edhoc" to Client applications can use the resource type "core.edhoc" to
discover a server's EDHOC resource, i.e., where to send a request for discover a server's EDHOC resource, i.e., where to send a request for
executing the EDHOC protocol, see Section 10.10. An alternative executing the EDHOC protocol; see Section 10.10. An alternative
transfer of the forward message flow is specified in transfer of the forward message flow is specified in
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc]. [EDHOC-CoAP-OSCORE].
In order for the server to correlate a message received from a client In order for the server to correlate a message received from a client
to a message previously sent in the same EDHOC session over CoAP, to a message previously sent in the same EDHOC session over CoAP,
messages sent by the client SHALL be prepended with the CBOR messages sent by the client SHALL be prepended with the CBOR
serialization of the connection identifier which the server has serialization of the connection identifier that the server has
selected, see Section 3.4.1. This applies both to the forward and selected; see Section 3.4.1. This applies both to the forward and
the reverse message flows. To indicate a new EDHOC session in the the reverse message flows. To indicate a new EDHOC session in the
forward message flow, message_1 SHALL be prepended with the CBOR forward message flow, message_1 SHALL be prepended with the CBOR
simple value true (0xf5). Even if CoAP is carried over a reliable simple value true (0xf5). Even if CoAP is carried over a reliable
transport protocol such as TCP, the prepending of identifiers transport protocol, such as TCP, the prepending of identifiers
specified here SHALL be practiced to enable interoperability specified here SHALL be practiced to enable interoperability
independent of how CoAP is transported. independent of how CoAP is transported.
The prepended identifiers are encoded in CBOR and thus self- The prepended identifiers are encoded in CBOR and thus self-
delimiting. The representation of identifiers described in delimiting. The representation of identifiers described in
Section 3.3.2 SHALL be used. They are sent in front of the actual Section 3.3.2 SHALL be used. They are sent in front of the actual
EDHOC message to keep track of messages in an EDHOC session, and only EDHOC message to keep track of messages in an EDHOC session, and only
the part of the body following the identifier is used for EDHOC the part of the body following the identifier is used for EDHOC
processing. In particular, the connection identifiers within the processing. In particular, the connection identifiers within the
EDHOC messages are not impacted by the prepended identifiers. EDHOC messages are not impacted by the prepended identifiers.
An EDHOC message has media type application/edhoc+cbor-seq, whereas An EDHOC message has media type "application/edhoc+cbor-seq", whereas
an EDHOC message prepended by a connection identifier has media type an EDHOC message prepended by a connection identifier has media type
application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq, see Section 10.9. "application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq"; see Section 10.9.
To mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks, the CoAP server MAY To mitigate certain denial-of-service attacks, the CoAP server MAY
respond to the first POST request with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) respond to the first POST request with a 4.01 (Unauthorized)
containing an Echo option [RFC9175]. This forces the Initiator to containing an Echo option [RFC9175]. This forces the Initiator to
demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. If message demonstrate reachability at its apparent network address. If message
fragmentation is needed, the EDHOC messages may be fragmented using fragmentation is needed, the EDHOC messages may be fragmented using
the CoAP Block-Wise Transfer mechanism [RFC7959]. the CoAP Block-Wise Transfer mechanism [RFC7959].
EDHOC error messages need to be transported in response to a message EDHOC error messages need to be transported in response to a message
that failed (see Section 6). EDHOC error messages transported with that failed (see Section 6). EDHOC error messages transported with
skipping to change at page 79, line 32 skipping to change at line 3667
* The client prepends the connection identifier selected by the * The client prepends the connection identifier selected by the
server (or, for message_1, the CBOR simple value true) to any server (or, for message_1, the CBOR simple value true) to any
request message it sends. request message it sends.
* The server does not send any such indicator, as responses are * The server does not send any such indicator, as responses are
matched to request by the client-server protocol design. matched to request by the client-server protocol design.
A.2.1. The Forward Message Flow A.2.1. The Forward Message Flow
In the forward message flow the CoAP client is the Initiator and the In the forward message flow, the CoAP client is the Initiator and the
CoAP server is the Responder. This flow protects the client identity CoAP server is the Responder. This flow protects the client identity
against active attackers and the server identity against passive against active attackers and the server identity against passive
attackers. attackers.
In the forward message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on In the forward message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on
the Initiator (client) side, and the prepended C_R enables the Initiator (client) side, and the prepended C_R enables
correlation on the Responder (server) side. correlation on the Responder (server) side.
* EDHOC message_1 is sent in the payload of a POST request from the * EDHOC message_1 is sent in the payload of a POST request from the
client to the server's resource for EDHOC, prepended with the client to the server's resource for EDHOC, prepended with the
identifier true (0xf5) indicating a new EDHOC session. identifier true (0xf5), indicating a new EDHOC session.
* EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server * EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server
to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case
with response code 2.04 (Changed), in the latter with response with response code 2.04 (Changed) and in the latter with response
code as specified in Appendix A.2.3. code as specified in Appendix A.2.3.
* EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client * EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client
to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request, to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request,
prepended with the connection identifier C_R. prepended with connection identifier C_R.
* If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is * If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is
sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response, sent from the server to the client in the payload of the response,
with response codes analogously to message_2. In case of an error with response codes analogously to message_2. In case of an error
message sent in response to message_4, it is sent analogously to message sent in response to message_4, it is sent analogously to
error message sent in response to message_2. the error message sent in response to message_2.
An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the forward An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the forward
message flow is shown in Figure 18. message flow is shown in Figure 10.
Client Server Client Server
| | | |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
| | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: true, EDHOC message_1 | | Payload: true, EDHOC message_1
| | | |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq
skipping to change at page 80, line 35 skipping to change at line 3719
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
| | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: C_R, EDHOC message_3 | | Payload: C_R, EDHOC message_3
| | | |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: EDHOC message_4 | | Payload: EDHOC message_4
| | | |
Figure 18: Example of the forward message flow. Figure 10: Example of the Forward Message Flow
The forward message flow of EDHOC can be combined with an OSCORE The forward message flow of EDHOC can be combined with an OSCORE
exchange in a total of two round-trips, see exchange in a total of two round trips; see [EDHOC-CoAP-OSCORE].
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc].
A.2.2. The Reverse Message Flow A.2.2. The Reverse Message Flow
In the reverse message flow the CoAP client is the Responder and the In the reverse message flow, the CoAP client is the Responder and the
CoAP server is the Initiator. This flow protects the server identity CoAP server is the Initiator. This flow protects the server identity
against active attackers and the client identity against passive against active attackers and the client identity against passive
attackers. attackers.
In the reverse message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on In the reverse message flow, the CoAP Token enables correlation on
the Responder (client) side, and the prepended C_I enables the Responder (client) side, and the prepended C_I enables
correlation on the Initiator (server) side. correlation on the Initiator (server) side.
* To trigger a new EDHOC session, the client makes an empty POST * To trigger a new EDHOC session, the client makes an empty POST
request to the server's resource for EDHOC. request to the server's resource for EDHOC.
* EDHOC message_1 is sent from the server to the client in the * EDHOC message_1 is sent from the server to the client in the
payload of the response with response code 2.04 (Changed). payload of the response with response code 2.04 (Changed).
* EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client * EDHOC message_2 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the client
to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request, to the server's resource in the payload of a POST request,
prepended with the connection identifier C_I. prepended with connection identifier C_I.
* EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server * EDHOC message_3 or the EDHOC error message is sent from the server
to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case to the client in the payload of the response, in the former case
with response code 2.04 (Changed), in the latter with response with response code 2.04 (Changed) and in the latter with response
code as specified in Appendix A.2.3. code as specified in Appendix A.2.3.
* If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is * If EDHOC message_4 is used, or in case of an error message, it is
sent from the client to the server's resource in the payload of a sent from the client to the server's resource in the payload of a
POST request, prepended with the connection identifier C_I. In POST request, prepended with connection identifier C_I. In case
case of an error message sent in response to message_4, it is sent of an error message sent in response to message_4, it is sent
analogously to an error message sent in response to message_2. analogously to an error message sent in response to message_2.
An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the reverse An example of a completed EDHOC session over CoAP in the reverse
message flow is shown in Figure 19. message flow is shown in Figure 11.
Client Server Client Server
| | | |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
| | | |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: EDHOC message_1 | | Payload: EDHOC message_1
| | | |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | POST | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc"
| | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: C_I, EDHOC message_2 | | Payload: C_I, EDHOC message_2
| | | |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed |<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | 2.04 | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq
| | Payload: EDHOC message_3 | | Payload: EDHOC message_3
| | | |
Figure 19: Example of the reverse message flow. Figure 11: Example of the Reverse Message Flow
A.2.3. Errors in EDHOC over CoAP A.2.3. Errors in EDHOC over CoAP
When using EDHOC over CoAP, EDHOC error messages sent as CoAP When using EDHOC over CoAP, EDHOC error messages sent as CoAP
responses MUST be sent in the payload of error responses, i.e., they responses MUST be sent in the payload of error responses, i.e., they
MUST specify a CoAP error response code. In particular, it is MUST specify a CoAP error response code. In particular, it is
RECOMMENDED that such error responses have response code either 4.00 RECOMMENDED that such error responses have response code either 4.00
(Bad Request) in case of client error (e.g., due to a malformed EDHOC (Bad Request) in case of client error (e.g., due to a malformed EDHOC
message), or 5.00 (Internal Server Error) in case of server error message) or 5.00 (Internal Server Error) in case of server error
(e.g., due to failure in deriving EDHOC keying material). The (e.g., due to failure in deriving EDHOC keying material). The
Content-Format of the error response MUST be set to application/ Content-Format of the error response MUST be set to "application/
edhoc+cbor-seq, see Section 10.9. edhoc+cbor-seq"; see Section 10.9.
Appendix B. Compact Representation Appendix B. Compact Representation
This section defines a format for compact representation based on the This section defines a format for compact representation based on the
Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String Conversion defined in Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String Conversion defined in
Section 2.3.3 of [SECG]. Section 2.3.3 of [SECG].
As described in Section 4.2 of [RFC6090] the x-coordinate of an As described in Section 4.2 of [RFC6090], the x-coordinate of an
elliptic curve public key is a suitable representative for the entire elliptic curve public key is a suitable representative for the entire
point whenever scalar multiplication is used as a one-way function. point whenever scalar multiplication is used as a one-way function.
One example is ECDH with compact output, where only the x-coordinate One example is ECDH with compact output, where only the x-coordinate
of the computed value is used as the shared secret. of the computed value is used as the shared secret.
In EDHOC, compact representation is used for the ephemeral public In EDHOC, compact representation is used for the ephemeral public
keys (G_X and G_Y), see Section 3.7. Using the notation from [SECG], keys (G_X and G_Y); see Section 3.7. Using the notation from [SECG],
the output is an octet string of length ceil( (log2 q) / 8 ), where the output is an octet string of length ceil( (log2 q) / 8 ), where
ceil(x) is the smallest integer not less than x. See [SECG] for a ceil(x) is the smallest integer not less than x. See [SECG] for a
definition of q, M, X, xp, and ~yp. The steps in Section 2.3.3 of definition of q, M, X, xp, and ~yp. The steps in Section 2.3.3 of
[SECG] are replaced by: [SECG] are replaced with the following steps:
1. Convert the field element xp to an octet string X of length ceil( 1. Convert the field element xp to an octet string X of length ceil(
(log2 q) / 8 ) octets using the conversion routine specified in (log2 q) / 8 ) octets using the conversion routine specified in
Section 2.3.5 of [SECG]. Section 2.3.5 of [SECG].
2. Output M = X 2. Output M = X.
The encoding of the point at infinity is not supported. The encoding of the point at infinity is not supported.
Compact representation does not change any requirements on Compact representation does not change any requirements on
validation, see Section 9.2. Using compact representation has some validation; see Section 9.2. Using compact representation has some
security benefits. An implementation does not need to check that the security benefits. An implementation does not need to check that the
point is not the point at infinity (the identity element). point is not the point at infinity (the identity element).
Similarly, as not even the sign of the y-coordinate is encoded, Similarly, as not even the sign of the y-coordinate is encoded,
compact representation trivially avoids so-called "benign compact representation trivially avoids so-called "benign
malleability" attacks where an attacker changes the sign, see [SECG]. malleability" attacks where an attacker changes the sign; see [SECG].
The following may be needed for validation or compatibility with APIs The following may be needed for validation or compatibility with APIs
that do not support compact representation or do not support the full that do not support compact representation or do not support the full
[SECG] format: [SECG] format:
* If a compressed y-coordinate is required, then the value ~yp set * If a compressed y-coordinate is required, then the value ~yp set
to zero can be used. The compact representation described above to zero can be used. In such a case, the compact representation
can in such a case be transformed into the SECG point compressed described above can be transformed into the Standards for
format by prepending it with the single byte 0x02 (i.e., M = Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) point-compressed format by
0x02 || X). prepending it with the single byte 0x02 (i.e., M = 0x02 || X).
* If an uncompressed y-coordinate is required, then a y-coordinate * If an uncompressed y-coordinate is required, then a y-coordinate
has to be calculated following Section 2.3.4 of [SECG] or has to be calculated following Section 2.3.4 of [SECG] or
Appendix C of [RFC6090]. Any of the square roots (see [SECG] or Appendix C of [RFC6090]. Any of the square roots (see [SECG] or
[RFC6090]) can be used. The uncompressed SECG format is M = [RFC6090]) can be used. The uncompressed SECG format is M =
0x04 || X || Y. 0x04 || X || Y.
For example: The curve P-256 has the parameters (using the notation For example: The curve P-256 has the parameters (using the notation
in [RFC6090]) in [RFC6090]):
* p = 2^256 − 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 − 1 * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
* a = -3 * a = -3
* b = 410583637251521421293261297800472684091144410159937255 * b = 410583637251521421293261297800472684091144410159937255
54835256314039467401291 54835256314039467401291
Given an example x: Given an example x:
* x = 115792089183396302095546807154740558443406795108653336 * x = 115792089183396302095546807154740558443406795108653336
398970697772788799766525 398970697772788799766525
we can calculate y as the square root w = (x^3 + a ⋅ x + b)^((p + We can calculate y as the square root w = (x^3 + a ⋅ x + b)^((p +
1)/4) (mod p) 1)/4) (mod p).
* y = 834387180070192806820075864918626005281451259964015754 * y = 834387180070192806820075864918626005281451259964015754
16632522940595860276856 16632522940595860276856
Note that this does not guarantee that (x, y) is on the correct Note that this does not guarantee that (x, y) is on the correct
elliptic curve. A full validation according to Section 5.6.2.3.3 of elliptic curve. A full validation according to Section 5.6.2.3.3 of
[SP-800-56A] can be achieved by also checking that 0 ≤ x < p and that [SP-800-56A] is done by also checking that 0 ≤ x < p and that y^2 ≡
y^2 ≡ x^3 + a ⋅ x + b (mod p). x^3 + a ⋅ x + b (mod p).
Appendix C. Use of CBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC Appendix C. Use of CBOR, CDDL, and COSE in EDHOC
This Appendix is intended to help implementors not familiar with CBOR This appendix is intended to help implementors not familiar with CBOR
[RFC8949], CDDL [RFC8610], COSE [RFC9052], and HKDF [RFC5869]. [RFC8949], CDDL [RFC8610], COSE [RFC9052], and HKDF [RFC5869].
C.1. CBOR and CDDL C.1. CBOR and CDDL
The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949] is a data The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949] is a data
format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR
builds on the JSON data model but extends it by e.g., encoding binary builds on the JSON data model but extends it by, e.g., encoding
data directly without base64 conversion. In addition to the binary binary data directly without base64 conversion. In addition to the
CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a diagnostic notation that is readable binary CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a diagnostic notation that is
and editable by humans. The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) readable and editable by humans. The Concise Data Definition
[RFC8610] provides a way to express structures for protocol messages Language (CDDL) [RFC8610] provides a way to express structures for
and APIs that use CBOR. [RFC8610] also extends the diagnostic protocol messages and APIs that use CBOR. [RFC8610] also extends the
notation. diagnostic notation.
CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a
type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits
of the initial byte contain information about the major type. CBOR of the initial byte contain information about the major type. CBOR
supports several types of data items, in addition to integers (int, supports several types of data items, integers (int, uint), simple
uint), simple values, byte strings (bstr), and text strings (tstr), values, byte strings (bstr), and text strings (tstr). CBOR also
CBOR also supports arrays [] of data items, maps {} of pairs of data supports arrays [] of data items, maps {} of pairs of data items, and
items, and sequences [RFC8742] of data items. Some examples are sequences [RFC8742] of data items. Some examples are given below.
given below.
The EDHOC specification sometimes use CDDL names in CBOR diagnostic The EDHOC specification sometimes use CDDL names in CBOR diagnostic
notation as in e.g., << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >>. This means that EAD_2 notation as in, e.g., << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >>. This means that
is optional and that ID_CRED_R and EAD_2 should be substituted with EAD_2 is optional and that ID_CRED_R and EAD_2 should be substituted
their values before evaluation. I.e., if ID_CRED_R = { 4 : h'' } and with their values before evaluation. That is, if ID_CRED_R = { 4 :
EAD_2 is omitted then << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> = << { 4 : h'' } >>, h'' } and EAD_2 is omitted, then << ID_CRED_R, ? EAD_2 >> = << { 4 :
which encodes to 0x43a10440. We also make use of the occurrence h'' } >>, which encodes to 0x43a10440. We also make use of the
symbol "*", like in e.g., 2* int, meaning two or more CBOR integers. occurrence symbol "*", like in, e.g., 2* int, meaning two or more
CBOR integers.
For a complete specification and more examples, see [RFC8949] and For a complete specification and more examples, see [RFC8949] and
[RFC8610]. We recommend implementors get used to CBOR by using the [RFC8610]. We recommend implementors get used to CBOR by using the
CBOR playground [CborMe]. CBOR playground [CborMe].
Diagnostic Encoded Type +==================+==============+==================+
----------------------------------------------------------- | Diagnostic | Encoded | Type |
1 0x01 unsigned integer +==================+==============+==================+
24 0x1818 unsigned integer | 1 | 0x01 | unsigned integer |
-24 0x37 negative integer +------------------+--------------+------------------+
-25 0x3818 negative integer | 24 | 0x1818 | unsigned integer |
true 0xf5 simple value +------------------+--------------+------------------+
h'' 0x40 byte string | -24 | 0x37 | negative integer |
h'12cd' 0x4212cd byte string +------------------+--------------+------------------+
'12cd' 0x4431326364 byte string | -25 | 0x3818 | negative integer |
"12cd" 0x6431326364 text string +------------------+--------------+------------------+
{ 4 : h'cd' } 0xa10441cd map | true | 0xf5 | simple value |
<< 1, 2, true >> 0x430102f5 byte string +------------------+--------------+------------------+
[ 1, 2, true ] 0x830102f5 array | h'' | 0x40 | byte string |
( 1, 2, true ) 0x0102f5 sequence +------------------+--------------+------------------+
1, 2, true 0x0102f5 sequence | h'12cd' | 0x4212cd | byte string |
----------------------------------------------------------- +------------------+--------------+------------------+
| '12cd' | 0x4431326364 | byte string |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| "12cd" | 0x6431326364 | text string |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| { 4 : h'cd' } | 0xa10441cd | map |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| << 1, 2, true >> | 0x430102f5 | byte string |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| [ 1, 2, true ] | 0x830102f5 | array |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| ( 1, 2, true ) | 0x0102f5 | sequence |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
| 1, 2, true | 0x0102f5 | sequence |
+------------------+--------------+------------------+
Figure 20: Examples of use of CBOR and CDDL. Table 15: Examples of Use of CBOR and CDDL
C.2. CDDL Definitions C.2. CDDL Definitions
This section compiles the CDDL definitions for ease of reference. This section compiles the CDDL definitions for ease of reference.
suites = [ 2* int ] / int suites = [ 2* int ] / int
ead = ( ead = (
ead_label : int, ead_label : int,
? ead_value : bstr, ? ead_value : bstr,
skipping to change at page 86, line 43 skipping to change at line 4008
info = ( info = (
info_label : int, info_label : int,
context : bstr, context : bstr,
length : uint, length : uint,
) )
C.3. COSE C.3. COSE
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052] describes how to CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052] describes how to
create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and create and process signatures, MACs, and encryptions using CBOR.
encryption using CBOR. COSE builds on JOSE, but is adapted to allow COSE builds on JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) but is
more efficient processing in constrained devices. EDHOC makes use of adapted to allow more efficient processing in constrained devices.
COSE_Key, COSE_Encrypt0, and COSE_Sign1 objects in the message EDHOC makes use of COSE_Key, COSE_Encrypt0, and COSE_Sign1 objects in
processing: the message processing:
* ECDH ephemeral public keys of type EC2 or OKP in message_1 and * ECDH ephemeral public keys of type EC2 or OKP in message_1 and
message_2 consist of the COSE_Key parameter named 'x', see message_2 consist of the COSE_Key parameter named 'x'; see
Section 7.1 and 7.2 of [RFC9053] Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of [RFC9053].
* The ciphertexts in message_3 and message_4 consist of a subset of * The ciphertexts in message_3 and message_4 consist of a subset of
the single recipient encrypted data object COSE_Encrypt0, which is the single recipient encrypted data object COSE_Encrypt0, which is
described in Sections 5.2-5.3 of [RFC9052]. The ciphertext is described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of [RFC9052]. The ciphertext is
computed over the plaintext and associated data, using an computed over the plaintext and associated data, using an
encryption key and an initialization vector. The associated data encryption key and an initialization vector. The associated data
is an Enc_structure consisting of protected headers and externally is an Enc_structure consisting of protected headers and externally
supplied data (external_aad). COSE constructs the input to the supplied data (external_aad). COSE constructs the input to the
AEAD [RFC5116] for message_i (i = 3 or 4, see Section 5.4 and AEAD [RFC5116] for message_i (i = 3 or 4; see Sections 5.4 and
Section 5.5, respectively) as follows: 5.5, respectively) as follows:
- Secret key K = K_i - Secret key K = K_i
- Nonce N = IV_i - Nonce N = IV_i
- Plaintext P for message_i - Plaintext P for message_i
- Associated Data A = [ "Encrypt0", h'', TH_i ] - Associated Data A = [ "Encrypt0", h'', TH_i ]
* Signatures in message_2 of method 0 and 2, and in message_3 of * Signatures in message_2 of method 0 and 2, and in message_3 of
method 0 and 1, consist of a subset of the single signer data method 0 and 1, consist of a subset of the single signer data
object COSE_Sign1, which is described in Sections 4.2-4.4 of object COSE_Sign1, which is described in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 of
[RFC9052]. The signature is computed over a Sig_structure [RFC9052]. The signature is computed over a Sig_structure
containing payload, protected headers and externally supplied data containing payload, protected headers and externally supplied data
(external_aad) using a private signature key and verified using (external_aad) using a private signature key, and verified using
the corresponding public signature key. For COSE_Sign1, the the corresponding public signature key. For COSE_Sign1, the
message to be signed is: message to be signed is:
[ "Signature1", protected, external_aad, payload ] [ "Signature1", protected, external_aad, payload ]
where protected, external_aad and payload are specified in where protected, external_aad, and payload are specified in
Section 5.3 and Section 5.4. Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Different header parameters to identify X.509 or C509 certificates by Different header parameters to identify X.509 or C509 certificates by
reference are defined in [RFC9360] and reference are defined in [RFC9360] and [C509-CERTS]:
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]:
* by a hash value with the 'x5t' or 'c5t' parameters, respectively: * by a hash value with the 'x5t' or 'c5t' parameters, respectively:
- ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R, - ID_CRED_x = { 34 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R and
- ID_CRED_x = { TBD3 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R; - ID_CRED_x = { 22 : COSE_CertHash }, for x = I or R,
* or by a URI with the 'x5u' or 'c5u' parameters, respectively: * or by a URI with the 'x5u' or 'c5u' parameters, respectively:
- ID_CRED_x = { 35 : uri }, for x = I or R, - ID_CRED_x = { 35 : uri }, for x = I or R, and
- ID_CRED_x = { TBD4 : uri }, for x = I or R. - ID_CRED_x = { 23 : uri }, for x = I or R.
When ID_CRED_x does not contain the actual credential, it may be very When ID_CRED_x does not contain the actual credential, it may be very
short, e.g., if the endpoints have agreed to use a key identifier short, e.g., if the endpoints have agreed to use a key identifier
parameter 'kid': parameter 'kid':
* ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I or R. For * ID_CRED_x = { 4 : kid_x }, where kid_x : kid, for x = I or R. For
further optimization, see Section 3.5.3. further optimization, see Section 3.5.3.
Note that ID_CRED_x can contain several header parameters, for Note that ID_CRED_x can contain several header parameters, for
example { x5u, x5t } or { kid, kid_context }. example, { x5u, x5t } or { kid, kid_context }.
ID_CRED_x MAY also identify the credential by value. For example, a ID_CRED_x MAY also identify the credential by value. For example, a
certificate chain can be transported in an ID_CRED field with COSE certificate chain can be transported in an ID_CRED field with COSE
header parameter c5c or x5chain, defined in header parameter c5c or x5chain, as defined in [C509-CERTS] and
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] and [RFC9360] and credentials of [RFC9360]. Credentials of type CWT and CCS can be transported with
type CWT and CCS can be transported with the COSE header parameters the COSE header parameters registered in Section 10.6.
registered in Section 10.6.
Appendix D. Authentication Related Verifications Appendix D. Authentication-Related Verifications
EDHOC performs certain authentication related operations, see EDHOC performs certain authentication-related operations (see
Section 3.5, but in general it is necessary to make additional Section 3.5), but in general, it is necessary to make additional
verifications beyond EDHOC message processing. Which verifications verifications beyond EDHOC message processing. Which verifications
that are needed depend on the deployment, in particular the trust that are needed depend on the deployment, in particular, the trust
model and the security policies, but most commonly it can be model and the security policies, but most commonly, it can be
expressed in terms of verifications of credential content. expressed in terms of verifications of credential content.
EDHOC assumes the existence of mechanisms (certification authority or EDHOC assumes the existence of mechanisms (certification authority or
other trusted third party, pre-provisioning, etc.) for generating and other trusted third party, pre-provisioning, etc.) for generating and
distributing authentication credentials and other credentials, as distributing authentication credentials and other credentials, as
well as the existence of trust anchors (CA certificates, trusted well as the existence of trust anchors (CA certificates, trusted
public keys, etc.). For example, a public key certificate or CWT may public keys, etc.). For example, a public key certificate or CWT may
rely on a trusted third party whose public key is pre-provisioned, rely on a trusted third party whose public key is pre-provisioned,
whereas a CCS or a self-signed certificate/CWT may be used when trust whereas a CCS or a self-signed certificate / CWT may be used when
in the public key can be achieved by other means, or in the case of trust in the public key can be achieved by other means, or in the
Trust on first use, see Appendix D.5. case of trust on first use, see Appendix D.5.
In this section we provide some examples of such verifications. In this section, we provide some examples of such verifications.
These verifications are the responsibility of the application but may These verifications are the responsibility of the application but may
be implemented as part of an EDHOC library. be implemented as part of an EDHOC library.
D.1. Validating the Authentication Credential D.1. Validating the Authentication Credential
The authentication credential may contain, in addition to the In addition to the authentication key, the authentication credential
authentication key, other parameters that needs to be verified. For may contain other parameters that need to be verified. For example:
example:
* In X.509 and C509 certificates, signature keys typically have key * In X.509 and C509 certificates, signature keys typically have key
usage "digitalSignature" and Diffie-Hellman public keys typically usage "digitalSignature", and Diffie-Hellman public keys typically
have key usage "keyAgreement" [RFC3279][RFC8410]. have key usage "keyAgreement" [RFC3279] [RFC8410].
* In X.509 and C509 certificates validity is expressed using Not * In X.509 and C509 certificates, validity is expressed using Not
After and Not Before. In CWT and CCS, the “exp” and “nbf” claims After and Not Before. In CWT and CCS, the "exp" and "nbf" claims
have similar meanings. have similar meanings.
D.2. Identities D.2. Identities
The application must decide on allowing a connection or not depending The application must decide on allowing a connection or not,
on the intended endpoint, and in particular whether it is a specific depending on the intended endpoint, and in particular whether it is a
identity or in a set of identities. To prevent misbinding attacks, specific identity or in a set of identities. To prevent misbinding
the identity of the endpoint is included in a MAC verified through attacks, the identity of the endpoint is included in a MAC verified
the protocol. More details and examples are provided in this through the protocol. More details and examples are provided in this
section. section.
Policies for what connections to allow are typically set based on the Policies for what connections to allow are typically set based on the
identity of the other endpoint, and endpoints typically only allow identity of the other endpoint, and endpoints typically only allow
connections from a specific identity or a small restricted set of connections from a specific identity or a small restricted set of
identities. For example, in the case of a device connecting to a identities. For example, in the case of a device connecting to a
network, the network may only allow connections from devices which network, the network may only allow connections from devices that
authenticate with certificates having a particular range of serial authenticate with certificates having a particular range of serial
numbers and signed by a particular CA. Conversely, a device may only numbers and signed by a particular CA. Conversely, a device may only
be allowed to connect to a network which authenticates with a be allowed to connect to a network that authenticates with a
particular public key. particular public key.
* When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates, * When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates,
the identity is the subject whose unique name, e.g., a domain the identity is the subject whose unique name, e.g., a domain
name, a Network Access Identifier (NAI), or an Extended Unique name, a Network Access Identifier (NAI), or an Extended Unique
Identifier (EUI), is included in the endpoint's certificate. Identifier (EUI), is included in the endpoint's certificate.
* Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, the identity is the * Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, the identity is the
subject identified by the relevant claim(s), such as 'sub' subject identified by the relevant claim(s), such as 'sub'
(subject). (subject).
* When PKI is not used (e.g., CCS, self-signed certificate/CWT) the * When PKI is not used (e.g., CCS, self-signed certificate / CWT),
identity is typically directly associated with the authentication the identity is typically directly associated with the
key of the other party. For example, if identities can be authentication key of the other party. For example, if identities
expressed in the form of unique subject names assigned to public can be expressed in the form of unique subject names assigned to
keys, then a binding to identity is achieved by including both public keys, then a binding to identity is achieved by including
public key and associated subject name in the authentication both the public key and associated subject name in the
credential: CRED_I or CRED_R may be a self-signed certificate/CWT authentication credential. CRED_I or CRED_R may be a self-signed
or CCS containing the authentication key and the subject name, see certificate / CWT or CCS containing the authentication key and the
Section 3.5.2. Each endpoint thus needs to know the specific subject name; see Section 3.5.2. Thus, each endpoint needs to
authentication key/unique associated subject name, or set of know the specific authentication key / unique associated subject
public authentication keys/unique associated subject names, which name or set of public authentication keys / unique associated
it is allowed to communicate with. subject names, which it is allowed to communicate with.
To prevent misbinding attacks in systems where an attacker can To prevent misbinding attacks in systems where an attacker can
register public keys without proving knowledge of the private key, register public keys without proving knowledge of the private key,
SIGMA [SIGMA] enforces a MAC to be calculated over the "identity". SIGMA [SIGMA] enforces a MAC to be calculated over the "identity".
EDHOC follows SIGMA by calculating a MAC over the whole EDHOC follows SIGMA by calculating a MAC over the whole
authentication credential, which in case of an X.509 or C509 authentication credential, which in case of an X.509 or C509
certificate includes the "subject" and "subjectAltName" fields, and certificate, includes the "subject" and "subjectAltName" fields and,
in the case of CWT or CCS includes the "sub" claim. in the case of CWT or CCS, includes the "sub" claim.
(While the SIGMA paper only focuses on the identity, the same (While the SIGMA paper only focuses on the identity, the same
principle is true for other information such as policies associated principle is true for other information such as policies associated
with the public key.) with the public key.)
D.3. Certification Path and Trust Anchors D.3. Certification Path and Trust Anchors
When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates, the When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used with certificates, the
trust anchor is a Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Each trust anchor is a certification authority (CA) certificate. Each
party needs at least one CA public key certificate, or just the CA party needs at least one CA public key certificate or just the CA
public key. The certification path contains proof that the subject public key. The certification path contains proof that the subject
of the certificate owns the public key in the certificate. Only of the certificate owns the public key in the certificate. Only
validated public-key certificates are to be accepted. validated public key certificates are to be accepted.
Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, each party needs to have at Similarly, when a PKI is used with CWTs, each party needs to have at
least one trusted third party public key as trust anchor to verify least one trusted third-party public key as a trust anchor to verify
the end entity CWTs. The trusted third party public key can, e.g., the end entity CWTs. The trusted third-party public key can, e.g.,
be stored in a self-signed CWT or in a CCS. be stored in a self-signed CWT or in a CCS.
The signature of the authentication credential needs to be verified The signature of the authentication credential needs to be verified
with the public key of the issuer. X.509 and C509 certificates with the public key of the issuer. X.509 and C509 certificates
includes the “Issuer” field. In CWT and CCS, the “iss” claim has a includes the "Issuer" field. In CWT and CCS, the "iss" claim has a
similar meaning. The public key is either a trust anchor or the similar meaning. The public key is either a trust anchor or the
public key in another valid and trusted credential in a certification public key in another valid and trusted credential in a certification
path from trust anchor to authentication credential. path from the trust anchor to the authentication credential.
Similar verifications as made with the authentication credential (see Similar verifications as made with the authentication credential (see
Appendix D.1) are also needed for the other credentials in the Appendix D.1) are also needed for the other credentials in the
certification path. certification path.
When PKI is not used (CCS, self-signed certificate/CWT), the trust When PKI is not used (CCS and self-signed certificate / CWT), the
anchor is the authentication key of the other party, in which case trust anchor is the authentication key of the other party; in which
there is no certification path. case, there is no certification path.
D.4. Revocation Status D.4. Revocation Status
The application may need to verify that the credentials are not The application may need to verify that the credentials are not
revoked, see Section 9.8. Some use cases may be served by short- revoked; see Section 9.8. Some use cases may be served by short-
lived credentials, for example, where the validity of the credential lived credentials, for example, where the validity of the credential
is on par with the interval between revocation checks. But, in is on par with the interval between revocation checks. But, in
general, credential lifetime and revocation checking are general, credential lifetime and revocation checking are
complementary measures to control credential status. Revocation complementary measures to control credential status. Revocation
information may be transported as External Authentication Data (EAD), information may be transported as External Authorization Data (EAD);
see Appendix E. see Appendix E.
D.5. Unauthenticated Operation D.5. Unauthenticated Operation
EDHOC might be used without authentication by allowing the Initiator EDHOC might be used without authentication by allowing the Initiator
or Responder to communicate with any identity except its own. Note or Responder to communicate with any identity except its own. Note
that EDHOC without mutual authentication is vulnerable to active on- that EDHOC without mutual authentication is vulnerable to active on-
path attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is path attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is
possible to later establish a trust relationship with an unknown or possible to later establish a trust relationship with an unknown or
not-yet-trusted endpoint. Some examples: not-yet-trusted endpoint. Some examples are listed below:
* The EDHOC authentication credential can be verified out-of-band at * The EDHOC authentication credential can be verified out-of-band at
a later stage. a later stage.
* The EDHOC session key can be bound to an identity out-of-band at a * The EDHOC session key can be bound to an identity out-of-band at a
later stage. later stage.
* Trust on first use (TOFU) can be used to verify that several EDHOC * Trust on first use (TOFU) can be used to verify that several EDHOC
connections are made to the same identity. TOFU combined with connections are made to the same identity. TOFU combined with
proximity is a common IoT deployment model which provides good proximity is a common IoT deployment model that provides good
security if done correctly. Note that secure proximity based on security if done correctly. Note that secure proximity based on
short range wireless technology requires very low signal strength short range wireless technology requires very low signal strength
or very low latency. or very low latency.
Appendix E. Use of External Authorization Data Appendix E. Use of External Authorization Data
In order to reduce the number of messages and round trips, or to In order to reduce the number of messages and round trips, or to
simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated simplify processing, external security applications may be integrated
into EDHOC by transporting related external authorization data (EAD) into EDHOC by transporting related external authorization data (EAD)
in the messages. in the messages.
The EAD format is specified in Section 3.8, this section contains The EAD format is specified in Section 3.8. This section contains
examples and further details of how EAD may be used with an examples and further details of how EAD may be used with an
appropriate accompanying specification. appropriate accompanying specification.
* One example is third party assisted authorization, requested with * One example is third-party-assisted authorization, requested with
EAD_1, and an authorization artifact (“voucher”, cf. [RFC8366]) EAD_1, and an authorization artifact ("voucher", cf. [RFC8366])
returned in EAD_2, see [I-D.selander-lake-authz]. returned in EAD_2; see [LAKE-AUTHZ].
* Another example is remote attestation, requested in EAD_2, and an * Another example is remote attestation, requested in EAD_2, and an
Entity Attestation Token (EAT, [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]) returned in Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [EAT] returned in EAD_3.
EAD_3.
* A third example is certificate enrolment, where a Certificate * A third example is certificate enrollment, where a Certificate
Signing Request (CSR, [RFC2986]) is included EAD_3, and the issued Signing Request (CSR) [RFC2986] is included in EAD_3, and the
public key certificate (X.509 [RFC5280], C509 issued public key certificate (X.509 [RFC5280] and C509
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]) or a reference thereof is [C509-CERTS]) or a reference thereof is returned in EAD_4.
returned in EAD_4.
External authorization data should be considered unprotected by External authorization data should be considered unprotected by
EDHOC, and the protection of EAD is the responsibility of the EDHOC, and the protection of EAD is the responsibility of the
security application (third party authorization, remote attestation, security application (third-party authorization, remote attestation,
certificate enrolment, etc.). The security properties of the EAD certificate enrollment, etc.). The security properties of the EAD
fields (after EDHOC processing) are discussed in Section 9.1. fields (after EDHOC processing) are discussed in Section 9.1.
The content of the EAD field may be used in the EDHOC processing of The content of the EAD field may be used in the EDHOC processing of
the message in which they are contained. For example, authentication the message in which they are contained. For example,
related information like assertions and revocation information, authentication-related information, like assertions and revocation
transported in EAD fields may provide input about trust anchors or information, transported in EAD fields may provide input about trust
validity of credentials relevant to the authentication processing. anchors or validity of credentials relevant to the authentication
The EAD fields (like ID_CRED fields) are therefore made available to processing. The EAD fields (like ID_CRED fields) are therefore made
the application before the message is verified, see details of available to the application before the message is verified; see
message processing in Section 5. In the first example above, a details of message processing in Section 5. In the first example
voucher in EAD_2 made available to the application can enable the above, a voucher in EAD_2 made available to the application can
Initiator to verify the identity or public key of the Responder enable the Initiator to verify the identity or the public key of the
before verifying the signature. An application allowing EAD fields Responder before verifying the signature. An application allowing
containing authentication information thus may need to handle EAD fields containing authentication information thus may need to
authentication related verifications associated with EAD processing. handle authentication-related verifications associated with EAD
processing.
Conversely, the security application may need to wait for EDHOC Conversely, the security application may need to wait for EDHOC
message verification to complete. In the third example above, the message verification to complete. In the third example above, the
validation of a CSR carried in EAD_3 is not started by the Responder validation of a CSR carried in EAD_3 is not started by the Responder
before EDHOC has successfully verified message_3 and proven the before EDHOC has successfully verified message_3 and proven the
possession of the private key of the Initiator. possession of the private key of the Initiator.
The security application may reuse EDHOC protocol fields which The security application may reuse EDHOC protocol fields that
therefore need to be available to the application. For example, the therefore need to be available to the application. For example, the
security application may use the same crypto algorithms as in the security application may use the same crypto algorithms as in the
EDHOC session and therefore needs access to the selected cipher suite EDHOC session and therefore needs access to the selected cipher suite
(or the whole SUITES_I). The application may use the ephemeral (or the whole SUITES_I). The application may use the ephemeral
public keys G_X and G_Y, as ephemeral keys or as nonces, see public keys G_X and G_Y as ephemeral keys or as nonces; see
[I-D.selander-lake-authz]. [LAKE-AUTHZ].
The processing of the EAD item (ead_label, ? ead_value) by the The processing of the EAD item (ead_label, ? ead_value) by the
security application needs to be described in the specification where security application needs to be described in the specification where
the ead_label is registered, see Section 10.5, including the optional the ead_label is registered (see Section 10.5), including the
ead_value for each message and actions in case of errors. An optional ead_value for each message and actions in case of errors.
application may support multiple security applications that make use An application may support multiple security applications that make
of EAD, which may result in multiple EAD items in one EAD field, see use of EAD, which may result in multiple EAD items in one EAD field;
Section 3.8. Any dependencies on security applications with see Section 3.8. Any dependencies on security applications with
previously registered EAD items needs to be documented, and the previously registered EAD items need to be documented, and the
processing needs to consider their simultaneous use. processing needs to consider their simultaneous use.
Since data carried in EAD may not be protected, or be processed by Since data carried in EAD may not be protected, or processed by the
the application before the EDHOC message is verified, special application before the EDHOC message is verified, special
considerations need to be made such that it does not violate security considerations need to be made such that it does not violate security
and privacy requirements of the service which uses this data, see and privacy requirements of the service that uses this data; see
Section 9.5. The content in an EAD item may impact the security Section 9.5. The content in an EAD item may impact the security
properties provided by EDHOC. Security applications making use of properties provided by EDHOC. Security applications making use of
the EAD items must perform the necessary security analysis. the EAD items must perform the necessary security analysis.
Appendix F. Application Profile Example Appendix F. Application Profile Example
This appendix contains a rudimentary example of an application This appendix contains a rudimentary example of an application
profile, see Section 3.9. profile; see Section 3.9.
For use of EDHOC with application X the following assumptions are For use of EDHOC with application X, the following assumptions are
made: made:
1. Transfer in CoAP as specified in Appendix A.2 with requests 1. Transfer in CoAP as specified in Appendix A.2 with requests
expected by the CoAP server (= Responder) at /app1-edh, no expected by the CoAP server (= Responder) at /app1-edh, no
Content-Format needed. Content-Format needed.
2. METHOD = 1 (I uses signature key, R uses static DH key.) 2. METHOD = 1 (I uses signature key; R uses static DH key.)
3. CRED_I is an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID encoded as a C509 certificate of 3. CRED_I is encoded with IEEE 802.1AR IDevID as a C509 certificate
type 0 [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. of type 0 [C509-CERTS].
* R acquires CRED_I out-of-band, indicated in EAD_1. * R acquires CRED_I out-of-band, indicated in EAD_1.
* ID_CRED_I = {4: h''} is a 'kid' with value the empty CBOR byte * ID_CRED_I = {4: h''} is a 'kid' with the value of the empty
string. CBOR byte string.
4. CRED_R is a CCS of type OKP as specified in Section 3.5.2. 4. CRED_R is a CCS of type OKP as specified in Section 3.5.2.
* The CBOR map has parameters 1 (kty), -1 (crv), and -2 * The CBOR map has parameters 1 (kty), -1 (crv), and -2
(x-coordinate). (x-coordinate).
* ID_CRED_R is {TBD2 : CCS}. Editor's note: TBD2 is the COSE * ID_CRED_R is {14 : CCS}.
header parameter value of 'kccs', see Section 10.6
5. External authorization data is defined and processed as specified 5. External authorization data is defined and processed as specified
in [I-D.selander-lake-authz]. in [LAKE-AUTHZ].
6. EUI-64 is used as the identity of the endpoint (see example in 6. EUI-64 is used as the identity of the endpoint (see an example in
Section 3.5.2). Section 3.5.2).
7. No use of message_4: the application sends protected messages 7. No use of message_4. The application sends protected messages
from R to I. from R to I.
Appendix G. Long PLAINTEXT_2 Appendix G. Long PLAINTEXT_2
By the definition of encryption of PLAINTEXT_2 with KEYSTREAM_2, it By the definition of encryption of PLAINTEXT_2 with KEYSTREAM_2, it
is limited to lengths of PLAINTEXT_2 not exceeding the output of is limited to lengths of PLAINTEXT_2 not exceeding the output of
EDHOC_KDF, see Section 4.1.2. If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2 EDHOC_KDF; see Section 4.1.2. If the EDHOC hash algorithm is SHA-2,
then HKDF-Expand is used, which limits the length of the EDHOC_KDF then HKDF-Expand is used, which limits the length of the EDHOC_KDF
output to 255 ⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the length of the output to 255 ⋅ hash_length, where hash_length is the length of the
output of the EDHOC hash algorithm given by the cipher suite. For output of the EDHOC hash algorithm given by the cipher suite. For
example, with SHA-256 as EDHOC hash algorithm, the length of the hash example, with SHA-256 as an EDHOC hash algorithm, the length of the
output is 32 bytes and the maximum length of PLAINTEXT_2 is 255 ⋅ 32 hash output is 32 bytes and the maximum length of PLAINTEXT_2 is 255
= 8160 bytes. ⋅ 32 = 8160 bytes.
While PLAINTEXT_2 is expected to be much shorter than 8 kB for the While PLAINTEXT_2 is expected to be much shorter than 8 kB for the
intended use cases, it seems nevertheless prudent to specify a intended use cases, it seems nevertheless prudent to specify a
solution for the event that this should turn out to be a limitation. solution for the event that this should turn out to be a limitation.
A potential work-around is to use a cipher suite with a different A potential work-around is to use a cipher suite with a different
hash function. In particular, the use of KMAC removes all practical hash function. In particular, the use of KMAC removes all practical
limitations in this respect. limitations in this respect.
This section specifies a solution which works with any hash function, This section specifies a solution that works with any hash function
by making use of multiple invocations of HKDF-Expand and negative by making use of multiple invocations of HKDF-Expand and negative
values of info_label. values of info_label.
Consider the PLAINTEXT_2 partitioned in parts P(i) of length equal to Consider the PLAINTEXT_2 partitioned in parts P(i) of length equal to
M = 255 ⋅ hash_length, except possibly the last part P(last) which M = 255 ⋅ hash_length, except possibly the last part P(last), which
has 0 < length ≤ M. has 0 < length ≤ M.
PLAINTEXT_2 = P(0) | P(1) | ... | P(last) PLAINTEXT_2 = P(0) | P(1) | ... | P(last)
where | indicates concatenation. where "|" indicates concatenation.
The object is to define a matching KEYSTREAM_2 of the same length and The object is to define a matching KEYSTREAM_2 of the same length and
perform the encryption in the same way as defined in Section 5.3.2: perform the encryption in the same way as defined in Section 5.3.2:
CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2 CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2
Define the keystream as: Define the keystream as:
KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) | OKM(1) | ... | OKM(last) KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) | OKM(1) | ... | OKM(last)
where where:
OKM(i) = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, -i, TH_2, length(P(i)) ) OKM(i) = EDHOC_KDF( PRK_2e, -i, TH_2, length(P(i)) )
Note that if length(PLAINTEXT_2) ≤ M then P(0) = PLAINTEXT_2 and the Note that if length(PLAINTEXT_2) ≤ M, then P(0) = PLAINTEXT_2 and the
definition of KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) coincides with Figure 8. definition of KEYSTREAM_2 = OKM(0) coincides with Figure 6.
This describes the processing of the Responder when sending This describes the processing of the Responder when sending
message_2. The Initiator makes the same calculations when receiving message_2. The Initiator makes the same calculations when receiving
message_2, but interchanging PLAINTEXT_2 and CIPHERTEXT_2. message_2 but interchanging PLAINTEXT_2 and CIPHERTEXT_2.
An application profile may specify if it supports or not the method An application profile may specify if it supports or does not support
described in this appendix. the method described in this appendix.
Appendix H. EDHOC_KeyUpdate Appendix H. EDHOC_KeyUpdate
To provide forward secrecy in an even more efficient way than re- To provide forward secrecy in an even more efficient way than re-
running EDHOC, this section specifies the optional function running EDHOC, this section specifies the optional function
EDHOC_KeyUpdate in terms of EDHOC_KDF and PRK_out. EDHOC_KeyUpdate in terms of EDHOC_KDF and PRK_out.
When EDHOC_KeyUpdate is called, a new PRK_out is calculated as a When EDHOC_KeyUpdate is called, a new PRK_out is calculated as the
"hash" of the old PRK_out using the EDHOC_Expand function as output of the EDHOC_Expand function with the old PRK_out as input.
illustrated by the following pseudocode. The change of PRK_out The change of PRK_out causes a change to PRK_exporter, which enables
causes a change to PRK_exporter which enables the derivation of new the derivation of new application keys superseding the old ones,
application keys superseding the old ones, using EDHOC_Exporter, see using EDHOC_Exporter; see Section 4.2.1. The process is illustrated
Section 4.2.1. by the following pseudocode.
EDHOC_KeyUpdate( context ): EDHOC_KeyUpdate( context ):
new PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( old PRK_out, 11, context, hash_length ) new PRK_out = EDHOC_KDF( old PRK_out, 11, context, hash_length )
new PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( new PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length ) new PRK_exporter = EDHOC_KDF( new PRK_out, 10, h'', hash_length )
where hash_length denotes the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash where hash_length denotes the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash
algorithm of the selected cipher suite. algorithm of the selected cipher suite.
The EDHOC_KeyUpdate takes a context as input to enable binding of the The EDHOC_KeyUpdate takes the context as input to enable binding of
updated PRK_out to some event that triggered the key update. The the updated PRK_out to some event that triggered the key update. The
Initiator and the Responder need to agree on the context, which can, Initiator and Responder need to agree on the context, which can,
e.g., be a counter, a pseudorandom number, or a hash. To provide e.g., be a counter, a pseudorandom number, or a hash. To provide
forward secrecy the old PRK_out and keys derived from it (old forward secrecy, the old PRK_out and keys derived from it (old
PRK_exporter and old application keys) must be deleted as soon as PRK_exporter and old application keys) must be deleted as soon as
they are not needed. When to delete the old keys and how to verify they are not needed. When to delete the old keys and how to verify
that they are not needed is up to the application. that they are not needed is up to the application. Note that the
security properties depend on the type of context and the number of
KeyUpdate iterations.
An application using EDHOC_KeyUpdate needs to store PRK_out. An application using EDHOC_KeyUpdate needs to store PRK_out.
Compromise of PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material Compromise of PRK_out leads to compromise of all keying material
derived with the EDHOC_Exporter since the last invocation of the derived with the EDHOC_Exporter since the last invocation of the
EDHOC_KeyUpdate function. EDHOC_KeyUpdate function.
While this key update method provides forward secrecy it does not While this key update method provides forward secrecy, it does not
give as strong security properties as re-running EDHOC. give as strong security properties as re-running EDHOC.
EDHOC_KeyUpdate can be used to meet cryptographic limits and provide EDHOC_KeyUpdate can be used to meet cryptographic limits and provide
partial protection against key leakage, but it provides significantly partial protection against key leakage, but it provides significantly
weaker security properties than re-running EDHOC with ephemeral weaker security properties than re-running EDHOC with ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman. Even with frequent use of EDHOC_KeyUpdate, Diffie-Hellman. Even with frequent use of EDHOC_KeyUpdate,
compromise of one session key compromises all future session keys, compromise of one session key compromises all future session keys,
and an attacker therefore only needs to perform static key and an attacker therefore only needs to perform static key
exfiltration [RFC7624], which is less complicated and has a lower exfiltration [RFC7624], which is less complicated and has a lower
risk profile than the dynamic case, see Section 9.1. risk profile than the dynamic case; see Section 9.1.
A similar method to do key update for OSCORE is KUDOS, see A similar method to do a key update for OSCORE is KUDOS; see [KUDOS].
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update].
Appendix I. Example Protocol State Machine Appendix I. Example Protocol State Machine
This appendix describes an example protocol state machine for the This appendix describes an example protocol state machine for the
Initiator and for the Responder. States are denoted in all capitals Initiator and Responder. States are denoted in all capitals, and
and parentheses denote actions taken only in some circumstances. parentheses denote actions taken only in some circumstances.
Note that this state machine is just an example, and that details of Note that this state machine is just an example, and that details of
processing are omitted, for example: processing are omitted. For example:
* When error messages are being sent (with one exception) * when error messages are being sent (with one exception);
* How credentials and EAD are processed by EDHOC and the application * how credentials and EAD are processed by EDHOC and the application
in the RCVD state in the RCVD state; and
* What verifications are made, which includes not only MACs and * what verifications are made, which includes not only MACs and
signatures signatures.
I.1. Initiator State Machine I.1. Initiator State Machine
The Initiator sends message_1, triggering the state machine to The Initiator sends message_1, triggering the state machine to
transition from START to WAIT_M2, and waits for message_2. transition from START to WAIT_M2, and waits for message_2.
If the incoming message is an error message then the Initiator If the incoming message is an error message, then the Initiator
transitions from WAIT_M2 to ABORTED. In case of error code 2 (Wrong transitions from WAIT_M2 to ABORTED. In case of error code 2 (Wrong
Selected Cipher Suite), the Initiator remembers the supported cipher Selected Cipher Suite), the Initiator remembers the supported cipher
suites for this particular Responder and transitions from ABORTED to suites for this particular Responder and transitions from ABORTED to
START. The message_1 that the Initiator subsequently sends takes START. The message_1 that the Initiator subsequently sends takes
into account the cipher suites supported by the Responder. into account the cipher suites supported by the Responder.
Upon receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from Upon receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from
WAIT_M2 to RCVD_M2 and processes the message. If a processing error WAIT_M2 to RCVD_M2 and processes the message. If a processing error
occurs on message_2, then the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to occurs on message_2, then the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to
ABORTED. In case of successful processing of message_2, the ABORTED. In case of successful processing of message_2, the
Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to VRFD_M2. Initiator transitions from RCVD_M2 to VRFD_M2.
The Initiator prepares and processes message_3 for sending. If any The Initiator prepares and processes message_3 for sending. If any
processing error is encountered, the Initiator transitions from processing error is encountered, the Initiator transitions from
VRFD_M2 to ABORTED. If message_3 is successfully sent, the Initiator VRFD_M2 to ABORTED. If message_3 is successfully sent, the Initiator
transitions from VRFD_M2 to COMPLETED. transitions from VRFD_M2 to COMPLETED.
If the application profile includes message_4, then the Initiator If the application profile includes message_4, then the Initiator
waits for message_4. If the incoming message is an error message waits for message_4. If the incoming message is an error message,
then the Initiator transitions from COMPLETED to ABORTED. Upon then the Initiator transitions from COMPLETED to ABORTED. Upon
receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from receiving a non-error message, the Initiator transitions from
COMPLETED (="WAIT_M4") to RCVD_M4 and processes the message. If a COMPLETED (="WAIT_M4") to RCVD_M4 and processes the message. If a
processing error occurs on message_4, then the Initiator transitions processing error occurs on message_4, then the Initiator transitions
from RCVD_M4 to ABORTED. In case of successful processing of from RCVD_M4 to ABORTED. In case of successful processing of
message_4, the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M4 to PERSISTED message_4, the Initiator transitions from RCVD_M4 to PERSISTED
(="VRFD_M4"). (="VRFD_M4").
If the application profile does not include message_4, then the If the application profile does not include message_4, then the
Initiator waits for an incoming application message. If the Initiator waits for an incoming application message. If the
skipping to change at page 98, line 37 skipping to change at line 4537
| | (Receive message_4) | | | (Receive message_4) |
| | | | | |
| (Processing error) v | (Verify | (Processing error) v | (Verify
+------------------- (RCVD_M4) | application +------------------- (RCVD_M4) | application
| | message) | | message)
| (Verify message_4) | | (Verify message_4) |
| | | |
v | v |
PERSISTED <---------------+ PERSISTED <---------------+
Figure 12: Initiator State Machine
I.2. Responder State Machine I.2. Responder State Machine
Upon receiving message_1, the Responder transitions from START to Upon receiving message_1, the Responder transitions from START to
RCVD_M1. RCVD_M1.
If a processing error occurs on message_1, the Responder transitions If a processing error occurs on message_1, the Responder transitions
from RCVD_M1 to ABORTED. This includes sending error message with from RCVD_M1 to ABORTED. This includes sending an error message with
error code 2 (Wrong Selected Cipher Suite) if the selected cipher error code 2 (Wrong Selected Cipher Suite) if the selected cipher
suite in message_1 is not supported. In case of successful suite in message_1 is not supported. In case of successful
processing of message_1, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M1 to processing of message_1, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M1 to
VRFD_M1. VRFD_M1.
The Responder prepares and processes message_2 for sending. If any The Responder prepares and processes message_2 for sending. If any
processing error is encountered, the Responder transitions from processing error is encountered, the Responder transitions from
VRFD_M1 to ABORTED. If message_2 is successfully sent, the Initiator VRFD_M1 to ABORTED. If message_2 is successfully sent, the Initiator
transitions from VRFD_M2 to WAIT_M3, and waits for message_3. transitions from VRFD_M2 to WAIT_M3 and waits for message_3.
If the incoming message is an error message then the Responder If the incoming message is an error message, then the Responder
transitions from WAIT_M3 to ABORTED. transitions from WAIT_M3 to ABORTED.
Upon receiving message_3, the Responder transitions from WAIT_M3 to Upon receiving message_3, the Responder transitions from WAIT_M3 to
RCVD_M3. If a processing error occurs on message_3, the Responder RCVD_M3. If a processing error occurs on message_3, the Responder
transitions from RCVD_M3 to ABORTED. In case of successful transitions from RCVD_M3 to ABORTED. In case of successful
processing of message_3, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M3 to processing of message_3, the Responder transitions from RCVD_M3 to
COMPLETED (="VRFD_M3"). COMPLETED (="VRFD_M3").
If the application profile includes message_4, the Responder prepares If the application profile includes message_4, the Responder prepares
and processes message_4 for sending. If any processing error is and processes message_4 for sending. If any processing error is
skipping to change at page 100, line 5 skipping to change at line 4605
| | Verify message_3 | | Verify message_3
| | | |
| (Processing error) v | (Processing error) v
+------------------- COMPLETED +------------------- COMPLETED
| |
| (Send message_4) | (Send message_4)
| |
v v
PERSISTED PERSISTED
Appendix J. Change Log Figure 13: Responder State Machine
RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix.
* From -21 to -22
- Normative text on transport capabilities.
* From -20 to -21
- Recommendation to use chain instead of bag
- Improved text about
o denial-of-service
o deriving secret and non-secret randomness from the same KDF
instance
o practical security against quantum computers
- Clarifications, including
o several updates section 3.4. Transport
o descriptions in COSE IANA registration
o encoding in Figure 5, reading of Figure 17
- Removed term "dummy"
- Harmonizing captions
- Updated references
- Acknowledgments
* From -19 to -20
- C_R encrypted in message_2
- C_R removed from TH_2
- Error code for unknown referenced credential
- Error code 0 (success) explicitly reserved
- Message deduplication section moved from appendix to body
- Terminology
o discontinued -> aborted
o protocol run / exchange -> session
- Clarifications, in particular
o when to derive application keys
o the role of the application for authentication
- Security considerations for kccs and kcwt
- Updated references
* From -18 to -19
- Clarifications:
o Relation to SIGMA
o Role of Static DH
o Initiator and Responder roles
o Transport properties
o Construction of SUITES_I
o Message correlation, new subsection 3.4.1, replacing former
appendix H
o Role of description about long PLAINTEXT_2
o ead_label and ead_value
o Message processing (Section 5)
o Padding
o Cipher suite negotiation example
- Other updates:
o Improved and stricter normative text in Appendix A
o Naming and separate sections for the two message flows in
Appendix A: Forward/Reverse message flow,
o Table index style captions
o Aligning with COSE terminology: header map -> header_map
o Aligning terminology, use of "_" instead of "-"
o Prefixing "EDHOC_" to functions
o Updated list of security analysis papers
o New appendix with example state machine
o Acknowledgements
o Language improvements by native English speakers
o Updated IANA section with registration procedures
o New and updated references
o Removed appendix H
* From -17 to -18
- Padding realised as EAD with ead_label = 0, PAD fields removed
- Revised EAD syntax; ead is now EAD item; ead_value is now
optional
- Clarifications of
o Identifier representation
o Authentication credentials
o RPK
o Encoding of ID_CRED with kid
o Representation of public keys, y-coordinate of ephemeral
keys and validation
o Processing after completed protocol
o Making verifications available to the application
o Relation between EDHOC and OSCORE identifiers
- Terminology alignment in particular session / protocol;
discontinue / terminate
- Updated CDDL
- Additional unicode encodings
- Large number of nits from WGLC
* From -16 to -17
- EDHOC-KeyUpdate moved to appendix
- Updated peer awareness properties based on SIGMA
- Clarify use of random connection identifiers
- Editorials related to appendix about messages with long
PLAINTEXT_2
- Updated acknowledgments (have we forgotten someone else? please
send email)
* From -15 to -16
- TH_2 used as salt in the derivation of PRK_2e
- CRED_R/CRED_I included in TH_3/TH_4
- Distinguish label used in info, exporter or elsewhere
- New appendix for optional handling arbitrarily large message_2
o info_label type changed to int to support this
- Updated security considerations
- Implementation note about identifiers which are bstr/int
- Clarifications, especifically about compact representation
- Type bug fix in CDDL section
* From -14 to -15
- Connection identifiers and key identifiers are now byte strings
o Represented as CBOR bstr in the EDHOC message
+ Unless they happen to encode a one-byte CBOR int
o More examples
- EAD updates and details
o Definition of EAD item
o Definition of critical / non-critical EAD item
- New section in Appendix D: Unauthenticated Operation
- Clarifications
o Lengths used in EDHOC-KDF
o Key derivation from PRK_out
+ EDHOC-KeyUpdate and EDHOC-Exporter
o Padding
- Security considerations
o When a change in a message is detected
o Confidentiality in case of active attacks
o Connection identifiers should be unpredictable
o Maximum length of message_2
- Minor bugs
* From -13 to -14
- Merge of section 1.1 and 1.2
- Connection and key identifiers restricted to be byte strings
- Representation of byte strings as one-byte CBOR ints (-24..23)
- Simplified mapping between EDHOC and OSCORE identifiers
- Rewrite of 3.5
o Clarification of authentication related operations performed
by EDHOC
o Authentication related verifications, including old section
3.5.1, moved to new appendix D
- Rewrite of 3.8
o Move content about use of EAD to new appendix E
o ead_value changed to bstr
- EDHOC-KDF updated
o transcript_hash argument removed
o TH included in context argument
o label argument is now type uint, all labels replaced
- Key schedule updated
o New salts derived to avoid reuse of same key with expand and
extract
o PRK_4x3m renamed PRK_4e3m
o K_4 and IV_4 derived from PRK_4e3m
o New PRK: PRK_out derived from PRK_4e3m and TH_4
o Clarified main output of EDHOC is the shared secret PRK_out
o Exporter defined by EDHOC-KDF and new PRK PRK_exporter
derived from PRK_out
o Key update defined by Expand instead of Extract
- All applications of EDHOC-KDF in one place
- Update of processing
o EAD and ID_CRED passed to application when available
o identity verification and credential retrieval omitted in
protocol description
o Transcript hash defined by plaintext messages instead of
ciphertext
o Changed order of input to TH_2
o Removed general G_X checking against selfie-attacks
- Support for padding of plaintext
- Updated compliance requirements
- Updated security considerations
o Updated and more clear requirements on MAC length
o Clarification of key confirmation
o Forbid use of same key for signature and static DH
- Updated appendix on message deduplication
- Clarifications of
o connection identifiers
o cipher suites, including negotiation
o EAD
o Error messages
- Updated media types
- Applicability template renamed application profile
- Editorials
* From -12 to -13
- no changes
* From -12:
- Shortened labels to derive OSCORE key and salt
- ead_value changed to bstr
- Removed general G_X checking against selfie-attacks
- Updated and more clear requirements on MAC length
- Clarifications from Kathleen, Stephen, Marco, Sean, Stefan,
- Authentication Related Verifications moved to appendix
- Updated MTI section and cipher suite
- Updated security considerations
* From -11 to -12:
- Clarified applicability to KEMs
- Clarified use of COSE header parameters
- Updates on MTI
- Updated security considerations
- New section on PQC
- Removed duplicate definition of cipher suites
- Explanations of use of COSE moved to Appendix C.3
- Updated internal references
* From -10 to -11:
- Restructured section on authentication parameters
- Changed UCCS to CCS
- Changed names and description of COSE header parameters for
CWT/CCS
- Changed several of the KDF and Exporter labels
- Removed edhoc_aead_id from info (already in transcript_hash)
- Added MTI section
- EAD: changed CDDL names and added value type to registry
- Updated Figures 1, 2, and 3
- Some correction and clarifications
- Added core.edhoc to CoRE Resource Type registry
* From -09 to -10:
- SUITES_I simplified to only contain the selected and more
preferred suites
- Info is a CBOR sequence and context is a bstr
- Added kid to UCCS example
- Separate header parameters for CWT and UCCS
- CWT Confirmation Method kid extended to bstr / int
* From -08 to -09:
- G_Y and CIPHERTEXT_2 are now included in one CBOR bstr
- MAC_2 and MAC_3 are now generated with EDHOC-KDF
- Info field “context” is now general and explicit in EDHOC-KDF
- Restructured Section 4, Key Derivation
- Added EDHOC MAC length to cipher suite for use with static DH
- More details on the use of CWT and UCCS
- Restructured and clarified Section 3.5, Authentication
Parameters
- Replaced 'kid2' with extension of 'kid'
- EAD encoding now supports multiple ead types in one message
- Clarified EAD type
- Updated message sizes
- Replaced “perfect forward secrecy” with “forward secrecy”
- Updated security considerations
- Replaced prepended 'null' with 'true' in the CoAP transport of
message_1
- Updated CDDL definitions
- Expanded on the use of COSE
* From -07 to -08:
- Prepended C_x moved from the EDHOC protocol itself to the
transport mapping
- METHOD_CORR renamed to METHOD, corr removed
- Removed bstr_identifier and use bstr / int instead; C_x can now
be int without any implied bstr semantics
- Defined COSE header parameter 'kid2' with value type bstr / int
for use with ID_CRED_x
- Updated message sizes
- New cipher suites with AES-GCM and ChaCha20 / Poly1305
- Changed from one- to two-byte identifier of CNSA compliant
suite
- Separate sections on transport and connection id with further
sub-structure
- Moved back key derivation for OSCORE from draft-ietf-core-
oscore-edhoc
- OSCORE and CoAP specific processing moved to new appendix
- Message 4 section moved to message processing section
* From -06 to -07:
- Changed transcript hash definition for TH_2 and TH_3
- Removed "EDHOC signature algorithm curve" from cipher suite
- New IANA registry "EDHOC Exporter Label"
- New application defined parameter "context" in EDHOC-Exporter
- Changed normative language for failure from MUST to SHOULD send
error
- Made error codes non-negative and 0 for success
- Added detail on success error code
- Aligned terminology "protocol instance" -> "session"
- New appendix on compact EC point representation
- Added detail on use of ephemeral public keys
- Moved key derivation for OSCORE to draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc
- Additional security considerations
- Renamed "Auxililary Data" as "External Authorization Data"
- Added encrypted EAD_4 to message_4
* From -05 to -06:
- New section 5.2 "Message Processing Outline"
- Optional inital byte C_1 = null in message_1
- New format of error messages, table of error codes, IANA
registry
- Change of recommendation transport of error in CoAP
- Merge of content in 3.7 and appendix C into new section 3.7
"Applicability Statement"
- Requiring use of deterministic CBOR
- New section on message deduplication
- New appendix containin all CDDL definitions
- New appendix with change log
- Removed section "Other Documents Referencing EDHOC"
- Clarifications based on review comments
* From -04 to -05:
- EDHOC-Rekey-FS -> EDHOC-KeyUpdate
- Clarification of cipher suite negotiation
- Updated security considerations
- Updated test vectors
- Updated applicability statement template
* From -03 to -04:
- Restructure of section 1
- Added references to C509 Certificates
- Change in CIPHERTEXT_2 -> plaintext XOR KEYSTREAM_2 (test
vector not updated)
- "K_2e", "IV_2e" -> KEYSTREAM_2
- Specified optional message 4
- EDHOC-Exporter-FS -> EDHOC-Rekey-FS
- Less constrained devices SHOULD implement both suite 0 and 2
- Clarification of error message
- Added exporter interface test vector
* From -02 to -03:
- Rearrangements of section 3 and beginning of section 4
- Key derivation new section 4
- Cipher suites 4 and 5 added
- EDHOC-EXPORTER-FS - generate a new PRK_4x3m from an old one
- Change in CIPHERTEXT_2 -> COSE_Encrypt0 without tag (no change
to test vector)
- Clarification of error message
- New appendix C applicability statement
* From -01 to -02:
- New section 1.2 Use of EDHOC
- Clarification of identities
- New section 4.3 clarifying bstr_identifier
- Updated security considerations
- Updated text on cipher suite negotiation and key confirmation
- Test vector for static DH
* From -00 to -01:
- Removed PSK method
- Removed references to certificate by value
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Christian Amsüss, Alessandro Bruni, The authors want to thank Christian Amsüss, Karthikeyan Bhargavan,
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Carsten Bormann, Timothy Claeys, Baptiste Carsten Bormann, Alessandro Bruni, Timothy Claeys, Baptiste Cottier,
Cottier, Roman Danyliw, Martin Disch, Martin Duke, Donald Eastlake, Roman Danyliw, Martin Disch, Martin Duke, Donald Eastlake 3rd, Lars
Lars Eggert, Stephen Farrell, Loïc Ferreira, Theis Grønbech Petersen, Eggert, Stephen Farrell, Loïc Ferreira, Theis Grønbech Petersen,
Felix Günther, Dan Harkins, Klaus Hartke, Russ Housley, Stefan Felix Günther, Dan Harkins, Klaus Hartke, Russ Housley, Stefan
Hristozov, Marc Ilunga, Charlie Jacomme, Elise Klein, Erik Kline, Hristozov, Marc Ilunga, Charlie Jacomme, Elise Klein, Erik Kline,
Steve Kremer, Alexandros Krontiris, Ilari Liusvaara, Rafa Marín- Steve Kremer, Alexandros Krontiris, Ilari Liusvaara, Rafa Marín-
López, Kathleen Moriarty, David Navarro, Karl Norrman, Salvador López, Kathleen Moriarty, David Navarro, Karl Norrman, Salvador
Pérez, Radia Perlman, David Pointcheval, Maïwenn Racouchot, Eric Pérez, Radia Perlman, David Pointcheval, Maïwenn Racouchot, Eric
Rescorla, Michael Richardson, Thorvald Sahl Jørgensen, Zaheduzzaman Rescorla, Michael Richardson, Thorvald Sahl Jørgensen, Zaheduzzaman
Sarker, Jim Schaad, Michael Scharf, Carsten Schürmann, John Scudder, Sarker, Jim Schaad, Michael Scharf, Carsten Schürmann, John Scudder,
Ludwig Seitz, Brian Sipos, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, Valery Smyslov, Ludwig Seitz, Brian Sipos, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, Valery Smyslov,
Peter van der Stok, Rene Struik, Vaishnavi Sundararajan, Erik Peter van der Stok, Rene Struik, Vaishnavi Sundararajan, Erik
Thormarker, Marco Tiloca, Sean Turner, Michel Veillette, Mališa Thormarker, Marco Tiloca, Sean Turner, Michel Veillette, Mališa
Vučinić, Paul Wouters, and Lei Yan for reviewing and commenting on Vučinić, Paul Wouters, and Lei Yan for reviewing and commenting on
intermediate versions of the draft. We are especially indebted to intermediate draft versions of this document. We are especially
the late Jim Schaad for his continuous reviewing and implementation indebted to the late Jim Schaad for his continuous reviewing and
of early versions of this and other drafts. implementation of early draft versions of this document.
Work on this document has in part been supported by the H2020 project Work on this document has in part been supported by the H2020 project
SIFIS-Home (grant agreement 952652). SIFIS-Home (grant agreement 952652).
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Göran Selander Göran Selander
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden Sweden
 End of changes. 665 change blocks. 
2296 lines changed or deleted 1758 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48.