Internet DRAFT - draft-badra-hajjeh-mtls
draft-badra-hajjeh-mtls
TLS Working Group M. Badra
Internet Draft LIMOS Laboratory
I. Hajjeh
INEOVATION
Intended status: Standards Track May 19, 2008
Expires: November 2008
MTLS: TLS Multiplexing
draft-badra-hajjeh-mtls-04.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 19, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard provides connection
security with mutual authentication, data confidentiality and
integrity, key generation and distribution, and security parameters
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
negotiation. However, missing from the protocol is a way to multiplex
application data over a single TLS session.
This document defines MTLS, an application-level protocol running
over TLS (or DTLS) Record protocol. The MTLS design provides
application multiplexing over a single TLS (or DTLS) session.
Therefore, instead of associating a TLS connection with each
application, MTLS allows several applications to protect their
exchanges over a single TLS session.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................3
2. TLS multiplexing overview and considerations...................3
2.1. Handshake.................................................3
2.1.1. Opening and closing connections......................4
2.2. MTLS protocol.............................................5
2.3. MTLS Message Types........................................7
3. Security Considerations........................................7
4. IANA Considerations............................................8
5. References.....................................................8
5.1. Normative References......................................8
5.2. Informative References....................................8
Author's Addresses................................................9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements....................9
1. Introduction
HTTP over TLS [RFC2818], POP over TLS and IMAP over TLS [RFC2595] are
examples of securing, respectively HTTP, POP and IMAP data exchanges
using the TLS protocol [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
TLS ([I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis], [RFC4347]) is the most deployed
security protocol for securing exchanges, for authenticating entities
and for generating and distributing cryptographic keys. However, what
is missing from the protocol is the way to multiplex application data
over the same TLS session.
Actually, TLS (or DTLS) clients and servers MUST establish a TLS (or
DTLS) session for each application they want to run over a transport
layer. However, some applications may agree or be configured to use
the same security policies or parameters (e.g. authentication method
and cipher_suite) and then to share a single TLS session to protect
their exchanges. In this way, this document describes a way to allow
application multiplexing over TLS.
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
The document motivations included:
o TLS is application protocol-independent. Higher-level protocol can
operate on top of the TLS protocol transparently.
o TLS is a protocol of a modular nature. Since TLS is developed in
four independent protocols, the approach defined in this document
can be used with a total reuse of pre-existing TLS infrastructures
and implementations.
o It provides a secure VPN tunnel over a transport layer. Unlike
"ssh-connection" [RFC4254], MTLS can run over unreliable transport
protocols, such as UDP.
o Establishing a single TLS session for a number of applications -
instead of establishing a TLS session per one of those
applications- reduces resource consumption, latency and messages
flow that are associated with executing simultaneous TLS sessions.
o TLS can not forbid an intruder to analyze the traffic and cannot
protect data from inference. Thus, the intruder can know the type
of application data transmitted through the TLS session. However,
the approach defined in this document allows, by its design, data
protection against inference.
1.1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
2. TLS multiplexing overview and considerations
This document defines an application-level protocol called
Multiplexing TLS (MTLS) to handle data multiplexing.
2.1. Handshake
If the client is willing to run MTLS, it MUST connect to the server
that passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the IANA-
to-be-assigned TCP or UDP port <TBA>. The client MUST therefore send
the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. Once the Handshake
is complete, the client and the server can establish and manage many
application channels using the MTLS requests/responses defined below.
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
2.1.1. Opening and closing connections
Once the Handshake is complete, both the client and the server can
start data multiplexing using a set of requests/responses defined
below. All requests/requests will pass through MTLS layer and are
formatted into MTLS packets, depending on each request/response.
The sender MAY request the opening of many channels. For each
channel, the MTLS layer generates and sends the following request:
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque sender_channel_id[2];
uint32 sender_window_length;
uint32 sender_max_packet_length;
opaque source_address_machine<4..7>;
opaque source_port[2];
opaque destination_address_machine<4..7>;
opaque destination_port[2];
} RequestEstablishmentChannel;
The field "type" specifies the MTLS packet type (types are summarized
below), the "max_packet_length" and the "sender_channel_id" are used
as described below. The "source_address_machine" MAY carry either the
numeric IP address or the domain name of the host from where the
application originates the data multiplexing request and the "port"
is the port on the host from where the connection originated.
The sender initializes its "window_length" with the data length (in
octets), specifying how many bytes the receiver can maximally send on
the channel before receiving a new window length (available free
space). Each end of the channel establishes a "receive buffer" and a
"send buffer".
The sender initializes its "max_packet_length" with the data length
(in octets), specifying the maximal packet's length in octets the
receiver can send on the channel.
The "destination_address_machine" and "destination_port" specify the
TCP/IP host and port where the recipient should connect the channel.
The "destination_address_machine" MAY be either a domain name or a
numeric IP address.
The receiver decides whether it can open the channel, and replies
with one of the following messages:
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque sender_channel_id[2];
opaque receiver_channel_id[2];
uint32 receiver_window_length;
uint32 max_packet_length;
} RequestEstablishmentSuccess;
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque sender_channel_id[2];
opaque error<0..2^16>;
} RequestEchecChannel;
The field "error" conveys a description of the error.
If an error occurs at the MTLS layer, the established secure session
is still valid and no alert of any type is sent by the TLS Record.
Each MTLS channel has its identifier computed as:
channel_id = sender_channel_id" + "receiver_channel_id
Where "+" indicates concatenation.
The following packet MAY be sent to notify the receiver that the
sender will not send any more data on this channel and that any data
received after a closure request will be ignored. The sender of the
closure request MAY close its "receive buffer" without waiting for
the receiver's response. However, the receiver MUST respond with a
confirmation of the closure and close down the channel immediately,
discarding any pending writes.
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque channel_id[4];
} CloseChannel;
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque channel_id[4];
} ConfirmationCloseChannel;
2.2. MTLS protocol
The structure of the MTLS packet is described below. The
"sender_channel_id" and "receiver_channel_id" are the same generated
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
during the connection establishment. The length conveys the data
length of the current packet.
Each entity maintains its "max_packet_length" (that is originally
initialized during the connection establishment) to a value not
bigger than the maximum size of this entity's "receive buffer". For
each received packet, the entity MUST subtract the packet's length
from the "max_packet_length". The result is always positive since the
packet's length is always less than or equal to the current
"max_packet_length".
The free space of the "receive buffer" MAY increase in length.
Consequently, the entity MUST inform the other end about this
increase, allowing the other entity to send packet with length bigger
than the old "max_packet_length" but smaller or equal than the new
value.
The entity MAY indicate this increase by sending an Acknowledgment
packet. The Acknowledgment packet carries the available free space
("free_space" field in octets) the receiver of that packet can send
on the channel before receiving a new window length.
If the length of the "receive buffer" does not change, Acknowledgment
packet will never be sent.
In the case where the "receive buffer" of an entity fills up, the
other entity MUST wait for an Acknowledgment packet before sending
any more MTLSPlaintext packets.
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque channel_id[4];
uint32 length;
opaque data[MTLSPlaintext.length];
} MTLSPlaintext;
struct {
uint8 type;
opaque channel_id[4];
uint32 free_space;
} Acknowledgment;
The TLS Record Layer receives data from MTLS, supposes it as
uninterpreted data and applies the fragmentation and the
cryptographic operations on it, as defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-
bis]. The type is set to mtls(TBA).
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
Note: multiple MTLS fragments MAY be coalesced into a single
TLSPlaintext record.
Received data is decrypted, verified, decompressed, and reassembled,
then delivered to MTLS entity. Next, the MTLS sends data to the
appropriate application using the channel identifier and the length
value.
2.3. MTLS Message Types
This section defines the initial set of MTLS Message Types used in
Request/Response exchanges. The Message Type field is one octet and
identifies the structure of an MTLS Request or Response message.
The messages defined in this document are listed below. More Message
Types may be defined in future documents. The list of Message Types,
as defined through this document, is maintained by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). Thus, an application needs to be
made to the IANA in order to obtain a new Message Type value. Since
there are subtle (and not-so-subtle) interactions that may occur in
this protocol between new features and existing features that may
result in a significant reduction in overall security, new values
SHALL be defined only through the IETF Consensus process specified in
[RFC2434]. All of the messages defined in this document follow the
convention that for each message that an entity sends and that the
other entity understands, this latter entity replies with a message
of the same type.
RequestEstablishmentChannel 1
RequestEstablishmentSuccess 2
RequestEchecChannel 3
CloseChannel 4
ConfirmationCloseChannel 5
MTLSPlaintext 6
Acknowledgment 7
3. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this document and in [I-
D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] and [RFC4347] documents.
If a fatal error related to any channel or a connection of an
arbitrary application occurs, the secure session MUST NOT be resumed.
This is logic since the Record protocol does not distinguish between
the MTLS channels. However, if an error occurs at the MTLS layer,
both parties immediately close the related channels, but not the TLS
session (no alert of any type is sent by the TLS Record).
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
4. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the IANA regarding registration of
values related to the TLS protocol.
IANA is requested to assign a TCP and UDP port numbers that will be
the default port for MTLS sessions as defined in this document.
There is one name space in MTLS that requires registration: Message
Types.
Message Types have a range from 1 to 255, of which 1-7 are to be
allocated for this document. Because a new Message Type has
considerable impact on interoperability, a new Message Type SHALL be
defined only through the IETF Consensus process specified in
[RFC2434].
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10
(work in progress), March 2008.
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E., Modadugu, N., "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC2595] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595,
June 1999.
[RFC4254] Lonvick, C., "SSH Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, January
2005.
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
Author's Addresses
Mohamad Badra
LIMOS Laboratory - UMR6158, CNRS
France
Email: badra@isima.fr
Ibrahim Hajjeh
INEOVATION
France
Email: hajjeh@ineovation.com
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft TLS Multiplexing May 2008
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Badra & Hajjeh Expires November 2008 [Page 10]
