HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 09 Apr 2002 03:49:51 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) Last-Modified: Wed, 30 Jul 1997 13:57:00 GMT ETag: "2f5300-872c-33df482c" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 34604 Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain IPng Working Group Matt Crawford Internet Draft Fermilab Robert Hinden Ipsilon Networks July 29, 1997 Router Renumbering for IPv6 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet Drafts. Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months. Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a "working draft" or "work in progress." To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet Drafts Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). Distribution of this memo is unlimited. 1. Abstract IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [ND] and Address Autoconfiguration [AA] conveniently make initial assignments of address prefixes to hosts. Aside from the problem of connection survival across a renumbering event, these two mechanisms also simplify the reconfiguration of hosts when the set of valid prefixes changes. This document defines a mechanism called Router Renumbering ("RR") which allows address prefixes on routers to be configured and reconfigured almost as easily as the combination of Neighbor Discovery and Address Autoconfiguration works for hosts. It provides a means for a network manager to make updates to the prefixes used by and advertised by IPv6 routers throughout a site. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 1] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 2. Functional Overview Router Renumbering packets contain a sequence of Prefix Control Operations (PCOs). Each PCO specifies an operation, a Match-Prefix, and zero or more Use-Prefixes. A router processes each PCO in sequence, checking each of its interfaces for an address or prefix which matches the match-prefix. For every interface on which a match is found, the operation is applied. The operation is one of ADD, CHANGE, or SET-GLOBAL to instruct the router to respectively add the Use-Prefixes to the set of configured prefixes, remove the prefix which matched the Match-Prefix and replace it with the Use- Prefixes, or replace all global-scope prefixes with the Use- Prefixes. If the set of Use-Prefixes in the PCO is empty, the ADD operation does nothing and the other two reduce to deletions. Additional information for each use-prefix is included in the Prefix Control Operation: the valid and preferred lifetimes to be included in Router Advertisement Prefix Information Options [ND], and either the L and A flags for the same option, or an indication that they are to be copied from the prefix that matched the match-prefix. It is possible to instruct routers to create new prefixes by combining the use-prefixes in a PCO with some portion of the existing prefix which matched the match-prefix. This simplifies certain operations which are expected to be among the most common. For every use-prefix, the PCO specifies a number of bits which should be copied from the address or prefix which matched the match-prefix and appended to the use-prefix prior to configuring the new prefix on the interface. The copied bits are zero or more bits from the positions immediately beyond the length of the use-prefix. If subnetting information is in the same portion of of the old and new prefixes, this synthesis allows a single Prefix Control Operation to define a new global prefix on every router in a site, while preserving the subnetting structure. Because of the power of the Router Renumbering mechanism, each RR message includes a sequence number and an authenticator to guard against replays. Each elementary RR operation is idempotent and so could be retransmitted for improved reliability, as long as the sequence number is current, without concern about multiple processing. However, non-idempotent combinations of elementary RR operations can easily be constructed and messages containing such combinations could not be safely reprocessed. Therefore, all routers are required guard against processing an RR message more than once. Possibly a network manager will want to perform more renumbering, or exercise more detailed control, than can be expressed in a single Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 2] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 Router Renumbering packet on the available media. The RR mechanism is most powerful when RR packets are multicast, so IP fragmentation is undesirable. For these reasons, each RR packet contains a "Segment Number". All RR packets which have a Sequence Number equal to the highest value seen (for each valid key), and which pass the authentication check, are equally valid and must be processed. However, a router must keep track of the Segment Numbers of RR messages already processed and avoid reprocessing a message whose Sequence Number and Segment Number match a previously processed message. There is a "Dry Run" indicator which indicates that all routers should simulate processing of the RR message and not perform any reconfiguration. A separate "Report" flags instruct routers to send a Router Renumbering Result message back to the source of the RR message indicating the actual or simulated result of the operations in the RR message. The effect of an RR message, or the simulated effect of a Dry Run RR message, may also reported to network management by means outside the scope of this document, regardless of the value of the "Report" flag. 3. Definitions 3.1. Requirements The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [KWORD]. 3.2. Terminology Address This term always refers to a 128-bit IPv6 address [AARCH]. When referring to bits within an address, they are numbered from 0 to 127, with bit 0 being the first bit of the Format Prefix. Prefix A prefix can be understood as an address plus a length, the latter being an integer in the range 0 to 128 indicating how many leading bits are significant. When referring to bits within a prefix, they are numbered in the same way as the bits of an address. For example, the significant bits of a prefix whose length is L are the bits numbered 0 through L-1, inclusive. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 3] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 Match An address A "matches" a prefix P whose length is L, if the first L bits of A are identical with the first L bits of P. (Every address matches a prefix of length 0.) A prefix P1 with length L1 matches a prefix P2 of length L2 if L1 >= L2 and the first L2 bits of P1 and P2 are identical. Prefix Control Operation, Match-Prefix, Use-Prefix These are defined section 2. Matched Prefix The existing prefix or address which matched a Match-Prefix. New Prefix A prefix constructed from a Use-Prefix, possibly including some of the Matched-Prefix. Recorded Sequence Number The highest sequence number found in a valid, authenticated message with a given key MUST be recorded in non-volatile storage along with that key. 3.3. Authentication Algorithms All implementations MUST support HMAC-MD5 [HMAC] for authentication. Additional algorithms MAY be supported. 4. Message Format There are two types of Router Renumbering messages: Commands, which are sent to routers, and Results, which are sent by routers. The two types of messages are distinguished by a flag in the header, and differ in the contents of the "Message Body" field. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 4] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 / / | IPv6 header, extension headers | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / / | ICMPv6 & RR Header (16 octets) | / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / / | RR Message Body | / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / / | Authentication Data (16 octets for HMAC-MD5) | / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Router Renumbering messages are carried in ICMP packets with Type = TBA. The RR message consists of An RR header, containing the sequence and segment numbers and information about the authentication key and the location and length of the authentication data within the packet. The RR Message Body, of variable length; The authentication data, with length dependent on the authentication type. For HMAC-MD5, 16 octets. All fields marked "unused" MUST be set to zero on generation of an RR message. During processing of the message they MUST be included in the authentication check, but otherwise ignored. All implementations which generate Router Renumbering messages MUST support sending them to the All Routers multicast address with Link Local and Site Local scopes, and to unicast addresses of link local and site local formats. All routers MUST be capable of receiving RR messages sent to those multicast addresses and to any of their link local and site local unicast addresses. Implementations MAY support sending and receiving RR messages addressed to other unicast addresses. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 5] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 4.1. Router Renumbering Header 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Code | Checksum | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | SegmentNumber | KeyID | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AuthLen | AuthOffset | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | SequenceNumber | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: Type TBA, the ICMP type code assigned to Router Renumbering Code A combination of three flag bits +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | unused |C|R|D| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ C=1 for an RR Command message; C=0 for an RR Result message. R=1 in an RR Command indicates that the router must send an RR Result message upon completion of processing the message; if R=0, no Result must be sent (but other forms of logging are not precluded). D=1 to indicate a "Dry Run" message; D=0 indicates that the router configuration is to be modified. Checksum The ICMPv6 checksum, as specified in [ICMPV6]. The checksum covers the IPv6 pseudo-header and all fields of the RR message from the Type field through the Authentication Data. (For purposes of calculating and verifying the Authentication Data, the ICMPv6 checksum field is considered to be zero.) SegmentNumber An unsigned 16-bit field which enumerates different valid RR messages having the same SequenceNumber and KeyID. KeyID An unsigned 16-bit field that identifies the key used to create and verify the Authentication Data for this RR Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 6] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 message. If multiple authentication algorithms are supported by the implementation, the choice of algorithm is implicit in the KeyID. AuthLen An unsigned 16-bit field giving the length in octets of the Authentication Data. AuthOffset An unsigned 16-bit offset, measured in octets, from the beginning of the RR message to the beginning of the Authentication Data. SequenceNumber An unsigned 32-bit sequence number. The sequence number MUST be non-decreasing for all messages sent with the same KeyID. 4.2. Message Body -- Command Message The body of an RR Command message is a sequence of zero or more Prefix Control Operations, each of variable length. The end of the sequence MAY be located by the AuthOffset field in the RR header. 4.2.1. Prefix Control Operation A Prefix Control Operation has one Match-Prefix Part of 24 octets, followed by zero or more Use-Prefix Parts of 32 octets each. 4.2.1.1. Match-Prefix Part 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OpCode | OpLength | unused | MatchLen | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | unused | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | +- -+ | | +- MatchPrefix -+ | | +- -+ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 7] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 Fields: OpCode An unsigned 8-bit field specifying the operation to be performed when the associated MatchPrefix matches an interface's prefix or address. Values are: 1 the ADD operation 2 the CHANGE operation 3 the SET-GLOBAL operation OpLength The total length of this Prefix Control Operation, in units of 8 octets. A valid OpLength will always be of the form 4N+3, with N equal to the number of UsePrefix parts (possibly zero). MatchLen An 8-bit unsigned integer between 0 and 128 inclusive specifying the number of initial bits of MatchPrefix which are significant in matching. MatchPrefix The 128-bit prefix to be compared with each interface's prefix or address. 4.2.1.2. Use-Prefix Part 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | UseLen | KeepLen | Mask | Flags | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Valid Lifetime | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Preferred Lifetime | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |V|P| unused | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | +- -+ | | +- UsePrefix -+ | | +- -+ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 8] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 UseLen An 8-bit unsigned integer less than or equal to 128 specifying the number of initial bits of UsePrefix to use in creating a new prefix for an interface. KeepLen An 8-bit unsigned integer less than or equal to (128- UseLen) specifying the number of bits of the prefix or address which matched the associated Match-Prefix which should be retained in the new prefix. The retained bits are those at positions UseLen through (UseLen+KeepLen-1) in the matched address or prefix, and they are copied to the same positions in the New Prefix. Mask An 8-bit mask. A 1 bit in any position means that the corresponding flag bit in a Router Advertisement (RA) Prefix Information Option should be set from the Flags field in this Use-Prefix Part. A 0 bit in the Mask means that the RA flag bit should be unchanged by this operation. Flags An 8 bit field which, under control of the Mask field, may be used to initialize the flags in Router Advertisement Prefix Information Options which advertise the New Prefix. Note that only two flags have defined meanings to date: the L (on-link) and A (autonomous configuration) flags. Valid Lifetime A 32-bit unsigned integer which is the number of seconds for which the New Prefix will be valid [ND, SAA]. Preferred Lifetime A 32-bit unsigned integer which is the number of seconds for which the New Prefix will be preferred [ND, SAA]. V A 1-bit flag indicating that the valid lifetime of the New Prefix MUST be effectively decremented in real time. P A 1-bit flag indicating that the preferred lifetime of the New Prefix MUST be effectively decremented in real time. UsePrefix The 128-bit Use-prefix which either becomes or is used in forming (if KeepLen is nonzero) the New Prefix. It MUST NOT have the form of a multicast or link-local address [AARCH]. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 9] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 4.3. Message Body -- Result Message The body of an RR Result message is a sequence of one or more Prefix Result's, each of variable length. The end of the sequence MAY be located by the AuthOffset field in the RR header. 4.3.1. Prefix Result A Prefix Result has one Result-Request Part of 8 octets, followed by zero or more Result-Data parts of 72 octets each. 4.3.1.1. Result-Request Part 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OpCode | OpLength | unused | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: OpCode An unsigned 8-bit field specifying the operation that generated this result. Values are: 1 the ADD operation 2 the CHANGE operation 3 the SET-GLOBAL operation OpLength The total length of this Prefix Results Return, in units of 8 octets. A valid OpLength will always be of the form 9N+1, with N equal to the number of Result-Data Parts (possibly zero). 4.3.1.2. Result-Data Part Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 10] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Interface Index | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | +- -+ | | +- Original Prefix -+ | | +- -+ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | +- -+ | | +- New Prefix -+ | | +- -+ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: Interface Index A 32-bit unsigned integer specifying the interface index that the return applies to. Original Prefix The 128-bit prefix that matched the operation in the Result Request part. This is the prefix before the operation was performed. New Prefix The 128-bit new prefix that resulted from the operation. If the operation resulted in deleting the prefix from the interface all zeros should be returned. 4.4. Authentication -- HMAC-MD5 When the key and algorithm associated with the KeyID indicate that HMAC-MD5 authentication is to be used, the authentication data is generated in accordance with RFC 2104 [HMAC]. Before generating the AuthData, all fields of the RR header and all the PCOs are filled in, except that the ICMPv6 checksum field is set Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 11] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 to zero. AuthLen will be 16 and AuthOffset will be equal to the length in octets of the RR packet, not including the IPv6 header or any extension headers. When checking the AuthData, the ICMPv6 checksum must be set to zero. 5. Message Processing Processing of received Router Renumbering messages consists of three parts: header check, authentication check, and execution. 5.1. Header Check First, the existence and validity of the key indicated by the KeyID are checked. If there is no such valid key, or if the value of AuthLen is not correct for that key, the message MUST be discarded, and SHOULD be logged to network management. Next, the SequenceNumber is compared to the Recorded Sequence Number for the specified key. (If no messages have been received using this key, the recorded number is zero.) This comparison is done with the two numbers considered as simple non-negative integers, not as DNS-style serial numbers. If the SequenceNumber is less than the Recorded Sequence Number for the key, the message MUST be discarded and SHOULD be logged to network management. Finally, if the SequenceNumber in the message is equal to the Recorded Sequence Number, the SegmentNumber MUST be checked. If a correctly authenticated message with the same KeyID, SequenceNumber and SegmentNumber has already been processed, the current message MUST be discarded. If it is discarded, it SHOULD NOT be logged to network management. 5.2. Authentication Check The authentication check is performed over the RR message, without any IPv6 or extension headers. In the case of Keyed MD5 it proceeds as follows. First, the authentication data octets are saved, then that portion of the packet is replaced with the MD5 secret. The padding and length fields are appended just as during message generation, and the MD5 digest is computed and compared to the saved value. If the computed digest is not equal to the saved authentication data, the authentication check fails. If the authentication check fails, the message MUST be discarded and Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 12] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 SHOULD be logged to network management. If the authentication check passes, and the SequenceNumber is greater than the Recorded Sequence Number for the key, then the list of processed SegmentNumbers, if any, MUST be cleared and the Recorded Sequence Number MUST be updated to the value used in the current message, regardless of subsequent processing errors. 5.3. Execution THIS SECTION IS NOT YET COMPLETED. After succesful processing of all the Prefix Control Operations, an implementation MUST record the SegmentNumber of the packet in a list associated with the KeyID and SequenceNumber. 6. Key Management As with all security methods using keys, it is necessary to change the RR Authentication Key on a regular basis. To provide RR functionality during key changes, implementations MUST be able to store and use more than one Authentication Key at the same time. The Authentication Keys SHOULD NOT be stored or transmitted using algorithms or protocols that have known flaws. Implementations MUST support the storage of more than one key at the same time, MUST associate a specific lifetime (start and end times) and a key identifier with each key, and MUST support manual key distribution (e.g., manual entry of the key, key lifetime, and key identifier on the router console). An infinite key lifetime SHOULD NOT be allowed. If infinite lifetimes are allowed, manual deletion of valid keys MUST be supported; otherwise manual deletion SHOULD be supported. The implementation MAY automatically delete expired keys. 7. Usage Guidelines 7.1. Updating Global-Scope Prefixes A simple use of the Router Renumbering mechanism, and one which is expected to to be common, is the maintenance of a set of global prefixes with a subnet structure that matches that of the site's site-local address assignments. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 13] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 7.2. Key Changes Using a new authentication key while a previously used key is still valid can open the possibility of a replay attack. The processing rules as given in section 5. specify that routers keep track of the highest sequence number seen for each key, and that messages with that key and seuence number remain valid until either a higher sequence number is seen or the key expires. The difficulty arises when a new key is used to send a message which supersedes the last message sent with another still-valid key. That older message can still be replayed. This vulnerability can be avoided in practice by sending a "NO-OP" message with the old key and a valid new sequence number before using a newer key. This mesage will then become the only one which can be replayed with the old key. An example of a NO-OP message would be one which contains no Prefix Control Operations. Cearly a management station must keep track of the highest sequence number it has used for each authentication key, at least to the extent of being able to generate a larger value when needed. A timestamp may make a good sequence number. 8. Points for Discussion Does the site-local all-routers multicast address exist? RFC1884 sort of glosses over that. If it doesn't, we need a new multicast address to be assigned. The "unusued" fields of the MatchPart could be used to specify another condition in addition to matching a prefix. For example, one of the prefix lifetime timers could be tested against a value. If the messages of several different protocols use the same authentication mechanism, as this draft tries to emulate the Keyed-MD5 authentication proposed for RIPv2, then it's possible for one authenticated message body to be grafted onto a different set of headers and cause at least some confusion, and possibly worse. This can be prevented by placing magic numbers or other fixed data in the packets so that a packet for one protocol is never valid for another. Since RR messages will presumably be generated only by a set network management stations which is disjoint from the Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 14] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 set of routers to which they are directed, an asymmetric authentication scheme would be desirable. 9. Security Considerations The Router Renumbering mechanism proposed here is very powerful and prevention of spoofing it is important. Replay of old messages must be prevented, except in the narrow case of idempotent messages which are still valid at the time of replay. We believe the authentication mechanisms included in this specification achieve the necessary protections, so long as authentication keys are not compromised. Authentication keys must be as well protected as is any other access method that allows reconfiguration of a site's routers. Distribution of keys must not expose them or permit alteration, and key lifetimes must be limited. 10. Acknowledgments Some of the key management text was borrowed from "RIP-II MD5 Authentication." (And the loan was repaid in kind.) 11. References [AARCH] R. Hinden, S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 1884. [HMAC] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104. [ICMPV6]A. Conta, S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 1885. [KWORD] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," RFC 2119. [ND] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 1970. Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 15] Internet Draft Router Renumbering July 29, 1997 [SAA] S. Thomson, T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 1971. 12. Authors' Addresses Matt Crawford Robert M. Hinden Fermilab MS 368 Ipsilon Networks, Inc. PO Box 500 232 Java Drive Batavia, IL 60510 Sunnyvale, CA 94089 USA USA Phone: +1 630 840 3461 Phone: +1 408 990 2004 Email: crawdad@fnal.gov Email: hinden@ipsilon.com Expires January 29, 1998 Crawford [Page 16]