NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen Internet-Draft Juniper Networks Intended status: Standards Track October 30, 2017 Expires: May 3, 2018 YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-04 Abstract This document defines a YANG module called a "keystore", containing pinned certificates and pinned SSH host-keys. The module also defines a grouping for configuring public key pairs and a grouping for configuring certificates. The module also defines a notification that a system can use when one of its configured certificates is about to expire. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements: o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: o "2017-10-30" --> the publication date of this draft The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: o Appendix A. Change Log Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 1] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 2] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 1. Introduction This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below. This module has the following characteristics: o A 'grouping' for a public/private key pair, and an 'action' for requesting the system to generate a new private key. o A 'grouping' for a list of certificates that might be associated with a public/private key pair, and an 'action' the requesting a system to generate a certificate signing request. o An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates. This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned certificates on a case-by-case basis. For instance, one set of pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating client connections (e.g., certificate-based client authentication). o An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned SSH host key set contains an unordered list of pinned SSH host keys. This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned SSH host-keys on a case-by-case basis. For instance, SSH clients can be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host keys when connecting to different SSH servers. o A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire. Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's private keys as configuration. It is not required that a system has an operating system level keystore utility to implement this module. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 3] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Tree Diagram The following tree diagram [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] provides an overview of the data model for the "ietf-keystore" module. module: ietf-keystore +--rw keystore +--rw pinned-certificates* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw description? string | +--rw pinned-certificate* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw data binary +--rw pinned-host-keys* [name] +--rw name string +--rw description? string +--rw pinned-host-key* [name] +--rw name string +--rw data binary notifications: +---n certificate-expiration +--ro certificate instance-identifier +--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time grouping certificate-grouping +---- certificates | +---- certificate* [name] | +---- name? string | +---- value? binary +---x generate-certificate-signing-request +---w input | +---w subject binary | +---w attributes? binary +--ro output +--ro certificate-signing-request binary grouping private-key-grouping +---- algorithm? identityref +---- private-key? union +---- public-key? binary +---x generate-private-key +---w input +---w algorithm identityref Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 4] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 3. Example Usage The following example illustrates what a configured keystore might look like. manufacturers-root-ca-certs Certificates built into the device for authenticating manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates, vouchers, etc.. Note, though listed here, these are not configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied. Manufacturer Root CA cert 1 base64encodedvalue== Manufacturer Root CA cert 2 base64encodedvalue== explicitly-trusted-client-certs Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates that are not signed by a pinned CA. George Jetson base64encodedvalue== explicitly-trusted-server-certs Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates that are not signed by a pinned CA. Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 5] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 Fred Flintstone base64encodedvalue== deployment-specific-ca-certs Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate client connections. Clients are authenticated if their certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured CA certificates. ca.example.com base64encodedvalue== common-ca-certs Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers. These certificates are similar to those that might be shipped with a web browser. ex-certificate-authority base64encodedvalue== explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers. These host keys would be analogous to those stored in a known_hosts file in OpenSSH. corp-fw1 base64encodedvalue== Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 6] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" notification in use with the NETCONF protocol. [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only] 2016-07-08T00:01:00Z /ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certifica\ tes/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert'] 2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00 The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the groupings defined in the "ietf-keystore" module. Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 7] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 module ex-keystore-usage { yang-version 1.1; namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"; prefix "eku"; import ietf-keystore { prefix ks; reference "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism"; } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: WG List: Author: Kent Watsen "; description "This module uses the groupings defines the keystore draft for illustration."; revision "YYYY-MM-DD" { description "Initial version"; } container key { uses ks:private-key-grouping; uses ks:certificate-grouping; description "A container of certificates, and an action to generate a certificate signing request."; } } The following example illustrates what a configured key might look like. This example uses the "ex-keystore-usage" module above. Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 8] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only] ks:\ secp521r1 base64encodedvalue== base64encodedvalue== domain certificate base64encodedvalue== The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing- request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. This example uses the "ex-keystore-usage" module above. REQUEST ------- base64encodedvalue== base64encodedvalue== RESPONSE -------- base64encodedvalue== The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. This example uses the "ex- keystore-usage" module above. Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 9] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 REQUEST ------- [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only] ks:secp521r1 RESPONSE -------- 4. YANG Module This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991]. This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986], [RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994]. This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480]. file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-30.yang" module ietf-keystore { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; prefix "ks"; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; } import ietf-netconf-acm { prefix nacm; reference "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model"; Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 10] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: WG List: Author: Kent Watsen "; description "This module defines a keystore to centralize management of security credentials. Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; revision "2017-10-30" { description "Initial version"; reference "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism"; } // Identities identity key-algorithm { description "Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived."; } identity rsa1024 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key."; Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 11] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; } identity rsa2048 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key."; reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; } identity rsa3072 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key."; reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; } identity rsa4096 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key."; reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; } identity rsa7680 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key."; reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; } identity rsa15360 { base key-algorithm; description "The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key."; reference "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 12] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 } identity secp192r1 { base key-algorithm; description "The secp192r1 algorithm."; reference "RFC5480: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; } identity secp256r1 { base key-algorithm; description "The secp256r1 algorithm."; reference "RFC5480: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; } identity secp384r1 { base key-algorithm; description "The secp384r1 algorithm."; reference "RFC5480: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; } identity secp521r1 { base key-algorithm; description "The secp521r1 algorithm."; reference "RFC5480: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; } // typedefs typedef pinned-certificates { type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-certificates/ks:name"; } description "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a reference to pinned-certificates. Use of this type also Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 13] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 impacts the YANG tree diagram output."; reference "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams"; } typedef pinned-host-keys { type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-host-keys/ks:name"; } description "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a reference to pinned-host-keys. Use of this type also impacts the YANG tree diagram output."; reference "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams"; } // groupings grouping private-key-grouping { description "A private/public key pair, and an action to request the system to generate a private key."; leaf algorithm { type identityref { base "key-algorithm"; } description "Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically, this leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key' binary leafs are encoded."; } leaf private-key { nacm:default-deny-all; type union { type binary; type enumeration { enum "hardware-protected" { description "The private key is inaccessible due to being protected by a cryptographic hardware module (e.g., a TPM)."; } } } must "../algorithm"; description Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 14] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 "A binary that contains the value of the private key. The interpretation of the content is defined by the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]"; reference "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure."; } leaf public-key { type binary; must "../algorithm"; must "../private-key"; description "A binary that contains the value of the public key. The interpretation of the content is defined by the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key is represented using the 'publicKey' described in [RFC5915]"; reference "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure."; } action generate-private-key { description "Requests the device to generate a private key using the specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to support cryptographic processors that must generate the private key themselves. The resulting key is considered operational state and hence only present in the ."; input { leaf algorithm { type identityref { base "key-algorithm"; } mandatory true; description "The algorithm to be used when generating the key."; } } } // end generate-private-key } Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 15] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 grouping certificate-grouping { description "A container of certificates, and an action to generate a certificate signing request."; container certificates { description "Certificates associated with this key. More than one certificate supports, for instance, a TPM-protected key that has both IDevID and LDevID certificates associated."; list certificate { key name; description "A certificate for this private key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for the certificate."; } leaf value { type binary; description "A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690. This structure contains the certificate itself as well as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY be included as well."; reference "RFC 2315: PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5. ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."; } } } action generate-certificate-signing-request { description "Generates a certificate signing request structure for the associated private key using the passed subject and attribute values. The specified assertions need to be Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 16] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 appropriate for the certificate's use. For example, an entity certificate for a TLS server SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy RFC 6125 processing."; input { leaf subject { type binary; mandatory true; description "The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7. ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."; } leaf attributes { type binary; description "The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7. ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."; } } output { leaf certificate-signing-request { type binary; mandatory true; description "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 17] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7. ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."; } } } } // protocol accessible nodes container keystore { nacm:default-deny-write; description "The keystore contains X.509 certificates and SSH host keys."; list pinned-certificates { key name; description "A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF client connections."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates."; } leaf description { type string; description "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned certificates."; } list pinned-certificate { key name; Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 18] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 description "A pinned certificate."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The name must be unique across all lists of pinned certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs from another module can resolve to unique values."; } leaf data { type binary; mandatory true; description "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; reference "RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. ITU-T X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)."; } } } list pinned-host-keys { key name; description "A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose, so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when authenticating specific SSH servers."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys."; } leaf description { type string; description Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 19] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host keys."; } list pinned-host-key { key name; description "A pinned host key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just this list) so that a leafref to it from another module can resolve to unique values."; } leaf data { type binary; mandatory true; description "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: string certificate or public key format identifier byte[n] key/certificate data."; reference "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"; } } } } notification certificate-expiration { description "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is either about to expire or has already expired. When to send notifications is an implementation specific decision, but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once a day thereafter."; leaf certificate { type instance-identifier; mandatory true; description "Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired."; } leaf expiration-date { Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 20] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 type yang:date-and-time; mandatory true; description "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate."; } } } 5. Security Considerations The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication. The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and content. There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: /: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically alter the implemented security policy. This being the case, the top-level node in this module is marked with the NACM value 'default-deny-write'. /keystore/keys/key/private-key: When writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the strength of the key being configured is not greater than the strength of the underlying secure transport connection over which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the write-request if ever the strength of the private key is greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and alert the client that the strength of the key may have been compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node, implementations SHOULD automatically (without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 21] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way. Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: /keystore/keys/key/private-key: This node is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The best reason for returning this node is to support backup/restore type workflows. This being the case, this node is marked with the NACM value 'default-deny-all'. Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control access to these operations. These are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability: generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding [RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer was established. 6. IANA Considerations 6.1. The IETF XML Registry This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the following registration is requested: Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 22] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 name: ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore prefix: ks reference: RFC VVVV 7. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen. 8. References 8.1. Normative References [ITU.X690.1994] International Telecommunications Union, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 1994. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998, . [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, . [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February 2003, . [RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253, January 2006, . Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 23] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, . [RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010, . [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, . [RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012, . [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, . [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, . 8.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft- ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-02 (work in progress), October 2017. [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, . [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, . Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 24] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, . [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, . [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, . [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [Std-802.1AR-2009] IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", December 2009, . Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 25] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 Appendix A. Change Log A.1. 00 to 01 o Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7 structures. (Issue #1) o Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the 'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2) o Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module. (Issues #4 and #5) A.2. 01 to 02 o Added back 'generate-private-key' action. o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type. o Fixed up a few description statements. A.3. 02 to 03 o Changed draft's title. o Added missing references. o Collapsed sections and levels. o Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section. o Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'. o Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true. o Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC 4253. A.4. 03 to 04 o Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams o Removed Design Considerations section o Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 26] Internet-Draft YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism October 2017 Author's Address Kent Watsen Juniper Networks EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net Watsen Expires May 3, 2018 [Page 27]