Internet DRAFT - draft-hallambaker-muststaple
draft-hallambaker-muststaple
Internet Engineering Task Force P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft Comodo Group Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track October 2, 2012
Expires: April 5, 2013
X.509v3 Extension: OCSP Stapling Required
draft-hallambaker-muststaple-00
Abstract
The purpose of the TLS Security Policy extension is to prevent
downgrade attacks that are not otherwise prevented by the TLS
protocol.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2013.
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Table of Contents
1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. minVersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. Certificate Signing Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.2. Certificate Signing Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.3. End Entity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.1. Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.2. Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.3. Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Alternative Certificates and Certificate Issuers . . . . . 7
5.2. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Cipher Suite Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. For discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Cipher Suite Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Remove Version attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Mandated client behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.4. Other protocols and applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. Definitions
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Purpose
[This could do with a re-write to start by explaining the intended
use od OCSP, the reasons that browsers do not normally hard fail (DoS
attack, flaky OCSP servers, efficiency) and that passing the OCSP
data in band avoids dependence on an external service but does not
allow the client to avoid the DoS attack or consequences of flaky
servers unless it knows the OCSP data is passed in band.]
The purpose of the TLS Security Policy extension is to prevent
downgrade attacks that are not otherwise prevented by the TLS
protocol.
Since the TLS protocol itself provides strong protection against most
forms of downgrade attack, the TLS Security Policy is only relevant
to the validation of TLS protocol credentials. In particular to the
revocation status of the credentials presented.
At the time of writing, the only TLS feature that is relevant to the
revocation status of credentials is the Certificate Status Request
extension (status_request) used to support in-band exchange of OCSP
tokens, otherwise known as OCSP stapling. This extension is
described in RFC 4366 [RFC4366].
The TLS Security Policy mechanism described in this document is
designed to support policy statements that prevent a downgrade attack
against the current OCSP stapling mechanism and possible future
certificate revocation mechanisms such as stapling of multiple OCSP
tokens.
The OCSP stapling mechanism described in RFC 4366 [RFC4366] permits a
TLS server to provide evidence of valid certificate status inband and
thus improve client response. A TLS Security Policy that advertises
the status_request extension informs a client that if the
status_request is specified in a TLS Client Helo, that a server
compliant with the policy MUST respond with a valid OCSP token for
the End Entity Certificate it presents.
Verification of the TLS Security Policy extension in a client permits
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the client to avoid reliance on certificates that are revoked for the
reasons that occur most frequently. In particular it allows a client
to avoid mis-reliance on certificates that are revoked for cause or
at the request of the subject (e.g. because of a compromised private
key).
Since the TLS Security Policy extension is an option, it is not
likely that an attacker attempting to obtain a certificate through
fraud will choose to have a certificate issued with this extension.
Such risks are more approrpriately addressed by mechanisms such as
Certificate Authority Authorization records that are designed to
prevent or mitigate mis-issue. Nevertheless a Certification
Authority MAY consider the presence or absence of a required security
policy as one factor in determining the level of additional scruitiny
a request should be subject to.
Any security policy specified in an End Entity certificate MUST be
followed by the server or clients MAY refuse connection. It is
important therefore that a Certification Authority only issue
certificates that specify policies that match the configuration of
the server and that the server is capable of verifying that its
configuration is compatible with the security policy of the
certificates it offers. Ideally, the TLS security policy would be
specified by the client as part of the certificate issue process.
This document describes a mechanism that MAY be used to provide this
communication in-band for the most commonly used certificate
registration protocol.
3. Syntax
The TLS Security Policy extension has the following format:
cabf-tls-security-policy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { cabf 1 }
SecurityPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
minVersion [0] INTEGER,
extensions [1] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER OPTIONAL}
Extension MAY be marked critical. Implementations that process the
extension MUST ignore the criticality bit setting.
3.1. minVersion
The minVersion element constrains the minimum version of the TLS
protocol to be offered as follows:
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1 To be compliant with the policy a server MUST offer TLS version
1.0 or higher
2 To be compliant with the policy a server MUST offer TLS version
1.1 or higher
3 To be compliant with the policy a server MUST offer TLS version
1.2 or higher
n To be compliant with the policy a server MUST offer a TLS
connection that specifies a version identifier of {3, m} where
m >= n.
For historical reasons, TLS version 1.0 uses the protocol identifer
{3,1}, TLS version 1.1 the identifier {3,2} and so on. The
minVersion specifier is defined for consistency with the internal TLS
protocol rather than the descriptive name.
It will be noted that this approach does not support major version
number increments. This is intentional since a major version number
increment signals an incompatible change to the specification which
would almost certainly require a new Security Policy extension to be
defined.
3.2. extensions
The extensions element lists a sequence of TLS extension identifiers
that a server compliant with the policy MUST support and accept on
client request.
If the TLS status_request extension is specified in the Client Hello,
a compliant server MUST return a valid OCSP token for the specified
End Entity certificate in the response.
3.3. Use
3.3.1. Certificate Signing Request
If the certificate issue mechanism makes use of the PKCS#10
Certificate Signing Request (CSR) RFC 4366 [RFC4366], the CSR MAY
specify a TLS Security Policy extension as a CSR attribute. A server
or server administration tool should only generate key signing
requests that it knows can be supperted by the server for which the
certificate is intended.
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3.3.2. Certificate Signing Certificate
When present in a Certificate Signing Certificate, the TLS Security
Policy extension specifies a constraint on valid certificate chains.
Specifically, a certificate chain is only valid if each certificate
in the chain specifies a TLS Security Policy that is at least as
restrictive as that specified in the certificate for the key used to
sign it.
While relying clients MAY reject certificates that do not comply with
this particular requirement, the use of TLs Security Policy in
Certificate Signing Certificates is primarily intended for use by
parties seeking to evaluate the performance of certificate issuers
and MAY be ignored by clients.
3.3.3. End Entity Certificate
When specified in an End Entity Certificate, the TLS Security Policy
extension specifies criteria that a server MUST meet to be compliant
with the policy.
In the case that a client determines that the server configuration is
inconsistent with the specified policy it MAY reject the TLS
configuration.
In the case that a client determines that the server configuration is
inconsistent with a policy specifying support for the TLS
status_request extension it SHOULD reject the TLS configuration.
3.4. Processing
3.4.1. Certification Authority
A CA SHOULD NOT issue certs with the extension unless there is an
affirmative statement to the effect that stapling is requested.
For example the use of the extension in the CSR or through an out of
band communication.
3.4.2. Server
A server SHOULD verify that its configuration is compatible with the
TLS Security Policy extension expressed in a certificate it presents.
A server MAY override local configuration options if necessary to
ensure consistency but SHOULD inform the administrator whenever such
an inconsitency is discovered.
A server SHOULD NOT override local configuration options to offer use
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of cipher suites that have been otherwise deprecated as insecure but
MAY override local configuration to offer stronger cipher suites that
would otherwise have been the case. For example, a server that would
normally only offer DES might offer 3DES but not vice versa.
A server SHOULD support generation of the extension in CSRs if key
generation is supported.
3.4.3. Client
A compliant client SHOULD reject an attempt to establish a TLS
connection with security properties that are inconsistent with the
specified TLS Security Policy extension.
4. Acknowledgements
[List of CABForum and PKIX contributors]
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Alternative Certificates and Certificate Issuers
Use of the TLS Security Policy to mandate support for a particular
form of revocation checking is optional. This control can provide
protection in the case that a certificate with a TLS Security Policy
is compromised after issue but not in the case that the attacker
obtains an unmarked certificate from an issuer through fraud.
TLS Security Policy is a post-issue security control. Such risks can
only be addressed by security controls that take effect before issue.
5.2. Denial of Service
A certificate Issuer could issue a certificate that intentionally
specified a security policy that they knew the server could not
support.
The risks of such refusal would appear to be negligible since a
Certificate Authority could equally refuse to issue the certificate.
5.3. Cipher Suite Downgrade Attack
The TLS Security Policy extension does not provide protection against
a cipher suite downgrade attack. This is left to the existing
controls in the TLS protocol itself.
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6. For discussion.
[RFC EDITOR: DELETE PRIOR TO PUBLICATION]
During the design of the extension, various proposals were made to
add functionality. This section explains the reasons that particular
functionality was chosen to be supported. It should be deleted by
the RFC editor prior to publication.
6.1. Cipher Suite Downgrade Attack
The TLS protocol provides controls designed to prevent a cipher suite
downgrade attack. Should these be found to be inadequate, the
appropriate response would be a modification of the TLS protocol and
assignment of a new minor version number or a required extension.
6.2. Remove Version attribute
The TLS protocol arguably provides a sufficient degree of protection
against a version number downgrade attack and thus it could be argued
that this particular attribute is unnecessary.
The reason the attribute was included is that it provides a failsafe
for the single most important aspect of the protocol. While TLS is
intended to be secure against downgrade attack this is not
established by means of a formal proof, nor is it likely that such
proof would be possible without making assumptions as to the security
of the cryptographic algorithms used to authenticate packets.
6.3. Mandated client behavior
Many certificate issuers (including this one) would like to mandate a
particular set of client behavior when a certificate is processed.
For example, requiring that a certificate 'hard fail' in cases where
the server is unable to obtain OCSP status.
Desirable though this functionality is to certificate issuers, it is
hard to see how client providers are likely to provide support. In
particular the browser providers are already aware that CAs would
prefer that they 'hard fail' on OCSP status. Will expressing that
request in a certificate make them any more likely to comply?
6.4. Other protocols and applications
Should we describe a similar extension for code signing?
While such an extension would clearly be useful, execution would
require a specification for code signing to refer to.
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7. IANA Considerations
No action by IANA is required.
8. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.
[X.509] International Telecommunication Union, "ITU-T
Recommendation X.509 (11/2008): Information technology -
Open systems interconnection - The Directory: Public-key
and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T
Recommendation X.509, November 2008.
[X.680] International Telecommunication Union, "ITU-T
Recommendation X.680 (11/2008): Information technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of
basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680,
November 2008.
Author's Address
Phillip Hallam-Baker
Comodo Group Inc.
Email: philliph@comodo.com
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