| ANIMA WG | M. Pritikin |
| Internet-Draft | M. Behringer |
| Intended status: Informational | S. Bjarnason |
| Expires: August 17, 2015 | Cisco |
| February 13, 2015 |
Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures
draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-01
This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an key infrastructure using vendor installed IEEE 802.1AR manufacturing installed certificates, in combination with a vendor based service on the Internet. Before being authenticated, a new device has only link-local connectivity, and does not require a routable address. When a vendor provides an Internet based service, devices can be forced to join only specific domains but for constrained environments we describe a variety of options that allow bootstrapping to proceed.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2015.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible action. Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure without external help is also an impossibility. Today it is accepted that the initial connections between nodes are insecure, until key distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying material is pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-scalable manner. This document describes a zero-touch approach to bootstrapping an entity by securing the initial distribution of key material using third-party generic keying material, such as a manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate [IDevID], and a corresponding third-party service on the Internet.
The two sides of an association being bootstrapped authenticate each other and then determine appropriate authorization. This process is described as four distinct steps between the existing domain and the new entity being added:
A precise answer to these questions can not be obtained without leveraging an established key infrastructure(s). The domain's decisions are based on the new entity's authenticated identity, as established by verification of previously installed credentials such as a manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate, and verified back-end information such as a configured list of purchased devices or communication with a trusted third-party. The new entity's decisions are made according to verified communication with a trusted third-party or in a strictly auditable fasion.
Optimal security is achieved with IEEE 802.1AR certificates on each new entity, accompanied by a third-party Internet based service for verification. The concept also works with less requirements, but is then less secure. A domain can choose to accept lower levels of security when a trusted third-party is not available so that bootstrapping proceeds even at the risk of reduced security. Only the domain can make these decisions based on administrative input and known behavior of the new entity.
The result of bootstrapping is that a domain specific key infrastructure is deployed. Since IEEE 802.1AR PKI certificates are used for identifying the new entity and the public key of the domain identity is leveraged during communiciations with an Internet based service, which is itself authenticated using HTTPS, bootstrapping of a domain specific Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is fully described. Sufficient agility to support bootstrapping alternative key infrastructures (such as symmetric key solutions) is considered although no such key infrastructure is described.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The following terms are defined for clarity:
The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in this section. Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the components. Each component is logical and may be combined with other components as necessary.
Factory components
.
. +------------+
. | Factory CA |
. +------------+
. |
. +------------+
. | |
+--------------(provides)---------------------------| Factory |
| +---------->| |
| | . +------------+
| V .
| +---------------+ . +------------+
| | Orchestrator | . | MASA |
V +---------------+ . | Service |
+-------+ | . | |
| New | +------------+ +-----------+ . +------------+
| Entity|<--L2-->| Proxy |<----->| | ....... ^
| | +------------+ | | |
| | | Registrar | |
| | | | |
| |<--DHCP-->(L3 bootstrap) | | |
| | | | |
| |<-----L3---------------------( registrar )-----------+
| | ( may proxy ) |
+-------+ +-----------+
|
+----------------------------+
^ | Domain Certification | ^
. | Authority | .
. +----------------------------+ .
. .
.........................................
|
"domain" components
We assume a multi-vendor network. In such an environment, there could a MASA for each vendor that supports devices following this document's specification, or an integrator could provide a MASA service for all devices which he supplies. Note again that the MASA is not mandatory. Also, this approach describes a secure zero-touch approach to bootstrapping a key infrastructure; if certain devices in a network do not support this approach, they can still be bootstrapped manually.
This section describes how an operator interacts with a domain that supports the bootstrapping as described in this document.
This is a one time step by the domain administrator. This is an "off the shelf" CA with the exception that it is designed to work as an integrated part of the security solution. This precludes the use of 3rd party certification authority services that do not provide support for delegation of certificate issuance decisions to a domain managed Registration Authority.
This is a one time step by the domain administrator. One or more devices in the domain are configured take on a Registrar function.
A device can be configured to act as a Registrar or a device can auto-select itself to take on this function, using a detection mechanism to resolve potential conflicts and setup communication with the Domain Certification Authority. Automated Registrar selection is outside scope for this document.
For each New Entity the Registrar is informed the unique identifier (e.g. serial number) along with the manufacturer's identifying information (e.g. manufacturer root certificate). This can happen in different ways:
None of the approaches requires the network to have permanent Internet connectivity. Even when the Internet based MASA service is used, it is possible to pre-fetch the required information from the MASA a priori, for example at time of purchase. In this case devices can enrol later even in a completely isolated network.
Additional policy can be stored for future authorization decisions. For example an expected deployment time window or that a certain Proxy must be used.
The approach outlined in this document provides a secure zero-touch method to enrol new devices without any pre-staged configuration. New devices communicate with already enrolled devices of the domain, which proxy between the new device and a Registrar. As a result of this completely automatic operation, all devices obtain a domain based certificate.
The certificate installed in the previous step can be used for all subsequent operations. For example, to determine the boundaries of the domain: If a neighbor has a certificate from the same trust anchor it can be assumed "inside" the same organization; if not, as outside. See also Section 4.5.1. The certificate can also be used to securely establish a connection between devices and central control functions. Also autonomic transactions can use the domain certificates to authenticate and/or encrypt direct interactions between devices. The usage of the domain certificates is outside scope for this document.
Entities behave in an autonomic fashion. They discover each other and autonomically establish a key infrastructure deliminating the autonomic domain. See [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] for more information.
The overall flow is shown in Figure 2:
+---------+ +----------+ +-----------+
| New | | | | MASA |
| Entity | | Domain | | Service |
| | | | | (Internet)|
+---------+ +----------+ +-----------+
| | |
|<-------discovery--------->| |
|---802.1AR credential----->| |
| | |
| [ accept device? ] |
| | |
| |---802.1AR identity-------->|
| |---Domain ID--------------->|
| | |
| | [device belongs]
| | [to domain? ]
| | |
| | [update audit log]
| | |
| |<---device history log------|
| |<-- authorization token-----|
| | |
| [ still accept device?] |
| | |
|<----authorization token---| |
|<----domain information----| |
| | |
[auth token valid?] | |
| | |
|----domain enrolment------>| |
|<----domain certificate----| |
| |
A New Entity that has not yet been bootstrapped attempts to find a local domain and join it. A number of methods are attempted for establishing communications with the domain in a specified order.
Client behavior is as follows:
The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.
Existing protocols provide the appropriate functionality for both discovering the Proxy and facilitating communication through the Proxy:
Each provides a method for the New Entity to discover and initiate communication with a local neighbor. In each protocol methods are available to support encapsulation of the bootstrapping protocol messages described elsewhere in this document. Other protocols for transporting bootstrapping messages can be added in future references.
All security assocaitions established are between the new device and the Registrar regardless of proxy operations.
If multiple proxies are available the New Entity tries each until a successful bootstrapping occurs. The New Entity may prioritize proxies selection order as appropriate for the anticipated environment.
If Proxy discovery fails the New Entity moves on to discovering a Registrar directly.
The domain trust anchor is received by the New Entity during the boostrapping protocol exchange.
An enrollment protocol such as EST [RFC7030] details a set of non-autonomic bootstrapping methods such as:
This document describes an additional autonomic method:
If the autonomic methods fails the New Entity returns to discovery state and attempts bootstrapping with the next available discovered Registrar.
As the final step of bootstrapping a Registrar helps to issue a domain specific credential to the New Entity. For simplicity in this document, a Registrar primarily facilitates issuing a credential by acting as an RFC5280 Registration Authority for the Domain Certification Authority.
Enrollment proceeds as described in Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030]. The New Entity contacts the Registrar using EST as indicated:
Functionality to provide generic "configuration" is supported. The parsing of this data and any subsequent use of the data, for example communications with a Network Management System is out of scope but is expected to occur after bootstrapping enrollment is complete.
See Section 4.5.
The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communications. The Proxy forwards messages between the New Entity and a Registrar. Where existing protocols, as detailed in Section 4.1.1, already provide this functionality nothing additional is defined.
Once a registrar is established it listens for new entities and determines if they can join the domain. The registrar delivers any necessary authorization information to the new device and facilitates enrollment with the domain PKI.
Registrar behavior is as follows:
The applicable authentication methods detailed in EST [RFC7030] are:
In a fully automated network all devices must be securely identified.
A Registrar accepts or declines a request to join the domain, based on the authenticated identity presented and other policy defined criteria such as Proxy identity. Automated acceptance criteria include:
In all cases a Registrar must use the globally available MASA service to verify that the device's history log does not include unexpected Registrars. Because if a device had previously registered with another domain, the registrar of that domain would show in the log.
If a device is accepted into the domain, it is then invited to request a domain certificate through a certificate enrolment process. The result is a common trust anchor and device certificates for all autonomic devices in a domain. These certificates can subsequently be used to determine the boundaries of the homenet, to authenticate other domain nodes, and to autonomically enable services on the homenet.
For each entity that will be accepted a Registrar maintains the Factory CA identity and the entity's unique identifier. The Factory CA identity could be implemented as the Factory CA root certificate keyIdentifier (the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey). For user interface purposes the keyIdentifier information can be mapped to a colloquial Factory name (Registrars can be shipped with the keyIdentifier of a significant number of third-party manufacturers).
During initial bootstrapping the New Entity provides a nonce specific to the particular bootstrapping attempt. The registrar should include this nonce when claiming the New Entity from the Internet based MASA service. If a nonce is provided by the Registrar, then claims from an unauthenticated Registrar are serviced by the MASA resource.
The Registrar can claim a New Entity that is not online by forming the request using the entities unique identifier but not including a nonce in the claim request. MASA authorization tokens obtained in this way do not have a lifetime and they provide a permanent method for the domain to claim the device. Evidence of such a claim is provided in the audit log entries available to any future Registrar. Such claims reduce the ability for future domains to secure bootstrapping and therefore the Registrar MUST be authenticated by the MASA service.
Claiming an entity establishes an audit log at the MASA server and provides the Registrar with proof, in the form of a MASA authorization token, that the log entry has been inserted. As indicated in Section 4.1.2 a New Entity will only proceed with bootstrapping if a validated MASA authorization token has been recieved. The New Entity therefore enforces that bootstrapping only occurs if the claim has been logged.
The MASA service is provided by the Factory provider on the global Internet. The URI of this service is well known. The URI should be provided as an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID X.509 extension (a "MASA authorization token Distribution Point" extension).
The MASA service provides the following functionalities to Registrars:
A Registrar POSTs a claim message optionally containing the bootstrap nonce to the MASA server.
If a nonce is provided the MASA service responds to all requests. The MASA service verifies the Registrar is representative of the domain and generates a privacy protected log entry before responding with the authorization token.
If a nonce is not provided then the MASA service MUST authenticate the Registrar as a valid customer. This prevents denial of service attacks. The specific level of authentication provided by the customer is not defined here. An MASA Practice Statement (MPS) similar to the Certification Authority CPS, as defined in RFC5280, is provided by the Factory such that Registrar's can determine the level of trust they have in the Factory.
When determining if a New Entity should be accepted into a domain the Registrar retrieves a copy of the audit log from the MASA service. This contains a list of privacy protected domain identities that have previously claimed the device. Included in the list is an indication of the time the entry was made and if the nonce was included.
As the devices have a common trust anchor, device identity can be securely established, making it possible to automatically deploy services across the domain in a secure manner.
Examples of services:
When a device has joined the domain, it can validate the domain membership of other devices. This makes it possible to create trust boundaries where domain members have higher level of trusted than external devices. Using the autonomic User Interface, specific devices can be grouped into to sub domains and specific trust levels can be implemented between those.
For simplicity the bootstrapping protocol is described as extensions to EST [RFC7030].
EST provides a bootstrapping mechanism for new entities that are configured with the URI of the EST server such that the Implicit TA database can be used to authenticate the EST server. Alternatively EST clients can "engage a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-of-band data such as a CA certificate". EST does not provide a completely automated method of bootstrapping the PKI as both of these methods require some user input (either of the URI or authorizing the CA certificate).
This section details additional EST functionality that support automated bootstrapping of the public key infrastructure. These additions provide for fully automated bootstrapping. These additions are to be optionally supported by the EST server within the same .well-known URI tree as the existing EST URIs.
The "New Entity" is the EST client and the "Registrar" is the EST server.
The extensions for the client are as follows:
These extensions could be implemented as an independent protocol from EST but since the overlap with basic enrollment is extensive, particularly with respect to client authorization, they are presented here as additions to EST.
In order to obtain a validated bootstrap token and history logs the Registrar contacts the MASA service Service using REST calls.
In order to support Proxy environments EAP-EST is defined.
[[EDNOTE: TBD. EST is TLS with some data. EAP-TLS and other similar protocols provide an example framework for filling out this section]]
When the New Entity reaches the EST section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates" state but wishes to proceed in a fully automated fashion it makes a request for a MASA authorization token from the Registrar.
This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of "/requestbootstraptoken".
The request format is JSON object containing a nonce.
Request media type: application/masanonce
Request format: a json file with the following:
{"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>"}
[[EDNOTE: exact format TBD. There is an advantage to having the client sign the nonce (similar to a PKI Certification Signing Request) since this allows the MASA service to confirm the actual device identity. It is not clear that there is a security benefit from this.]]
The Registrar validates the client identity as described in EST [RFC7030] section 3.3.2. The registrar performs authorization as detailed in Section 4.3.2. If authorization is successful the Registrar obtains a MASA authorization token from the MASA service (see Section 5.3).
The recieved MASA authorization token is returned to the New Entity.
A registrar requests the MASA authorization token from the MASA service using a REST interface.
This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of "/requestMASAauthorization".
The request format is a JSON object optionally containing the nonce value (as obtained from the bootstrap request) and the IEEE 802.1AR identity of the device as a serial number (the full certificate is not needed and no proof-of-possession information for the device identity is included). The New Entity's serial number is extracted from the subject name :
{"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>", "serialnumber", "<subjectname/subjectaltname serial number>"}
Inclusion of the nonce is optional because the Registar might request an authorization token when the New Entity is not online, or when the target bootstrapping environment is not on the same network as the MASA server.
This information is encapsulated in a PKCS7 signed data structure that is signed by the Registrar. The entire certificate chain, up to and including the Domain CA, is included in the PKCS7.
The MASA service checks the internal consistency of the PKCS7 but is unable to actually authenticate the domain identity information. The domain is not know to the MASA server in advance and a shared trust anchor is not implied. The MASA server verifies that the PKCS7 is signed by a Registrar (by checking for the cmc-idRA field in the Registrar certificate) certificate that was issued by the root certificate included in the PKCS7.
The domain ID is extracted from the root certificate and is used to generate the MASA authorization token and to update the audit log.
[[EDNOTE: This assumes the Registrar can extract the serial number successfullly from the cilent certificate. The RFC4108 hardwareModuleName is likely the best known location.]]
A registrar requests the MASA authorization log from the MASA service using this EST extension.
This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of "/requestMASAlog".
The log data returned is a file consisting of all previous log entries. For example:
"log":[
{"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
"domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
certificate within the PKCS7 of the
authorization token request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},
{"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
"domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
certificate within the PKCS7 of the
authorization token request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},
]
Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can be optimized as follows: only the most recent nonce'd log entry is required in the response. All nonce-less entries for the same domainID can be condensed into the single most recent nonceless entry.
The Registrar uses this log information to make an informed decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the New Entity.
[[EDNOTE: certificate transparency might offer an alternative log entry method]]
A common requirement of bootstrapping infrastructures is often that they support less secure operational modes. To support these operational modes the Registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods. For example:
In order to support a variety of use cases, devices can be claimed by a registrar without proving possession of the device in question. This would result in a nonceless, and thus always valid, claim. The MASA service is required to authenticate such Registrars but no programmatic method is provided to ensure good behavior by the MASA service. Nonceless entries into the audit log therefore permanently reduce the value of a device because future Registrars, during future bootstrap attempts, must now be configured with policy to ignore previously (and potentially unknown) domains.
Future registrars are recommended to take the audit history of a device into account when deciding to join such devices into their network.
It is possible for an attacker to send an authorization request to the MASA service directly after the real Registrar obtains an authorization log. If the attacker could also force the bootstrapping protocol to reset there is a theoretical opportunity for the attacker to use the authorization token to take control of the New Entity but then proceed to enrol with the target domain. To prevent this the MASA service is rate limited to only generate authorization tokens at a rate of 1 per minute. The Registrar therefore has at least 1 minute to get the response back to the New Entity. [[EDNOTE: a better solution can likely be found. This text captures the issue for now.]] Also the Registrar can double check the log information after enrolling the New Entity.
The MASA service could lock a claim and refuse to issue a new token. Or the MASA service could go offline (for example if a vendor went out of business). This functionality provides benefits such as theft resistance, but it also implies an operational risk. This can be mitigated by Registrars that request nonce-less authorization tokens.
[[EDNOTE: (need to describe that we need to trust the device h/w. To be completed.)]]
We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in particular Markus Stenberg, Michael Richardson, Brian Carpenter, Fuyu Eleven.
| [IDevID] | IEEE Standard, , "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", December 2009. |
| [RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| [RFC7030] | Pritikin, M., Yee, P. and D. Harkins, "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, October 2013. |
| [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] | Behringer, M., Pritikin, M. and S. Bjarnason, "Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet", Internet-Draft draft-behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap-00, October 2012. |
| [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] | Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S. and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic Networking - Definitions and Design Goals", Internet-Draft draft-irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions-00, December 2013. |