Internet DRAFT - draft-451-imp-report
draft-451-imp-report
Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group S. Abraham
Internet-Draft CIS India
Intended status: Informational MP. Canales
Expires: January 16, 2018 Derechos Digitales
J. Hall
CDT
O. Khrustaleva
American University
N. ten Oever
ARTICLE 19
C. Runnegar
ISOC
S. Sahib
Cisco Systems
July 15, 2017
Implementation Report for HTTP Status Code 451 (RFC 7725)
draft-451-imp-report-00
Abstract
This report describes implementation experience between various
components working with the HTTP Status Code 451 [RFC7725], a risk
assessment and recommendation for improvements.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Target audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Who is likely to implement the 451 status code? . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Server operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Who is likely to use the 451 status code data? . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Browser vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. End users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.3. Researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.4. Civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.5. Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Current Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Trends and observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Potential negative or positive impacts . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. What are features of a blocking reporting infrastructure that
would be useful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. What features of blocking events are supported by the
existing 451 status code, and what features do we need to
add? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. Appendix: Legal Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
13. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
13.1. Federal Law of 27 July 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
13.2. "Yarovaya laws" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14. Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14.1. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
15.1. Blocking by government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
15.2. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
16. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16.1. Blocking by the government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16.2. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16.3. Takedowns by web sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
17. United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
17.1. Section 512 of the DMCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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17.2. Other US-based forms of takedown . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
18. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
This document evaluates the usage of HTTP Status Code 451, which was
standardized by the IETF in February 2016 [RFC7725]. This
implementation report aims to illuminate whether the status code does
what it set out to do ("provide transparency in circumstances where
issues of law or public policy affect server operations"), the
different ways it is being used, positive and negative impacts the
standard might have and we end with suggestions for improvement of
the standard.
2. Vocabulary
Blocking The act of making an HTTP resource inaccessible to a class
of users.
Resource A top-level information object served by an HTTP server
(e.g., HTML page).
Subresource An information object served within the context of a
top-level Resource (e.g., JavaScript, Image, etc.)
Server Operator An entity or an individual operating an HTTP server.
HTTP status For each response, HTTP servers return a numerical
status code (e.g., 400 (OK), 403 (unauthorized), etc.) described
by IANA https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes/http-
status-codes.xhtml.
Response When an HTTP Server responds to a request, it sends a
Response, made up of header fields and a body (See:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7725#section-3
Legal demand A verbal or written request grounded in law or
regulation from an Authority to a Server Operator to Blocking a
Resource.
Authority A government or government-licensed entity mandating
blocking of a resource directly or that may institute laws that
indirectly require blocking of a resource.
Complainant A party making a Legal demand; may or may not be an
Authority (e.g., the US DMCA allows a copyright holder to demand
takedown).
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3. Target audiences
4. Who is likely to implement the 451 status code?
4.1. Server operators
Server operators that are being confronted with an order from a legal
authority can use the HTTP Status Code to communicate to third
parties why the resource is not available on the server.
4.2. Intermediaries
Intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers, Content
Distribution Networks and other might be obligated by a legal
authority in their operational jurisdiction to filter certain
content. The HTTP status code would add transparency to this
practice.
5. Who is likely to use the 451 status code data?
5.1. Browser vendors
Browser vendors might implement functionality to communicate the
presence of a HTTP status code 451 to a user.
5.2. End users
End users will be informed about why the information they are trying
to access is not available, instead of merely concluding that the
content is not available due to other reasons (e.g., 404
unavailable).
5.3. Researchers
Researchers might want to scan for the prevalence of blocking, as
well as trends in blocking behavior.
5.4. Civil society
Civil society may want to use instances of HTTP status code 451 to
highlight censorship and censorship trends, to challenge blocking.
5.5. Governments
Governments might want to verify compliance with blocking orders and
use HTTP status code 451 to do so on the networks in their
jurisdiction.
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6. Current Usage
7. Overview
In the majority of cases in which HTTP status code 451 is being
deployed [Censys], the status code reads as follows - "451
Unavailable For Legal Reasons" or "451" or "451 Unknown Error" or
"451 Error" or "451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons (burned)" or "451
OK". The Page Title could say "404 Not Found" or "Blocked" or "451
-" or "Restricted access" or "Bloqueado por ordem judicial" ("Blocked
by judicial order") or "Sito censurato" ("Censored site") or
"Доступ
ограничен"
("Access is restricted") or
"Зелёная
точка -
доступ к за

87;рашиваемо
084;у ресурсу
ограничен"
("Zelenaya tochka" - Internet and TV provider - access to the
requested resource is restricted")or "Violazione del bispensiero" or
"Please report sexual abuse against children to the Swedish National
Bureau of Investigation!" or "Copyright Notice" or "451 RKN Redirect"
(RKN is likely Russia's Roskomnadzor) or "ATTENZIONE!! - POLIZIA
POSTALE E DELLE COMUNICAZIONI - PAGINA BLOCCATA" ("Attention! -
Postal and Communications Policy - Blocked Page") or "451 Unavailable
For Legal Reasons 本网站由于国
3478;政策而不可用" (Chinese:
"This site is not available due to national policy").
The hosts that were observed implementing the status code are located
in Russia, United States of America, Singapore, Czech Republic,
Thailand, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Norway, Finland,
Kazakhstan, United Arab Emirates, Japan, China, Philippines and
Australia. In some cases - the visitor to the website is provided
some context for the block - for example, a take-down notice for
copyright infringment - in other cases the visitor is encouraged to
cooperate with law enforcement agencies. The page title may have
information that does not always make sense in the context of the
error code, for example when the title says "404 Not Found" but the
page is a 451 response body. These observations are based an
examination of the search results from Censys.io on 15 July 2017
which featured 526 IPv4 Hosts of which 17 were included in the list
of "Top Million Websites".
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Several large content providers are now supporting the HTTP 451
Status Code, such as [Github] and [Reddit], whereas other content
providers such as [Twitter], [Facebook], and [Youtube] are currently
not using the HTTP status code to indicate the blocking or takedown
of specific content.
8. Trends and observations
- The majority of instance of HTTP status code 451 provide no
explanation in the response body.
- There have been found several cases of servers serving HTTP status
code 451 with redirect another server with a central warning
message of a blocking authority.
- A registrar serves HTTP status code 451 when a registrant did not
pay their domain fees.
- There are significant observations of server serving HTTP status
code 451 based on geoIP (especially for gambling sites).
- There are different understandings of the 'blocked-by' field as
defined in RFC7725. Some people interpret is as the entity that
is doing the blocking, others are interpreting it at the authority
responsible for ordering the blocking.
- HTTP Status Code 451 is thusfar only served by hosts, not by
intermediaries.
9. Potential negative or positive impacts
- [RFC7725] specifies a status code for web resources that are
blocked for legal reasons. The HTTP status code 451 is designed
to enable content providers and intermediaries (including ISPs and
search engines) to notify users that their access to specific web
resources has been blocked for legal reasons. The standard also
recommends that the notification include an explanation. This is
important because this is the detail the user needs to be able to
understand why access has been blocked, and if desired, to take
action to challenge the blocked access. It also helps content
servers and intermediaries who have been required to block access
to notify users who directed that access by blocked.
- Also, as the 451 status code is machine-readable, researchers and
others could use web crawlers to identity which blocked URLs or
sub-resources use error code 451. This data could be used to
produce a searchable open repository of all known error code 451
instances. This information could then be used to map the blocked
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Web and to analyze the explanations, looking for trends and
anomalies. For example, one day there might be an answer to the
question - "how much content is blocked for IPR reasons?"
- The 451 status code can also be used for encrypted webpages, which
is significant as encryption on the Web becomes more and more
prevalent. A user should be able to see the error code
irrespective of whether they try to access the content via HTTP or
HTTPS.
- This standard is a prime example of an Internet protocol enabling
common policy objectives (in this case, transparency) to be
implemented across the world. However, as with all IETF
standards, the implementation of the 451 status code is voluntary.
So, how widely it is used will likely depend on a number of
factors, including a legal/political regime that does not penalize
transparency, the willingness to be transparent and the capability
to implement.
- It is possible that status code 451 code could be used for other
purposes (e.g. to mislead users as to the reason for the content
being blocked), especially as "legal reasons" is not defined.
- It is also possible that content providers and intermediaries who
are required to block content for legal reasons to be asked or
compelled to use another status code (e.g. 404). In these
circumstances, content providers and intermediaries should include
information in their transparency reports to indicate whether this
is happening, by, for example, stating: "We have/have not been
required to replace 451 by other status codes."
- There may be a temptation in some cases of the implementation of
status code 451 to include the ability to identify and/or track
the users that visit a web resource that has been blocked. This
raises significant privacy issues.
- The usage of HTTP status code 451 might lead to an increase in
blocking because it makes analyzing compliance easier.
10. What are features of a blocking reporting infrastructure that would
be useful?
- The reporting format needs to cover information enough to satisfy
transparency and offer insight about possible misuse of 451 error
as a vehicle for censorship.
- Transparency requirement will be better served through
standardization of fields and descriptions. Currently many
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implementations for HTTP status code 451 do not provide the reason
for blocking. This could be attributed to the fact that the
different needs are not sufficiently documented in RFC7725. This
could be fixed by adding fields in the header. Useful
categorization fields to accurately describe content blocked by
legal reasons are:
- Identification of the legal source on which the blocking request is
based.
- Identification of the complainant/requestor if is an institution
(not if individual because of privacy concerns). It could be useful
to identify in this field if the request comes from a private or
public entity, and in if there is a judicial order involved, or a law
enforcement or other type of governmental request.
- Description of blocked content (example: 'Non-consensual sexually
explicit imagery'). It could be helpful to have suggested fields
that standardize type of content in order to make easier the analysis
and the evaluation about eventual challenge of the use of error 451
for the specific content removal.
- Determination of the geographical scope of the blocking.
Increasingly blocks are being implemented at the level of the city or
province. Therefore country codes may not be sufficient to describe
the geographical scope.
- Date of block order and time-period for which the block has to be
enforced.
- Date of start serving HTTP status code 451.
- Link to the final decision (if available). Again this should only
be the case when the complainant is not an individual.
- Contact information for relevant authority for the purposes of
verification of procedural stage and appeal or redress opportunities.
11. What features of blocking events are supported by the existing 451
status code, and what features do we need to add?
- Guidance on the representation of HTTP status code for
subresources in browsers
- Guidance on the implementation of HTTP status code 451 could lead
to an increase in adoption. RFC7725 provides high level advice
but still leaves space for interpretation. An implementation
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guide in conjunction with an adoption campaign might lead to
increased adoption.
- [RFC7725] does not clarify whether HTTP Status Code 451 is only
meant for respones to GET/HEAD requests or also for POST/HEAD
requests.
- Guidance on a HTTP link header to indicate that a resources that
is linked on the page, but not loaded, is no longer available for
legal reasons.
12. Appendix: Legal Realities
In the light of the use cases outlined above underneath we are
providing an overview of legal frameworks in a number of countries
that could be used to make a blocking request. This is to show that
a reference to a the description of blocked content, the legal source
on which the blocking order or request is based and the authority
that is makes the order or request is crucial in understanding the
context and nature of the blockage.
13. Russia
Blocking by the government:
13.1. Federal Law of 27 July 2006
Law No. 149-FZ on Information, Information Technologies and
Protection of Information and its amendments:
- "Blacklist" law 139-FZ (2012) - allowing to block websites if they
appear to have dangerous information for children such as
information about suicide and drugs. The blocking was often done
by keyword so as a result one of the biggest wiki sites in Russia
(Lukmore) was accused of drugs propaganda, an online encyclopedia
(Absurdopedia) was accused of suicide propaganda and an online
game was blocked because on it's forum somebody used a word
"drug".
- "Anti-pirate" law 187-FZ (2013) - easier way for the government to
block access to websites if they are suspected in any wrongdoing.
The amendment also allows blocking by IP address. Leads to the
blockage of portals such as OpenSharing.org
- The law 398-FZ on immediate blockage of websites at the request of
Prosecutor General (2013).
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- "Bloggers' amendment" 97-FZ (2014) - bloggers with more than 3000
need to register as mass media ("information distributors") and
have the same responsibilities (including on what their readers
post in comments).
- Data localization law 242-FZ (2015) all companies collecting
personal data of the Russian citizens must store that information
on the servers within Russia
- The laws against extremism that have been updated throughout the
past 5 years expanding the term "extremism" and making the
punishment tougher (jail terms for posting and reposting) as well
as blocking. These laws have been used widely after the conflict
in Ukraine. Some people got jail sentences and resources were
being blocked for spreading information sympathizing with the
Ukrainian side. Such laws are particularly vague and "extremism"
is very laxly defined. For example, "...extremist materials, as
well as information propagating racial, national or religious
hatred or enmity or hatred towards any social group."
13.2. "Yarovaya laws"
This law was approved by the Parliament and, if passed, will oblige
messaging apps to store messaging history and decrypt messages at
prosecutors' request.
14. Chile
14.1. Blocking by courts
The Law No. 20.435 (Copyright Act reform from 2010) contains a notice
and take down procedure, for copyright infringements under which a
court order is required -instead of a private notice like happens in
the DMCA- to have content taken down. A Supreme Court decision from
2016 held that it was possible to request a news oulet to remove
content in its website to enforce the constitutional right of
privacy, when the data is no longer relevant and it availability on
the network cause harm to the data subject. The case was
controversial because the information was about a public servant
condemned in a pedophilia case. This decision has been used to
enforce a kind of 'right to be forgotten' for lower courts since the
Supreme Court decision, but there is a lack of general legislation
that clarify this cause of removals. On the other hand, the Law No.
20.453 tackles intermediary non-interference from the perspective of
users by adding to the general rules within the General
Telecommunications Act (Law No 18.168) new rules for internet service
providers. Among those rules the internet service providers "shall
not block or interfere in any way with the rights of the user to use
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any content, application or service on the internet; but they may
take traffic management measures or block contents upon user requests
(and to their cost)".
15. Iran
15.1. Blocking by government
The Committee Charged with Determining Offensive Content (CCDOC) is
the official authority on censorship and blocking of web content in
Iran. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), established in 2012,
develops policies related to cyberspace governance. However,
blocking and filtering directives originate from various levels of
the government, including through direct orders by the judiciary
independent of the SCC and CCDOC. Other organizations involved in
the censorship process include the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) and
the Telecommunication Company of Iran. By national law, the
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) is the exclusive provider of
Internet bandwidth in the country. All ISPs have to purchase
bandwidth from TCI and are legally bound to use censoring software.
Such a system enables a centralized filtering program for all
Internet traffic in the country.
15.2. Blocking by courts
In Iran, freedom of expression is regulated by the Penal Code and the
Press Law of 1986. The Press Law was amended in 2000 to mandate that
publishing online without a license was grounds for blocking,
effectively censoring services such as Google, Facebook and Twitter.
Iran also has Internet-specific laws, such as the 2001 resolution
called "Regulations and Conditions Related to Computerized
Information Networks" that ordered that ISPs remove 'offensive'
websites and mandated the use of filtering technology. The main law
in terms of applicability to Internet censorship is the Computer
Crimes Law (CCL) of 2009. CCL prescribes articles that provide for
content-based restrictions on the Internet usage of Iranian citizens.
Articles 21 through 23, in particular, hold ISPs liable for filtering
content and reporting illegal material (as described in the articles)
to a 'web crimes committee' made up of government officials. ISPs
are also required to store usage data and logs about visited web
pages for a window of at least six months. It is worth noting that
none of the terms used in the CCL are defined strictly, potentially
over-broadening its scope. There have been many cases of Iranian
bloggers being prosecuted for violation of censorship laws. National
Internet Project: The Iranian government has been working towards the
creation of a National Internet Network which would domestically host
all accessible Internet content, isolating Iranian citizens from the
World Wide Web. Implementation of the national network would make it
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easier for the government to block services and web pages through
measures such as intelligent filtering. Already the use of social
networking platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Viber is heavily
monitored and controlled.
16. India
16.1. Blocking by the government
Under Section 69A of Information Technology Act 2000, the executive
branch of the government has "the power to issue directions for
blocking for public access of any information through any computer
Resource". According to the law, any person can send a block request
to a Nodal Officer. These Nodal Officers should be designated in all
government entities to deal with block requests. The request is then
approved by the state or central Chief Secretary. This step is not
required if the Nodal Officer has initiated the blocking procedure
without any complainant. The request is then forward to the head of
CERT-IN. If it is not a public emergency, the persons or
intermediaries should be given 48 hours to respond. But this is not
required if the emergency provision has been invoked, but the block
list still has to be reviewed by "Committee for Examination of
Request" within 48 hours after the block been issued. The block
lists are usually issued directly to ISPs and are marked confidential
and are implemented unevenly with some ISPs providing sparse details
if users try to access the blocked resources and other ISPs returning
a 404 Error Code.
16.2. Blocking by courts
Increasingly Indian courts are issuing ex-parte John Doe orders for
website blocking. These orders can be issued by courts for any
illegal content. There are around 30 different laws that place
reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech in India. For
example: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, The Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation
and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 and The Juvenile Justice Act,
2000. Some of these laws have multiple provisions that regulate
speech for ex. the Information Technology Act has 6 sections and the
Indian Penal Code has 10 sections. Once a court order has been
obtained, the order can be sent to Secretary of the Department of
Electronics and Information Technology who will then forward it to
ISPs. Or alternatively complainants could also send court orders
directly to ISPs without following the procedure described above.
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16.3. Takedowns by web sites
Under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000, both the
government and private parties can send take-down notices to web
sites. Intermediaries can ignore private party take-downs without
losing immunity but take-down notices from the government have to be
complied with. Under Section 52(1)(c) of the Indian Copyright Act,
take-down notices can be sent to websites who are engaged in
infringement but they need to be followed by court orders otherwise
the content can be reinstated.
17. United States of America
17.1. Section 512 of the DMCA
The United States Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) has a
provision that has greatly shaped the landscape of online content
[Quilter]. Section 512 of the DMCA has a "notice and takedown"
procedure that copyright holders can use to assert that a piece of
copyrighted material has been posted against their wishes and that it
should be taken down. Under this provision, after a website operator
receives a 512 notice, it must: 1) remove the material
"expeditiously"; 2) notify the poster that someone has alleged
copyright infringement in that material and that the material has
been removed; and 3) send any "counternotices" from the poster -
objections from the poster to claims of copyright - to the original
complaintant. The complaintant must notify the website operator that
it has filed a lawsuite within 10-14 days or the website can
reinstate the removed material.
17.2. Other US-based forms of takedown
There are a number of other legal methods that are used with much
less frequency in the United States:
- Defamation: Under US law, balancing the freedom of speech in the
US constitution is also a right to be free from untrue attacks on
one's reputation. Threats and lawsuits are regularly filed
claiming statements are untrue and reputationally damaging.
- Rights of publicity: The United States has a number of States that
recognize a "right of publicity", typically a right enjoyed by
celebrities and public figures to limit the ability of others to
use their likeness, name, or recognizable features for commercial
purposes.
- Non-consensual sexually-explicit imagery: A number of content
providers and online content hosts (intermediaries) have begun to
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honor request to take down material that may include sexually-
explicit imagery that was either captured without consent or
shared online without consent (cite).
- Mugshot images: Images taken in the process of a law enforcement
arrest or detention have increasingly been subject to state-based
regulation in the United States, recognizing that people may
suffer undue reputational harm from the display and searchability
of this kind of content [ElManzalawy].
- Trademark-based takedowns: A US law, The Anti-cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), protects the owners of trademarks
from abuse by entities "cybersquatting" on domain names that
contain their trademarks (cybersquatting is proactively
registering a domain name to demand substantial fees from the
trademark holder). Trademark holders can use the remedies in this
law to request cancellation or transfer of the domain name as well
as damages.
- E-Commerce Patents: Because software can be patented in the United
States, there are regular claims made by patent holders against
online content and services that they claim infringe their patent.
18. Informative References
[Censys] Durumeric, Z., Adrian, D., Mirian, A., Bailey, M., and J.
Halderman, "80.http.get.status_code: 451 - Censys", 2017,
<https://www.censys.io/
ipv4?q=80.http.get.status_code%3A+451>.
[ElManzalawy]
El Manzalawy, M., "Should the Mugshot Industry be
Regulated? States Push Legislation to Protect Individuals
from Disproportionate Reputational Harm", 2017,
<https://www.lumendatabase.org/blog_entries/789>.
[Facebook]
Facebook, inc., "How do I add or edit country or age
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[RFC7725] Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
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Authors' Addresses
Sunil Abraham
CIS India
EMail: sunil@cis-india.org
Maria Paz Canales
Derechos Digitales
EMail: mariapaz@derechosdigitales.org
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
CDT
EMail: joe@cdt.org
Olga Khrustaleva
American University
EMail: ok4193a@student.american.edu
Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 15]
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Niels ten Oever
ARTICLE 19
EMail: niels@article19.org
Christine Runnegar
ISOC
EMail: runnegar@isoc.org
Shivan Kaul Sahib
Cisco Systems
EMail: shivankaulsahib@gmail.com
Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 16]
