Vint, On Monday morning the RIRs provided you with a draft of a response to your note of the 5th November in order to have some material available to assist with our meeting. We have now concluded the drafting of the RIR response to your note, and it is attached to his message. As I do not have posting permission to forward this to your colleagues on the ICANN Board I would be grateful if you could forward this to icann-board@icann.org. Kind regards, Geoff Huston on behalf of the Boards and CEO/Directors of the RIRs -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13th November 2002 Dear Vint, Thank you for your letter of the 5th November. We appreciate your effort to identify points for continued discussion. The Boards of the RIRs have now had the opportunity to get together and review the activities of the past couple of weeks and are now able to offer a considered response to your letter and the attached document. We, the RIRs, share an interest in the operational integrity of the Internet and the ability to support its continued growth and evolution and our efforts within the RIR sector are largely motivated by such interests. We would like to respond specifically to the matters described in your note and the attached document that form the substance of the matters of negotiation between the RIRs and ICANN. As a preface to these comments, we note the apparent disclaimer in the discussion draft that the document does not represent a "position" of ICANN or the ERC. We do nevertheless provide the following comments as a considered position of the RIRs, and would ask that you respond formally in a manner which is actually representative of ICANN's position on these important matters. It is also noted that we assume that the points you have raised in your note to us are the major areas where this is some level of disagreement between the draft RIR Blueprint and ICANN's perspective. It is our intention to be able to use these discussions as a basis for modification of the draft RIR Blueprint document, so as to in due course arrive at a description that is agreed between ICANN and the RIRs. From your note, and from previous discussions on this topic, it would be fair to state that there are three substantive areas of discussion, firstly, that of the development of global address policies, secondly that of the operation of the unallocated number resource pool and finally the issues of mitigation of risk to the integrity and stability of the number distribution function through the failure of any of the parties who have an interest in the administration of this function. We would like to address each of these areas in turn. 1. Global Address Policy Development The first matter is that of the development of global address policies. What matters are encompassed by global addressing policies has not been well defined to date, and the RIRs note their presumption that such policies encompass the recognition of new RIRs, and the definition of aspects of operation and management of the unallocated Internet number resource pool and the associated number resource registry function. We agree with the position that address policy development is the responsibility of the RIRs, and actions with respect to global policies should be coordinated through the Address Council of the ICANN Address Supporting Organization. It may be a subtle distinction, but the RIRs would offer the view that the role of the ICANN Board in address policy development process is limited to acceptance of global policy, reserving the ability to reject proposed global address policies through a process described below. It is also agreed that no RIR can be required to adopt or adhere to a global address policy which has not been collectively agreed by the RIRs, through processes of each RIR's devising. An RIR cannot be required to adopt or adhere to a policy which has not been approved within its own policy process. This policy process may produce results which are not collectively agreed by the RIRs, yet the RIR concerned would certainly be required to follow it. The discussion document offered a process description of the manner by which global address policy could be developed. The RIRs would like to make the following comments on this proposal: 1) A global or common policy is adopted by the Address Council by consensus (following procedures for policy development, and for the recognition of consensus, established by the RIRs acting collectively through the ASO). RIR Comment: 1. It would be more appropriate for the Address Council to adopt such a policy as a "proposed global address policy", given that its recognition as a global address policy is subject to further actions. 2. The ASO is not a common vehicle for RIR action. The RIRs do not place members on the Address Council as representatives of either the RIR or the RIR membership. Address Council members are elected using an open voting process that allows participation by a broader community than the RIRs and their members. Accordingly it is considered to be more appropriate to use a parenthesized comment along the lines of: "(following procedures for policy development, and for the recognition of consensus, established by the RIRs)" 2) The policy is forwarded to the ICANN Board, which may ask questions and otherwise consult with the Address Council and/or the RIRs, if necessary to fully understand it, and may also consult with other parties as appropriate. RIR Comment: 1. It is entirely appropriate that the ICANN Board undertake due diligence in asking for clarification from the ASO and the RIRs and in taking comment from other interested parties, and the RIRs accept this as part of a process of due diligence of a review function. 3) After a period of no more than 30 days, the ICANN Board must adopt the policy, unless (a) the RIRs and the Address Council agree, during the consultation period (step 2), that changes to the policy should be made, in which case the process returns to step 1; or (b) a super- majority (2/3) of the Board votes to reject it. RIR Comment 1. As noted already in this response, the RIRs would see the ICANN role as one of "acceptance" of the proposed policy or a decision to "reject" the proposed policy. Accordingly, the RIRs would prefer to use language such that the above step is altered to read "the ICANN Board must accept the proposed policy", and leave the conditions listed as part of the "unless" clause as is. 2. It is also considered appropriate to specify the consequences of inaction on the part of ICANN at the expiration of 30 days. The RIRs would consider it appropriate to allow a single extension of 30 days if so requested by ICANN, but at the expiration of this period, or at the expiration of an extension of time as requested, inaction on the part of ICANN shall constitute acceptance of the policy. The RIRs would like some level of assurance at all times that a proposed policy does not enter an undefined state where there is no well defined process and associated timeline to progress the consideration of the policy. 4) If the ICANN Board adopts the policy, it becomes a global address policy. RIR Comment 1. The RIRs would see this action as "accept" 5) If the ICANN Board rejects the policy, it must deliver to the Address Council a statement of the concerns it has with adopting the policy as proposed, including in particular an explanation of the significant viewpoints that were not adequately considered during the regular RIR/ASO process. RIR Comment 1. As per the comment on step 3) regarding assurance that policy proposals are handled within a well defined process with an associated well-defined timeline, the RIRs would prefer to see some time limit applied to the delivery of such a statement. An indeterminate delay in the delivery of such a statement would imply an indeterminate delay in the policy development process. 6) The Address Council, in conjunction with the RIRs through agreed procedures, considers the concerns raised by the Board, and engages in a dialogue as appropriate with the Board, following which, pursuant to a new consensus, it forwards a new recommendation (either reaffirming its previous proposal or a modified proposal) to the ICANN Board. RIR Comment 1. Noting the distinction drawn between the Address Council as currently constituted and the RIRs, the appropriate course of action is for the Address Council to pass such statements to the RIRs and await notice of RIR consensus in terms of reaffirmation of the previous proposal or confirmation of consensus within the RIRs to submit a modified proposal. It would be anticipated that Address Council members may decide to play an active role in presenting the issue at hand to their respective regional constituencies. 7) The new consensus proposal then becomes a global address policy unless, by a super-majority (2/3) vote, the ICANN Board rejects the new proposal, in which case it does not become a global addressing policy, and the RIRs are free to take whatever regionally applicable decisions they consider to be appropriate. RIR Comment 1. It is possible to conceive of policies and scenarios where this outcome, namely that of the RIRs being free to take whatever regionally applicable decisions they consider to be appropriate, may not be the correct course of action. An example of such a scenario involves policies relating to the allocation of number resources from the number resource registry collection to the RIRs. In such a case, where the ICANN Board rejects the policy, it is not clear how regional decisions can alter the global policies that apply to the management of the number resource registry collection. The RIRs would anticipate that such an eventuality be properly addressed in terms of a joint agreement to resolve the matter by a mutually agreeable means, such as, for example, independent arbitration of the dispute. The ICANN Board would also have the right to request that the Address Council initiate a policy development process through the RIRs, applying the above procedure. Any such request must include an explanation of the significant viewpoints that call for policy development. (Note: This provision, and the similar provision in step 5 of the procedure described above, are intended to ensure that the ICANN Board acts in these circumstances only with substantial, credible, and defensible support from the community.) RIR Comment 1. It would be entirely appropriate for this to occur on the basis that the substantial, credible and defensible support from the community is documented within the initiated policy development process, and that the ICANN Board make available delegated individuals who can present the ICANN perspective to the open policy meetings of the RIRs. The open policy structure of the RIRs make no restrictions on the entities that can initiate consideration of a policy proposal, and the RIRs acknowledge that ICANN is validly entitled to initiate such a policy development process within the context of the RIR open policy process. In summary, the RIRs have no fundamental disagreement with the policy development process as proposed, but do have some points of difference in terms of detail. The RIRs have noted a number of minor refinements to the ICANN document that would allow the RIRs to consent to such a structure. 2. Operation of the Unallocated Number Resource Pool As a point of correction in section 2 of the discussion draft, the RIRs note that the allocation from the unallocated pool to RIRs may include allocations from the standards-defined unicast IPv4 address pool, the standards-defined unicast IPv6 pool and the non-reserved Autonomous System number pool. In the RIR blueprint document and during negotiations with the ERC, the RIRs have noted that the existing IP address and related number registries have a set of common characteristics that are unique to these registries. We feel that the issue of who operates these registries is not as critical as, and is in fact subsidiary to, the more critical issue of the enduring stability of these number registries (which is discussed below). We therefore reserve our judgement on whether they should necessarily be operated by IANA within the new ICANN structure. Within the context of an RIR application for allocation of a number block it is envisaged that the application would include documentation relating to conformance of the application to current agreed Internet number resource management policies. As the discussion draft notes, there are proposals from the technical and addressing community to manage a segment of the unicast address space for the IPv6 protocol using a sparse allocation policy, and that the RIR consideration of this policy may lead to the proposal of a global management policy for this particular number resource. 3. Management of the Unallocated Number Resource Pool and Consideration of Risk The existence of a stable and accepted global number space that underpins IP is a fundamental component of the global Internet. The use of an unallocated number pool from which allocations can ultimately be made to end users forms an integral part of the resource management control function that is intended to prevent distribution breakdown and various forms of distortion of the distribution function. The RIRs are of the view that disruption to the stable operation of this unallocated number pool will result in disruption and distortions within the number distribution function. Furthermore, any form of distortion in the number space distribution function, including hoarding, seizure, price escalation, duplication, and fragmentation, will have an immediate and lasting negative impact on the utility of the Internet as a communications medium. The RIRs are of the view that number resources play a unique role in the utility of the Internet, and breakdown in the number distribution functions would result in immediate impacts on the stability and well-being of the Internet. The RIRs note the admissions of ICANN in early 2002 concerning the potential for failure of ICANN and note that in any undertaking of this form some element of risk of failure is always present. The RIRs recognize the potential for failure of an RIR, and note ICANN's interest in ensuring the continued stability of the number distribution function in such a scenario. The RIRs offer the view that they share with ICANN a mutual interest in a stable and robust number resource management and operational structure. Furthermore the RIRs appear to share with ICANN a mutual interest in making this structure enduring, such that failure of an RIR or failure of ICANN would not impact on the continued functioning of this number distribution operation. The RIRs do not believe that a 'just in time' failure-triggered mechanism to alter the management of the number resource is appropriate or responsible. The RIRs consider it to be responsible and appropriate to create stable and enduring structures at this point in time, to ensure that the number resource is adequately safeguarded against a broad range of potential disruptive events, and by interference the integrity of the Internet itself is adequately safeguarded. We note that the RIR Blueprint draft with its description of a Number Resource Registry was an illustration of one possible means of addressing these requirements. We would be interested in developing those means, or in suggestions of other structures that have similar properties of stability and robustness, and that also express the mutual interests of ICANN and the RIRs in the appropriate and responsible management of this resource. The RIRs wish to include consideration of this matter within the agenda of discussions with ICANN on Evolution and Reform and do not believe that it is appropriate to defer consideration of this matter to a later date. Obviously we would welcome the opportunity to further discuss these matters, either by a continuing exchange of notes, or by meetings. Regards, The Boards of APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE NCC The CEO / Directors of APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE NCC Distribution: ICANN board, RIR boards, Reform committee