Internet DRAFT - draft-hallambaker-mesh-quantum
draft-hallambaker-mesh-quantum
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft 2 November 2020
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 6 May 2021
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part X: Considerations for Quantum Cryptanalysis
Resistance
draft-hallambaker-mesh-quantum-03
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an infrastructure that
facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between
multiple user devices and provides end-to-end security. This
document describes.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-quantum.html.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Internet-Draft Mathematical Mesh Reference November 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Recommended and Required Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Quantum Resistant Signatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Example: Creating a Quantum Resistant Signature
Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
One of the core goals of the Mesh is to move the state of the art in
commercial cryptography beyond that achieved in the 1990s when PKIX,
S/MIME and OpenPGP were first developed. While each of these
infrastructures and protocols has been subject to incremental
improvement, none has seen widespread adoption of new cryptographic
approaches.
* Quantum Resistant Signatures.
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
3. Recommended and Required Algorithms
4. Quantum Resistant Signatures.
Quantum computing has made considerable advances over the past decade
and the field has now reached the point where a machine weighing many
tons can apply Shor's algorithm to factor numbers as large as 35
before decoherence occurs.
Should construction of a large-scale device prove practical, it will
in principle be possible to break all of the public key cryptosystems
currently in use. While public key cryptosystems that resist quantum
cryptanalysis are currently in development, none has yet reached a
sufficient state of maturity for the field to reach consensus that
they are resistant to ordinary cryptanalysis, let alone offer a
replacement.
The consequence of successful quantum cryptanalysis for encryption
systems is that all material encrypted under existing public key
systems could be decrypted by a quantum capable attacker. Nor is
mitigation of this consequence practical since it is not the adoption
of new cryptographic algorithms that make a system more secure, it is
the elimination of weak options that provides improvement.
The Mesh does not currently provide an infrastructure that is Quantum
Resistant but could in principle be used as the basis for deploying a
Needham-Schroeder style symmetric key infrastructure or a future PKI
based on an as yet undecided quantum cryptanalysis resistant public
key algorithm.
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Mesh profiles MAY include a Quantum Resistant Signature Fingerprint
(QRSF). This contains the UDF fingerprint of an XMSS signature
public key [RFC8391] together with the parameters used to derive the
private key set for the public key from a 256 bit master secret.
Should it ever become necessary to make use of the QRSF, the user
first recovers the master secret from whatever archival mechanism was
used to protect it. The use of secret sharing to protect the secret
is RECOMMENDED. The master secret is then used to reconstruct the
set of private keys from which the public key set is reconstructed.
The profile owner can now authenticate themselves by means of their
XMSS public key.
4.1. Example: Creating a Quantum Resistant Signature Fingerprint
Alice decides to add a QRSF to her Mesh Profile. She creates a 256
bit master secret.
TBS:
To enable recovery of the master key, Alice creates five keyshares
with a quorum of three:
TBS:
Alice uses the master secret to derrive her private key values:
TBS:
These values are used to generate the public key value:
TBS:
The QRSF contains the UDF fingerprint of the public key value plus
the XMSS parameters:
TBS:
Alice adds the QRSF to her profile and publishes it to a Mesh Service
that is enrolled in at least one multi-party notary scheme.
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].
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6. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
7. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
8. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-14, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
architecture-14>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII:
Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
security-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
9. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
developer-10>.
[RFC8391] Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., Rijneveld, J., and A.
Mohaisen, "XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme",
RFC 8391, DOI 10.17487/RFC8391, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8391>.
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