Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6
draft-ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6
DHC Working Group Sheng Jiang
Internet Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Intended status: Proposed Standard Sean Shen
Update: RFC3315 CNNIC
Expires: March 17, 2013 September 14, 2012
Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs
draft-ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-07.txt
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Abstract
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
DHCPv6 servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
various attacks, particularly spoofing attacks. This document
analyzes the security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies a Secure DHCPv6
mechanism based on using CGAs.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................ 3
2. Terminology ................................................. 3
3. Security Overview of DHCPv6 ................................. 3
4. Secure DHCPv6 Overview ...................................... 4
4.1. New Components ......................................... 5
4.2. Support for algorithm agility .......................... 5
5. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 ................................ 6
5.1. CGA Parameter Option ................................... 6
5.2. Signature Option ....................................... 7
5.3. Signature Option for Relay-Reply Message ............... 9
5.4. DUID-SA Type .......................................... 10
6. Processing Rules and Behaviors ............................. 11
6.1. Processing Rules of Sender ............................ 11
6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver .......................... 12
6.3. Processing Rules of Relay Agent ....................... 13
7. Security Considerations .................................... 14
8. IANA Considerations ........................................ 16
9. Acknowledgments ............................................ 17
10. References ................................................ 17
10.1. Normative References ................................. 17
10.2. Informative References ............................... 17
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1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6 [RFC3315])
enables DHCPv6 servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
various attacks, particularly spoofing attacks.
This document analyzes the security issues of DHCPv6 in details. This
document provides mechanisms for improving the security of DHCPv6:
- the address of a DHCPv6 message sender, which can be a DHCPv6
server, a relay agent or a client, can be verified by a
receiver.
- The integrity of DHCPv6 messages can be checked by the receiver
of the message.
The security mechanisms specified in this document is based on
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA [RFC3972]).
Secure DHCPv6 is applicable in environments where physical security
on the link is not assured (such as over wireless) and attacks on
DHCPv6 are a concern.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Security Overview of DHCPv6
DHCPv6 is a client/server protocol that provides managed
configuration of devices. It enables DHCPv6 server to automatically
configure relevant network parameters on clients. In the basic DHCPv6
specification [RFC3315], security of DHCPv6 message can be improved
in a few aspects.
a) In the basic DHCPv6 specifications, the DHCPv6 server uses a
"regular" IPv6 address for itself. It is possible for a malicious
attacker to use a fake address to spoof or launch an attack. See
Section 23, "Security Considerations" of [RFC3315] for more
details.
CGA-based security mechanism can provide proof of ownership of
source addresses, which prevents such attacks.
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b) The basic DHCPv6 specifications can optionally authenticate the
origin of messages and validate the integrity of messages using an
authentication option with a symmetric key pair. [RFC3315] relies
on pre-established secret keys. For any kind of meaningful
security, each DHCPv6 client would need to be configured with its
own secret key; [RFC3315] provides no mechanism for doing this.
For the key of the hash function, there are two key management
mechanisms. Firstly, the key management is out of band, usually
manual, i.e. operators set up key database for both server and
client before running DHCPv6. Usually multiple keys are deployed
one a time and key id is used to specify which key is used.
Manual key distribution runs counter to the goal of minimizing the
configuration data needed at each host. [RFC3315] provides an
additional mechanism for preventing off-network timing attacks
using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key authentication
method. However, this method provides no message integrity or
source integrity check. This key is transmitted in plaintext.
Comparing to this, the CGA-based security mechanism only require a
key pair on the sender. The key management mechanism is very
simple.
c) Communication between a server and a relay agent, and
communication between relay agents, can be secured through the use
of IPsec, as described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315]. However,
IPsec is quite complicated. A simpler security mechanism, which
can be easier to deploy, is desirable.
4. Secure DHCPv6 Overview
To solve the abovementioned security issues, we introduce the use of
CGAs into DHCPv6. CGAs are introduced in [RFC3972]. By combining CGAs
with signatures based on the CGA-associated key pair, address
ownership can be verified and messages protected, "without a
certification authority or any security infrastructure." [RFC3972]
This document introduces a Secure DHCPv6 mechanism that uses CGAs to
secure the DHCPv6 protocol. It assumes: the secured DHCPv6 message
sender already has a CGA and its corresponding CGA parameters; and
the receiver has already been have the CGAs of the sender, which may
be pre-configured or recorded from previous communications; in the
server-relay and relay-server scenarios, the receiver has also been
pre-configured the associated CGA parameters of the sender.
In this document, we introduce a CGA option with a mechanism for
proving address ownership and two signature options with a
corresponding verification mechanism. A DHCPv6 message (from a
server, a relay agent or a client), with a CGA as source address and
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carry a digital signature, can be verified by the receiver for both
the CGA and signature, then process the payload of the DHCPv6 message
only if the validation is successful.
This improves communication security of DHCPv6 messages. The
authentication options can also be used for replay protection.
Because the sender can be a DHCPv6 server, a relay agent or a client,
the end-to-end security protection can be from DHCPv6 servers to
relay agents or clients, or from clients to DHCPv6 servers. Relay
agents MAY add its own Secure DHCPv6 options in Relay-Forward
messages when transmitting client messages to the server.
4.1. New Components
The components of the solution specified in this document are as
follows:
- CGAs are used to make sure that the sender of a DHCPv6 message
is the "owner" of the claimed address. A public-private key
pair has been generated by a node itself before it can claim an
address. A new DHCPv6 option, the CGA Parameter Option, is used
to carry the public key and associated parameters.
- Signatures signed by private key protect the integrity of the
DHCPv6 messages and authenticate the identity of their sender.
- Server Address type of DUID is used to carry server's source
address in the server-relay-client scenarios. The receiver gets
the server's source CGA address for CGA verification.
4.2. Support for algorithm agility
Hash functions are the fundamental security mechanism, including CGAs
in this document. "...they have two security properties: to be one
way and collision free." "The recent attacks have demonstrated that
one of those security properties is not true." [RFC4270] It is
theoretically possible to perform collision attacks against the
"collision-free" property.
Following the approach recommended by [RFC4270] and [NewHash], recent
analysis shows none of these attacks are currently possible,
according to [RFC6273]. "The broken security property will not affect
the overall security of many specific Internet protocols, the
conservative security approach is to change hash algorithms."
[RFC4270]
However, these attacks indicate the possibility of future real-world
attacks. Therefore, we have to take into account that attacks will
improved in the future, and provide a support for multiple hash
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algorithms. Our mechanism, in this document, supports not only hash
algorithm agility but also signature algorithm agility.
Support for hash agility within CGAs has been defined in [RFC4982].
The usage of CGAs in this document SHOULD also obey [RFC4982], too.
The support for algorithm agility in this document is mainly a
unilateral notification model from a sender to a receiver. If the
receiver cannot support the algorithm provided by the sender, it
takes the risk itself. Senders in a same network do not have to
upgrade to a new algorithm simultaneously.
5. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6
This section extends DHCPv6. Three new options and a new DUID type
have been defined. The new options MUST be supported in the Secure
DHCPv6 message exchange. The new DUID type MUST be supported in relay
scenarios.
5.1. CGA Parameter Option
The CGA option allows the verification of the sender's CGAs. The
format of the CGA option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_CGA_PARAMETER | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. CGA Parameters (variable length) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_CGA_PARAMETER (TBA1).
option-len Length of CGA Parameters in octets.
CGA Parameters A variable-length field containing the CGA
Parameters data structure described in Section 4
of [RFC3972]. This specification requires that
the public key found from the CGA Parameters
field in the CGA option MUST be that referred by
the Key Hash field in the Signature option.
Packets received with two different keys MUST be
silently discarded.
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5.2. Signature Option
The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option could be any place
within the DHCPv6 message. It protects the entire DHCPv6 header and
options, particularly including the CGA option, except for the
Signature option and the Authentication Option. The format of the
Signature option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id | SA-id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id-KH | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp (64-bit) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Key Hash (128-bit) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Signature (variable length) .
. .
. +-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA2).
option-len 32 + Length of Signature field and Padding field
in octets.
HA-id Hash Algorithm id. The hash algorithm is used
for computing the signature result. This design
is adopted in order to provide hash algorithm
agility. The value is from the Hash Algorithm
for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The initial
values are assigned for SHA-1 is 0x0001.
SA-id Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm
is used for computing the signature result. This
design is adopted in order to provide signature
algorithm agility. The value is from the
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry
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in IANA. The initial values are assigned for
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is 0x0001.
HA-id-KH Hash Algorithm id for Key Hash. Hash algorithm
used for producing the Key Hash field in the
Signature option. This design is adopted in
order to provide hash algorithm agility. The
value is from the Hash Algorithm for Secure
DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The initial values are
assigned for SHA-1 is 0x0001.
Reserved A 16-bit field reserved for future use. The
value MUST be initialized to zero by the sender,
and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Timestamp The current time of day (NTP-format timestamp
[RFC5905], a 64-bit unsigned fixed-point number,
in seconds relative to 0h on 1 January 1900.).
It can reduce the danger of replay attacks.
Key Hash A 128-bit field containing the most significant
(leftmost) 128 bits of the hash value of the
public key used for constructing the signature.
The hash algorithm is indicated in the HA-id-KH
field. The field is taken over the presentation
used in the Public Key field of the CGA
Parameters data structure carried in the CGA
option. Its purpose is to associate the
signature to a particular key known by the
receiver. Such a key can either be stored in the
certificate cache of the receiver or be received
in the CGA option in the same message.
Signature A variable-length field containing a digital
signature. The signature value is computed with
the hash algorithm and the signature algorithm,
as described in HA-id and SA-id. The signature
constructed by using the sender's private key
protects the following sequence of octets:
1. The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag value for
Secure DHCPv6, 0x81be a1eb 0021 ce7e caa9 4090
0665 d2e0 02c2.
2. The 128-bit Source IPv6 Address.
3. The 128-bit Destination IPv6 Address.
4. The DHCPv6 message header.
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5. All DHCPv6 options except for the Signature
option and the Authentication Option.
6. The content between the option-len field and
the signature field in this Signature option, in
the format described above.
Padding This variable-length field contains padding, as
many bits long as remain after the end of the
signature. This padding is only needed if the
length of signature is not a multiple of 8
bits.
Note: a Relay-Reply message is constructed by a DHCPv6 server in
segments. The server first constructs the server message for client,
which includes a Signature Option that covers the server message. In
the signed data, the destination address is the address of the
client. It then constructs the Relay-Reply message by encapsulating
the server message into a Relay Message Option. If there is
additional option for relay, the server MUST include a Signature
Option for Relay-Reply Message, defined below, which covers the
entire Relay-Reply message. In the signed data, the destination
address is the address of the target relay agent.
5.3. Signature Option for Relay-Reply Message
In the server-relay-client scenario, the Relay-Reply message may be
carried two signatures: one covers the server message for client, one
covers the entire relay-reply message. In order to save the double
transmission of 32 byte duplicated data, which include HA-id, SA-id,
SA-id-HK, Timestamp and Key Hash, another signature option is
designed for Relay-Reply message only. On the receiver - the relay
agent, these data can be obtained from the Signature Option within
the Relay Message option. The format of the Signature Option for
Relay-Reply message is described as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE_RRM | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Signature (variable length) .
. .
. +-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_SIGNATURE_RRM (TBA3).
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option-len Length of Signature field and Padding field in
octets.
Signature The same with Section 5.3.
Padding The same with Section 5.3.
5.4. DUID-SA Type
Server Address Type DUID (DUID-SA) allows IPv6 address of DHCPv6
servers can be carried in DHCPv6 message payload.
The following diagram illustrates the format of a DUID-SA:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TBA3 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
| Server Address (128-bit) |
| |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type-code DUID-SA Type (TBA4)
Server Address The 128-bit IPv6 address of the DHCPv6 server.
The Server Address field of DUID-SA, which is the IPv6 address of the
DHCPv6 server, MUST be a CGA in the Secure DHCPv6.
In the server-relay-client scenarios, a DHCPv6 server knows a client
is behind relay(s) if it receives a Relay-forward DHCPv6 message.
Then it will reply a Relay-reply message. Within the payload of
Replay-reply message, the server's source CGA address is carried in
the Server Address Type DUID that is encapsulated in a Relay Message
option. In this way, the receiver, a DHCPv6 client can get the
server's source CGA address for CGA verification.
All the payloads, including DUID-SA, are protected by signature
option by the definition of section 5.1 and 5.2.
If there is DUID-SA in the server message and its address is
different from the source address of IP packet, the client MUST use
the address in DUID-SA for CGA verification.
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6. Processing Rules and Behaviors
6.1. Processing Rules of Sender
The sender of a Secure DHCPv6 message could be a DHCPv6 server, a
DHCPv6 relay agent or a DHCPv6 client.
The node MUST have the following information in order to create
Secure DHCPv6 messages:
CGA parameters Any information required to construct CGAs, as
described in [RFC3972].
Keypair A public-private key pair. The public key used
for constructing the signature MUST be the same
in CGA parameters.
CGA flag A flag that indicates whether CGA is used or
not.
To support Secure DHCPv6, the Secure DHCPv6 enabled sender MUST
construct the DHCPv6 message following the rules defined
in [RFC3315]. The sender MUST use a CGA, which be constructed as
specified in Section 4 of [RFC3972], as the source address, unless
they are sent with the unspecified source address.
A Secure DHCPv6 message MUST contain both the CGA option and the
Signature option, except for the Relay-forward and Relay-reply
Messages. If a relay agent adds its own options in Relay-forward
message, it MUST contain the Signature option. If it does not any add
new options it MUST NOT add either the CGA option or the Signature
option into Relay-forward message. If a server adds addition options
for relay agents in Relay-reply message, it MUST contain the
Signature Option for Relay-Reply Message. If it does not add any
addition options, it MUST NOT add the CGA option, the Signature
option, or the Signature Option for Relay-Reply Message into the
Relay-reply message.
The CGA option is constructed according to the rules presented in
Section 5.1 and in [RFC3972]. The public key in the field is the one
associated with the CGA, which is also the source address in the
message header.
The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in Section 5.2.
It protects the message header and the message payload and all DHCPv6
options (including the CGA option) except for the Signature option
itself and the Authentication Option. The Signature Option for
Relay-Reply Message MUST be constructed as explained in Section 5.3.
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When constructing a Relay-reply message, a DHCPv6 server MUST include
an OPTION_SERVERID [RFC3315] and put its CGA in the Server Address
field of the DUID in the OPTION_SERVERID in the Relay Message Option.
By applying this rule, the CGA of the DHCPv6 server will not be lost
when the relay agents decapsulate the Relay-reply messages, so that
the client can verify CGA address and signature.
6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver
When receiving a DHCPv6 message (except for Relay-Forward and
Relay-Reply messages), a Secure DHCPv6 enabled receiver SHOULD
discard the DHCPv6 message if either the CGA option or the Signature
option is absent. If both options are absent, the receiver MAY fall
back the unsecure DHCPv6 model.
The receiving node MUST verify the source CGA address of the DHCPv6
message by using the public key of the DHCPv6 message sender, CGA
Parameters and the algorithm described in Section 5 of [RFC3972]. The
inputs to the algorithm are the source address, as used in IPv6
header, and the CGA Parameters field. In the relay scenarios, a
DHCPv6 server obtains the CGA of a client from the peer address field
in the Relay-forward message. A DHCPv6 client obtains the CGA of a
server from the Server Address field of the DUID in the
OPTION_SERVERID.
If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with a
more time-consuming cryptographic check of the signature. Note that
even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about the validity
of the use can be made until the signature has been checked.
The receiving node MUST verify the Signature option as follows: the
Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key, the one
learned from a preceding CGA option in the same message. The
signature field verification MUST show that the signature has been
calculated as specified in Section 5.2.
Only the messages that get through both CGA and signature
verifications are accepted as secured DHCPv6 messages and continue to
be handled for their contained DHCPv6 options as defined
in [RFC3315]. Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be
discarded or treated as unsecure messages.
The receiver MAY record the verified CGA for future authentications.
Furthermore, the node that supports the verification of the Secure
DHCPv6 messages MAY record the following information:
Minbits The minimum acceptable key length for public
keys used in the generation of CGAs. An upper
limit MAY also be set for the amount of
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computation needed when verifying packets that
use these security associations. The appropriate
lengths SHOULD be set according to the signature
algorithm and also following prudent
cryptographic practice. For example, minimum
length 1024 and upper limit 2048 may be used for
RSA [RSA].
A Relay-forward message without any addition option to Relay Message
option or a Relay-forward message with both addition options and the
Signature option is accepted for a Secure DHCPv6 enabled server.
Otherwise, the message SHOULD be discarded or treated as unsecure
message. If Signature option is presented in the Relay-forward
message, the CGA verification and signature verification are needed.
The server obtains the CGA parameters of the relay agents from
pre-configured data. The server MUST also verify the CGA and
signature for the encapsulated client DHCPv6 message in the Relay
Message Option. The client CGA address is obtained from the
peer-address field in the Relay-forward message.
A Relay-reply message without any addition option to Relay Message
option or a Relay-reply message with both addition options and the
Signature Option for Relay-Reply message is accepted for a Secure
DHCPv6 enabled server. Otherwise, the message SHOULD be discarded or
treated as unsecure message. If the Signature Option for Relay-Reply
message is presented in the Relay-reply message, the CGA verification
and signature verification are needed. The relay agents obtain the
CGA parameters of the server from pre-configured data. It obtains
HA-id, SA-id, SA-id-HK, Timestamp and Key Hash from Signature option
encapsulated in the Relay Message option.
6.3. Processing Rules of Relay Agent
To support Secure DHCPv6, relay agents MUST follow the same
processing rules defined in [RFC3315].
In the client-relay-server scenario, the relay agent MAY verify the
CGA and signature as a receiver before relaying the client message
further, following verification procedure define in Section 6.2. In
the case of failure, it MUST discard the DHCPv6 message. However,
this does not save the load of the DHCPv6 server. The server still
MUST verify the CGA and signature by itself in order to prevent the
attack between the relay agent and server.
In the server-relay-client scenario, if the Signature Option for
Relay-Reply message is presented, the relay agent MUST verify the CGA
and signature before relaying the server message further, following
verification procedure define in Section 6.2. In the case of failure,
it MUST discard the DHCPv6 message.
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In the relay scenarios, because relay agents restructure the DHCPv6
messages, a downstream receiver would not find the sender's source
CGA address in the DHCPv6 message header.
In the client-relay-server scenarios, "The relay agent copies the
source address from the IP datagram in which the message was received
from the client into the peer-address field in the Relay-forward
message" [RFC3315]. Therefore, the CGA of a client will not be lost
during the relay processing from the client to the server. The
receiver, a DHCPv6 server, can find the sender's source CGA address
in the peer-address field for CGA verification.
During the relay processing from the server to the client, when the
relay agent constructs the IPv6 header for the server message, the
source IPv6 address is the relay's IPv6 address, rather than the
server's IPv6 address. In order to make the CGA of the DHCPv6 server
reach the client, DUID-SA, described in Section 5.4, MUST be used.
Defined in [RFC6422], "the implicit requirement that relay agents not
modify the content of encapsulation payloads as they are relayed back
toward clients", A relay agent will not change the OPTION_SERVERID
when processing Relay-reply message from a DHCPv6 server, so that the
CGA of the DHCPv6 server will not be lost when the Relay-reply
message is decapsulated in the relay agent. The relay agent MAY also
verify the CGA and signature for the encapsulated DHCPv6 message in
the Relay Message Option. This can be helpful if the DHCPv6 response
traverses a separate administrative domain, or if the relay agent is
in a separate administrative domain. However, this is not necessary
because the DHCPv6 client validation will catch any modification to
the response.
7. Security Considerations
This document provides new security features to the DHCPv6 protocol.
Using CGA as source addresses with its verification mechanism in
DHCPv6 message exchanging provides the source address ownership
verification and data integrity protection.
The Secure DHCPv6 mechanism is based on the pre-condition that the
receiver knows the CGA of senders. For example, to prevent DHCPv6
server spoofing, the clients should be pre-configured with the DHCPv6
server CGA. The clients may decline the DHCPv6 messages from unknown
servers, which may be fake servers; or may prefer DHCPv6 messages
from known servers over unsigned messages or messages from unknown
servers. The pre-configuration operation also needs to be protected,
which is out of scope.
In the relay-server and server-relay authentication scenarios, the
Secure DHCPv6 mechanism is based on the pre-condition that the
receiver has been pre-configured with sender's CGAs and associated
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CGA parameters. The pre-configuration operation also needs to be
protected, which is out of scope.
CGA-based signatures cannot be used to authenticate a transaction if
the CGA key isn't pre-configured in the DHCPv6 client that needs to
authenticate the transaction. However, such a DHCPv6 client can make
a leap of faith when it first encounters a new CGA. If the DHCPv6
server that used that CGA is in fact legitimate, then all future
communication with that DHCPv6 server can be protected by caching the
CGA and the associated public key. This does not provide complete
security, but it limits the opportunity to mount an attack on a
specific DHCPv6 client to the first time it communicates with a new
DHCPv6 server.
DHCPv6 nodes without CGAs or the DHCPv6 messages that use unspecific
addresses cannot be protected.
Downgrade attacks cannot be avoided if nodes are configured to accept
both secured and unsecured messages. A future specification may
provide a mechanism on how to treat unsecured DHCPv6 messages.
As stated in CGA definition [RFC3972], link-local CGAs are more
vulnerable because the same prefix is used by all IPv6 nodes.
Therefore, when link-local CGAs are used by the DHCPv6 clients, it is
recommended to use a slightly higher Sec value, for example Sec=1 for
now. When higher Sec values are used, the relative advantage of
attacking link-local addresses becomes insignificant.
Impacts of collision attacks on current uses of CGAs are analyzed in
[RFC4982]. The basic idea behind collision attacks, as described in
Section 4 of [RFC4270], is on the non-repudiation feature of hash
algorithms. However, CGAs do not provide non-repudiation features.
Therefore, as [RFC4982] points out CGA-based protocols, including
Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document, are not affected by collision
attacks on hash functions.
[RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used
in SEND. Since the Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the
same hash algorithms in similar way to SEND (except that Secure
DHCPv6 has not used PKIX Certificate), analysis results could be
applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not constitute
any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the signature
algorithm in the Secure DHCPv6. Attacks on CGAs, as described in
[RFC4982], will compromise the security of Secure DHCPv6 and they
need to be addressed by encoding the hash algorithm information into
the CGA as specified in [RFC4982].
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8. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options, which MUST be
assigned Option Type values within the option numbering space for
DHCPv6 messages:
The CGA Parameter Option (TBA1), described in Section 5.1.
The Signature Option (TBA2), described in Section 5.2.
The Signature Option for Relay-Reply Message (TBA3), described in
Section 5.3.
This document defines a new DHCPv6 DUID, which MUST be assigned DUID
Type values within the DHCPv6 DUID Type numbering space:
The DUID-SA (TBA4), described in Section 5.4.
This document defines two new registries that have been created and
are maintained by IANA. Initial values for these registries are given
below. Future assignments are to be made through Standards Action
[RFC5226]. Assignments for each registry consist of a name, a value
and a RFC number where the registry is defined.
Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this name space are
16-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned
for Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+------------
Reserved | 0x0000 | this document
SHA-1 | 0x0001 | this document
SHA-256 | 0x0002 | this document
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this name space
are 16-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are
assigned for Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+------------
Reserved | 0x0000 | this document
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 | 0x0001 | this document
This document defines a new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type
[RFC3972] namespace, 0x81be a1eb 0021 ce7e caa9 4090 0665 d2e0 02c2.
(The tag value has been generated randomly by the editor of this
specification. It may replaced by any IANA-allocated value when the
specification is published.)
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9. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Bernie Volz, Ted Lemon, Ralph Dorms,
Jari Arkko, Sean Turner, Stephen Kent, Thomas Huth, David Schumacher
and other members of the IETF DHC and CSI working groups for their
valuable comments.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC3315] R. Droms, et al., "Dynamic Host Configure Protocol for
IPv6", RFC3315, July 2003.
[RFC3972] T. Aura, "Cryptographically Generated Address", RFC3972,
March 2005.
[RFC4982] M. Bagnulo, J. Arkko, "Support for Multiple Hash Algorithms
in Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs)", RFC4982,
July 2007.
[RFC5905] D. Mills, J. Martin, Ed., J. Burbank and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC6422] T. Lemon, and Q. Wu, "Relay-Supplied DHCP Options", RFC
6422, December 2011.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", c, March 1997.
[RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270, November 2005.
[RFC5226] T. Narten and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, May 2008.
[RFC6273] A. Kukec, S. Krishnan and S. Jiang "The Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) Hash Threat Analysis", RFC 6274, June
2011.
[NewHash] S.Bellovin and E. Rescorla, "Deploying a New Hash
Algorithm", November 2005.
[RSA] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1",
PKCS 1, November 2002.
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[sha-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIBS PUB 180-1, April 1995,
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm.
Author's Addresses
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus
No.156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
P.R. China
EMail: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Sean Shen
CNNIC
4, South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
P.R. China
EMail: shenshuo@cnnic.cn
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