Internet DRAFT - draft-hares-i2nsf-ssls
draft-hares-i2nsf-ssls
I2NSF S. Hares
Internet-Draft Hickory Hill Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track R. Moskowitz
Expires: January 19, 2018 HTT Consulting
July 18, 2017
Secure Session Layer Services
draft-hares-i2nsf-ssls-02.txt
Abstract
Each I2NSF agent and I2NSF client needs to provide application level
support for management traffic during periods of DDoS and network
security attacks to deal with congestion (burst and/or continuous),
high error rates and packet loss due to the attacks, and the
inability to utilize a transport protocol (E.g. TCP) due to a
specific protocol attack. This application level support needs to be
able to select the key management system and provide "chunking" of
data (in order to fit in reduced effective MTUs), compression of data
(in order to fit into reduced bandwidth), small security envelope )in
order to maximize room for management payload), and fragmentation and
reassembly at the application layer for those protocols which do not
support fragmentation/reassembly (E.g. UDP or SMS).
These Secure Session Layer services may only be deployed on a the few
management ports which need to be protected during DDoS attacks or
network security attacks, and turned on/off based on need. The
application and the network instrumentation need to cooperate to
determine if this service needs to be turned on or off. This draft
specifies a security session layer services(SSLs) which provide these
features in terms of APIs (North-Bound and South-bound), and the
component features (interface to key management systems, data
compression, chunking of data, secure session envelope (SSE) to send
data, and fragmentation and reassembly, and ability to detect
existence of attack).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2018.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. SSLS Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Chunking of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Secure Session Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Application Packet Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . 5
2.4. Proprietary Plugins: Detect Conditions + Select Transport 5
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Each I2NSF agent and I2NSF client needs to provide application level
support for management traffic during periods of DDoS and network
security attacks to deal with congestion (burst and/or continuous),
high error rates and packet loss due to the attacks, and the
inability to utilize a transport protocol (E.g. TCP) due to a
specific protocol attack. Some of the services the I2NSF controller
must provide during these periods of DDoS or network security attacks
are:
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o receiving information regarding DDoS Threats from DOTS systems,
o Changing policy on vNSF and NSF devices during these periods,
o exchanging information with user security applications using I2NSF
to obtain information from the controller,
o Aid the I2NSF reporting of attacks with the the CERT (MILE) either
by providing data or sendign the report
o and manages network connnectivity of devices out of compliance
(SACM).
This application level support for I2NSF client-agent communication
needs to be able to select the key management system and provide
"chunking" of data (in order to fit in reduced effective MTUs),
compression of data (in order to fit into reduced bandwidth), small
security envelope )in order to maximize room for mangement payload),
and fragmentation and reassembly at the application layer for those
protocols which do not support fragmentation/reassembly (E.g. UDP or
SMS). The application layer needs to be able to turn off this
features if the system detects these features are no longer needed.
These requirements can be well met with the Secure Session Layer
Service [draft-hares-ssls-00]:
o A North-bound API from the application to the session layer
o A South-bound API from the session layer to the network layer
o interface to key management system,
o data compression
o chunking of data
o secure envelope,
o fragmentation and reassembly,
o detection of network conditions that require this service.
A diagram of the SSLS with these process is in figure 1.
The API for this SSLS allows the application to select the types of
key management, and the different types of services (data
compression, chunking of data, secure e)
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Secure Session Layer Services(SSLS)
| API |
| |
+------------------------------+
| | Key Mangement(KMP) |
| |........................|
| | Detection of network |
|SB===| conditions + selection |
|API | of transport (optional |
| | proprietary code) |
| .........................|
|SSLS | Compression (GPComp) |
| |........................|
|SB===| Chunking of data |
|API | (this draft) |
| .........................|
| | Session Security |
| | Envelope (SSE) |
| |........................|
| | fragmentation and |
|SB== | reassembly at |
|API | application layer |
| | (This draft) |
+------------------------------+
2. SSLS Processes
2.1. Chunking of Data
The process that "chunks" data breaks down the application stream
after the compression process. If the compression process has
compressed the data, the chunking process will chunk compressed data.
If the user has requested no compression, this chunking process will
chunk uncompressed data.
The secure session envelope must be bigger than the chunk.
If the SSE is using TCP or STCP, that assembles the application flow
into a byte stream, then the SSE packages will contain a chunk within
the secure session envelope.
If Transports that do not fragment and re-assembly are being
specified, the SSL will support application layer fragmentation and
reassembly. (see the fragmentation section below).
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2.2. Secure Session Envelope
The Secure Session Envelope (SSE) [I-D.moskowitz-sse] creates a
secure envelope using the SPI created by the key management and
running over the transport selected by the user.
2.3. Application Packet Fragmentation and Reassembly
SSE's secure envelope may be passed over UDP to avoid transport-level
security attacks. Alternatively SSE's secure transport may go over
the extremely limited SMS fabric so that some security management
information gets through. In both cases, the user (or the "detection
log") can select the transport and fragmentation.
If fragmentation is turned on, the individual SSE envelopes will
track the IP messages the SSE envelope is broken into. The SSE
process receiving the traffic will send back an acknowledge SSE
packet. It is anticipate that the fragmentation process will attempt
to bundle some acks.
2.4. Proprietary Plugins: Detect Conditions + Select Transport
The SSL process allows two proprietary plugins:
1. Plugin to detect error conditions which require SSLS services
which include:
* High levels of end-to-end congestion,
* High levels of error and loss,
* Input from IDS/IPS that detects problems
* Signals from other I2NSF applications
2. Proprietary actions may select transport based on input from
other standardize security services (DOTS, CERT, MILE) or
proprietary services.
Prototype code will provide instances to show plugin values, and the
South-Bound API to these plugins.
3. IANA Considerations
TBD
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4. Security Considerations
The SSLS shares the following security considerations with the SSE
Technology:
o As SSE uses an AEAD block cipher, it is vulnerable to attack if a
sequence number is reused for a given key. Thus implementations
of SSE MUST provide for rekeying prior to Sequence Number
rollover. An implementation should never assume that for a given
context, the sequence number space will never be exhausted. Key
Management Protocols like IKEv2 [RFC7296] or HIP [RFC7401] could
be used to provide for rekeying management. The KMP SHOULD not
create a network layer fate-sharing limitation.
o As any security protocol can be used for a resource exhaustion
attack, implementations should consider methods to mitigate
flooding attacks of messages with valid SPIs but invalid content.
Even with the ICV check, resources are still consumed to validate
the ICV.
o SSE makes no attempt to recommend the ICV length. For constrained
network implementations, other sources should guide the
implementation as to ICV length selection. The ICV length
selection SHOULD be the the responsibility of the KMP.
o As with any layered security protocol, SSE makes no claims of
protecting lower or higher processes in the communication stack.
Each layer's risks and liabilities need be addressed at that
level.
5. Acknowledgements
The authos would like to thank Frank (Liang) Xia for his comments and
suggestions on this draft.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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6.2. Informative References
[I-D.moskowitz-sse]
Moskowitz, R., Faynberg, I., Lu, H., Hares, S., and P.
Giacomin, "Session Security Envelope", draft-moskowitz-
sse-05 (work in progress), June 2017.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
Authors' Addresses
Susan Hares
Hickory Hill Consulting
Saline
US
Email: shares@ndzh.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
USA
Phone: +1-248-968-9809
Email: rgm@htt-consult.com
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