Internet DRAFT - draft-borchert-sidrops-rpki-state-unverified

draft-borchert-sidrops-rpki-state-unverified



 



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       O. Borchert
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Updates: 6811, 8097 (if approved)                               USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: July 19, 2021                                  January 15, 2021

             RPKI Route Origin Validation State Unverified
            draft-borchert-sidrops-rpki-state-unverified-04

Abstract

   In case operators decide not to evaluate BGP route prefixes according
   to RPKI route origin validation (ROV), none of the available states
   as specified in RFC 6811 do properly represent this decision. This
   document introduces "Unverified" as well-defined validation state
   which allows to properly identify route prefixes as not evaluated
   according to RPKI route origin validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Suggested Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Initializing route prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1. Update to RFC 6811  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2. Update to RFC 8097  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

















 


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1.  Introduction

   Prefix origin validation provides well-defined validation states.
   Though, there are instances in which no evaluation of a route prefix
   is performed, not through RPKI route origin validation [RFC6811],
   signaling via the extended community string as specified in
   [RFC8097], or operator configuration. In these circumstances RFC 6811
   specifies the implementation SHOULD initialize the validation state
   of such route to "NotFound". Here, the absence of a well-defined
   validation state for a route prefix not evaluated, requires the usage
   of a state otherwise reserved as outcome of the evaluation of such.
   This "waters" down the meaning of the used state. The specification
   of a proper validation state that allows identifying non-evaluated
   routes, becomes of essence once an operator decides to write policies
   on the validation state "NotFound". A route prefix labeled "NotFound"
   cannot be considered same as an unverified route prefix.

   Hence, this document updates RFC 6811 and RFC 8097 by adding the
   proposed validation state "Unverified".

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
   [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based
   Prefix Validation [RFC6811], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
   Extended Community [RFC8097], Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation
   Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC8481]

3.  Initializing route prefixes

   This document introduces the validation state "Unverified" to be used
   for route prefixes that are not evaluated through either operator
   configuration, RPKI route origin validation, or other means such as
   receiving a signaled validation state via the extended community
   string. To allow proper initialization the following state is
   introduced:

   o  Unverified: Specifies the state of a route prefix on which no
      evaluation has been performed.

 


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3.1. Update to RFC 6811

   RFC 6811 specifies that:

      If validation is not performed on a Route, the implementation
      SHOULD initialize the validation state of such a route to
      "NotFound".

   This document specifies that: 

   If no evaluation of a route prefix is performed in any form, the
   implementation MUST initialize the validation state of such a route
   to "Unverified".

   This removes the necessity to initialize the route with any of the
   states "Valid", "Invalid", or "NotFound" and therefore does not
   "water-down" the meaning of such. 

3.2. Update to RFC 8097

   As specified in RFC 8097:

      If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in
      this document" - (RFC 8097) - ", it SHOULD attach the origin
      validation state extended community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to
      IBGP peers by mapping the computed validation state in the last
      octet of the extended community.

   The missing part here is what to do with route prefixes not evaluated
   and no validation state was assigned. At this point the only solution
   is to omit the extended community for such routes. If the usage of
   the extended community would have been negotiated during the BGP OPEN
   MESSAGE the receiver would be able to determine that the sender did
   not evaluate the route in any form. But this is not the case, so a
   receiver does not know if the sender is RPKI capable and chose not to
   attach the origin validation state to the BGP UPDATE or the route did
   not have any validation state assigned. 

   Hence, this document specifies for all routes that are labeled as
   "Unverified" to attach the "unverified" state extended community to
   BGP UPDATE messages send to IBGP peers by mapping the computed
   validation state in the last octet of the extended community.






 


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   AS specified in the table below, this document adds the value
   "unverified = 3" to the list of acceptable values.

                       The value on the protocol

   +-------+------------------------------+
   | Value | Meaning                      |
   +-------+------------------------------+
   |   0   | Lookup result = "valid"      |
   |   1   | Lookup result = "not found"  |
   |   2   | Lookup result = "invalid"    |
   |   3   | Lookup result = "unverified" |
   +-------+------------------------------+

3.  Usage Considerations

   The well-defined validation state "Unverified" allows to distinguish
   between evaluated routes and non-evaluated routes. This allows the
   operator to create policies to treat such route prefixes different
   from route prefixes labeled with one of the validation states
   "Valid", "NotFound", or "Invalid". 

4.  Security Considerations 

   This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is
   described in [RFC6811] and [RFC8097]

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.


















 


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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC8097]  Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
              Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
              Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
              RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8174>.


8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC8481]  Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
              on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8481>.



 


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Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
   suggestions from K. Sriram on this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Oliver Borchert
   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   United States of America

   Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov



   Doug Montgomery
   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   United States of America

   Email: dougm@nist.gov



























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