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RUCUS Exploratory Working GroupD. Wing
Internet-DraftCisco
Intended status: ExperimentalS. Niccolini
Expires: August 16, 2008M. Stiemerling
 NEC
 H. Tschofenig
 Nokia Siemens Networks
 February 13, 2008


Spam Score for SIP
draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-01

Status of this Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2008.

Abstract

This document defines a mechanism for SIP proxies to communicate a spam score to downstream SIP proxies and to SIP user agents. This information can then be used as input to other decision making engines, for example, to provide alternate call routing or call handling.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Terminology
3.  Operation of Spam-Scoring Proxy
4.  Operation of Proxy or User Agent
5.  Grammar
6.  Examples
7.  Security Considerations
8.  Acknowledgements
9.  IANA Considerations
10.  References
    10.1.  Normative References
    10.2.  Informational References
Appendix A.  Changes
    A.1.  Changes from -00 to -01
§  Authors' Addresses
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements




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1.  Introduction

It is desirable for SIP proxies to insert a spam score so that downstream SIP proxies and downstream SIP user agents can use a high score to decide that special handling is required. For example, a score above 20 might cause one of the spam avoidance techniques described in [RFC5039] (Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, “The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam,” January 2008.) to be triggered for this call.

This specification allows each SIP proxy to contribute spam scoring information that can be useful to downstream SIP proxies and the SIP user agent (UA). The downstream SIP proxies or SIP UA might ignore that information (e.g., it doesn't trust the SIP proxy that generated the spam score) or might use it.

Note that this document does not make the attempt to define how the spam score was derived nor to distribute information that could be used to verify the spam score generation. Furthermore, this document does not attempt to cryptographically bind the identity of the entity generating the score to the value itself. Hence, its usage is likely to be useful only between neighboring administrative domains communicating such a score.



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2.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).



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3.  Operation of Spam-Scoring Proxy

A SIP proxy evaluates an incoming SIP request and generates a spam score using a local mechanism. This score is between 0 (indicating the message is not spam) and 100 (indicating the message is spam). Values between 0 and 100 indicate the 'likelihood' that the SIP request is spam, with higher values indicating a higher likelihood the message is spam.

This spam score is inserted into the new "Spam-Score" header. This header field contains a summary spam score and optionally contains detail information. The detail information is implementation dependent. The detail information is valuable for debugging and to provide the SIP user agent or SIP proxy with additional information regarding how the spam-scoring SIP proxy's local mechanism arrived at the summary spam score.



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4.  Operation of Proxy or User Agent

A downstream proxy or the SIP user agent MAY use the spam score or spam-detail information to change call routing or call handling. It is envisioned that some form of policies indicate the trusted proxies in order to decide which spam scores to consider for special call treatment.

In some jurisdictions, the end user needs to authorize call handling, including rejection of a call based on a spam score. Mechanisms to allow users to influence such policies are, however, out of scope of this document.

The behavior of the SIP proxy or user agent when the spam score is above a certain value is a local policy matter. Examples of behavior include:



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5.  Grammar



ABNF using the ABNF syntax of [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.):

  extension-header   = spam-score [ SP ";" spam-detail ]

  spam-score         = score SP "by" SP hostname
  score              = 1*3DIGIT [ "." 0*3DIGIT ]

  spam-detail        = "detail" EQUAL detail
  detail             = QUOTE mech SEMI rule-score
                       *(COMMA rule-score) QUOTE
                       ; mathematical average of the rule-scores
                       ; MUST be same as spam-score

  rule-score         = rule [ "=" score ]
  mech               = token
  rule               = token

 Figure 1: ABNF 



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6.  Examples



The following example shows a SIP score generated and inserted by two SIP proxies, sip.example.com and sip.example.net. In this example, sip.example.com is owned by a spammer who is trying to fool downstream systems with their low spam score (0). However, the example.net proxies and user agents only pay attention to spam scores from Spam-Score headers generated by example.net proxies, so example.com's attempts to fool the downstream proxies (with its low spam score) are in vain.

  INVITE sip:bob@example.net SIP/2.0
  Via: SIP/2.0/UDP sip.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8
    ;received=192.0.2.1
  Spam-Score: 75 by sip.example.net
    ;detail="SIPfilter-1.0;call_volume=75"
  Via: SIP/2.0/UDP sip.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKfjzc
    ;received=192.0.2.127
  Max-Forwards: 70
  To: Bob <sip:bob@example.net>
  From: Alice <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=1928301774
  Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710@pc33.example.com
  CSeq: 314159 INVITE
  Contact: <sip:alice@pc33.example.com>
  Content-Type: application/sdp
  Content-Length: 142

  [... SDP elided from this example...]

 Figure 2: Example with spam scores 



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7.  Security Considerations

SIP proxies and SIP user agents need to ignore spam scores generated by proxies that aren't trusted.

[[This section will be completed in a later version of this document.]]



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8.  Acknowledgements

Thanks to Joachim Charzinski, Daniel Quinlan, and S. Moonesamy for their suggestions to improve this document.



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9.  IANA Considerations

[[This section will be completed in a later version of this document.]]



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10.  References



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10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” RFC 3261, June 2002 (TXT).


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10.2. Informational References

[RFC5039] Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, “The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam,” RFC 5039, January 2008 (TXT).


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Appendix A.  Changes

Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.



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A.1.  Changes from -00 to -01



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Authors' Addresses

  Dan Wing
  Cisco Systems, Inc.
  170 West Tasman Drive
  San Jose, CA 95134
  USA
Email:  dwing@cisco.com
  
  Saverio Niccolini
  Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
  Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
  Heidelberg 69115
  Germany
Phone:  +49 (0) 6221 4342 118
Email:  saverio.niccolini@netlab.nec.de
URI:  http://www.netlab.nec.de
  
  Martin Stiemerling
  Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
  Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
  Heidelberg 69115
  Germany
Phone:  +49 (0) 6221 4342 113
Email:  stiemerling@netlab.nec.de
URI:  http://www.netlab.nec.de
  
  Hannes Tschofenig
  Nokia Siemens Networks
  Linnoitustie 6
  Espoo 02600
  Finland
Phone:  +358 (50) 4871445
Email:  Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI:  http://www.tschofenig.com


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Full Copyright Statement

Intellectual Property

Acknowledgment