Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd
draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd
Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Somos Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: 7 December 2023 Neustar Inc.
5 June 2023
PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data
draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-26
Abstract
This document extends PASSporT, a token for conveying
cryptographically-signed call information about personal
communications, to include rich meta-data about a call and caller
that can be signed and integrity protected, transmitted, and
subsequently rendered to the called party. This framework is
intended to include and extend caller and call specific information
beyond human-readable display name comparable to the "Caller ID"
function common on the telephone network and is also enhanced with a
integrity mechanism that is designed to protect the authoring and
transport of this information for different authoritative use-cases.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 December 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Overview of the use of the Rich Call Data PASSporT
extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Overview of Rich Call Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. PASSporT Claim "rcd" Definition and Usage . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. PASSporT "rcd" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.1. "nam" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.2. "apn" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.3. "icn" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.4. "jcd" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.5. "jcl" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. "rcdi" RCD Integrity Claim Definition and Usage . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Creation of the "rcd" element digests . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.1. "nam" and "apn" elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.2. "icn" elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.3. "jcd" elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.4. "jcl" elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. JWT Claim Constraints for "rcd" claims . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. JWT Claim Constraints usage for "rcd" and "rcdi"
claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. PASSporT "crn" claim - Call Reason Definition and Usage . . . 16
7.1. JWT Constraint for "crn" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Rich Call Data Claims Usage Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. "rcd" PASSporT Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. "rcdi" Integrity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.3. Example "rcd" PASSporTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Compact form of "rcd" PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. Compact form of the "rcd" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. Compact form of the "rcdi" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 21
9.3. Compact form of the "crn" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 21
10. Third-Party Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10.1. Signing as a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.2. Verification using Third Party RCD . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Levels of Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
12. Use of "rcd" PASSporTs in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
12.1. Authentication Service Behavior for SIP protocol . . . . 25
12.2. Verification Service Behavior for SIP protocol . . . . . 26
13. Using "rcd", "rcdi", "crn" as additional claims to other
PASSporT extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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13.1. Procedures for applying RCD claims as claims only . . . 27
13.2. Example for applying RCD claims as claims only . . . . . 27
14. Further Information Associated with Callers . . . . . . . . . 28
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.1. JSON Web Token Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.2. Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extensions . . . . . 30
16.3. PASSporT RCD Claim Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
17. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
17.1. The use of JWT Claim Constraints in delegate certificates
to exclude unauthorized claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
PASSporT [RFC8225] is a token format based on JWT [RFC7519] for
conveying cryptographically-signed information about the parties
involved in personal communications; it is used to convey a signed
assertion of the identity of the participants in real-time
communications established via a protocol like SIP [RFC8224]. The
STIR problem statement [RFC7340] declared securing the display name
of callers outside of STIR's initial scope. This document extends
the use of JWT and PASSporT in the overall STIR framework by defining
a PASSporT extension and the associated STIR procedures to protect
additional caller and call related information. This is additional
information beyond the calling party originating identity (e.g.
telephone number or SIP URI) that is intended to be rendered to
assist a called party in determining whether to accept or trust
incoming communications. This includes information such as the name
of the person or entity on one side of a communications session, for
example, the traditional "Caller ID" of the telephone network along
with related display information that would be rendered to the called
party during alerting or potentially used by an automaton to
determine whether and how to alert a called party to a call and whom
is calling.
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Traditional telephone network signaling protocols have long supported
delivering a 'calling name' from the originating side, though in
practice, the terminating side is often left to determine a name from
the calling party number by consulting a local address book or an
external database. SIP, for example, similarly can carry this
information in a 'display-name' in the From header field value from
the originating to terminating side, or alternatively in the Call-
Info header field. In this document, we utilize the STIR framework
to more generally extend the assertion of an extensible set of
identity information not limited to but including calling name.
This document extends PASSporT to provide cryptographic protection
for the "display-name" field of SIP requests, or similar name fields
in other protocols, as well as further "rich call data" (RCD) about
the caller, which includes the contents of the Call-Info header field
or other data structures that can be added to the PASSporT. In
addition, Section 12 describes use-cases that enable external third-
party authorities to convey rich information associated with a
calling number via a "rcd" PASSporT while clearly identifying the
third-party as the source of the Rich Call Data information.
Finally, this document describes how to preserve the integrity of the
RCD in scenarios where there may be non-authoritative users
initiating and signing RCD and therefore a constraint on the RCD data
that a PASSporT can attest via certificate-level controls.
2. Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Overview of the use of the Rich Call Data PASSporT extension
This document defines Rich Call Data (RCD) which is a PASSporT
extension [RFC8225] that defines an extensible claim for asserting
information about the call beyond the telephone number. This
includes information such as more detailed information about the
calling party or calling number being presented or the purpose of the
call. There are many use-cases that will be described in this
document around the entities responsible for the signing and
integrity of this information, whether it is the entity that
originates a call, a service provider acting on behalf of a caller or
use-cases where third-party services may be authoritative over the
rich call data on behalf of the caller. In general, PASSporT
[RFC8225] has been defined to be a communications protocol
independent technology, but it's initial usage as detailed in
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[RFC8224] is with the SIP protocol [RFC3261]. There are many SIP
specific references and definitions in this document, but future
specifications may extend the usage of RCD PASSporTs and claims to
other protocol specific usage and definitions.
The RCD associated with the identity of the calling party described
in this document is of two main categories. The first data is a more
traditional set of info about a caller associated with "display-name"
in SIP [RFC3261], typically a textual description of the caller, or
alternate presentation numbers often used in From Header field
[RFC3261] or P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325], or an icon associated
with the caller. The second category is a set of RCD that is defined
as part of the jCard definitions or extensions to that data.
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] describes the optional use of jCard
in Call-Info header field as RCD with the "jcard" Call-Info purpose
token. Either or both of these two types of data can be incorporated
into an "rcd" claim defined in this document.
Additionally, in relation to the description of the specific
communications event itself (versus the identity description in
previous paragraph), [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] also describes a
"call-reason" parameter intended for description of the intent or
reason for a particular call. A new PASSporT claim "crn", or call
reason, can contain a string that describes the intent of the call.
This claim is intentionally kept separate from the "rcd" claim
because it is envisioned that call reason is not the same as
information associated with the caller and may change on a more
frequent, per call, type of basis.
4. Overview of Rich Call Data Integrity
When incorporating call data that represents a user, even in
traditional calling name services today, often there are policy and
restrictions around what data elements are allowed to be used.
Whether preventing offensive language or icons or enforcing
uniqueness, potential trademark or copyright violations or other
policy enforcement, there might be the desire to pre-certify or "vet"
the specific use of rich call data. This document defines a
mechanism that allows for a direct or indirect party that enforces
the policies to approve or certify the content, create a
cryptographic digest that can be used to validate that data and
applies a constraint in the certificate to allow the recipient and
verifier to validate that the specific content of the RCD is as
intended at its creation and approval or certification.
There are two mechanisms that are defined to accomplish that for two
distinct categories of purposes. The first of the mechanisms include
the definition of an integrity claim. The RCD integrity mechanism is
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a process of generating a cryptographic digest for each resource
referenced by a URI within a claim value (e.g., an image file
referenced by "jcd" or a jCard referenced by "jcl"). This mechanism
is inspired by and based on the W3C Subresource Integrity
specification [W3C-SubresourceIntegrity]. The second of the
mechanisms uses the capability called JWT Claim Constraints, defined
in [RFC8226] and extended in [RFC9118]. The JWT Claim Constraints
specifically guide the verifier within the certificate used to
compute the signature in the PASSporT for the inclusion (or
exclusion) of specific claims and their values, so that the content
intended by the signer can be verified to be accurate.
Both of these mechanisms, integrity digests and JWT Claims
Constraints, can be used together or separately depending on the
intended purpose. The first category of purpose is whether the rich
call data conveyed in the PASSporT claims is pass-by-value or pass-
by-reference; i.e., is the information contained in the PASSporT
claims and therefore integrity protected by the PASSporT signature,
or is the information contained in an external resource referenced by
a URI in the PASSporT. The second category of purpose is whether the
signer is authoritative or has responsibility for the accuracy of the
RCD based on the policies of the eco-system the "rcd" PASSporTs or
"rcd" claims are being used.
The following table provides an overview of the framework for how
integrity should be used with RCD. ("Auth" represents
"authoritative" in this table.)
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Modes | No URI refs | Includes URI refs |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Auth | 1: No integrity req | 2: RCD Integrity |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Non-Auth | 3: JWT Claim Const. | 4: RCD Integ./JWT Claim Const. |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
The first and simplest mode is exclusively for when all RCD content
is directly included as part of the claims (i.e. no URIs referencing
external content are included in the content) and when the signer is
authoritative over the content. In this mode, integrity protection
is not required and the set of claims is simply protected by the
signature of the standard PASSporT [RFC8225] and SIP identity header
[RFC8224] procedures. The second mode is an extension of the first
where the signer is authoritative and an "rcd" claim contents include
a URI identifying external resources. In this mode, an RCD Integrity
or "rcdi" claim MUST be included. This integrity claim is defined
later in this document and provides a digest of the "rcd" claim
content so that, particularly for the case where there are URI
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references in the RCD, the content of that RCD can be comprehensively
validated that it was received as intended by the signer of the
PASSporT.
The third and fourth modes cover cases where there is a different
authoritative entity responsible for the content of the RCD, separate
from the signer of the PASSporT itself, allowing the ability, in
particular when delegating signing authority for PASSporT, to enable
a mechanism for allowing agreed or vetted content included in or
referenced by the RCD claim contents. The primary framework for
allowing the separation of authority and the signing of PASSporTs by
non-authorized entities is detailed in [RFC9060] although other cases
may apply. As with the first and second modes, the third and fourth
modes differ with the absence or inclusion of referenced external
content using URIs.
5. PASSporT Claim "rcd" Definition and Usage
5.1. PASSporT "rcd" Claim
This document defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rcd", Rich Call
Data, the value of which is a JSON object that can contain one or
more key value pairs. This document defines a default set of key
values.
5.1.1. "nam" key
The "nam" key value is a display name, associated with the originator
of personal communications, which may for example match the display-
name component of the From header field value of a SIP request
[RFC3261] or alternatively from the P-Asserted-Identity header field
value [RFC3325], or a similar field in other PASSporT using
protocols. This key MUST be included once as part of the "rcd" claim
value JSON object. The key syntax of "nam" MUST follow the display-
name ABNF given in [RFC3261]. If there is no string associated with
a display name, the claim value MUST then be an empty string.
5.1.2. "apn" key
The "apn" key value is an optional alternate presentation number
associated with the originator of personal communications, which may
for example match the user component of the From header field value
of a SIP request (in cases where a network number is carried in the
P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325]), or alternatively from the Additional-
Identity header field value [3GPP TS 24.229 v16.7.0], or a similar
field in other PASSporT using protocols. Its intended semantics are
to convey a number that the originating user is authorized to show to
called parties in lieu of their default number, such as cases where a
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remote call agent uses the main number of a call center instead of
their personal telephone number. The "apn" key value is a
canonicalized telephone number per [RFC8224] Section 8.3. If
present, this key MUST be included once as part of the "rcd" claim
value JSON object.
The use of the optional "apn" key is intended for cases where the
signer of an "rcd" PASSporT or "rcd" claims authorizes the use of an
alternate presentation number by the user. How the signer determines
that a user is authorized to present the number in question is a
policy decision outside the scope of this document, however, the
vetting of the alternate presentation number should follow the same
level of vetting as telephone identities or any other information
contained in an "rcd" PASSporT or "rcd" claims. This usage is
intended as an alternative to conveying the presentation number in
the "tel" key value of a jCard, in situations where no other rich
jCard data needs to be conveyed with the call. Only one "apn" key
may be present. "apn" MUST be used when it is the intent of the
caller or signer to display the alternate presentation number even if
"jcd" or "jcl" keys are present in a PASSporT with a "tel" key value.
5.1.3. "icn" key
The "icn" key value is an optional HTTPS URL reference to an image
resource that can be used to pictorially represent the originator of
personal communications. This icon key value should be used as a
base or default method of associating an image with a calling party.
When being used for SIP [RFC3261] this claim key value used to
protect the Call-Info header field with a purpose parameter value of
"icon" as described in Section 20.9 [RFC3261]. Example as follows:
Call-Info: <http://wwww.example.com/alice/photo.jpg>;
purpose=icon
Note that [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] extends the specific usage
of "icon" in SIP in the context of the larger rich call data
framework with specific guidance on referencing images and image
types, sizes and formats.
It should be also noted that with jCard, as described in the
following "jcd" and "jcl" key value sections and in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], there are alternative ways of
including photos and logos as HTTPS URL references. The "icn" key
should be then considered a base or default image and jCard usage
should be considered for profiles and extensions that provide more
direct guidance on the usage of specific defined usage of what each
image type represents for the proper rendering to end users.
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5.1.4. "jcd" key
The "jcd" key value is defined to contain a jCard [RFC7095] JSON
object. The jCard is defined in this specification as an extensible
object format used to contain RCD information about the call
initiator. This object is intended to directly match the Call-Info
header field value defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] with a
type of "jcard" where the format of the jCard and properties used
should follow the normative usage and formatting rules and procedures
in that document. It is an extensible object where the calling party
can provide both the standard types of information defined in jCard
or can use the built-in extensibility of the jCard specification to
add additional information. The "jcd" key is optional. Either a
"jcd" or "jcl" MAY appear in the "rcd" claim, but not both.
The jCard object value for "jcd" MUST be a jCard JSON object that MAY
have URI referenced content, but that URI referenced content MUST NOT
further reference URIs. Future specifications may extend this
capability, but as stated in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] it
constrains the security properties of RCD information and the
integrity of the content referenced by URIs.
Note: even though we refer to [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] as the
definition of the jcard properties for usage in "rcd" claims, using
Call-Info as protocol with the addition of an identity header
carrying the PASSPorT is not required. The identity header carrying
a PASSporT with "rcd" claim including a "jcd" value can be used as
the primary and only transport of the RCD information.
5.1.5. "jcl" key
The "jcl" key value is an HTTPS URL that refers to a jCard [RFC7095]
JSON object on a web server. The web server MUST use the MIME media
type for JSON text as application/json with a default encoding of
UTF-8 [RFC8259]. This link may correspond to the Call-Info header
field value defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] with a type of
"jcard". As also defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], format
of the jCard and properties used should follow the normative usage
and formatting rules and procedures. The "jcl" key is optional. The
"jcd" or "jcl" keys MAY only appear once in the "rcd" claim but MUST
be mutually exclusive.
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The jCard object referenced by the URI value for "jcl" MUST be a
jCard JSON object that MAY have URI referenced content, but that URI
referenced content MUST NOT further reference URIs. Future
specifications may extend this capability, but as stated in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] it constrains the security properties
of RCD information and the integrity of the content referenced by
URIs.
6. "rcdi" RCD Integrity Claim Definition and Usage
The "rcdi" claim is included for the second and fourth modes
described in the integrity overview Section 4 of this document.
"rcdi" and "rcd" claims MAY each appear once in a PASSporT, but if
"rcdi" is included the "rcd" MUST correspondingly be present also.
The value of the "rcdi" claim is a JSON object that is defined as
follows.
The claim value of "rcdi" claim key is a JSON object with a set of
JSON key/value pairs. These objects correspond to each of the
elements of the "rcd" claim object that require integrity protection
with an associated digest over the content referenced by the key
string. The individual digest of different elements of the "rcd"
claim data and URI referenced external content is kept specifically
separate to allow the ability to verify the integrity of only the
elements that are ultimately retrieved or downloaded or rendered to
the end-user.
The key value references a specific object within the "rcd" claim
value using a JSON pointer defined in [RFC6901] with a minor
additional rule to support URI references to external content that
include JSON objects themselves, for the specific case of the use of
"jcl", defined in Section 6.1.4. JSON pointer syntax is the key
value that documents exactly the part of JSON that is used to
generate the digest which produce the resulting string that makes up
the value for the corresponding key. Detailed procedures are
provided below, but an example "rcdi" is provided here:
"rcdi" : {
"/jcl": "sha256-7kdCBZqH0nqMSPsmABvsKlHPhZEStgjojhdSJGRr3rk",
"/jcl/1/2/3": "sha256-jL4f47fF82LuwcrOrSyckA4SWrlElfARHkW6kYo1JdI"
}
The values of each key/value pair consists of a digest across one of
the following objects referenced by the JSON pointer key,
* content inline to the referenced object
* the content of a resource referenced by an inline URI object
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* the content of a resource specified by a URI that is in embedded
in content specified by an inline URI object(e.g., jcl)
This is combined with a string that defines the crypto algorithm used
to generate the digest. RCD implementations MUST support the hash
algorithms SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. These hash algorithms are
identified by "sha256", "sha384", and "sha512", respectively. SHA-
256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are part of the SHA-2 set of cryptographic
hash functions [RFC6234] defined by the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). Implementations MAY support
additional recommended hash algorithms in [IANA-COSE-ALG]; that is,
the hash algorithm has "Yes" in the "Recommended" column of the IANA
registry. Hash algorithm identifiers MUST use only lowercase
letters, and they MUST NOT contain hyphen characters. The character
following the algorithm string MUST be a hyphen character, "-", or
ASCII 45. The subsequent characters are the base64 encoded [RFC4648]
digest of a canonicalized and concatenated string or binary data
based on the JSON pointer referenced elements of "rcd" claim or the
URI referenced content contained in the claim. The details of the
determination of the input string used to determine the digest are
defined in the next section.
6.1. Creation of the "rcd" element digests
"rcd" claim objects can contain "nam", "apn", "icn", "jcd", or "jcl"
keys as part of the "rcd" JSON object claim value. This document
defines the use of JSON pointer [RFC6901] as a mechanism to reference
specific "rcd" claim elements.
In order to facilitate proper verification of the digests and whether
the "rcd" elements or content referenced by URIs were modified, the
input to the digest must be completely deterministic at three points
in the process. First, at the certification point where the content
is evaluated to conform to the application policy and the JWT Claim
Constraints is applied to the certificate containing the digest.
Second, when the call is signed at the Authentication Service, there
may be a local policy to verify that the provided "rcd" claim
corresponds to each digest. Third, when the "rcd" data is verified
at the Verification Service, the verification is performed for each
digest by constructing the input digest string for the element being
verified and referenced by the JSON pointer string.
The procedure for the creation of each "rcd" element digest string
corresponding to a JSON pointer string key is as follows.
1. The JSON pointer either refers to a value that is a part or the
whole of a JSON object or to a string that is a URI referencing
an external resource.
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2. For a JSON value, serialize the JSON to remove all white space
and line breaks. The procedures of this deterministic JSON
serialization are defined in [RFC8225], Section 9. The resulting
string is the input for the hash function.
3. For any URI referenced content, the bytes of the body of the HTTP
response is the input for the hash function.
Note that the digest is computed on the Json representation of the
string, which necessarily includes the beginning and ending double-
quote characters.
6.1.1. "nam" and "apn" elements
In the case of "nam" and "apn", the only allowed value is a string.
For both of these key values an "rcdi" JSON pointer or integrity
digest is optional because the direct value is protected by the
signature and can be constrained directly with JWTClaimConstraints.
6.1.2. "icn" elements
In the case of "icn", the only allowed value is a URI value that
references an image file. If the URI references externally linked
content there MUST be a JSON pointer and digest entry for the content
in that linked resource. When creating a key/value representing
"icn", the key is the JSON pointer string "/icn" and the digest value
string would be created using the image file byte data referenced in
the URI.
6.1.3. "jcd" elements
In the case of "jcd", the value associated is a jCard JSON object,
which happens to be a JSON array with sub-arrays. JSON pointer
notation uses numeric indices into elements of arrays, including when
those elements are arrays themselves.
As example, for the following "rcd" claim:
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"rcd": {
"jcd": ["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/photos/quartermaster-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
],
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets"
}
In order to use JSON pointer to refer to the URIs, the following
example "rcdi" claim includes a digest for the entire "jcd" array
string as well as three additional digests for the URIs, where, as
defined in [RFC6901] zero-based array indices are used to reference
the URI strings.
"rcdi": {
"/jcd": "sha256-7kdCBZqH0nqMSPsmABvsKlHPhZEStgjojhdSJGRr3rk",
"/jcd/1/3/3": "sha256-RojgWwU6xUtI4q82+kHPyHm1JKbm7+663bMvzymhkl4",
"/jcd/1/4/3": "sha256-jL4f47fF82LuwcrOrSyckA4SWrlElfARHkW6kYo1JdI",
"/jcd/1/5/3": "sha256-GKNxxqlLRarbyBNh7hc/4lbZAdK6B0kMRf1AMRWPkSo"
}
}
The use of a JSON pointer and integrity digest for the "jcd" claim
key and value is optional. The "jcd" value is the directly included
jCard array and can be protected by the signature and can be
constrained directly with JWTClaimConstraints. However, for data
length reasons (as with "icn" above) or more importantly for
potential privacy and/or security considerations with a publically
accessible certificate, the use of the "rcdi" JSON pointer and
integrity digest as the constraint value in JWTClaimConstraints over
the jCard data is RECOMMENDED.
It is important to remember the array indices for JSON Pointer are
dependent on the order of the elements in the jCard. The use of
digest for the "/jcd" corresponding to the entire jCard array string
can be included as a redundant mechanism to avoid any possibility of
substitution, insertion attacks, or other potential techniques that
may be possible to avoid integrity detection.
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Each URI referenced in the jCard array string MUST have a
corresponding JSON pointer string key and digest value.
6.1.4. "jcl" elements
In the case of the use of a "jcl" URI reference to an external jCard,
the procedures are similar to "jcd" with the exception and the minor
modification to JSON pointer, where "/jcl" is used to refer to the
external jCard array string and any following numeric array indices
added to the "jcl" (e.g., "/jcl/1/2/3") are treated as if the
external content referenced by the jCard was directly part of the
overall "rcd" claim JSON object. The following example illustrates a
"jcl" version of the above "jcd" example.
"rcd": {
"jcl": "https://example.com/qbranch.json",
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets"
},
"rcdi": {
"/jcl": "sha256-7kdCBZqH0nqMSPsmABvsKlHPhZEStgjojhdSJGRr3rk",
"/jcl/1/3/3": "sha256-RojgWwU6xUtI4q82+kHPyHm1JKbm7+663bMvzymhkl4",
"/jcl/1/4/3": "sha256-jL4f47fF82LuwcrOrSyckA4SWrlElfARHkW6kYo1JdI",
"/jcl/1/5/3": "sha256-GKNxxqlLRarbyBNh7hc/4lbZAdK6B0kMRf1AMRWPkSo"
}
The "rcdi" MUST have a "/jcl" key value and digest value to protect
the referenced jCard object and each URI referenced in the referenced
jCard array string MUST have a corresponding JSON pointer string key
and digest value.
The following is the example contents of resource pointed to by
https://example.com/qbranch.json used to calculate the above digest
for "/jcl"
["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/photos/quartermaster-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
]
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6.2. JWT Claim Constraints for "rcd" claims
When using JWT Claim Constraints for "rcd" claims the procedure when
creating the signing certificate should follow the following
guidelines.
The "permittedValues" for the "rcd" claim MAY contain a single entry
or optionally MAY contain multiple entries with the intent of
supporting cases where the certificate holder is authorized to use
different sets of rich call data corresponding to different call
scenarios.
Only including "permittedValues" for "rcd", with no "mustInclude",
provides the ability for the construction a valid PASSPorT that can
either have no "rcd" claim within or only the set of constrained
"permittedValues" values for an included "rcd" claim.
6.3. JWT Claim Constraints usage for "rcd" and "rcdi" claims
The use of JWT Claim Constraints with an "rcdi" claim is for cases
where URI referenced content is to be protected by the authoritative
certificate issuer. The objective for the use of JWT Claim
Constraints for the combination of both "rcd" and "rcdi" claims is to
constrain the signer to only construct the "rcd" and "rcdi" claims
inside a PASSporT to contain and reference only a pre-determined set
of content. Once both the contents of the "rcd" claim and any
referenced content is certified by the party that is authoritative
for the certificate being issued to the signer, the "rcdi" claim is
constructed and linked to the STIR certificate associated with the
signature in the PASSporT via JWT Claim Constraints extension as
defined in [RFC8226] Section 8 and extended in [RFC9118]. It should
be recognized that the "rcdi" set of digests is intended to be unique
for only a specific combination of "rcd" content and URI referenced
external content, and therefore provides a robust integrity mechanism
for an authentication service being performed by a non-authoritative
party. This would often be associated with the use of delegate
certificates [RFC9060] for the signing of calls by the calling party
directly as an example, even though the "authorized party" is not
necessarily the subject of a STIR certificate.
For the cases that there should always be both "rcd" and "rcdi"
claims included in the PASSporT, the certificate JWT Claims
Constraint extension MUST include both of the following:
* a "mustInclude" for the "rcd" claim, which simply constrains the
fact that an "rcd" must be included
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* a "mustInclude" for the "rcdi" claim and a "permittedValues" equal
to the created "rcdi" claim value string.
Note that optionally the "rcd" claims may be included in the
"permittedValues" however it is recognized that this may be redundant
with the "rcdi" permittedValues because the "rcdi" digest will imply
the content of the "rcd" claims themselves.
The "permittedValues" for the "rcdi" claims (or "rcd" claims more
generally) may contain multiple entries, to support the case where
the certificate holder is authorized to use different sets of rich
call data.
7. PASSporT "crn" claim - Call Reason Definition and Usage
This document defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "crn", Call
Reason, the value of which is a single string that can contain
information as defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd]
corresponding to the "call-reason" parameter for the Call-Info
header. This claim is optional.
Example "crn" claim with "rcd":
"crn" : "For your ears only",
"rcd": { "nam": "James Bond",
"jcl": "https://example.org/james_bond.json"}
7.1. JWT Constraint for "crn" claim
The integrity of the "crn" claim contents can optionally be protected
by the authoritative certificate issuer using JWT Constraints in the
certificate. When the signer of the PASSporT intends to always
include a call reason string of any value, a "mustInclude" for the
"crn" claim in the JWT Claim Constraints indicates that a "crn" claim
must always be present and is RECOMMENDED to be included by the
certificate issuer. If the signer of the "crn" claim wants to
constrain the contents of "crn", then "permittedValues" for "crn" in
JWT Claim Constraints should match the contents of the allowed
strings and is RECOMMENDED to be included by the certificate issuer.
8. Rich Call Data Claims Usage Rules
The "rcd" or "crn" claims MAY appear in any PASSporT claims object as
optional elements. The creator of a PASSporT MAY also add a PASSporT
extension ("ppt") value, defined in [RFC8225] Section 8.1, of "rcd"
to the header of a PASSporT as well, in which case the PASSporT
claims MUST contain at least one or both an "rcd" or "crn" claim.
Any entities verifying the PASSporT claims defined in this document
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are required to understand the PASSporT extension in order to process
the PASSporT in question. An example PASSporT header with the
PASSporT extension ("ppt") value of "rcd" included is shown as
follows:
{ "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"rcd",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" }
The PASSporT claims object contains the "rcd" key with its
corresponding value. The value of "rcd" is an array of JSON objects,
of which one, the "nam" key and value, is mandatory.
After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed,
their signature is computed normally per the guidance in [RFC8225].
8.1. "rcd" PASSporT Verification
A verifier that successfully verifies a PASSportT that contains an
"rcd" claim MUST ensure the following about the PASSporT:
* it has a valid signature per the verification procedures detailed
in [RFC8225]
* it abides by all rules set forth in the proper construction of the
claims defined in Section 5 of this document
* it abides by JWT Claims Constraint rules defined in [RFC8226]
Section 8 or extended in [RFC9118] if present in the certificate
used to compute the signature in the PASSporT
In addition if the "iss" claim is included in the PASSPorT,
verification should follow procedures described in Section 10.2.
Consistent with the verification rules of PASSporTs more generally
[RFC8225], if any of the above criteria is not met, relying parties
MUST NOT use any of the claims in the PASSporT.
8.2. "rcdi" Integrity Verification
When the "rcdi" claim exists, the verifier should verify the digest
for each JSON pointer key. Any digest string that doesn't match a
generated digest MUST be considered a failure of the verification of
the content referenced by the JSON pointer.
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If there is any issue with completing the integrity verification
procedures for referenced external content, including HTTP or HTTPS
errors, the referenced content MUST be considered not verified. This
SHOULD NOT however impact the result of base PASSporT verification
for claims content that is directly included in the claims of the
PASSporT.
As a potential optimization of verification procedure, an entity that
does not otherwise need to dereference a URI from the "rcd" claim for
display to end-user is NOT RECOMMENDED to unnecessarily dereference
the URI solely to perform integrity verification.
8.3. Example "rcd" PASSporTs
An example of a "nam" only PASSporT claims object is shown next (with
line breaks for readability only).
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"} }
An example of a "nam", "apn", and "icn" using an https URI PASSporT
claims object is shown next (with line breaks for readability only).
Note, in this example, there is no integrity protection over the
"icn" element in the "rcd" claim.
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12155551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"rcd":{
"apn":"12025559990",
"icn":"https://example.com/photos/quartermaster-256x256.png",
"nam":"Her Majesty's Secret Service" } }
An example of a "nam", "apn", and "icn" using data URI PASSporT
claims object is shown next (with line breaks for readability only).
Note, in this example, the "icn" data is incorporated directly in the
"rcd" claim and therefore separate integrity protection is not
required.
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{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12155551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"rcd":{
"apn":"12025559990",
"icn":"
AAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OH
wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
"nam":"Her Majesty's Secret Service" } }
An example of an "rcd" claims object that includes the "jcd" and also
contains URI references to content which requires the inclusion of an
"rcdi" claim and corresponding digests. Note, in this example, the
"rcdi" claim includes integrity protection of the URI referenced
content.
{
"crn": "Rendezvous for Little Nellie",
"orig": { "tn": "12025551000"},
"dest": { "tn": ["12155551001"]},
"iat": 1443208345,
"rcd": {
"jcd": ["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri","https://example.com/photos/q-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
] ],
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets"
},
"rcdi": {
"/jcd/1/3/3":"sha256-RojgWwU6xUtI4q82+kHPyHm1JKbm7+663bMvzymhkl4",
"/jcd/1/4/3":"sha256-jL4f47fF82LuwcrOrSyckA4SWrlElfARHkW6kYo1JdI",
"/jcd/1/5/3":"sha256-GKNxxqlLRarbyBNh7hc/4lbZAdK6B0kMRf1AMRWPkSo"
}
}
In an example PASSporT, where a jCard is linked via HTTPS URL using
"jcl", a jCard file served at a particular URL.
An example jCard JSON file hosted at the example web address of
https://example.com/qbranch.json is shown as follows:
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["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri","https://example.com/photos/q-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
]
For the above referenced jCard, the corresponding PASSporT claims
object would be as follows:
{
"crn": "Rendezvous for Little Nellie",
"orig": {"tn": "12025551000"},
"dest": {"tn": ["12155551001"]},
"iat": 1443208345,
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"jcl": "https://example.com/qbranch.json"
},
"rcdi": {
"/jcl":"sha256-qCn4pEH6BJu7zXndLFuAP6DwlTv5fRmJ1AFkqftwnCs",
"/jcl/1/3/3":"sha256-RojgWwU6xUtI4q82+kHPyHm1JKbm7+663bMvzymhkl4",
"/jcl/1/4/3":"sha256-jL4f47fF82LuwcrOrSyckA4SWrlElfARHkW6kYo1JdI",
"/jcl/1/5/3":"sha256-GKNxxqlLRarbyBNh7hc/4lbZAdK6B0kMRf1AMRWPkSo"
}
}
An example "rcd" PASSporT that uses "nam" and "icn" keys with "rcdi"
for calling name and referenced icon image content:
{
"crn": "Rendezvous for Little Nellie",
"orig": {"tn": "12025551000"},
"dest": {"tn": ["12155551001"]},
"iat": 1443208345,
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"icn": "https://example.com/photos/q-256x256.png"
},
"rcdi": {
"/nam": "sha256-sM275lTgzCte+LHOKHtU4SxG8shlOo6OS4ot8IJQImY",
"/icn": "sha256-RojgWwU6xUtI4q82+kHPyHm1JKbm7+663bMvzymhkl4"
}
}
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9. Compact form of "rcd" PASSporT
9.1. Compact form of the "rcd" PASSporT claim
The specific usage of compact form of an "rcd" PASSporT claim,
defined in [RFC8225] Section 7, has some restrictions that will be
enumerated below, but mainly follows standard PASSporT compact form
procedures. Compact form only provides the signature from the
PASSporT, requiring the re-construction of the other PASSporT claims
from the SIP header fields as discussed in [RFC8224] Section 4.1.
The re-construction of the "nam" claim, if using SIP protocol, should
use the display-name string in the From header field. For other
protocols, if there is a display name field that exists, the string
should be used, otherwise the string should be an empty string, e.g.,
"". "jcl" and "jcd" MUST NOT be used with compact form due to
integrity rules and URI reference rules in this document leading to
too restrictive of a set of constraints. Future specifications may
revisit this to propose a consistent and comprehensive way of
addressing integrity and security of information and to provide
specific guidance for other protocol usage.
9.2. Compact form of the "rcdi" PASSporT claim
The use of compact form of a PASSporT using an "rcdi" claim is not
supported, so if "rcdi" is required compact form MUST NOT be used.
9.3. Compact form of the "crn" PASSporT claim
Compact form of a "crn" PASSporT claim shall be re-constructed using
the "call-reason" parameter of a Call-Info header as defined by
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd].
10. Third-Party Uses
While rich data about the call can be provided by an originating
authentication service, an intermediary in the call path could also
acquire rich call data by querying a third-party service. Such a
service effectively acts as a STIR Authentication Service, generating
its own PASSporT, and that PASSporT could be attached to a call by
either the originating or terminating side. This third-party
PASSporT attests information about the calling number, rather than
the call or caller itself, and as such its RCD MUST NOT be used when
a call lacks a first-party PASSporT that assures verification
services that the calling party number is not spoofed. It is
intended to be used in cases when the originating side does not
supply a display-name for the caller, so instead some entity in the
call path invokes a third-party service to provide rich caller data
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for a call.
In telephone operations today, a third-party information service is
commonly queried with the calling party's number in order to learn
the name of the calling party, and potentially other helpful
information could also be passed over that interface. The value of
using a PASSporT to convey this information from third parties lies
largely in the preservation of the third party's signature over the
data, and the potential for the PASSporT to be conveyed from
intermediaries to endpoint devices. Effectively, these use cases
form a sub-case of out-of-band [RFC8816] use cases. The manner in
which third-party services are discovered is outside the scope of
this document.
An intermediary use case might look as follows using SIP protocol for
this example: a SIP INVITE carries a display name in its From header
field value and an initial PASSporT object without the "rcd" claim.
When a terminating verification service implemented at a SIP proxy
server receives this request, and determines that the signature is
valid, it might query a third-party service that maps telephone
numbers to calling party names. Upon receiving the PASSporT in a
response from that third-party service, the terminating side could
add a new Identity header field to the request for the PASSporT
object provided by the third-party service. It would then forward
the INVITE to the terminating user agent. If the display name in the
PASSporT object matches, or is string equivelent to, the display name
in the INVITE, then the name would presumably be rendered to the end
user by the terminating user agent.
A very similar flow could be followed by an intermediary closer to
the origination of the call. Presumably such a service could be
implemented at an originating network in order to decouple the
systems that sign for calling party numbers from the systems that
provide rich data about calls.
In an alternative use case, the terminating user agent might query a
third-party service. In this case, no new Identity header field
would be generated, though the terminating user agent might receive a
PASSporT object in return from the third-party service, and use the
"rcd" field in the object as a calling name to render to users while
alerting.
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While in the traditional telephone network, the business relationship
between calling customers and their telephone service providers is
the ultimate root of information about a calling party's name, some
other forms of data like crowdsourced reputation scores might derive
from third parties. When those elements are present, they MUST be in
a third-party "rcd" PASSporT using "iss" claim described in the next
section.
10.1. Signing as a Third Party
A third-party PASSporT contains an "iss" element to distinguish its
PASSporTs from first-party PASSporTs. Third-party "rcd" PASSporTs
are signed with credentials that do not have authority over the
identity that appears in the "orig" element of the PASSporT claims.
The presence of "iss" signifies that a different category of
credential is being used to sign a PASSporT than the [RFC8226]
certificates used to sign STIR calls; it is instead a certificate
that identifies the source of the "rcd" data. How those credentials
are issued and managed is outside the scope of this document; the
value of "iss" however MUST reflect the Subject of the certificate
used to sign a third-party PASSporT. The explicit mechanism for
reflecting the subject field of the certificate is out of scope of
this document and left to the certificate governance policies that
define how to map the "iss" value in the PASSporT to the subject
field in the certificate. Relying parties in STIR have always been
left to make their own authorization decisions about whether to trust
the signers of PASSporTs, and in the third-party case, where an
entity has explicitly queried a service to acquire the PASSporT
object, it may be some external trust or business relationship that
induces the relying party to trust a PASSporT.
An example of a Third Party issued PASSporT claims object is as
follows.
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"iss":"Zorin Industries",
"rcd":{"nam":"James St. John Smythe"} }
10.2. Verification using Third Party RCD
The third-party "rcd" PASSporT cases must be considered in the
verification service, as an attacker could attempt to cut-and-paste
such a third-party PASSporT into a SIP request in an effort to get
the terminating user agent to render the display name or confidence
values it contains to a call that should have no such assurance.
Following the rules of [RFC8225] and in particular if there is
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multiple identity headers, for example with the case of the inclusion
of an "rcd" and "shaken" PASSporTs from two different signing
providers, a verification service MUST determine that the calling
party number shown in the "orig" of the "rcd" PASSporT corresponds to
the calling party number of the call it has received, and that the
"iat" field of the "rcd" PASSporT is within the date interval that
the verification service would ordinarily accept for a PASSporT. It
is possible that if there is multiple identity headers are present,
only the verified identity information should be considered when
presenting call information to an end user.
Verification services may alter their authorization policies for the
credentials accepted to sign PASSporTs when third parties generate
PASSporT objects, per Section 10.1. This may include accepting a
valid signature over a PASSporT even if it is signed with a
credential that does not attest authority over the identity in the
"orig" claim of the PASSporT, provided that the verification service
has some other reason to trust the signer. No further guidance on
verification service authorization policy is given here.
11. Levels of Assurance
As "rcd" can be provided by either first party providers that are
directly authorized to sign PASSporTs in the STIR eco-system or third
party providers that are indirectly or delegated authority to sign
PASSporTs. Relying parties could benefit from an additional claim
that indicates the identification, in the form of a uniquely
identifiable name, of the attesting party to the caller. Even in
first party cases, the Communications Service Provider (CSP) to which
a number was assigned might in turn delegate the number to a
reseller, who would then sell the number to an enterprise, in which
case the CSP might have little insight into the caller's name. In
third party cases, a caller's name could be determined from any
number of data sources, on a spectrum between public data scraped
from web searches to a direct business relationship to the caller.
As multiple PASSporTs can be associated with the same call,
potentially a verification service could receive attestations of the
caller name from multiple sources, which have different levels of
granularity or accuracy. Therefore, third-party PASSporTs that carry
"rcd" data are RECOMMENDED to also carry an indication of the
identity of the generator of the PASSporT in the form of the 'iss'
claim.
12. Use of "rcd" PASSporTs in SIP
This section documents SIP-specific usage for "rcd" PASSporTs and in
the SIP Identity header field value. Other using protocols of
PASSporT may define their own usages for the "rcd" PASSporTs.
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12.1. Authentication Service Behavior for SIP protocol
An authentication service creating a PASSporT containing an "rcd"
claim MAY include a PASSporT extension ("ppt" value) of "rcd" or not.
Third-party authentication services following the behavior in
Section 10.1 MUST include a PASSporT extension value of "rcd". If
PASSporT extension does contain an "rcd", then any SIP authentication
services MUST add a PASSporT extension "ppt" parameter to the
Identity header field containing that PASSporT with a value of "rcd".
The resulting Identity header field might look as follows:
Identity: sv5CTo05KqpSmtHt3dcEiO/1CWTSZtnG3iV+1nmurLXV/HmtyNS7Ltrg9
dlxkWzoeU7d7OV8HweTTDobV3itTmgPwCFjaEmMyEI3d7SyN21yNDo2ER/Ovgt
w0Lu5csIppPqOg1uXndzHbG7mR6Rl9BnUhHufVRbp51Mn3w0gfUs=;
info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cer>;alg=ES256;
ppt="rcd"
This document assumes that by default when using the SIP protocol, an
authentication service determines the value of "rcd", specifically
only for the "nam" key value, from the display-name component of the
From header field value of the request, alternatively for some calls
this may come from the P-Asserted-ID header. It is however a matter
of authentication service policy to decide how it populates the value
of "nam" key, which MAY also match or be determined by other fields
in the request, from customer profile data, or from access to
external services. If the authentication service generates an "rcd"
claim containing "nam" with a value that is not string equivalent to
the From header field display-name value, it MUST use the full form
of the PASSporT object in SIP.
In addition, {I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd}} defines a Call-Info
header field that MAY be used as a source of RCD information that an
authentication services uses to construct the appropriate PASSporT
RCD claim types used.
Note also that, as a best practice, the accuracy and legitimacy of
Rich Call Data information that is included in the claims is
RECOMMENDED to follow a trust framework that is out of scope of this
document. As with telephone numbers for the STIR framework the
authentication of Rich Call Data should follow some type of vetting
process by an entity that is authoritative over determining the
accuracy and legitimacy of that information. This includes the
mechanisms for how and from whom that information is received by the
authentication service. For example, the general use of Call-Info
via SIP as a trusted source of RCD information on the authentication
side is NOT RECOMMENDED.
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12.2. Verification Service Behavior for SIP protocol
[RFC8224] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that future specifications
defining PASSporT extension ("ppt") values describe any additional
verifier behavior specific to the SIP protocol. The general
verification proceedures defined in Section 8.1 should be followed,
but the following paragraphs describe some of the specifics needed to
implement a verification service using the SIP protocol.
If the PASSporT is in compact form, then the verification service
MUST extract the display-name from the From header field value, if
any, and MUST use that as the string value for the "nam" key when it
recomputes the header and claims of the PASSporT object.
Additionally, if there exists a Call-Info header field as defined in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], the "jcard" JSON object value MUST
be used to construct the "jcd" key value when it recomputes the
header and claims of the PASSporT object. If the signature validates
over the recomputed object, then the verification is considered
successful.
If the PASSporT is in full form with a PASSporT extension value of
"rcd", then the verification service MUST extract the value
associated with the "rcd" claim "nam" key in the object. If the
PASSporT signature is verified successfully then the verification
service MUST additionally compare the string value of the "rcd" claim
"nam" key value with the From header field value or the preferred
value. The preferred value depends on local policy of the SIP
network technique that conveys the display name string through a
field other than the From header field to interoperate with this
specification (e.g. P-Asserted-Identity) as discussed in [RFC8224].
Similarly, "jcd" or "jcl" jcard information, "icn", "apn", or "crn"
can be optionally, based on local policy for devices that support it,
used to populate a Call-Info header field following the format of
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd]. If future defined PASSporT RCD
claims types are present, they should follow similar defined
proceedures and policies.
The behavior of a SIP UAS upon receiving an INVITE or other type of
session initiation request containing a PASSporT object with an "rcd"
claim largely remains a matter of implementation policy. In most
cases, implementations would render this calling party name
information to the user while alerting. Any user interface additions
to express confidence in the veracity of this information are outside
the scope of this specification.
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13. Using "rcd", "rcdi", "crn" as additional claims to other PASSporT
extensions
Rich Call Data, including calling name information, as a common
example, is often data that is additive to the personal
communications information defined in the core PASSporT data required
to support the security properties defined in [RFC8225]. For cases
where the entity originating the personal communications is
supporting the authentication service for the calling identity and is
the authority of the Rich Call Data, rather than creating multiple
Identity header fields corresponding to multiple PASSporT extensions,
the authentication service can alternatively directly add the "rcd"
claim to a PASSporT that authenticates the calling identity.
13.1. Procedures for applying RCD claims as claims only
For a given PASSporT using some other extension than "rcd", the
Authentication Service MAY additionally include the "rcd" defined in
{#rcd_define}, "rcdi" defined in {#rcdi_define}, and "crn" defined in
{#crn_define} claims. This would result in a set of claims that
correspond to the original intended extension with the addition of
the "rcd" claim.
The Verification service that receives the PASSporT, if it supports
this specification and chooses to, should interpret the "rcd" claim
as simply just an additional claim intended to deliver and/or
validate delivered Rich Call Data.
13.2. Example for applying RCD claims as claims only
In the case of [RFC8588] which is the PASSporT extension supporting
the SHAKEN specification [ATIS-1000074.v002], a common case for an
Authentication service to co-exist in a CSP network along with the
authority over the calling name used for the call. Rather than
require two identity headers, the CSP Authentication Service can
apply both the SHAKEN PASSporT claims and extension and simply add
the "rcd" required claims defined in this document.
For example, the PASSporT claims for the "shaken" PASSporT with "rcd"
claims would be as follows:
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Protected Header
{
"alg":"ES256",
"typ":"passport",
"ppt":"shaken",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
Payload
{
"attest":"A",
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"origid":"123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426655440000",
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"}
}
A Verification Service that understands and supports claims defined
in the "rcd" and "shaken" PASSporT extensions is able to receive the
above PASSporT and interpret both the "shaken" claims as well as the
"rcd" defined claims.
If the Verification Service only understands the "shaken" PASSporT
extension claims and doesn't support "rcd" PASSporT extension or
claims, then the "rcd" claim, in this example, is used during
PASSporT signature validation but is otherwise ignored and
disregarded.
14. Further Information Associated with Callers
Beyond naming information and the information that can be contained
in a jCard [RFC7095] object, there may be additional human-readable
information about the calling party that should be rendered to the
end user in order to help the called party decide whether or not to
pick up the phone. This is not limited to information about the
caller, but includes information about the call itself, which may
derive from analytics that determine based on call patterns or
similar data if the call is likely to be one the called party wants
to receive. Such data could include:
* information related to the location of the caller, or
* any organizations or institutions that the caller is associated
with, or even categories of institutions (is this a government
agency, or a bank, or what have you), or
* hyperlinks to images, such as logos or pictures of faces, or to
similar external profile information, or
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* information processed by an application before rendering it to a
user, like social networking data that shows that an unknown
caller is a friend-of-a-friend, or reputation scores derived from
crowdsourcing, or confidence scores based on broader analytics
about the caller and callee.
All of these data elements would benefit from the secure attestations
provided by the STIR and PASSporT frameworks. A new IANA registry
has been defined to hold potential values of the "rcd" array; see
Section 16.3. Specific extensions to the "rcd" PASSporT claim are
left for future specification.
There is a few ways RCD can be extended in the future, jCard is an
extensible object and the key/values in the RCD claim object can also
be extended. General guidance for future extensibility that were
followed by the authors is that jCard generally should refer to data
that references the caller as an individual or entity, where other
claims, such as "crn" refer to data regarding the specific call.
There may be other considerations discovered in the future, but this
logical grouping of data to the extent possible should be followed
for future extensibility.
15. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank David Hancock, Robert Sparks, Russ Housley,
Eric Burger, Alec Fenichel, Ben Campbell, Jack Rickard, Jordan
Simpson for helpful suggestions, review, and comments.
16. IANA Considerations
16.1. JSON Web Token Claim
This document requests that the IANA add three new claims to the JSON
Web Token Claims registry as defined in [RFC7519].
Claim Name: "rcd"
Claim Description: Rich Call Data Information
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
Claim Name: "rcdi"
Claim Description: Rich Call Data Integrity Information
Change Controller: IESG
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Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
Claim Name: "crn"
Claim Description: Call Reason
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
16.2. Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extensions
This document requests that the IANA add a new entry to the Personal
Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extensions registry for the type "rcd"
which is specified in [RFCThis].
16.3. PASSporT RCD Claim Types
This document requests that the IANA create a new registry for
PASSporT RCD claim types. This new registry should be added to the
"Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)" group. Registration of new
PASSporT RCD claim types shall be under the Specification Required
policy.
This registry is to be initially populated with five claim name
values, "nam", "apn", "icn", "jcd", and "jcl", which are specified in
[RFCThis]. This is a two column registry with column1 = "Name" and
column2 = "Reference Document". Any new registrations should consist
of only of the name and the reference document. There is an
obligation for expert review, where the designated expert should
validate that the proposed new PASSporT RCD claim type has a scope
that doesn't potentially conflict or overlap with the usage or
interpretation of the other existing types in the registry.
17. Security Considerations
The process of signing information contained in a "rcd" PASSporT,
whether the identities, identifiers, alternate identities or
identifiers, images, logos, physical addresses, or otherwise should
follow some vetting process in which an authoritative entity should
follow an appropriate consistent policy defined and governed by the
eco-system using RCD and the STIR framework. This can be of many
forms, depending on the setup and constraints of the policy
requirements of the eco-system and is therefore out-of-scope of this
document. However, the general chain of trust that signers of "rcd"
PASSporT are either directly authoritative or have been delegated
authority through certificates using JWT Claim Constraints and
integrity mechanisms defined in this and related documents is
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critical to maintain the integrity of the eco-system utilizing this
and other STIR related specifications.
Revealing information such as the name, location, and affiliation of
a person necessarily entails certain privacy risks. Baseline
PASSporT has no particular confidentiality requirement, as the
information it signs in many current base communications protocols,
for example SIP, is information that carried in the clear anyway.
Transport-level security can hide those SIP fields from
eavesdroppers, and the same confidentiality mechanisms would protect
any PASSporT(s) carried in SIP.
The dereferencing and download of any RCD URI linked resources as
part of verification either in-network or on device could provide
some level of information about calling patterns, so this should be
considered when making these resources available.
The use of JWTClaimConstraints, a mechanism defined in [RFC8226] and
extended in [RFC9118] to constrain any of the RCD information in the
public certificate by including that information in the certificate,
depending on the availability in the deployment of the PKI system,
may present a privacy issue. The use of "rcdi" claim and digests for
representing JWT claim contents is RECOMMENDED for the prevention of
the exposure of that information through the certificates which are
often publically accessible and available.
Since computation of "rcdi" digests for URIs requires the loading of
referenced content, it would be best practice to validate that
content at the creation of the "rcdi" or corresponding JWT claim
constraint value by checking for content that may cause issues for
verification services or that doesn't follow the behavior defined in
this document, e.g., unreasonably sized data, the inclusion of
recursive URI references, etc. Along the same lines, the
verification service should also use precautionary best practices to
avoid attacks when accessing URI linked content.
As general guidance, the use of URLs and URIs that reference
potentially dangerous or intentionally harmful content should be
considered in implimenting this specification. [RFC3986] Section 7
contains good additional guidance to consider when communicating or
dereferencing URLs and URIs.
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17.1. The use of JWT Claim Constraints in delegate certificates to
exclude unauthorized claims
While this can apply to any PASSporT that is signed with a STIR
Delegate Certificates [RFC9060], it is important to note that when
constraining PASSporTs to include specific claims or contents of
claims, it is also important to consider potential attacks by non-
authorized signers that may include other potential PASSporT claims
that weren't originally vetted by the authorized entity providing the
delegate certificate. The use of JWT claims constraints as defined
in [RFC9118] for preventing the ability to include claims beyond the
claims defined in this document may need to be considered.
18. References
18.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "SIP Call-Info Parameters for
Rich Call Data", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd-06, 3 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sipcore-
callinfo-rcd-06>.
[IANA-COSE-ALG]
"COSE Algorithms
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml>", n.d..
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
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[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6901] Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed.,
"JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6901>.
[RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7095, January 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7095>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8588] Wendt, C. and M. Barnes, "Personal Assertion Token
(PaSSporT) Extension for Signature-based Handling of
Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", RFC 8588,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8588, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8588>.
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[RFC9060] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR)
Certificate Delegation", RFC 9060, DOI 10.17487/RFC9060,
September 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9060>.
[RFC9118] Housley, R., "Enhanced JSON Web Token (JWT) Claim
Constraints for Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR)
Certificates", RFC 9118, DOI 10.17487/RFC9118, August
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9118>.
18.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074.v002]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/62391/ATIS-1000074.v002.pdf>", November 2021.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3325, November 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3325>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC8816] Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "Secure Telephone Identity
Revisited (STIR) Out-of-Band Architecture and Use Cases",
RFC 8816, DOI 10.17487/RFC8816, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8816>.
[W3C-SubresourceIntegrity]
W3C, "Subresource Integrity <https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/>",
23 June 2016.
Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt
Somos Inc.
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc.
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
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