NETCONF Working Group M. Badra Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research Expires: April 25, 2013 J. Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen October 22, 2012 NETCONF Over Transport Layer Security (TLS) draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 Abstract The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges. This document obsoletes RFC 5539. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 1] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization . . 4 3.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK identities . . . . 7 3.2.3. Remote Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.1. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 to draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.2. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 2] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 1. Introduction The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and reliable, sequenced data delivery. This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246]. 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. NETCONF over TLS Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how NETCONF can be used within a TLS session. 2.1. Connection Initiation The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST also act as the TLS client. The client actively opens the TLS connection and the server passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port 6513. It MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF data. In particular, the client will send complete XML documents to the server containing elements, and the server will respond with complete XML documents containing elements. The client MAY indicate interest in receiving event notifications from a server by creating a subscription to receive event notifications [RFC5277]. In this case, the server replies to indicate whether the subscription request was successful and, if it was successful, the server begins sending the event notifications to the client as the events occur within the system. All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 3] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 records. The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the same framing sequence defined in [RFC6242], under the assumption that it could not be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, and at the same time be compatible with existing implementations, this document uses the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as following: The message MUST be followed by the character sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the message, the receiving peer's TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the message to the Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used. Implementation of the protocol specified in this document MAY implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication [RFC5246]. Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite, which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to apply to future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported. 2.2. Connection Closure Exiting NETCONF is accomplished using the operation. A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF client in the order in which they are received. When the NETCONF server processes a operation, the NETCONF server SHALL respond and close the TLS session channel. The NETCONF server MUST NOT process any NETCONF messages received after the operation. The TLS session is closed as described in [RFC6242] Section 7.2.1. 3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization 3.1. Server Identity If the server's presented certificate has passed certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, the client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets the client's expectations. Particularly, the Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 4] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 client MUST check its understanding of the server hostname against the server's identity as presented in the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man- in-the-middle attacks. Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's identity is suspect. Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by those servers. Clients SHOULD implement the algorithm in Section 6 of [RFC5280] for general certificate validation, but MAY supplement that algorithm with other validation methods that achieve equivalent levels of verification (such as comparing the server certificate against a local store of already-verified certificates and identity bindings). If the client has external information as to the expected identity of the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. 3.2. Client Identity The server MUST verify the identity of the client to ensure that the incoming client request is legitimate before the NETCONF session is started. The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's authentication process MUST result in an authenticated client identity whose permissions are known to the server. The authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the NETCONF username. The username provided by the TLS implementation will be made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped. Algorithms for mapping certificates or PSK identities (sent by the client) to NETCONF usernames are described below. 3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client Certificates The algorithm for deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS certificates is patterned after the algorithm for deriving tmSecurityNames from TLS Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 5] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 certificates specified in Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [RFC6353]. The NETCONF server MUST implement the algorithms for deriving NETCONF usernames from presented certificates that are documented in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in Section 3.2.3. This YANG module lets the NETCONF security administrator configure how the NETCONF server derives NETCONF usernames from presented certificates. It also lets different certificate-to-username derivation algorithms be used for different certificates. When a NETCONF server accepts a TLS connection from a NETCONF client, the NETCONF server attempts to derive a NETCONF username from the certificate presented by the NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server cannot derive a valid NETCONF username from the client's presented certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST close the TLS connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it. The NETCONF server uses one of the following algorithms to produce a NETCONF username from the certificate presented by the NETCONF client: o Map a certificate directly to a specified, pre-configured, NETCONF username; o Extract the subjectAltName's rfc822Name from the certificate, then use the extracted rfc822Name as the NETCONF username; o Extract the subjectAltName's dnsName from the certificate, then use the extracted dnsName as the NETCONF username; o Extract the subjectAltName's iPAddress from the certificate, then use the extracted iPAddress as the NETCONF username; o Examine the subjectAltName's rfc822Name, dnsName, and iPAddress fields in a pre-defined order. Return the value from the first subjectAltName field that is examined, defined, and populated with a non-empty value. If no subjectAltName field of a specific type is defined, then the examination skips that field and proceeds to examine the next field type. If a subjectAltName field is defined, but the value is not populated, or is populated by an empty value, then the examination skips that field and proceeds to examine the next field type. The NETCONF server MUST implement all of these algorithms, and allow the deployer to choose the algorithm used. The cert-map list in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module specifies how a NETCONF server transforms a certificate into a NETCONF username. If the fingerprint of locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate is configured in the cert-map list in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 6] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 module, and that CA certificate is used to validate the certificate presented by the client, then the NETCONF server uses that cert-map list entry to produce the NETCONF username. This allows multiple client certificates (all signed by the same trusted CA certificate) to be mapped to a NETCONF username by a single entry in the cert-map list. 3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK identities Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in section 3.2.3, specifies how a NETCONF server transforms a TLS pre-shared key into a NETCONF username. 3.2.3. Remote Configuration The ietf-netconf-tls YANG module defines objects for remotely configuring the mapping of TLS certficates and of PSK Identities to NETCONF usernames. module ietf-netconf-tls { namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls"; prefix "nctls"; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } import ietf-netconf-acm { prefix nacm; } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: WG List: WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 7] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 WG Chair: Bert Wijnen Editor: Mohamad Badra "; description "This module applies to NETCONF over TLS. It specifies how NETCONF servers transform X.509 certificates presented by clients into NETCONF usernames. It also specifies how NETCONF servers transform pre-shared TLS keys into NETCONF usernames. The cert-maps container in this YANG module is patterned after parts of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defined in RFC 6353. Much of the description text has been copied directly from the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB, and modified as necessary. Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and // remove this note // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication revision "2012-02-13" { description "Initial version"; reference "RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)"; } feature map-certificates { description "The map-certificates feature indicates that the server implements mapping X.509 certificates to NETCONF user names."; } feature map-pre-shared-keys { Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 8] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 description "The map-pre-shared-keys feature indicates that the server implements mapping TLS pre-shared keys to NETCONF user names."; } typedef tls-fingerprint-type { type string { pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*'; } description "A cryptographic signature (fingerprint) value that can be used to uniquely reference other data of potentially arbitrary length."; } container netconf-config { container tls { // // Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from X.509 // certificates. // container cert-maps { if-feature map-certificates; config true; description "The cert-maps container is used by a NETCONF server to map the NETCONF client's presented X.509 certificate to a NETCONF username. On an incoming TLS connection, the client's presented certificate MUST either be validated based on an established trust anchor, or it MUST directly match a fingerprint in the 'cert-map' list. This module does not provide any mechanisms for configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed trusted certificates for certificate chain validation is expected to occur through an out-of-band transfer. Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by certificate chain validation or directly matching a fingerprint in the cert-map list), the cert-map list is consulted to determine the appropriate NETCONF username to associate with the remote connection. This is done by considering each cert-map list entry in order. The cert-map entry's fingerprint determines whether the list entry is a match for the incoming connection: Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 9] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 1) If the cert-map list entry's fingerprint value matches that of the presented certificate, then consider the list entry as a successful match. 2) If the cert-map list entry's fingerprint value matches that of a locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate, and that CA certificate was part of the CA certificate chain to the presented certificate, then consider the list entry as a successful match. Once a matching cert-map list entry has been found, the NETCONF server uses the map-type list to determine how the NETCONF username associated with the session should be determined. See the map- type leaf's description for details on determining the NETCONF username value. If it is impossible to determine a NETCONF username from the cert-map list entry's data combined with the data presented in the certificate, then additional cert-map list entries MUST be searched looking for another potential match. If a resulting NETCONF username mapped from a given cert-map list entry is not compatible with the needed requirements of a NETCONF username, then it MUST be considered an invalid match and additional cert-map list entries MUST be searched looking for another potential match. If no matching and valid cert-map list entry can be found, then the NETCONF server MUST close the connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it. Security administrators are encouraged to make use of certificates with subjectAltName fields that can be used as NETCONF usernames so that a single root CA certificate can allow all child certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a NETCONF usernames via a 1:1 transformation."; list cert-map { key "key"; ordered-by user; description "A single list entry that specifies a mapping for an incoming TLS certificate to a NETCONF username."; leaf key { type string; nacm:default-deny-all; description "The key associated with the cert-map list."; } container fingerprint { Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 10] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 choice algorithm-and-hash { mandatory true; leaf md5 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } leaf sha1 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } leaf sha224 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } leaf sha256 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } leaf sha384 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } leaf sha512 { type tls-fingerprint-type; } description "Specifies the signature algorithm and cryptographic signature (fingerprint) used to identify an X.509 certificate. Implementations of this YANG module MAY, but are not required to, implement all of these cryptographic signature algorithms. Implementations of this YANG module MUST implement at least one of these cryptographic signature algorithms. The available choices may be extended in the future as stronger cryptographic signature algorithms become available and are deemed necessary."; reference "RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2; Section 7.4.1.4.1, Signature Algorithms"; } // choice algorithm-and-hash } // container fingerprint choice map-type { leaf specified { type nacm:user-name-type; description "Directly specifies the NETCONF username to be used for this certificate."; } Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 11] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 leaf-list from-certificate { ordered-by user; type enumeration { enum rfc822Name { description "Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a NETCONF username. The local part of the rfc822Name is passed unaltered but the domain-part of the name MUST be passed in lowercase. This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between equivalent subjectAltName rfc822Name values and NETCONF username values except that the domain-part of the name MUST be passed in lowercase. Example rfc822Name Field: FooBar@Example.COM is mapped to NETCONF username: FooBar@example.com."; } enum dNSName { description "Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a NETCONF username after first converting it to all lowercase (RFC 5280 does not specify converting to lowercase so this involves an extra step). This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between subjectAltName dNSName values and the NETCONF username values. reference: RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile."; } enum ipAddress { description "Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a NETCONF username by transforming the binary encoded address as follows: 1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1'). 2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a 32-character all lowercase hexadecimal string without any colon separators. This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between subjectAltName iPAddress values and the NETCONF username values."; } } } // leaf-list from-certificate Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 12] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 description "Specifies the algorithm for deriving a NETCONF username from a certificate. If a mapping succeeds, then it will return a NETCONF username. If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the needed requirements of a NETCONF username, then subsequent cert-map list entries MUST be searched for additional matches to look for a mapping that succeeds."; } // choice map-type } // list cert-map } // container cert-maps // // Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS pre-shared // keys. // container psk-maps { if-feature map-pre-shared-keys; description "During the TLS Handshake, the client indicates which key to use by including a PSK identity in the TLS ClientKeyExchange message. On the server side, this PSK identity is used to look up an entry in the psk-map list. If such an entry is found, and the pre-shared keys match, then the client is authenticated. The server uses the value from the user-name leaf in the psk-map list as the NETCONF username. If the server cannot find an entry in the psk-map list, or if the pre-shared keys do not match, then the server terminates the connection. For details on how the PSK identity MAY be encoded in UTF-8, see section 5.1. of RFC 4279."; reference "RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"; list psk-map { key psk-identity; leaf psk-identity { type string; description "The PSK identity encoded as a UTF-8 string."; reference "RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 13] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 Security (TLS)"; } leaf user-name { type nacm:user-name-type; mandatory true; description "The NETCONF username associated with this PSK identity."; } leaf valid-not-before { type yang:date-and-time; description "This PSK identity is not valid before the given data and time."; } leaf valid-not-after { type yang:date-and-time; description "This PSK identity is not valid before the given date and time."; } leaf key { type string { pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*'; } nacm:default-deny-all; description "The key associated with the PSK identity"; } } // list psk-map } // container psk-maps } // container tls } // container netconf-config } 4. Security Considerations The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and [RFC6241] apply here as well. This document in its current version does not support third-party Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 14] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third-party authentication is needed, SSH transport can be used. An attacker might be able to inject arbitrary NETCONF messages via some application that does not carefully check exchanged messages. When the :base:1.1 capability is not advertised by both peers, an attacker might be able to deliberately insert the delimiter sequence ]]>]]> in a NETCONF message to create a DoS attack. If the :base:1.1 capability is not advertised by both peers, applications and NETCONF APIs MUST ensure that the delimiter sequence ]]>]]> never appears in NETCONF messages; otherwise, those messages can be dropped, garbled, or misinterpreted. More specifically, if the delimiter sequence is found in a NETCONF message by the sender side, a robust implementation of this document SHOULD warn the user that illegal characters have been discovered. If the delimiter sequence is found in a NETCONF message by the receiver side (including any XML attribute values, XML comments, or processing instructions), a robust implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session. Finally, this document does not introduce any new security considerations compared to [RFC6242]. 5. IANA Considerations Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document. Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, mbadra@gmail.com. Transport Protocol: TCP. Port Number: 6513 Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No. Port Name: netconf-tls. Service Name: netconf. Reference: RFC 5539 Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 15] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 6. Acknowledgements A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from [RFC4642]. The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou, Eric Rescorla, Simon Josefsson, Olivier Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes, and the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on the document. The author also appreciates Bert Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue, and Dan Romascanu for their efforts on issues resolving discussion; and Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk for the thorough review of previous versions of this document. 7. Contributor's Address Ibrahim Hajjeh Ineovation France EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr Martin Bjorklund Tail-f Systems Email: mbj@tail-f.com 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005. [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 16] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. [RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 6353, July 2011. 8.2. Informative References [RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006. [RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event Notifications", RFC 5277, July 2008. [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5539, May 2009. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011. Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) A.1. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 to draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 o Update Section 3.2 and address some issues raised during WGLC A.2. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 o Remove the reference to BEEP o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822. Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 17] Internet-Draft NETCONF over TLS October 2012 Authors' Addresses Mohamad Badra LIMOS Laboratory Email: mbadra@gmail.com Alan Luchuk SNMP Research Email: luchuk@snmp.com Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de Badra, et al. Expires April 25, 2013 [Page 18]